Mao Fa Chen v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Mao Fa Chen v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs
[2001] FCA 298

MAO FA CHEN  v  THE MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

V 10 of 1999

RYAN J
MELBOURNE
23 MARCH 2001


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V 10 of 1999

BETWEEN:

MAO FA CHEN
Applicant

AND:

THE MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
Respondent

JUDGE:

RYAN J

DATE OF ORDER:

23 MARCH 2001

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.        The application be dismissed

2.The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the application, such costs to be taxed in default of agreement.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V 10 of 1999

BETWEEN:

MAO FA CHEN
Applicant

AND:

THE MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
Respondent

JUDGE:

RYAN J

DATE:

23 MARCH 2001

PLACE:

MELBOURNE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. This is an application for review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) affirming a decision to refuse the applicant a protection visa.

  2. The applicant is a national of the People’s Republic of China (“the PRC”) who claimed that he had left his homeland in 1997 because of the danger of persecution as a result of his political activities in support of the pro-democracy movement.  Those activities consisted of the formation, with four others, in 1994 of a group known as “Free China”.  That organisation conducted some fifty public meetings at which speeches were made in opposition to the ruling Chinese Communist Party (“CCP”).  The group also published leaflets and was concerned in these ways to expose corruption and complain about high taxes.  At its height, according to the applicant, “Free China” had about 100 members.  One of its activities was to arrange for people to hear radio broadcasts such as those by Voice of America (“VOA”).  The effect of the rest of the applicant’s case has been summarised by the  Tribunal in these terms;

    “He claims that the authorities discovered the existence of the group only in 1997 because the Public Security Bureau (PSB) is inefficient and because the group used to monitor the activities of PSB officers so that it could meet without the PSB's knowledge. He added that the group had its own contacts within the PSB who would inform the group members if and when the PSB was disposed to take action against them.

    The applicant said that he obtained false Indonesian documentation on which he left China.

    He claims that the authorities have harassed his family since his departure due to his former involvement in the pro-democracy group.  He also claims that he learned about a month ago that his colleagues who were arrested in 1997 have recently been sentenced to periods of nine to twelve years in prison.”

  3. The Tribunal noted that the applicant had encountered discrimination as a child because his father had been regarded as a Guo Min Dang…

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Details
Case
[2001] FCA 298
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Mao Fa Chen v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, the applicant sought a review of a decision made by the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) to refuse him a protection visa. The primary issue before the court was whether the RRT had properly considered the evidence and made findings on material questions of fact as required by the Migration Act. Specifically, the applicant argued that the RRT failed to reference the evidence upon which it based its findings of implausibility, thereby breaching the statutory obligation under section 430(1) of the Act.

The court addressed whether the RRT had complied with its duty to set out findings on material questions of fact. It considered the applicant's argument that the RRT's failure to refer to specific evidence indicated a breach of the requirement to determine substantive issues based on the material and evidence before it. The court also examined the Full Court's ruling in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Singh, which emphasised that the RRT must make findings on questions of fact that are objectively material to the decision. The court concluded that a fact is material if the decision in the practical circumstances of the particular case turns upon whether that fact exists.

In reaching its decision, the court found that the inconsistency identified by the RRT did not exist based on the evidence presented. The applicant's statement indicated that he learned of the arrests from his father after he had left Fujian, contradicting his earlier claim that he first heard of the arrests by telephone while still in Fujian. Despite the applicant's contentions, the court concluded that the RRT had adequately considered the evidence and made appropriate findings. Consequently, the application for a review of the RRT's decision was dismissed.

