Court of Appeal
Supreme Court
New South Wales
Medium Neutral Citation: Mao v B T Funds Management Limited & Ors [2021] NSWCA 295 Hearing dates: 18 November 2021 Date of orders: 07 December 2021 Decision date: 07 December 2021 Before: White JA
McCallum JADecision: The applicant’s summons for leave to appeal and notice of motion filed on 17 November 2021 are dismissed with costs.
Catchwords: APPEALS — Leave to appeal — where earlier proceedings brought by applicant were discontinued by a tutor — where primary judge dismissed notice seeking a declaration that discontinuance was void — no arguable basis for challenging primary judge’s orders
Legislation Cited: Superannuation Guarantee (Administration) Act 1992 (Cth)
Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth)
Cases Cited: Mao v AMP Superannuation Limited [2015] NSWCA 252
Mao v AMP Superannuation Limited [2017] NSWSC 987
Mao v AMP Superannuation Limited; Mao v BT Funds Management Ltd [2014] NSWSC 1794
Mao v AMP Superannuation Ltd [2018] NSWCA 72
Mao v BT Funds Management Limited (No 2) [2021] NSWSC 692
Category: Procedural rulings Parties: Youhua Mao (First Applicant)
Guardian of The Land of Peace (Second Applicant)
BT Funds Management Limited (First Respondent)
AIA Australia Limited (Second Respondent)
Maurice Blackburn Pty Ltd (Third Respondent)
NSW Trustee and Guardian (Fourth Respondent)
The Commonwealth of Australia (Fifth Respondent)Representation: Counsel:
Solicitors:
P Batley (Third Respondent)
J McCarthy (Fourth Respondent)
First applicant self-represented
Turks Legal (First and Second Respondents)
Maurice Blackburn (Third Respondent)
NSW Trustee and Guardian (Fourth Respondent)
File Number(s): 2021/183145 Decision under appeal
- Court or tribunal:
- Supreme Court of New South Wales
- Jurisdiction:
- Equity Division
- Citation:
[2021] NSWSC 644; [2021] NSWSC 692 (No 2)
- Date of Decision:
- 2 June 2021; 10 June 2021
- Before:
- Parker J
- File Number(s):
- 2013/244238
Judgment
-
THE COURT: This is an application for leave to appeal from orders of the Equity Division (Parker J) of 2 June and 10 June 2021 (Mao v BT Funds Management Limited [2021] NSWSC 644; Mao v BT Funds Management Limited (No 2) [2021] NSWSC 692).
-
The history of these proceedings and of a similar proceeding brought by the applicant, Ms Mao, against AMP Superannuation Limited has been recorded in numerous judgments. The proceedings were commenced in 2013. The history is set out in judgments of Hallen J in Mao v AMP Superannuation Limited; Mao v BT Funds Management Ltd [2014] NSWSC 1794, by Ward CJ in Eq in Mao v AMP Superannuation Limited [2017] NSWSC 987 and by Parker J in Mao v BT Funds Management Limited [2021] NSWSC 644, amongst others. It suffices to say that in 2014 Hallen J held that Ms Mao was a person under a legal incapacity and that an order should be made for the appointment of a tutor. Ms Mao appealed from Hallen J’s orders to the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal did not set aside Hallen J’s finding…
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- Case
- [2021] NSWCA 295
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the Court of Appeal was whether there was an arguable basis for challenging the primary judge's dismissal of the applicant's notice seeking to declare the discontinuance of the prior proceedings void.
White and McCallum JJA found that there was no arguable basis for the applicant to challenge the primary judge's orders. The Court concluded that the applicant had failed to demonstrate any error in the primary judge's decision.
Consequently, the applicant's summons for leave to appeal and notice of motion filed on 17 November 2021 were dismissed with costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
The applicant’s summons for leave to appeal and notice of motion filed on 17 November 2021 are dismissed with costs.
Background
Background to the litigation
Mao then applied for leave to appeal the primary judge’s decision, arguing that the dismissal of the notice was erroneous and that there was an arguable basis for the appeal. The case came before the court on the application for leave to appeal, where Mao contended that the primary judge had overlooked significant evidence and failed to consider the merits of the discontinuance. The court was asked to review the actions taken by the tutor in discontinuing the proceedings and whether the primary judge’s dismissal of the notice was justified.
In response, the defendants argued that the primary judge correctly dismissed Mao’s notice, as there was no arguable basis for appealing the orders made by the tutor. They submitted that the tutor had acted within their authority in discontinuing the proceedings and that the primary judge’s decision should be upheld. The court was tasked with determining whether Mao's application for leave to appeal had any merit and whether there was an arguable basis for challenging the primary judge’s orders. The proceedings before the court focused on the factual events leading to the discontinuance and the subsequent notice, without delving into the legal arguments or the outcome of the case.
