Manolakis v Henderson (No 2) - [2019] SADC 6

District Court of South Australia
(Civil)
MANOLAKIS v HENDERSON (No 2)
[2019] SADC 6
Judgment of His Honour Judge Slattery (ex tempore)
21 December 2018
TRAFFIC LAW - STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS ON COMPENSATION IN RESPECT OF MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENTS - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - ASSESSMENT AND AMOUNT OF COMPENSATION - NON-ECONOMIC LOSS
The plaintiff sued the defendant for damages said to have been caused in a motor vehicle collision on 17 December 2012. The plaintiff alleged that the effect of the collision upon his neck exacerbated pre-existing injuries in his neck and cervical spine.
Held:
1. The plaintiff failed to prove the collision caused any physical affect upon him sufficient to satisfy the court that he suffered an injury to or an exacerbation of a pre-existing condition in his neck as a result.
2. The plaintiff’s claim is dismissed.
3. Orders that this judgement together with the transcript and the exhibits tendered in this action be forwarded to the relevant Federal authorities.
Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) s 52; Privacy Act 1988 (Cth); Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 34C; Workers’ Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1986 (Cth) s 43(3)(b), referred to.
Giorginis v Kastrati (1998) 49 SASR 371; Speyer v Ballantyne (1990) 159 LSJS 179; SGIC v Fiorente (1991) 160 LSJS 416; Workers’ Rehabilitation and Compensation Corp v Phillips (1991) 160 LSJS 251; Custance v Prass (1989) 155 LSJS 136; Koulias v Reid (1992) 164 LSJS 20, considered.

MANOLAKIS v HENDERSON (No 2)
[2019] SADC 6

The plaintiff brings a claim for damages for injuries allegedly sustained as a result of a motor vehicle collision which occurred on 17 December 2012.
The plaintiff Mr Manolakis was born on 16 December 1958 and is now 60 years of age. He alleges that on 17 December 2012 at about 9.30 a.m. he was a passenger in an articulated bus that was travelling south on Leah Street, Forrestville. It had come to a halt at or near the intersection of Leah Street and the tram tracks for the Glenelg-Adelaide tram line at Forrestville. The later evidence before the court suggests that the bus was parked half in the slip lane for a bus stop and half across the road. Leah Street is a narrow street running in a general north-south direction.
Soon after the bus came to a halt, a utility vehicle driven by the defendant Mr Henderson collided with the rear right-hand side of that bus. The evidence is that this was not a substantial collision but one in which the vehicle driven by the defendant rolled into the back of the bus.
In paragraph 7 of the statement of claim, Mr Manolakis pleads that as a result of the collision he sustained injuries, that those injuries were caused by the defendant, and that as a result he has sustained personal injury, loss and damage, which in satisfaction of 6DCCR 99(3) he sets out in paragraph 10 of his pleadings. Liability is not in contest in this action, which is for an assessment of the damages, if any, sustained by Mr Manolakis.
In paragraph 11 of the statement of claim Mr Manolakis sets out seven bases of claim for injuries as follows:
11.1   Injury and/or aggravation of a pre-existing injury/condition of his neck and/or cervical spine, including pain, discomfort and restriction of movement;
11.2   Injury to his upper back and/or thoracic spine, including pain, discomfort and restriction of movement;
11.3   Injury to his lower back and/or lumbar spine including pain, discomfort, restriction of movement;
11.4   Injury to his right arm including pain, discomfort, restriction of movement and numbness in his right arm, right hand and fingers on his right hand;
11.5   Headaches;
11.6   Sleep impairment;
11.7   Mental injuries.
At the commencement of the action Mr Manolakis disclaimed his claims under paragraphs 11.2 and 11.3 of his pleadings. He maintains his claims under the balance of the sub-paragraphs of paragraph 11 of the pleadings. These claim damages for injury and/or aggravation of a pre-existing injury/condition of his neck and/or cervical spine including pain, discomfort and restriction of movement. He claims for injury to his right arm including pain, discomfort and restriction of movement and numbness in his right arm, right hand and fingers on his right side, for headaches, sleep impairment and mental injuries.
In paragraph 12 of his pleadings Mr Manolakis describes the treatment he has received from his general practitioner, from orthopaedic surgeons, from other surgeons, from radiologists, and paramedical services. He has had CT guided cortisone injections to the facet joints of his neck, as well as receiving anti- inflammatory medication.
Mr Manolakis pleads that a sequelae of these injuries is that he suffers and has suffered pain and disability and conditions which impair his capacity to work, his activities of daily living, and his enjoyment of life. He pleads that he suffers from mental injuries which also impair his capacity to work, his activities of daily living, and his enjoyment of life. This pleading is directed at the operation of s.52 of the Civil Liability Act, the pertinent portions of which read as follows:
52—Damages for non-economic loss
(1)Damages may only be awarded for non-economic loss if—
(a)the injured person's ability to lead a normal life was significantly impaired by the injury for a period of at least 7 days; or
(b)medical expenses of at least the prescribed minimum have been reasonably incurred in connection with the injury.
(2)If damages are to be awarded for non-economic loss, other than in relation to personal injury arising from an MVA motor accident, they must be assessed as follows:
…
(3)Subject to subsection (4), if damages are to be awarded for non‑economic loss in relation to personal injury arising from an MVA motor accident, they must be assessed as follows:
…
(4)A person who suffers personal injury arising from an MVA motor accident may only be awarded damages for non‑economic loss if the injury scale value that applies under subsection (3)(a) in relation to the injury exceeds 10.
(5)However, a court may award damages for non‑economic loss in a case that would otherwise be excluded by operation of subsection (4) if satisfied—
(a)that the consequences of the personal injury with respect to non‑economic loss are exceptional when judged by comparison with other cases involving the same injury; and
(b)that the application of the threshold set by that subsection would, in the circumstances of the particular case, be harsh and unjust.
(6)An assessment of damages for non‑economic loss under subsection (5) must be based on an injury scale value that should rarely be more than 25% higher than the injury scale value that applies under subsection (3)(a) in relation to the injury.