The court ordered that the application be dismissed and that the applicant pay the respondent's costs of the application, with costs to be taxed in default of agreement.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed

2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the application, such costs to be taxed in default of agreement.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

It was contended on behalf of the applicant that, in making the findings of implausibility which are set out in par 3 of these reasons, the Tribunal failed, in breach of s 430(1), to refer to the evidence or other material on which those findings were based. Those findings, it was said, were based on assumptions rather than evidence and indicated a failure by the Tribunal to discharge the obligation imputed to it by Merkel J in Paramananthan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998) 160 ALR 24 at 56, as approved by a Full Court of this Court in Thevendram v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 182, to “determine the substantive issues raised by the material and evidence before it.” (original emphasis). In the present case, it was said that “the Tribunal’s failure to refer to evidence upon which the findings concerning the PSB and the applicant were based is a breach relating to the central aspect of the claim.” A five-member Full Court of this Court has subsequently held in Minister forImmigration and Multicultural Affairs v Singh (2000) 98 FCR 469, that the Tribunal is obliged to set out its findings on any material questions of fact. The joint judgment of Black CJ, Sundberg, Katz and Hely JJ continued, at pars 47-48;“Ordinarily, materiality is an objective concept. If the RRT fails to make a finding on a fact which is in truth, as a Court subsequently determines, a material fact, then s 430(1)(c) will not have been complied with, even though the RRT has recorded its findings in relation to the facts before it that it regarded as material.The generally accepted view in this Court has been that the RRT is under a duty to make, and to set out, findings on all matters of fact that are objectively material to the decision it is required to make. It must make findings on questions of fact that are central to the case raised by the material and evidence before it. In this respect, s 430 sets a standard of decision-making the RRT is required to observe.” The Full Court then rejected the suggestion that the material facts referred to in s 430(1)(c) are confined to the facts which the Act requires to be decided, and continued, at par 55;“The reasoning process a Tribunal adopts may require a decision on a question of fact in order to complete the logical chain the Tribunal has adopted as the basis for its decision. Failure by a Tribunal to set out its findings in relation to that fact would involve a contravention of s 430(1)(c), as the process of reasoning adopted by the Tribunal has made that fact a material fact, since the decision is dependent upon it. Conversely an applicant may propose facts as material, but if the ultimate conclusion reached by the Tribunal is not dependent upon and does not require a finding on those facts, then they will not be material questions of fact, because the decision does not turn upon them.” That analysis led to the conclusion at par 57 of the joint judgment that;“A fact is material if the decision in the practical circumstances of the particular case turns upon whether that fact exists.”

Decision

Reasons for decision

RYAN J (dissent)
I entertain considerable doubt whether the inconsistency to which the Tribunal pointed was a “particular fact” within the meaning of s 476(4) of the Act. However, assuming in the applicant’s favour that the inconsistency was a fact of that kind, I am unable to find that it did not exist. At the end of his written statement in support of his application for the protection visa quoted at par 4 above, the applicant said;“On 22 October 1997 my father secretly visited me in Guangzhou. Before we said goodbye each other, my father told me that “Freedom China” had been sealed up. three members were arrested and the rest fled and hid somewhere, some of them in Zhuhai, Shenzhen and they were preparing to flee to overseas. I was very sad to hear the news.”That clearly suggests that the arrest of his three colleagues was “news” to the applicant when it was recounted to him by his father in Guangzhou after the applicant had left Fujian. On the other hand, the transcript of the hearing before the Tribunal records this exchange between Mr Brewer (constituting the Tribunal) and the applicant (through an interpreter);“MR BREWER: How do you know that three people were arrested?THE INTERPRETER: Someone told me by the phone, over the phone.MR BREWER: Someone rang you in Fujian and told you they’d been arrested, did they?THE INTERPRETER: Yes.”That was equally clearly a statement by the applicant that he first heard of the arrests by telephone before he left Fujian so that the arrests would not have been “news” to the applicant if they were later recounted to him by his father in Guangzhou. In the light of the whole of the relevant evidence, I am unable to find, as required by s 476(4)(b), that the inconsistency to which the Tribunal pointed did not exist. Conclusion It will be apparent from the foregoing reasons that each of the contentions which Mr Krohn ably advanced in support of the application for a review of the Tribunal’s refusal of a protection visa has been rejected. Accordingly, the application must be dismissed with costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by:

Full text does not contain this section.