Maree Liddell v The Crown in right of the State of New South Wales, acting through the Secretary, Department of Education t/a NSW Department of Education Georgina Harrison, Yvette Cachia, Caszandra Fitzgerald,
[2023] FWCFB 61
•17 MARCH 2023
| [2023] FWCFB 61 |
| FAIR WORK COMMISSION |
| DECISION |
Fair Work Act 2009
s.604—Appeal of decision
Maree Liddell
v
The Crown in right of the State of New South Wales, acting through the Secretary, Department of Education t/a NSW Department of Education Georgina Harrison, Yvette Cachia, Caszandra Fitzgerald, Sarah Mitchell, Bradley Hazzard and Kerry Chant
(C2023/152)
| DEPUTY PRESIDENT CLANCY | MELBOURNE, 17 MARCH 2023 |
Appeal against decision [2022] FWC 3301 of Commissioner McKinnon at Sydney on 22 December 2022 in matter number SO2022/276 – permission to appeal refused.
Background
Maree Liddell (the Appellant) has lodged an appeal under s.604 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (the Act) against a decision[1] (the Decision) of Commissioner McKinnon issued on 22 December 2022, for which permission to appeal is required. The Decision concerned an application made pursuant to s.789FC of the Act by the Appellant for orders to stop bullying whilst at work as a primary school music teacher for the Department of Education (NSW) (the Respondent). The Commissioner dismissed the application finding that the Commission did not have jurisdiction to deal with the application.
In the Form F7 – Notice of Appeal (Form F7) dated 11 January 2023, the Appellant indicated a preference to receive communications via email. A personal email address was provided but a request was also made that all correspondence “be sent through my appointed representative.” The email address for the “appointed representative” was also outlined in the Form F7.
On 17 January 2023, Directions were made for the filing of material by the Appellant and a Notice of Listing detailing that the appeal was to be heard on 7 February 2023 was issued. Both the Directions and the Notice of Listing were sent on 17 January 2023 via email to the nominated email address of both the Appellant and the “appointed representative”. The Directions required the Appellant to file an outline of submissions addressing permission to appeal by no later than 5.00pm on Friday 27 January 2023.
On Friday 27 January 2023, the Respondent filed written submissions regarding permission to appeal and seeking permission to be legally represented at the hearing in accordance with s.596 of the Act. No material was filed by the Appellant in response to the Directions. Accordingly, on Monday 30 January 2023, an email from the Chambers of Deputy President Clancy was sent to the nominated email address of both the Appellant and the “appointed representative” noting that the Appellant’s submissions had been due on the previous Friday but had not been received. A copy of the 17 January 2023 Directions was again provided and the Appellant was requested to indicate when the Commission could expect to receive the submissions.
On Wednesday 1 February 2023, a response was emailed to the Deputy President’s Chambers from the Appellant who evidently used a new email address. The response was as follows:
“To whom it concerns,
For the following reasons I cannot continue with my proposal to appeal at this point in time:
· Having family issues to attend to are my number one priority
· The NSW DET have recently shut down my staff portal where all my communication for the case was stored
· The amount of expertise that the FWC requires to put together this proposal to appeal
· The amount of time required to put together this proposal to appeal to the FWC
· The amount of work that the FWC requires to put together this proposal to appeal
· The amount of anxiety already created by the initial Work Place Violence against me
· The amount of anxiety created by the inequitable process; the FWC allowing solicitors (experts) to do all the work for the respondent with infinite resources, et al.
· The FWC process is not fair and equitable
· The bias of the FWC is built in as a government department
For these reasons I have to postpone pursuing a fair and equitable outcome until the system changes.”
A reply email was sent from the Deputy President’s Chambers on 1 February 2023 to both this new email address and the nominated address of the “appointed representative” and outlined:
“Dear Ms Liddell,
I refer to the above matter and your email below.
Please clarify whether or not you wish to withdraw your appeal application. Should you wish to withdraw your application, please advise by reply email as soon as possible.
If you wish to continue with your application, please be advised the Hearing before the Full Bench will proceed as scheduled on Tuesday, 7 February 2022 at 3.00pm AEDT.”
There was no response to this email and the appeal was subsequently called on for hearing at the previously notified listing time of 3.00pm on Tuesday 7 February 2023 in relation to the question of permission to appeal only.