(7)An amount applying under subsection (3) (and followed by the word "(indexed)") is to be adjusted on 1 July of each year, beginning on 1 July 2014, by multiplying the stated amount by a proportion obtained by dividing the Consumer Price Index for the March quarter of that year by the Consumer Price Index for the March quarter 2013 (with the amount so adjusted being calculated to the nearest multiple of $10).
(8)In connection with the operation of subsection (7), the amount to be applied with respect to a particular injury is the amount applying under subsection (3) at the time of occurrence of that injury.
Mr Manolakis then pleads the general effect of the injuries and disabilities on his activities, which would give rise to damages for economic and non-economic loss. These include pain and suffering, loss of amenities of life past and future, restrictions in his social, domestic, recreational, sporting and sleeping activities. He claims for past and future economic loss due to a loss of earning capacity and/or reduction in his employment options in the open labour market as a result of his injuries and disabilities. He further pleads the need for treatment, equipment and medical and like services, as well as for paid voluntary services in the past and in the future.
In paragraph 15 of his pleadings Mr Manolakis pleads that pursuant to 6DCCR 99 he does not plead and will not plead topics that will be covered by a statement of loss that are required to be delivered pursuant to 6DCCR 106.
These pleadings disclose that the focus of the claim of Mr Manolakis is now upon an injury to or aggravation of a pre-existing injury of his neck and cervical spine which consequently has affected his right arm, including for pain and discomfort, which is said to be directly as a result of the accident. He pleads mental injuries but there has been no evidence led in support of those alleged mental injuries and he has not led any evidence himself on that topic. He generally pleads the effect of injuries and disabilities such as past and future pain and suffering as I have already described. He did not give any particularity of those matters in the evidence which he led. I will discuss those matters later.
Mr Manolakis said in his pleadings that he will cover the rule 99 issues in the statement of loss. As things developed, this became an important matter because he did not provide that detail despite the court having made orders a number of times for the provision of that information. It is necessary for me to address that matter in more detail.
Between May 2013 and 17 October 2018, Mr Manolakis was represented by the firm of solicitors Palios Meegan & Nicholson. That firm arranged for Mr Manolakis to consult with Dr Carney, neurosurgeon, Dr Osti, spinal surgeon, and Dr Guirguis, orthopaedic surgeon. In the usual course that firm attended to all of the obligations imposed upon litigants in personal injuries matters prior to trial, such as for disclosure and preparation of statements of loss.
The firm of solicitors ceased to act for Mr Manolakis on 17 October 2018. Mr Manolakis then represented himself both at pre-trial applications and at the trial from that date. In the discussions below I make particular reference to pre-trial orders and their connection to the pleadings. I have also had regard to the transcript of the hearings before Judge Chivell of this Court on 6 November 2018 and later 21 November 2018.
At a directions hearing preparatory to trial held on 6 November 2018, Mr Manolakis informed Judge Chivell that he would be calling in evidence a number of doctors but still needed to follow up on Dr Turner, his general practitioner and the neurosurgeon, Dr Cindy Molloy, who had operated upon his neck.
He was told that as the trial was on 10 December, those matters must be followed up quickly. In his submissions before Judge Chivell, the defendant’s counsel Mr Ward emphasised that as Mr Manolakis was representing himself, difficulties often arise in trials because witnesses have not been arranged, updated reports have not been obtained and the requirements of 6DCCR 99 and 106 are not necessarily complied with by a self-represented litigant.
In the same appearance, Mr Ward emphasised the importance of 6DCCR 106(2)(8) which required Mr Manolakis to describe the periods for which he has been engaged in remunerative work and the nature and location and the name and address of any employer and any gross or nett income derived from any such work both before and subsequent to the collision. This was because in his earlier statement of loss, Mr Manolakis said that he had been unable to undertake some work.
Mr Ward emphasised to Judge Chivell that it was necessary for Mr Manolakis to properly comply with 6DCCR 106(2)(b) and to identify the tax paid on any earnings that he had received. The transcript of that hearing discloses that Mr Manolakis prevaricated on that topic and would not commit himself to a program of disclosure. When pressed by Judge Chivell, Mr Manolakis said he would comply with Rule 106. His Honour emphasised again that it was necessary for him to provide the dates of work and the details of the amounts earned by him. Mr Manolakis said he understood that requirement. Implicitly at least he agreed to comply with Court Orders.
In the same hearing, Mr Manolakis confirmed that although he had booked evidence times for appearances for Drs Osti and Guirguis, he had not booked an appearance time for Dr Turner. He said he would also book an appearance time for Dr Molloy. Mr Ward informed Judge Chivell that Dr Carney, neurosurgeon, would be called in evidence by the defence, he now having provided a second report. Judge Chivell informed Mr Manolakis that the better thing for him to do would be to arrange his medical witnesses from Wednesday, 12 December 2018 onwards. He told Mr Manolakis of the times during which the court sat and urged him to get his arrangements properly set.
The hearing before Judge Chivell then focused upon the question of the provision by Mr Manolakis of information regarding his claim for economic loss. Mr Manolakis said that he could have those details within a week. Judge Chivell reminded him the provision of this information is mandatory under the Rules and this is for the benefit of both he, Mr Manolakis and the defence. From the point of view of Mr Manolakis, it means that he has thoroughly reviewed his records and has made his claim for the whole of his economic and his non-economic loss. From the point of view of the defence, it means that the defence is fully informed of the case that it has to meet.
That directions hearing was then adjourned to 21 November 2018 for review and a further hearing was then conducted before Judge Chivell. In that hearing, Mr Manolakis confirmed that he had not yet followed up with Drs Turner and Molloy. If he could not call Dr Molloy, he wanted to get a report from her. Unsurprisingly, an objection was raised by the defence to that prospect. Judge Chivell warned Mr Manolakis that it would be necessary for a report of Dr Molloy to be provided. It would then be a question for the trial judge whether that report would be received into evidence.
Judge Chivell then questioned Mr Manolakis about his statement of loss. Mr Manolakis said that he had provided as much information as he possibly could. A copy of the last statement of loss document was provided to his Honour. It was pointed out that Mr Manolakis reported that he was currently still receiving a disability allowance from Centrelink, that no tax had been paid and that he did some part-time work but no tax had been paid on that work. Inferentially, Mr Manolakis said his earnings were not sufficient to affect the disability support pension that he received; no inference arose that he did not, for example, file tax returns as required.
