| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA | Not Restricted | |
AT MELBOURNE
PRACTICE COURT
No. 1602 of 2009
IN THE MATTER of a Bail Application
| JOSEPH MARIJANCEVIC | Applicant |
| V | |
| DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS | Respondent |
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JUDGE: | KAYE J | |
WHERE HELD: | Melbourne | |
DATE OF HEARING: | 6 November 2009 | |
DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 6 November 2009 | |
CASE MAY BE CITED AS: | Marijancevic v DPP | |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2009] VSC 511 | |
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CRIMINAL LAW – Bail s 74(2) of Bail Act 1977 – Exceptional circumstances – Applicant intending to defend himself at committal and at trial – Delay.
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APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Applicant | In Person | |
| For the Respondent | Mr M.H. Tinney SC | Solicitor to Office of Public Prosecutions |
HIS HONOUR:
On 25 June 2009, the applicant, Joseph Marijancevic, was charged with conspiring with Mark Adams and Paul Glushak to traffic methylamphetamine in a quantity not less than a commercial quantity, with trafficking a drug of dependence, namely methylamphetamine, and with possessing articles, materials and substances with the intention of trafficking in a drug of dependence. Each of the offences are alleged to have occurred between 5 August and 31 August 2008.
The applicant is currently in custody in the Metropolitan Remand Centre.
On 20 July 2009, the applicant made an application in the Magistrates’ Court at Melbourne for bail. On 16 July that application was refused. Subsequently, at a committal mention hearing on 17 September 2009, he made a further unsuccessful application for bail.
The committal proceeding in respect to the applicant and his co‑accused is due to commence on 23 November next.
The applicant now applies to this court for bail.
The prosecution case against the applicant is set out in some detail in the summary prepared by the informant which is an exhibit to the affidavit in opposition to this application. What I say in the following summary of the case is derived from that document.
The offences are alleged to have occurred at a property at 135 Elliotts Road, Broadford. On 6 July 2008 Nola Preece, the ex partner of the applicant, entered into a contract to purchase that property. The Crown alleges that the applicant, Adams, and Preece had each inspected the property before its purchase and were each involved in negotiations with the estate agent for its purpose. As part of the contract of sale they negotiated a licence agreement with the vendors which permitted them the rent‑free use of a cottage and shearing shed on the property during the 90 day settlement period.
The Crown alleges that the applicant paid the $1,000 cash deposit for the property. It alleges that on 8 July 2008, the applicant and Preece attended the offices of the vendor’s agent and signed the lease agreement and, at the same time, the applicant paid the balance of the deposit, namely $60,500, with a bank cheque.
Subsequently on 16 July 2008 Adams and Glushak were each observed at the cottage and at the shed on the property. An 5 August 2008, investigators covertly executed a…
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- Case
- [2009] VSC 511
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered that the concept of "exceptional circumstances" in the Bail Act is not strictly defined and requires a holistic assessment of the specific facts and circumstances of each case. In this instance, the court weighed the applicant's right to a fair trial against the potential risks to the community and the integrity of the judicial process. The court found that the delay in the applicant's decision to defend himself without representation, along with the advanced stage of the proceedings, did not amount to exceptional circumstances. The court emphasised that the applicant's right to self-representation must be balanced against the need for an expeditious trial and the potential prejudice to the prosecution's case due to the delay.
As a result, the court denied the application for bail. The court concluded that the delay and the late decision to represent himself without legal counsel did not meet the threshold for exceptional circumstances under the Bail Act. The applicant's intention to defend himself, while a personal choice, did not override the public interest considerations and the need for the judicial process to proceed without undue delay. The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the lower court to refuse bail to the applicant.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
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Ratio Decidendi