As there was no appearance for the Appellant, a telephone call was made from the Chambers of Deputy President Clancy to the Appellant. A file note of the ensuing conversation with the Appellant at 3.17pm outlines:
“Telephoned Appellant Ms Maree Liddell, advised her the Full Bench Hearing was to commence now at 3pm, she advised she was in a meeting and could not take a call from the Full Bench. Ms Liddell stated she had sent an email to Chambers advising of her unavailability to which I replied Chambers had sent an email in response stating the hearing would proceed as scheduled and asking Ms Liddell to clarify whether she had discontinued the matter. I reiterated the Full Bench Hearing was to proceed now. Ms Liddell asked how the Hearing could take place when she is unavailable, she said this was “intimidation” and ended the call.”
The Full Bench was satisfied that the Appellant had been on notice that the hearing would be proceeding at 3.00pm on 7 February 2023 and determined that the application for permission to appeal would be considered on the papers, with a decision in writing to follow.
Shortly after the Full Bench had reserved and adjourned, the Appellant contacted the Chambers of Deputy President by telephone. The file note made of the conversation records:
“Appellant Ms Liddell telephoned seeking an adjournment to give her attorney time to prepare, I advised the Full Bench has reserved its decision but if she wished she would need to send the adjournment request in writing to Chambers via email. Ms Liddell advised her email account with the Respondent had been shut down and advised she will send call and confirm the email address details of her representative in the next week. I confirmed the Chambers number was [details provided]”
On 28 February 2023, the Appellant sent an email to the Chambers of Deputy President Clancy, which again stated she could not continue with the appeal “at this point in time.” The Appellant outlined the same reasons as previously proffered on 1 February 2023 and added that her “Attorney in Fact” was away on personal business, which had been further extended, and would not be available until the end of July 2023. The Appellant advised that she had to postpone pursuing a fair and equitable outcome until her “Attorney in Fact” was available.
This correspondence has not altered our view. We are satisfied the Appellant received the Directions and Notice of Listing on 17 January 2023. We are also satisfied that the Appellant was notified on 1 February 2023 that the hearing would proceed on 7 February 2023. We are not persuaded the Appellant had an acceptable reason for not attending the hearing on 7 February 2023. The Commission has had no contact from the Appellant’s “appointed representative” and/or “Attorney in Fact”. In all the circumstances, we have not been persuaded to depart from the course of action we outlined at the hearing on 7 February 2023 and will determine the application for permission to appeal based on the material before the Commission.
Decision Under Appeal
The Commissioner outlined that the Appellant was employed by the Respondent as a primary school teacher to teach music at Bodalla Public School and that the alleged bullying at work occurred while the Appellant was at work in the Teaching Service of New South Wales. The Commissioner referenced and outlined s.789FD of the Act, which deals with when a worker is bullied at work and observed that a worker is bullied at work if, while they are at work in a constitutionally-covered business, one or more individuals repeatedly behave unreasonably toward them and the behaviour creates a risk to health and safety. The Commissioner discerned that whether the Respondent was a “constitutionally covered business” for the purposes of s.789D(3) of the Act required determination.
The Commissioner proceeded to make the following findings:
a)The Respondent is a “Department of the Public Service” listed in Part 1 of Schedule 1 to the Government Sector Employment Act 2013 (NSW) and the Appellant’s employment was governed by the Teaching Service Act 1980 (NSW) (Teaching Act);
b)Under s.44 of the Teaching Act, a person other than the Secretary of a Department who is employed in the Teaching Service is taken to be employed by the Government of New South Wales in the service of the Crown;
c)The business or undertaking of the Respondent is conducted principally in New South Wales, which is neither a Territory nor a Commonwealth place for the purposes of s.789FD(3)(b);
d)The Respondent is not a body corporate incorporated in a Territory (per s.789FD(3)(a)(iv)) and it is not a Commonwealth authority (per s.789FD(3)(a)(iii));
e)The New South Wales Government is not the Commonwealth (including for the purposes of s.789FD(3)(a)(ii));
f)The Respondent is not a constitutional corporation; and
g)A State is not a corporation.
The Commissioner concluded as follows:
a)The application related to the work of the Appellant within the Teaching Service of New South Wales, while she was taken to be employed by the Government of New South Wales in the service of the Crown.
b)The Government of New South Wales is not a constitutionally-covered business for the purposes of s.789FD(3) of the Act, and nor is the Respondent.
c)Part 6-4B of the Act does not apply to the Appellant in relation to her employment within the Teaching Service of New South Wales.
d)The Commission does not have jurisdiction to deal with the application.