A complaint was made by the defence that Mr Manolakis was doing some part-time work on an intermittent basis but not all of the information necessary to be provided under that Rule had been provided and it is not accepted that his alleged factual position obviates the necessity to file a tax return. That is the responsibility of every citizen and entity in this country and a failure to comply with this obligation has other consequences.
Mr Ward confirmed that a copy of the Rule had been given to Mr Manolakis for a second time. This was done to ensure that he knew what information was required to be provided. Mr Ward submitted that it was insufficient for Mr Manolakis to say that he had not earned enough income to be required to pay tax but then to refuse to hand over the records upon which such an assessment is made. The same reasoning applies to the issue of the tax return of Mr Manolakis.
I have described this history because these were to become crucial matters at the hearing of this trial. At the trial, Mr Manolakis was asked why he had not provided the information that had been promised and as required by the orders of Judge Chivell. Before Judge Chivell and before me, he said that he had provided some of the information to his former solicitors and he did not know why it was not referred on to the defendants.
In the last appearance before Judge Chivell, his Honour confirmed that he had ordered Mr Manolakis to provide the information on 6 November. Mr Manolakis responded he would have to go back and reconstruct the information required as best he could; he said that is what he had been trying to do. He said he had his banking records in part; he had some statements from the bank but not others. He had not made any disclosure of his bank statements to the defendants, despite requests being made for the provision of that material. No reasons were proffered. Mr Manolakis said he was aware of ongoing obligations to make disclosure and it was not as if he was refusing to hand over that material.
He could not explain why he had not complied with his obligation under the Rules and agreed that he was warned by the learned Judge that a trial Judge, would not put up with any form of prevarication or evasiveness. Mr Manolakis said he would happily provide his bank statements but he has never done so.
Judge Chivell gave Mr Manolakis an extension of time to provide his banking records for himself and any related entity, the wages records, records of receipts and payments in relation to any work that he has undertaken, Centrelink files from 17 December 2012 and other documents. That extension of time was for a further period of seven days ending 28 November 2018. The orders made by Judge Chivell on 21 November 2018 were as follows:
1.The time for the plaintiff to comply with my orders of 6 November 2018 is extended for a further seven days from today.
2.The plaintiff to provide to the defendant full disclosure of his bank records from the date of the accident, 7 December 2012, within seven days of today.
3.The plaintiff to disclose to the defendant his entire Centrelink file within seven days of today.
Mr Manolakis was the only person who could obtain the Centrelink file because it is known that Centrelink will not respond to a subpoena from this Court to provide such information.
A number of things follow. The first is that in those hearings before Judge Chivell, Mr Manolakis was placed on notice that it was his obligation to comply with the rules concerning provision of the statement of loss, further and better disclosure and provision of documents which are entirely within his control, such as, for example, the Centrelink file. The orders of Judge Chivell were made in circumstances where his statements of loss prepared on 31 October and 14 November 2018 were deficient and required updating and amendment.
In the trial before me, Mr Manolakis confirmed that he had received follow-up correspondence from the defendant's solicitors informing him of his obligations. He said that he had not complied with any of the orders of the Court. He did not initially provide any reason for this failure. The trial then proceeded despite Mr Manolakis’ contumacious refusal to comply with orders of the Court first made on 6 November and extended on 21 November 2018. In the result, Mr Manolakis did not provide to the defendant the whole of the information that the defendant was entitled to receive preparatory to the commencement of the hearing of this action. I was satisfied that Mr Manolakis was aware of the obligations upon him and he had refused to comply with them
I am also satisfied that the failures by Mr Manolakis were deliberately egregious. Mr Manolakis has been an unrepresented litigant since 17 October 2018. I have referred to the directions hearing before Judge Chivell. He was required to comply with the Rules of Court and the orders of the Court. On no basis could the Court make any exception for an unrepresented litigant concerning his obligation to comply with the Court Rules. And the compliance with the orders of Judge Chivell was as important for Mr Manolakis as it was for the defendant.

I have gone in to some detail to set out the pleadings of Mr Manolakis and in particular his claims for injuries suffered as a result of the accident and the sequelae of them, both physically and economically. It is well settled that it is the obligation of Mr Manolakis to put information before the Court to sustain the pleadings. A Court will not accept an assertion of fact on such important topics at face value. The Court will rely upon evidence led before the Court to sustain the allegations; so much is obvious, but it follows that if Mr Manolakis was to make good the allegations of injury and the physical and economic consequences of injury, it was necessary for him to lead evidence before the court to that effect. Without that evidence, the Court is left only with some oral evidence of Mr Manolakis.
As the trier of fact, the court makes its own decisions on the credibility, reliability and accuracy of the evidence given in chief by a plaintiff claimant. This is part and parcel of the court process. However, these are comparative questions. If a court does not receive any information about, for example, the past earnings of a claimant, the court may be unable to make an assessment of the loss of capacity. Sometimes such an assessment can be made independently but that is made far more difficult by the absence of information; the Court will do the best it can.
A court also obtains great assistance from objectively available material. In the case of a claim for loss of earnings and loss of capacity, the records of earnings of a claimant are the primary source which a court may take into account in making an assessment of damages, depending upon findings. There is yet a further overlay of those considerations in this matter. Mr Manolakis informed me that his claim was to be assessed according to the earnings that he would have received as a qualified accountant. He informed me that the last time he had worked as an accountant was in 2002, some 10 years prior to the accident.
Between 2002 and 2012, he had worked in a variety of roles but predominantly as a home-improvement handyman. In his evidence, Mr Manolakis agreed that he had earned income from those endeavours but there had been breaks in his ability to earn income because of surgery upon his neck in 2016 and later in the same year upon his back, and then even later still, upon his knees during 2018.
