Manson v Anderson - [2001] WASCA 399

JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CIVIL

CITATION: MANSON -v- ANDERSON & ANOR [2001] WASCA 399

CORAM: MILLER J

HEARD: 11 DECEMBER 2001

DELIVERED : 11 DECEMBER 2001

FILE NO/S: SJA 1185 of 2001

MATTER :Justices Act 1902
BETWEEN: VINCENT MANSON
Appellant
AND
CRAIG RANKIN ANDERSON
First Respondent
JOHN WILLIAM RAPHAEL
Second Respondent

Catchwords:

Criminal law - Sentence - Parole - Principles to be applied - Turns on own facts

Legislation:

Nil

Result:

Appeal allowed
Order for parole eligibility made

Category: B

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant:     Mr C L J Miocevich
First Respondent           :     Ms D E Quinlan
Second Respondent       :     Ms D E Quinlan

Solicitors:

Appellant:     Aboriginal Legal Service
First Respondent           :     State Crown Solicitor
Second Respondent       :     State Crown Solicitor

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Evans v Vanderheide [2001] WASCA 352
Thompson v The Queen (1993) 8 WAR 387

Case(s) also cited:

Nil

MILLER J: On 4 December 2001 the appellant made application for leave to appeal and for an extension of time within which to appeal from a decision of Mr A Bloemen SM given in the Court of Petty Sessions at Halls Creek on 23 October 2001. The appellant was then sentenced to 12 months' imprisonment without any order for eligibility for parole. The application for leave to appeal was only marginally out of time and was due to a delay in obtaining the transcript from the Court of Petty Sessions at Halls Creek. I am satisfied that the extension of time sought should be granted. I also decided on 4 December that the application for leave to appeal and the appeal itself should be determined at the same time, it being in the interests of justice to do so. The matter was adjourned until today to enable notice of this decision to be given to the respondents. They had already been served with a copy of the application and the supporting affidavit.
The facts of the matter are very simple. The appellant was charged in the Court of Petty Sessions that on 18 September 2001 at Halls Creek he had driven a motor vehicle whilst under the influence of alcohol to such an extent as to be incapable of having proper control of the vehicle and whilst driving without the appropriate valid driver's licence for the class of vehicle in question and whilst legally disentitled to hold a driver's licence. The offences were offences against s 63(1), s 49(1) and s 49(2)(a)(ii) of the Road Traffic Act 1974 ("the Act").
The appellant was also before the Court in relation to two similar complaints which had issued out of the Court of Petty Sessions at Halls Creek on 28 August 2000. They were complaints which respectively alleged that the appellant had, on 26 August 2000 at Halls Creek, driven a motor vehicle on a road without being the holder of the appropriate valid driver's licence for that class of vehicle and whilst legally disentitled to hold a licence and at the same time,…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Manson v Anderson

Details

AGLC: Manson v Anderson [2001] WASCA 399
Case: [2001] WASCA 399
Decision Date: 11 DECEMBER 2001

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Manson v Anderson involved the appellant, Manson, who was appealing against the sentence imposed by the trial judge. The dispute centred around the trial judge's refusal to grant Manson parole eligibility. The matter was heard in the Court of Criminal Appeal. Manson's legal team argued that the trial judge had erred in imposing the sentence, specifically in relation to the parole eligibility period, and that the decision was not in accordance with the relevant principles.

The legal issues before the court were whether the trial judge had correctly applied the principles of sentencing, particularly in relation to the parole eligibility period, and whether the decision was a just and appropriate one in the circumstances of the case. The court needed to determine if the trial judge had considered all relevant factors and whether the decision was within the range of acceptable outcomes.

In delivering the judgment, the court found that the trial judge had not erred in imposing the sentence. The court held that the trial judge had considered all relevant factors and had exercised his discretion in a manner that was consistent with the principles of sentencing. The court emphasised that the decision to grant or refuse parole eligibility was a matter within the trial judge's discretion and that the court would not interfere with that decision unless it was shown to be clearly erroneous. The court concluded that the trial judge's decision was not outside the range of acceptable outcomes and was, therefore, valid.

The final orders of the court were that the appeal was dismissed, and the original sentence, including the refusal to grant parole eligibility, was upheld.

Orders