Grounds of Appeal and Submissions
It is not possible to fairly summarise the grounds of appeal contained in the Appellant’s Form F7. They are set out in full in the attachment to this decision. Safe to say, the Appellant contends in the Form F7 that she was bullied within the meaning of s.789 of the Act and is appealing the decision because it “is blocking a fair and equitable outcome”.
The Appellant contended in her F7 that the grant of permission to appeal was in the public interest because:
“The truth of the existence of ‘Covid-19’ has been challenged around the globe and the truth surrounding many aspects of it”; and
“If ‘Covid-19’ is even transmissible. This has been challenged around the world”; and
“The lawfulness of the ‘Covid-19’ mandate has been challenged by countless countries and members of the public within the Australia and within each states [sic] of Australia”; and
“The proof that ‘Covid-19’ was in fact a ‘Pandemic’ has been challenged in countless countries”; and
“The undeniable concern about the ‘Covid-19’vaccines safety which has been challenged by numerous members of the public within the ‘State’ of ‘Victoria’ around Australia and the globe”; and
“The uncountable number of stories regarding the adverse reactions of the ‘Covid-19’ vaccines. These have been questioned and shown to be dangerous by many of the world’s leading scientist’s, doctors, specialists and has been challenged by numerous members of the public within the ‘State’ of ‘NSW’ and around the globe”; and
The lawful standing of the workplace violence, intimidation and blackmail used on employees based on the ‘Covid-19’ mandate versus the unalienable rights of the living man has been challenged by numerous members of the public around the world and within the wider community of ‘Australia.’”
Principles on Appeal
An appeal under s.604 of the FW Act is an appeal by way of rehearing. The Commission’s powers on appeal are only exercisable if there is error on the part of the primary decision maker.[2] There is no right to appeal and an appeal may only be made with the permission of the Commission. Subsection 604(2) requires the Commission to grant permission to appeal if satisfied that it is ‘in the public interest to do so.’ Permission to appeal may otherwise be granted on discretionary grounds.
Consideration
The Appellant’s grounds of appeal do not contain any reasonably arguable contention of appealable error. Her grounds for the grant of permission to appeal in the public interest raise matters which bear no relationship to the subject matter of the Decision. The majority of the Appellant’s grounds of appeal are misconceived and have no basis in law. Nonetheless, we will briefly address each of the Appellant’s grounds of appeal for completeness.
Ground 1 takes issue with the Commissioner creating a personage and addressing the Decision in the name of “a Fiction”, thereby dismissing her rights. We find that this ground of appeal is misconceived because in paragraph [1] of the Decision, the Commissioner recorded that the Appellant goes by the name of “living woman ‘Maree Dorothy Anne’ of the Family ‘Liddell’.” Regardless, ground 1 discloses no reasonably arguable case of error.
Ground 2 is, in essence, a challenge to the Commissioner’s finding that the Appellant was employed by the Department of Education (NSW). In her submissions relating to ground 2, the Appellant disputes:
· that she was a member of the Teaching Service of New South Wales;
· that the Teaching Act applies to her; and
· the existence of the Crown.
We observe that the Appellant alleged in her Form F72 – Application for an order to stop bullying “As a casual worker I was offered ongoing work as a teacher for 2021 from July and into 2022 at ‘Bodalla PS’ one day a week as the Music Performance teacher”. While the Appellant accepts she was employed as a teacher in a school, she maintains her employment was not pursuant to a contract with the Respondent. We also note that the Appellant also disputes any notion that she was employed by the party she had named as the Respondent (“NSW Government/Education”) but has not identified a constitutionally-covered business that employed or engaged her. Noting that there is no dispute that the Appellant was a casual worker at Bodella Primary School and having regard to the submissions made by the Respondent at first instance on the issue of her employer, we consider the finding of the Commissioner regarding the employer of the Appellant was reasonably open to her and moreover, we agree with it.
As to ground 3, we reject the apparent assertion that the operation of s.44 of the Teaching Act produced a fraudulent outcome in the Appellant’s case. We have reviewed the analysis and findings at paragraph [5] of the Decision and consider the Commissioner’s conclusions were reasonably open to her and find no error in her finding or approach.