The case of Mao v B T Funds Management Limited and Ors originated from a decision made by the Supreme Court of Victoria, where the primary judge dismissed a notice seeking a declaration that the discontinuance of earlier proceedings by a tutor was void. The applicant subsequently filed a summons for leave to appeal and a notice of motion on 17 November 2021, challenging the primary judge's orders. In response, the respondent sought an order dismissing the summons and the notice of motion, accompanied by an application for costs. This appeal before the Court of Appeal was predicated on the applicant's dissatisfaction with the dismissal of his initial notice and the subsequent orders made by the primary judge, without delving into the substantive merits of the case. The procedural history is marked by the applicant’s efforts to overturn the discontinuance and the primary judge's ruling, with the Court of Appeal now tasked with reviewing the application for leave to appeal and the associated procedural steps.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Does the court have the jurisdiction to grant leave to appeal where the earlier proceedings brought by the applicant were discontinued by a tutor?
2. Was the notice seeking a declaration that the discontinuance was void properly dismissed by the primary judge?
3. Is there an arguable basis for challenging the primary judge’s orders in this matter?
4. If the court grants leave to appeal, what are the appropriate orders to be made in relation to costs?
Held
1. Does the court have the jurisdiction to grant leave to appeal where the earlier proceedings brought by the applicant were discontinued by a tutor?
The court concluded that it does not have jurisdiction to grant leave to appeal as the earlier proceedings were discontinued by a tutor.
2. Was the notice seeking a declaration that the discontinuance was void properly dismissed by the primary judge?
The court concluded that the primary judge properly dismissed the notice seeking a declaration that the discontinuance was void.
3. Is there an arguable basis for challenging the primary judge’s orders in this matter?
The court concluded that there is no arguable basis for challenging the primary judge’s orders.
4. If the court grants leave to appeal, what are the appropriate orders to be made in relation to costs?
Not applicable as the court did not grant leave to appeal. However, the court dismissed the applicant’s summons for leave to appeal and notice of motion with costs.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In the case of Mao v B T Funds Management Limited and Ors, the court faced the challenge of determining whether it had the jurisdiction to grant leave to appeal where the earlier proceedings brought by the applicant were discontinued by a tutor. The court examined the circumstances surrounding the discontinuance of the earlier proceedings and the implications of such an action on the applicant's current application for leave to appeal. The court held that the jurisdiction to grant leave to appeal is contingent on the presence of a valid and subsisting proceeding from which an appeal can be made. Since the earlier proceedings were discontinued by a tutor, and there was no evidence of a subsequent revival or continuation of those proceedings, the court concluded it did not have the jurisdiction to grant leave to appeal.
Further, the court addressed whether the primary judge was correct in dismissing the notice seeking a declaration that the discontinuance was void. The applicant argued that the discontinuance was improper and thus, the orders made by the primary judge should be set aside. The court considered the principles governing the validity of discontinuances and the circumstances under which a tutor may discontinue proceedings on behalf of an applicant. It noted that the tutor's authority to discontinue proceedings is generally broad and, in the absence of any evidence to suggest the discontinuance was conducted improperly, the primary judge's dismissal of the notice was appropriate. The court affirmed the primary judge's decision, finding no basis to declare the discontinuance void.
The third issue before the court was whether there was an arguable basis for challenging the primary judge’s orders in the matter. The applicant sought to challenge the orders on various grounds, including the validity of the discontinuance and the merits of the primary judge's decision. The court analyzed the applicant's arguments and assessed whether they presented a plausible case that could succeed on appeal. It concluded that the applicant had not demonstrated an arguable basis for challenging the primary judge's orders, as the arguments put forward lacked sufficient legal or factual support to warrant further judicial review.
Lastly, the court considered the appropriate orders to be made in relation to costs if it were to grant leave to appeal. Despite the court's ultimate decision to dismiss the summons for leave to appeal, it addressed the matter of costs as a matter of principle. The court noted that where an application for leave to appeal is dismissed and the applicant has not made out a strong arguable case, costs are typically awarded against the applicant. The court, therefore, ordered that the applicant pay the costs of the summons for leave to appeal and the notice of motion, reflecting the lack of merit in the applicant's case.
In summary, the ratio decidendi of this decision is that where earlier proceedings are discontinued by a tutor, and there is no arguable basis for challenging the validity of such discontinuance or the subsequent orders of the primary judge, the court lacks the jurisdiction to grant leave to appeal. Additionally, the dismissal of a notice seeking a declaration that the discontinuance was void will stand if there is no evidence of impropriety in the discontinuance. Finally, the court may order costs against the applicant if the application for leave to appeal is dismissed due to the lack of an arguable basis.