Mansfield v Hrysikos - [2000] VSC 474

SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA
COMMON LAW DIVISION	Not Restricted

No.6441 of 2000

DEBRA ELAINE MANSFIELD	Appellant
v
JOHN HRYSIKOS	Respondent

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JUDGE:	Smith J
WHERE HELD:	Melbourne
DATE OF HEARING:	1 November 2000
DATE OF JUDGMENT:	14 November 2000
CASE MAY BE CITED AS:	Debra Elaine Mansfield v John Hrysikos
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:	[2000] VSC 474

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Crime – Road Safety Act 1986 S. 49(1)(e) – refusal to remain – meaning of "other place" and "there".
Evidence – Cross-examination on a prior statement of witness – Obligation to tender

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APPEARANCES:	Counsel	Solicitors
For the Appellant	Mr. P. Billings	Jack Sher & Associates
For the Respondent	Mrs. C. Quinn	Solicitor for D.P.P.

HIS HONOUR:

Background to appeal

On 13 July 2000 at the Magistrates' Court in Melbourne, the appellant Deborah Elaine Mansfield (Mansfield) was charged with breach of

(a)s. 49(1)(e) Road Safety Act 1986 (the Act) in that she was required to remain for the purposes of providing a sample for breath analysis pursuant to s. 55(1) of the Act but refused to do so.
(b)s. 52(1) of the Summary Offences Act 1966 in that she assaulted one Lisa Metcher, member of the police force, in the execution of her duty.

Mansfield pleaded not guilty to the charge brought under s. 49 (1)(e) of the Act. She was convicted and fined $400 together with statutory costs of $55 and all licences and permits held by her under the Act were cancelled and she was disqualified from obtaining any such licence for a period of two years. Mansfield appeals from the order made in respect of that charge. As to the charge under s. 52(1) of the Summary Offences Act 1966, she pleaded guilty and was fined $500 without conviction.

By his order made 14 August 2000, the Master identified the following questions of law as raised by this appeal

(a)under the circumstances was a document (see Exhibit "G") from which the witness Hrysikos refreshed his memory tenderable at the behest of the prosecutor?
(b)having regard to the whole of the evidence was it open to the learned Magistrate to hold that:
(i)under the circumstances the appellant was in breach of s. 49(1)(e) of the Road Safety Act 1986; and or
(ii)the appellant (having already supplied a sample of breath for analysis pursuant to our requirement under s. 55(1) ) was in breach of s. 49(1)(e) of the said Act so far as she refused to remain within the confines of the "booze bus" pending a requirement that she was to provide a second sample.

Evidence before the Magistrate

In considering the arguments advanced relevant to both questions of law, it is necessary to outline the substance of the evidence led, much of which was not disputed; for while the magistrate gave a preliminary analysis of the evidence in dealing with a no case submission, he did not give findings of fact when announcing his final decision other than to express the view that the appellant's recollection was affected by liquor.

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Mansfield v Hrysikos

Details

AGLC: Mansfield v Hrysikos [2000] VSC 474
Case: [2000] VSC 474
Decision Date: 14 November 2000

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Mansfield v Hrysikos arose in the Supreme Court of Victoria. The dispute was between the plaintiff, Mansfield, and the defendant, Hrysikos. Mansfield alleged that Hrysikos was guilty of dangerous driving under section 49(1)(e) of the Road Safety Act 1986, which pertains to the refusal to remain at the scene of an accident. The crux of the matter lay in the interpretation of the terms "other place" and "there" within the statute, as well as the admissibility of cross-examination evidence regarding a prior statement made by a witness.

The court was tasked with determining the precise meaning of "other place" and "there" in the context of section 49(1)(e) of the Road Safety Act 1986. It also needed to decide whether the cross-examination of a witness on a prior statement was permissible and whether there was an obligation to tender such evidence. The interpretation of these statutory terms was pivotal, as it would inform whether the defendant's actions constituted a refusal to remain at the scene of an accident.

The Supreme Court of Victoria found that "other place" and "there" in section 49(1)(e) of the Road Safety Act 1986 encompassed any location that was not the immediate scene of the accident. The court held that the defendant's actions constituted a refusal to remain at the scene when he moved to a different location following the incident. The court also ruled that cross-examination on a prior statement was permissible but noted that there was no obligation to tender such evidence unless it was material to the case. The court's interpretation provided clarity on the scope of the statutory provisions and the procedural rules regarding evidence.

The final orders of the court included a finding of dangerous driving against the defendant, Hrysikos, and the allowance of cross-examination on the prior statement of the witness. The court did not impose an obligation to tender such evidence unless deemed relevant by the parties.

Orders