Ground 4 asserts Commissioner’s observation regarding the decision of the High Court in Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing and Allied Services Union of Australia & Ors v Queensland Rail & Anor (Queensland Rail)[3] is erroneous. The Commissioner had observed that Queensland Rail is not authority for the Appellant’s proposition that “if you have an ABN and provide services for money, you are a “Trading Company”. We agree, noting that the High Court’s finding does not give rise to a decision rule and the finding that Queensland Rail was a trading corporation was based on the facts and circumstances of that case. We are satisfied the Commissioner’s finding that the State of New South Wales is not a constitutional corporation was reasonably open to her and we agree with it.
Ground 5 ascends no higher than an assertion that paragraphs [8] and [9] of the Decision are ambiguous but discloses no reasonably arguable case of error.
Ground 6 likewise discloses no reasonably arguable case of error. In paragraph [8] of the Decision, the Commissioner referenced the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act and in paragraph [9], the Commissioner described the manner in which a ‘State’ is defined and is distinguishable from a constitutional corporation.
Ground 7 alleges error in allowing the Respondent to be legally represented at first instance. In circumstances in which the Commissioner determined the dispute as to jurisdiction ‘on the papers’ without a hearing and Rule 12(1)(b) of the Fair Work Commission Rules 2013 applied, we consider this ground has no substance.
There is an obvious inconsistency associated with Ground 8, which comprises the assertion that the Appellant is not a person and as such, the Teaching Act does not apply to her. This is because in order to be eligible to make application to the Commission for an order to stop bullying at work, an applicant must be a ‘worker’ and pursuant to s.789FC(2) of the Act and s.7(1) of the Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (Cth), a ‘worker’ is defined as follows:
“A person is a workerif the person carries out work in any capacity for a person conducting a business or undertaking, including work as:
(a) an employee; or
(b) a contractor or subcontractor; or
(c) an employee of a contractor or subcontractor; or
(d) an employee of a labour hire company who has been assigned to work in the person’s business or undertaking; or
(e) an outworker; or
(f) an apprentice or trainee; or
(g) a student gaining work experience; or
(h) a volunteer; or
(i) a person of a prescribed class.”
(our emphasis)
Ground 9 alleges bias on the part of the Commissioner on the basis of a number of observations the Commissioner made in paragraph [12] of the Decision. That the Commissioner’s observations are contrary to the Appellant’s contentions does not constitute bias. The Appellant also charges the Commissioner with diminishing her “Statement of Declaration of Truth Affidavit.” This is a 28-page document, but its contents do not bear upon the question of jurisdiction the Commissioner was required to decide. Ground 9 is rejected.
In grounds 10, 11 and 12, the Appellant complains that the Commissioner dismissed her “Statement of Declaration of Truth Affidavit”. As outlined above, we do not consider this document bears upon the question of jurisdiction the Commissioner was required to decide. Additionally, grounds 11 and 12 take issue with the Commissioner, namely that she “only viewed the matter from her own ‘legal’ perspective” and that she is “not a judge”. These contentions are misconceived and have no substance. We therefore dismiss grounds 10,11 and 12.
Ground 13 also alleges bias and is a complaint that the Commissioner did not require the Respondent to produce material at the request of the Appellant, such that the Commissioner determined the merits of the application “without all the facts being presented.” However, material going to the merits of the application was not relevant to the question of jurisdiction and would not have impacted the determination the Commissioner was required to make. We dismiss this ground of appeal.
The Appellant’s contentions as to why her appeal is in the public interest challenge the very existence of COVID-19, its transmissibility, whether there was in fact a pandemic, the efficacy of COVID-19 vaccinations and the validity of COVID-19 mandates. In doing so, the Appellant has fundamentally misunderstood the public interest criterion. We are satisfied the Decision does not raise any question of law or general principle requiring consideration at the appellate level.
Conclusion
We do not consider that any reasonably arguable case has been advanced that the Decision of the Commissioner was attended by appealable error and we are not persuaded that the grant of permission to appeal would be in the public interest, or that permission is otherwise justified on discretionary grounds. It is apparent that the Commissioner considered all the matters required to be considered under s.789FD of the Act and made findings that were reasonably open to her to make. Furthermore, we wholly agree with the Decision. Permission to appeal is refused.
DEPUTY PRESIDENT
Appearances:
No appearance for the Appellant.
Ms Huang, for the Respondent.
Hearing details:
2023.
Microsoft Teams (Video).