However, all of these issues should have been recorded or identifiable from an assessment of the financial records that should have been kept by Mr Manolakis during the course of the operation of his business. Presumably there must have been bank statements, financial statements and tax returns which reflected the operation of these businesses. From the year 2000, there would have been BAS returns applicable to any GST collected or paid. These are all matters that a court can review and rely upon in making an assessment on an objective basis and compare it with the oral evidence given by a claimant. These matters are essential to an assessment of damages and are helpful to a plaintiff in the position of Mr Manolakis. None were provided. In part, Mr Manolakis said he did not provide his bank statements because he thought to do so would breach his right to privacy. I will deal with that matter later but on a number of levels this is an extraordinary statement. In the directions hearing before Judge Chivell he did not mention this concern and it seems to have occurred to him only after orders were made: self-evidently there is no privacy issue here. It is in the whole of that background that I now turn to consider the case put by Mr Manolakis.
Mr Manolakis gave evidence. He said that he has a BA in Accounting from the University of South Australia, 1995. He was then employed in the State public service but that service finished in 2003, he having commenced his own business in 2002. He said that in 2012 he commenced a Graduate Diploma in Carbon Management at the University of Adelaide. It appears to have been completed in 2013 but that is not clear. He also completed, at the Catholic University, a Graduate Certificate in Occupational Health and Safety. He was unsuccessful in finding employment in any of those fields. There seems to be a very particular reason why he has not been employed in any of those fields, which I will discuss later.
On the day of the collision, he was on the bus that was travelling southward to St Marys. The bus has stopped in Leah Street at the tram line; it was struck from behind. He did not get out of the bus to look at what had happened and he did not know what kind of car was involved in the collision. It is not clear on the viva voce evidence that he was aware that a collision had occurred; later evidence before the Court suggests that he was not so aware. He said that although he suffered no effect at the time, he did suffer pain later that evening. That pain was located in his neck in the area of his cervical spine. That pain did not improve over time.
On 24 December 2012, he went to see his GP to check his neck pain. He said that he had been treated over a long period of time, since 1995, for various neck injuries. He had received a number of treatments, including from Dr Osti. Eventually, in 2016, he underwent neck surgery. This was for a fusion of C6-7 and to treat compressed nerves. He also had surgery in October 2016 on his lumbar spine. He has had two full laminectomies and a fusion of two facet joints which was relatively successful.
He said that he was able to return to work relatively quickly after these surgeries and that occurred from about April 2016. He gave a list of the places at which he was working in his home-handyman business. He gave a description of the work that he was doing and some of the amounts of money that he was earning. He said as well as doing home handyman work, he did lawn coring and dethatching. That work was interrupted by the surgery that he had undertaken.
In cross-examination, he confirmed the lawn coring jobs that he had done and was asked about the information that he possessed concerning the jobs. He said that he did not bring information to the Court about those matters because he was concerned about the Privacy Act. I have been unable to identify any Privacy Act issues applicable and none exist; this explanation did not appear genuine. He denied that he was deliberately preventing that information from coming before the Court. I do not accept that explanation and I consider that Mr Manolakis was being deliberately obfuscatory.
He was then asked questions about Centrelink and reporting to the Australian Taxation Office. I was aware from the earlier hearing and the evidence before me that he had not filed tax returns for a long time and that he had gone on earning income from his business whilst receiving Centrelink benefits. I considered that the answers to those questions had the potential to incriminate him and I warned him accordingly. Mr Manolakis refused to answer questions in relation to those two topics concerning his cash earnings on the basis that those answers may incriminate him.
He gave a history of the work that he had done through to 2018 and then confirmed that he had commenced receiving a disability support pension on 20 November 2014. He said he could not find any Centrelink documents. It was not clear what he meant by that but I understood that he had not made a request for a copy of his Centrelink file. I do not accept that explanation because he did not give any evidence of his attempt to obtain his Centrelink file. Then he said that he could not recall being asked to supply a Centrelink file until the last hearing.
He admitted receiving the letter from Finlaysons Lawyers dated 6 November 2018 which is Exhibit D1. This letter requested the provision of a certain amount of information. Reference was made in the letter to the decision of Giorginis v Kastrati (1998) 49 SASR 371 and a copy of that decision was sent with the letter. The letter from Finlaysons Lawyers, set out the relevant passages from the decision of Von Doussa J in Giorginis. Those passages describe the requirements upon a litigant in the position of Mr Manolakis.
The solicitor’s letter of 6 November requests that Mr Manolakis, inter alia, obtain his Centrelink file. It requests copies of medical certificates, medical reports and assessments that have been relied upon by Centrelink in providing him with benefits for a period from three years prior to the subject collision to the present. He is informed that Centrelink material would be available to him upon request. It is obvious enough that the defendant’s solicitors wished to identify the basis upon which Mr Manolakis had been receiving Centrelink benefits and to identify what disclosures had been made to Centrelink concerning the earnings that he had made in the same period.
In his evidence, Mr Manolakis said that he ignored the letter because he said he was entitled to work up to 15 hours and was not aware he had to notify Centrelink about his earnings. He agreed that at times he had notified Centrelink when he had worked more than 15 hours per week. He said as far as he could remember, he struggled to work more than 15 hours per week; however, I reject that evidence. The later evidence discloses that he was working full days in his various businesses. In any event, the failure by Mr Manolakis to comply with the requests of the letter of Finlaysons Lawyers, in light of the directions from Judge Chivell, I find is a contumelious disregard for his obligations as a litigant.
Mr Manolakis then gave other evidence concerning his work history from 2002 through until 2018. He said that he had stopped work in 2012 to 2013 but that version is not consistent with some of the versions of events he has given to doctors. He then was asked whether he ever worked on a permanent basis. He identified that he did work for a nursing home called Aveco. He was asked about his banking records and said that he did not supply his banking details because he was concerned about privacy. No privacy issues have been previously raised; none exist. Again, I consider this to be a contumelious disregard of the orders of the Court and disingenuous.