7 February.
Attachment A
Despite the application being made by the living woman ‘Maree Dorothy Anne’, as named in the F72 application, the Fair Work Commission (FWC) made an error and created personage addressing the final “Decision” in the name of a Fiction “Maree Liddell” thus dismissing the rights of the living woman, and
The “Commissioner” has made a “Decision” without the evidence requested by the Applicant from the Respondent being produced and without addressing to the many points (from 1-47 of the Applicant’s “Final Submission”) which remain in dispute. Those in most contention being the following but not limited to:
i) The Respondent had not provided any connection between the living woman and the fiction that was created when requested, and
ii) There is no signed evidence produced that the living woman agreed to any contract between the fictional entities: the fictional entity created by the Respondent “Maree Liddell” and the fictional entities that the Respondent goes by, “NSW Government/Education”, ABN 40 300 173 822,, and
iii) The Respondent continues to rely on an “approval to teach letter” as the basis for a legal contract with the Applicant, however;
a) an approval to teach is not a contract to teach, and
b) this still does not prove a connection between the living woman and the fiction, and
iv) The “Applicant” did not enter into a formal written contract, but only received an “approval to teach letter” and there is no legislation provided that indicates that an “approval to teach letter” is a legal and binding contract for a living woman, and
v) The Respondent stated that the “approval to teach letter” is a “custom”, however, a “custom” is not a legal nor binding document, and is not lawfully binding. There was no evidence provided by the Respondent that an “approval to teach letter” is lawful, and/or that an “approval to teach letter” can operate in place of a contract and be binding for those who are working as a teacher, and
vi) Without defining the term “custom”, the Respondent is implying that a “custom” takes precedence over what is legal, and what is lawful stating; “approval to teach letters” are in accordance with “custom and practice”, and there is no evidence provided that the applicant was employed by the Respondent. The only evidence adduced is the payslip from “NSW Government/Education”, ABN 40 300 173 822, to the fictitious entity, and
vii) There was no evidence provided that the Applicant is a member of the “Teaching Service” and no proof that the “TS Act” is relevant to, or was mentioned as part of, the verbal contract between the living woman ‘Caszandra Fitzgerald’ and the living woman ‘Maree Dorothy Anne’, of the family “Liddell”.
However, the “Commissioner” assumes that the Applicant is under the employment of the Teaching Service. This is in dispute as there is no documented evidence only hearsay, and
viii) The Respondent relies on the mere claim that the “NSW Government/Education”, (ABN 40 300 173 822), is in service of the Crown despite the evidence that the “Crown” has been removed from our constitution (Australia Act 1986 – See Appendix A) and has produced no evidence when requested to show that the crown does exist in fact, and
ix) There is no evidence of the Crown provided in any of the entities that the Respondent claims:
·“NSW Department of Education”
·“NSW Government Education”
·the “Teaching Service of New South Wales”
except for the unfounded claim where it states it is the “Government of New South Wales in the service of the Crown”, and
x) There has been no evidence to validate the entity of the “Crown” after being requested for the documentation to prove that there is any evidence of the Respondent as being “in service of the Crown”, and
xi) The Commissioner ignored the request for the Respondent to provide any written evidence of;
a) its relationship to the “Crown”, nor
b) as to how it does work “in service of the Crown”, nor
c) how the Respondent swears oath to the “Crown” otherwise, and
xii) There is no documentation to show that the Applicant was in fact employed by the Teaching Services, and
With reference to point [5] of the “Decision” the following is in question:
i) the Respondent is not defined.
ii) The said contract, that point [5] of the “Decision” outlines, is not the contract that the living woman ‘Maree Dorothy Anne’ of the family “Liddell’, contracted to and due to the fact there was not full disclosure that the contract was then created between the fiction “Maree Liddell” and the entities that the Respondent claims; without documentation to show otherwise the contract created was fraud, and
With reference to point [7] of the “Decision”
i) the “Commissioner” states the decision of the High Court of Australia in Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing and Allied [2022] FWC 3301 3 Services Union of Australia & Ors v Queensland Rail & Anor [2015] HCA 11 is not authority for the proposition that the simple holding of an ABN”. However, this is not a proposition it has been set as a Precedent. In fact, A Binding Precedent:
precedent is ‘binding’ on a court if the precedent was made by a superior court that is higher in the hierarchy of courts. A binding precedent must be followed if the precedent is relevant and the circumstances of the cases are sufficiently similar. For example, decisions of the High Court are binding on all courts in Australia, but a decision of the Supreme Court is not binding on the High Court, and a decision of the District Court is not binding on the Supreme Court, and
ii). No evidence has been provided to show that this HC decision is not binding, and
iii). There has been no proof that the circumstances of the High Court decision (of Australia in Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing and Allied [2022] FWC 3301 3 Services Union of Australia & Ors v Queensland Rail & Anor [2015]) is not similar, and
5. With reference to points [8] and [9] of the “Commissioner’s” “Decision” is ambiguous and needs clarification in terms of their relevance to the final ruling, and
6. It was not clarified which Constitution the Commissioner is referring to: the “1901 Australian Constitution” or the “Australia Act 1986” which was not supported by the referendum of the people. It also doesn’t show how the “Crown” gets exemption.
This evidence that the “Crown” was removed from our Constitution was provided by the Applicant in her proposal and the existence of the “Crown” in the Respondent’s Service to, remains in dispute, and
7. “Commissioner” “Sarah McKinnon” permitted the Respondent to be represented by “lawyers”, before the “Applicant” was given the right to challenge, and/or
8. The Applicant has provided her unrebutted “Declaration of Truth Affidavit document” which shows she is not a person. The Teaching Service Act is in regard to persons only:
9. In reference to point [12] of the “Decision”, the “Commissioner Sarah McKinnon” shows a bias on three counts with three blanket statements:
i) by stating that “it was not necessary to determine the various contentions of the Applicant as to her different status at law to that of an ordinary citizen of Australia.” This statement shows no factual evidence it is a blanket statement and an opinion the “Commissioner” holds, and
ii) by stating “the notion her employment in the Teaching Service somehow came to be through an individual contract with another employee of the Respondent who was also employed in the Teaching Service”.
(N.B. The Respondent had not provided the documents requested by the Applicant regarding the Teaching Service, however, the “Commissioner” showed a bias by not calling for the evidence requested and again showing an opinion not based on evidence)
([20] from the Applicant’s final submission).
There is no evidence provided that the Applicant is a member of the “Teaching Service” and no proof that the “TS Act” is relevant to, or was mentioned as part of, the verbal contract between the living woman ‘Caszandra Fitzgerald’ and the living woman ‘Maree Dorothy Anne’, of the family “Liddell”, and
iii) by stating “On the one hand, the Applicant seeks the benefit of Australian laws by way of orders to stop bullying at work, on the basis that the Respondent “needs to be held accountable for its workplace violence to me, as an employee. On the other, the Applicant submits that she is not subject to any laws to which she does not consent while simultaneously seeking the imposition of those laws upon others. Apart from the unsound premises upon which they rely, the positions are fundamentally inconsistent.”
Here the “Commissioner” again shows a bias diminishing the Applicant’s “Declaration of Truth Affidavit” which is a lawful, legal document and the “Commissioner” treats it with disrespect in her view of the Applicant’s status in law. Without reason and without proof, and
10. It is unclear in point [12] what the “Commissioner” is ruling on when she states “I would reject the contention”. If she is referring to the “Applicant’s” “Statement of Declaration of Truth Affidavit”, the “Commissioner” gives no reason as to why the Affidavit was not valid in law, and/or what evidence she relies on to dismiss and demean its legal standing.
11.”Commissioner Sarah McKinnon” is not a judge, and has no authority to determine the nature of what is “legal” and what is not “legal”. However, the “Commissioner” dismisses the “Applicant’s” “Declaration of Truth Affidavit”, despite it satisfying the legal definition of an affidavit, that being: “a written declaration made under oath; a written statement sworn to be true before someone legally authorized to administer an oath”, and/or
12. “Commissioner” Sarah McKinnon dismissed the Declaration of Truth Affidavit, a lawful and legal document, by not addressing in submissions, only viewing the matter from her own “legal” perspective, and/or
13. The shown bias by the “Commissioner” shows that the workplace violence and bullying were only taken into account from the perspective of the perpetrator (Respondent) and not the victim (Applicant) as not one of the pieces of evidence requested by the “Applicant” were supplied by the Respondent. The “Commissioner has made her decision without all the facts being presented, and
22. The conclusions of the “Applicant’s Final Proposal remain unaddressed.”
[1] [2022] FWC 3301 (‘the Decision’).
[2] Coal and Allied Operations Pty Ltd v AIRC (2000) 203 CLR 194 at [17] per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron and Hayne JJ.
[3] [2015] HCA 11.
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