Mr Manolakis said that Aveco would not have taken money out for tax from salaries that were paid to him for the work that he was doing. There is no apparent reason why that would be so; if he was a subcontractor, other tax regimes have application. He then said to me that everything he earned was paid into his self-managed super fund, into his member's benefit account. He said that he was the controller or the corporate trustee of his self-managed super fund. I asked him to explain because tax would need to be paid on payments into the fund and he then said that there was then a dispute with the Australian Taxation Office about that superannuation fund being a non-complying superannuation fund. It has been closed down. I obtained no assistance from this evidence; it was wrong at many levels that do not require explanation here.
Mr Manolakis was then challenged about his ability to work as an accountant, being the basis upon which he says damages should be assessed. He said that he had worked as an accountant up until 2002, however he commenced a form of building consultancy business in 2002 that led him to insolvency by 2003. He disputed his bankruptcy but that challenge was unsuccessful. He appears to have been an undischarged bankrupt until about 2007. It seems that the Trustee in Bankruptcy successfully challenged his discharge from bankruptcy after the usual three-year period. He said that the reason was that he had not filled out proper declarations and reports.
On his employability as an accounting professional, he agreed that he had used Facebook and Twitter to make the most egregious accusations about a previous Chief Justice of South Australia and the present Chief Justice of South Australia. He said he had raised a number of issues with the Royal Commission into institutional child abuse and he had made disparaging and defamatory remarks about judges, politicians and other people. He also agreed, eventually, (having earlier denied it), that he was prosecuted for threatening a Federal Senator and calling him a paedophile. He agreed that he had been prosecuted in relation to those matters and that that record would have been available to any person checking his history on the internet. I am satisfied that no foresight is required to predict that even the most cursory examination of the internet would disclose these issues. They are a very big hurdle to his employability on any basis.
Finally, in relation to his evidence concerning his employability, he said that he had done work as a gardener. He had set up a business called De George Services, that he was advertising that business from at least 2013 (but my view is that it was considerably earlier than that period) and that the business of De George Services was very general. It provided roof repointing services and roof cleaning services. It included roof restoration services and this required painting, pressure cleaning and repointing. He said he used a high-pressure cleaner to clean roofs. Whilst it was physically hard work it was something that he could do. He was paid generally in cash for doing that work. He said he also did landscaping but that was rare. He also did work fixing TV antennae to homes and other physical work. The evidence before me shows that he had been in the antennae business for many years.
In his evidence, Mr Manolakis said he did monthly BAS statements from when the business started in 2013 until when he was provided with disability support. He was not able to provide copies of these BAS statements. These formed part of the documents that Judge Chivell had referred to in the orders that he had made. I do not accept the evidence of Mr Manolakis that he had prepared or lodged these BAS statements. Then he said to me that he had lost some documents and electronic records and if they were required, the ATO should have them.
Then in relation to the version of events concerning his injuries given to the medical practitioners, Mr Manolakis agreed that he had been to see Dr Carney, the neurosurgeon; he was sent initially by his solicitors. He was then shown the initial report of Dr Carney and he disagreed with the content of the report, where Dr Carney said that Mr Manolakis reported to him that he told Dr Gurigius that he had suffered neck problems for years leading up to the bus accident. He agreed that he had not done anything to correct any such error in Dr Carney's report. However, in later evidence before me, he said that he had had been suffering neck injuries at least as early as 1995.
He also said that he was continuing to get cervical neck pain at the C4-6 and C7 level for a period of time. He said that his neck began to hurt and be stiff after the bus accident and the soreness was on the right-hand side. Normally he would take pain killers and anti-inflammatories. He also said that after the bus accident he had some back pain but that was not a subject of his claim.
His general practitioner was Dr Turner. He saw her on 24 December 2012 but he did not recall telling her any of the problems affecting him were from a motor vehicle accident. The subpoenaed files from Dr Turner were available for inspection in the Court.
He asserted that his neck surgery in 2016 was partly related to the accident but he could not say to what extent. He explained that the report that he had made to the police occurred some nine months after the incident. He also agreed that he saw a Dr Thorpe on 27 May 2013 and that was at a time he was studying further in relation to the courses that he was doing. He agreed that both of the attendances on Dr Turner on 24 December 2012 and the attendance upon Dr Thorpe on 27 May 2013 were in relation to another compensation claim.
Mr Manolakis said that he had told Centrelink about his work hours in 2014. He said that everything that was within the websites for De George Services were services that he had and continued to be providing and that the income that he earned from those businesses was at a minimum. He also asserted that there were errors in the report from Dr Osti about his neck and that he denied telling Dr Osti that two years before seeing him, in December 2014, he had been in an accident and he had suffered neck pain. He denied saying to Dr Osti that he had been constantly debilitated by neck pain since the accident and that his symptoms were getting worse.
Any suggestion that he was constantly debilitated my neck pain after the date of the accident is untrue.
He was then shown the video of the events of the collision. A video had been taken inside the bus as a matter of security. He said that he had not seen that video earlier. He said that he had also seen the second report from Dr Carney prepared after he had seen the video. After watching the video, he denied that there was no movement in his head at the time of the bus accident. There is other video evidence. He agreed that, for example, on Exhibit D17 there is a video of him working on a roof in dangerous circumstances. That work included roof cleaning, roof repairs and the repointing using cement upon the hip tiles of a tiled roof. He said that also in relation to his business, he had purchased an excavator but had not had a chance to use it. He had built two retaining walls and he advertises to do retaining wall work.
I turn to the medical evidence; the only medical evidence that Mr Manolakis called in support of his case was from Dr Guirgius and this was reflected in a report by Dr Guirguis dated 15 October 2013, Exhibit P18. I will consider this evidence later. Prior to the commencement of the trial he had consulted with and obtained a report from Dr Carney, neurosurgeon and Dr Orso Osti, spinal surgeon. Mr Manolakis did not call Dr Carney or Dr Osti in evidence.
Dr Carney had prepared and delivered an amended report addressed to Finlaysons Lawyers dated 11 October 2016. In that report, Dr Carney amended his opinion expressed in his first report of 16 February 2016 because he had been given the benefit of viewing the video tape of events inside the bus at the time of the collision. He amended his opinion to say that if there had been any effect from the collision to, for example, Mr Manolakis as one of the passengers in the bus (and Dr Carney was not specifically directed to a passenger but to all passengers), he could not detect on the film that that effect had been shown. His view was that for Mr Manolakis, the only possible effect would have been a slight muscular injury which would have resolved in a number of days. Mr Manolakis was aware at least from the second report of Dr Carney that there was now a strong challenge to the veracity of his claims. The first report of Dr Carney had been supportive of his claims but the second report did not support him. The withdrawal of that support followed Dr Carney viewing a video tape provided by the defendant’s solicitors. At the time Mr Manolakis was represented by a firm of solicitors. I do not accept that the solicitors would not have discussed the details of these developments with Mr Manolakis or given him the chance to see the video. I will return to the medical evidence later in these reasons.
The evidence before me is that Mr Manolakis had been granted a Newstart pension on 19 March 2017. Later he qualified for a disability support pension on 20 November 2014 but there was no evidence before the Court about the test for being granted such a pension. The evidence before me discloses that whilst on the disability support pension, Mr Manolakis has been operating in and upon a number of businesses under the name De George Services.
The business of Mr Manolakis provides predominantly roof cleaning and restoring services which involve repointing roofs and repointing tiled roofs. Mr Manolakis said he had not lodged income tax returns or BAS statements for this business since 2014. The clear impression I obtained was that he had not lodged any of those returns prior to 2014; that could not be confirmed on the evidence. Calls were made for the production of these documents over the specified periods and these calls were not responded to by Mr Manolakis. I will have more to say about this later.

Mr Manolakis makes no claim for any injury to his lower back or for any knee problems. No evidence was led by him about the nature or extent of any mental injury, nor any sleep impairment, nor any headaches. I asked Mr Manolakis whether or not he would be leading any evidence from a psychologist or a psychiatrist. He said that he would not. I do not have any understanding of any sleep impairment allegedly suffered by him. I only have a general pleading concerning the sequelae of the aggravation of a pre-existing injury to his neck or cervical spine.
Mr Manolakis said that the whole of his upper back and thoracic spine problems are connected with the injury he said was suffered as a result of the collision. There was no medical evidence to support this assertion. In the absence of that medical evidence, I would not accept this asserted basis as raised by Mr Manolakis. When he gave his evidence, Mr Manolakis made no reference to any thoracic spine injury. He did confirm to me that his claim for right arm pain was from his neck and not from any other cause. This was set out in paragraph 11.4 of the statement of claim.
He said to me in his evidence-in-chief that the only consequence of the accident in respect of which he was making a claim was the alleged injuries to his neck, or alternatively the aggravation of a pre-existing cervical spine injury. On his case the claims for headaches, sleep impairment and mental injuries were allegedly causally connected to those injuries suffered by him as a result of the accident but they cannot be maintained on the evidence.
The defendant denied any such causal connection after having denied that the plaintiff sustained the injuries. The defendant pleaded in paragraph 13 of his defence that if the plaintiff suffers from any pain or disability it is not causally linked to or contributed to by the motor vehicle accident. In paragraph 14 of his defence, the defendant denies that Mr Manolakis has suffered any disability, loss or damage or that he was incapacitated or that he has any reduced capacity as a result of any injuries. The only incapacity he has results from injuries suffered from as far back as 1995 and then subsequent surgery.
On the papers before me it was not clear what had actually occurred in the accident alleged to have taken place in 1995. That was clarified in evidence, both in examination-in-chief and in cross-examination. Mr Manolakis told me that he had suffered neck injuries in an accident in 1995. He also suffered some lower back problems. He was not able to tell me how these were treated except conservatively. One of the difficulties that I had with the evidence is that on the papers before me, I did not completely understand the treatment that Mr Manolakis might have had for the neck injuries. He was able to tell me that he had a rhizolysis procedure and this improved his neck condition.
The impression that I had from the evidence was that the rhizolysis procedure occurred much earlier and was a medical intervention ordered by his treating surgeon at the time. The other impression I obtained from the evidence was that there was some improvement in the neck condition but it had not completely resolved. This was confirmed in his evidence when he said that he had continuing neck pain up to 17 December 2012 and that had been treated with painkillers.
The evidence is not clear whether the treating doctors or surgeons suggested a further rhizolysis procedure or some other form of surgical intervention. On the evidence, as at 17 December 2012, Mr Manolakis was suffering from a neck condition as a consequence of earlier injuries for which he had received prior treatment and which were now being managed with painkillers. None of the other conditions which he had, namely lower back, knee or carpal tunnel complaints or canal stenosis due to worn discs were aggravated in the accident.
Exhibit D11 is the first report of Dr Paul Carney, neurosurgeon. It is directed to Palios, Meegan & Nicholson Solicitors who were then acting for Mr Manolakis. After describing the history of the injuries and after examination and a review of the literature, Dr Carney noted a CT cervical spine performed on 29 May 2013 showed marked degenerative changes to C2-7 with reports of foraminal stenosis described as moderate to severe. There was no clinical evidence of foraminal stenosis causing radiculopathy. A bone scan CT performed on 7 June 2013 showed activity in the right-side facet joints which would be consistent with osteoarthritic changes causing pain in those joints.
This was confirmed again by Dr Orso Osti following an MRI cervical and lumber spine scan. This showed degenerative changes throughout. Dr Carney then refers to the report of Dr Guirguis and the recording in that report that the impact of the accident was minor but the neck of Mr Manolakis was jarred even though he was not thrown out of the seat of the bus.
He said that Mr Manolakis consulted his general practitioner within a week and was advised to take painkillers. He said that Dr Guirguis had expressed an opinion that as a result of his accident there was an acute aggravation of right cervical facet joints following the rear-end collision. He also records that the report of Dr Osti identifies that the rear-end collision was the cause of the development by Mr Manolakis of a recurrence of debilitating neck pain.
At p.6 Dr Carney said of Dr Osti's report:
Although not specifically stated, it would appear that Mr Osti was unaware that the impact was a car into the rear of a bus resulting in a jerk injury.
In his summary and prognosis, Dr Carney went on to say:
The incident of the bus impact necessarily was minor, both given the relative masses of the bus and the impacting vehicle, and Mr Manolakis' description of a jerk only. Mr Manolakis does not describe to me injuries to the upper back and right shoulder. Nevertheless there is likely some exacerbation to cervical spine problems in the subject impact in the form of a strain to an already significantly degenerative area.
He went on to say that the exacerbation of those symptoms was consistent with the accident and that in light of the fact that Mr Manolakis had been operating as a maintenance person 15-20 hours per week as he had done beforehand, he doubted whether the accident had significantly added to his long-term incapacity and it was unlikely that the accident would have significantly added to his overall permanent residual disability.
The report of Dr Guirguis of 25 October 2013 was also directed to the same firm of solicitors. It is dated some 10 months or so after the date of the accident. He reported on the history taken from Mr Manolakis. He was told that the bus impact was minor, but that the neck jarred even though he was not thrown out of his seat. That night he developed stiffness in his neck which became painful. Neck stiffness flares up but takes a week to settle down and there is always right arm symptoms associated with neck pain. That affected the right hand as well. In his assessment and opinion, Dr Guirguis reported that Mr Manolakis suffered an acute aggravation of his right cervical facet joints following the collision, and in the penultimate paragraph he said for the purposes of the report he has assumed the correctness and truthfulness of the version of events given to him by Mr Manolakis.
Both Dr Carney in his first report and Dr Guirguis in his report said that their views were reliant upon a number of essential features. The first, the pre-existing injuries and conditions suffered by Mr Manolakis as at 17 December 2012 resulting from a series of events from at least 1995, and as a result of which Mr Manolakis suffered a degenerative condition of his cervical spine which was in part severe.
Second, the description by Mr Manolakis of the subject accident and as a result of the collision he felt a jerk or jarring of his neck.
Third, the acceptance of those medical practitioners of a causative link between that jerk and the flare-up or exacerbation of that neck condition.
In that context and in that background as well as the report of Mr Osti and all the radiological examinations of Mr Manolakis, the effect of the collision between the defendant's vehicle and the bus comes into very sharp focus. This focus is only further sharpened by the denials of the defendant in his defence.
In assessing all of this evidence I accept that there will be events that do not cause an immediate physical effect upon a person. There are a number of occasions such as in car accidents where an injured person may not be able to identify any particular problem immediately following a collision, but later becomes aware of difficulties associated with some physical aspect of their being. So much is obvious from the authorities decided under the operation of s.52 of the Civil Liability Act. These situations occur regularly. In making assessments, the court relies upon the oral evidence of the plaintiff claimant as well as the radiological examinations and observations of medical practitioners, together with any other independent evidence concerning the collision, if the occurrence of the medical sequelae of the collision is put in contest by a defendant.
In this process, Courts take particular note of the observation of an injured party's general practitioner. This is because a person will ordinarily attend his or her general practitioner first, and then after conservative treatment (and if necessary) be referred to a specialist. That process is consistent with the usual conservative treatment of injuries. However the importance of the evidence of a general practitioner is that that doctor normally has a familiarity with the patient, with the patient's history and pre-existing conditions (if any) suffered by the patient. That information will inform the examination, the taking of the further history and the judgment about conservative treatment and then referral to a specialist. Mr Manolakis did not call his treating general practitioner in evidence despite having informed Judge Chivell that he would do so.
Mr Manolakis called Dr Guirguis to give evidence. Dr Guirguis gave his evidence by way of his report of 2013 and he said that he had thrown away any notes that he might have had in relation to the preparation of that report. He confirmed without reference to notes that the injuries to the facet joints of Mr Manolakis were not major and he could have worked at the time that he saw him in 2013.
Dr Guirguis said that Mr Manolakis told him that he was undertaking home maintenance work in 2013. He also agreed that there was a large gap of some five to six months from the accident before he saw his GP complaining in relation to something to do with his neck. He would be less inclined in those circumstances to say that the accident was the cause of him seeing the GP. He agreed that the impact as described to him was minor but he said that the neck being jarred could have contributed to the injuries. He said not everybody’s structure would react in the same way to an impact and he agreed if he was sitting in the seat without moving it would be unlikely that an injury would be developed.
Mr Manolakis did not call in evidence his general practitioner. In hearings before Judge Chivell he informed the Court that he intended to call Dr Turner. No explanation was given as to why Dr Turner was not called to give evidence. Nor was Dr Thorpe. So the Court is left with the description within the reports of Dr Carney and Mr Guirguis of the effect of an assumed or inferred jerk or jarring of the neck of Mr Manolakis at the time of the collision based entirely upon the history given to them by him. Mr Manolakis described to Dr Guirguis that the neck was jarred; he told Dr Carney that the neck was jerked. I do not think there is really a distinction between those two things. But the issue is that he was describing an effect upon his neck without having been thrown out of the seat as a result of the collision.
In relation to the collision the defendant gave evidence. He said he was driving a Mazda BT-50 vehicle south on Leah Street behind the bus. He knew the bus had come to a halt near the intersection with the tram lines. He said that the bus was positioned half in the slip lane and half across the road. He was stopping his vehicle behind the bus and due to a distraction which he did not explain, his vehicle rolled into the back of the bus. He described it as a rolling sort of impact and it was very light.
Exhibit D8 was a bundle of nine photographs of his vehicle. In evidence he identified those photographs and said the state of the vehicle in the photographs was exactly the same as at the time of the collision. There is a form of bull-bar on the front of the vehicle. The metal of the bull-bar at places and at the most forward protrusion is covered in black plastic. There was no sign of damage on that black plastic, including any scratching.
The defendant said in his evidence that there was no damage to his vehicle. He said that the collision occurred more towards the right side of the bus and he can recall some scratches on that right side of the bus and generally. He described that as a scratching of the plastic surface of the rear bumper of the bus. He did not require repairs to his vehicle.
Exhibit D21 is the Australian Bus and Coach Underwriting Claim for damages to the bus which reports no damage to the other vehicle and does not set out any costs of repairs, but says that there was a crack on the rear skirt of the bus and the rear bumper was pushed in.
There is evidence before the Court of the events inside the bus at the time of the collision. The Court was provided with a video taken from the inside of the bus of the view within it from the back of the bus and the view outside the front of the bus. The video shown to the Court discloses that the different camera angles were recorded as separate videos. These videos are to be understood as a continuous reel of photographs taken in a stream of particular views inside the bus or outside the bus. There was no evidence that the video taken was in any sense inaccurate because of the absence of a particular screen within the sequence of the videos. Thus the accuracy of the video was accepted as being continuous and showing the continuous view under the method of recording of the particular places to which the cameras were directed. Exhibit D22 also shows an example of these screenshots. All of the accuracy of this material is confirmed overall by the timer upon the video itself which is continuous.
Mr Manolakis was shown a copy of the video. He identified himself as boarding the bus at 8:44:55 hours on the day. I am satisfied of this fact. He spoke to the driver. He appeared to show him some form of card. At the time he did so the view disclosed a female passenger sitting in the front seat immediately behind the front door. The female passenger was reading a newspaper. Immediately behind her was a ticketing machine for the bus and then there were rows of seats on either side of the bus. The video showed when he first boarded the bus and sat down Mr Manolakis took a seat close behind this woman.
The Court did not need to view the whole of the video and picked it up some minutes later. By that time Mr Manolakis had moved to another seat on the opposite side of the bus behind the driver. This was on the right-hand side of the bus as Mr Manolakis faced the front window. He was in the third row of seating behind the driver. One of the video recorders inside the bus photographed the seat in which Mr Manolakis was sitting. The film record therefore shows the head, upper body and arms of Mr Manolakis at the time of the collision.
It is accepted that the time of the accident on the screen was 8:49:03 hours. I have viewed this video many times. I have had the benefit of seeing each of the screens covered by the cameras in enlarged forms. My observations are that Mr Manolakis did not move at the time of the collision; the collision can be heard through the audio system on the bus. I could also identify that the lady reading the newspaper at the front of the bus moved her head slightly backwards at the time that she was turning the pages of the newspaper that she was reading. It is possible she was moving her head in the process of changing the page of the newspaper she was reading, or alternatively that she moved her head slightly as a result of the collision, or for some other reason. The driver could be seen to move his head slightly backwards immediately following the collision. It is difficult to know what to make of that evidence because the driver reacted almost immediately to the noise and issued an exclamation with words to the effect ‘What are you doing?’ He opened the door, alighted and moved to the back of the bus.
I think the most important view taken by the cameras of Mr Manolakis is a view straight onto his head, shoulders and upper chest. It shows that at the time prior to the collision he was freely moving his head to the left and then back to the right and also towards the front of the bus. I was able to have a clear view of his head at the time of the collision and I was unable to detect any movement in his head or neck that would be described as jerking or jarring. Mr Manolakis then continued to move his head from left to right in the same way as he had done before the collision.
At the collision point the bus was stationary. As explained by Associate Adjunct Professor Anderson, the application of force to the rear of the bus will generally have the effect of causing passengers in the bus to move backwards by virtue of the transfer of energy from the colliding vehicle through the bus.
The content of Exhibit D22 showed at the point of the collision Mr Manolakis was sitting with his back to the seat and not forward. His right hand was up to his face on the right-hand side and his left arm folded across his chest. He had moved both his left and right arms prior to the time of the point of collision. If there was any effect of the collision upon Mr Manolakis it would have been easily discernible by the view in the bus. I was not able to discern any change in the position of the head of Mr Manolakis, or any other part of his body as a result of the collision.
The video showed him continuing to look around and sometimes with his right hand up to his face. More importantly, and immediately following the impact, the bus driver spoke and then alighted from the bus. During the time that the bus driver was absent, the woman in the front seat continued to read her newspaper, Mr Manolakis continued to look around the bus to the left and to the right and there was no discernible change in the pattern of his head movement. There was no change at the time of the collision. The only movement that was discernible following the collision was the same pattern as had been detected before the collision. Mr Manolakis was looking through the windows of the bus to his left and to his right.
I have also had the benefit of viewing the video when the bus driver reboarded the bus. He spoke to the woman in the front seat and informed her of the collision and the fact that he had taken some details. He spoke to the woman about his need to make a report. She was heard to say on the audio of the video that she did not even notice it.
I find that there was no jerking motion or apparent jarring of the head of Mr Manolakis at the time of the collision. I further find that there was no discernible effect upon the head of Mr Manolakis as a result of the collision which could inform any possibility of a jarring of his head to have any effect upon his neck.
I have earlier referred to the second report prepared by Dr Carney, Exhibit D12, after he was given a copy of the videotape of the events inside the bus by the defendant's solicitor. This further report (D12) contains statements by Dr Carney that having viewed the DVD he could not detect any evidence of any of the passengers sustaining any significant jerking in the impact. He refers to the woman reading the newspaper and the fact that she is unaware of the impact. In preparing this report he was not directed to any particular passengers but was asked to make observations of the whole population of passengers.

He says that there is no evidence of any impact likely to cause any exacerbation of longstanding cervical spine degenerative disease. He opined it is unlikely that there was any significant exacerbation of the symptoms relating to the degenerative disease of the plaintiff's cervical spine. He allowed for the possibility of an exacerbation simply by the fact of the collision. He opined that if there was any exacerbation occurring it would be temporary and only in the order of a few days.
In his reports, Dr Robin Jackson, orthopaedic surgeon, said that he examined the plaintiff on two occasions and prepared three reports, Exhibits D13, D14 and D15. The final report was provided on 26 October 2018 after Dr Jackson reviewed the DVD and the videotape. He also noted no movement of any passengers on the bus and confirmed his opinion of that in his evidence. He said that having viewed the video material he was of the view that Mr Manolakis would not have sustained any injury to either his cervical spine or his lumbar spine as a result of the accident.
The defendant also called in evidence adjunct Associate Professor Robert Anderson. Mr Anderson had prepared a report of 10 March 2018. He had the benefit of seeing the DVD and informed me he could detect some movement of the head of the woman reading the newspaper, and he could also detect some movement in the bus by the view at the front of the bus. He said that the effect of any such movement was so minor as to be almost undetectable in the sense that the application of the force would have produced a result no different from merely everyday activities.
He later went on to explain that these everyday activities relating to a bus would be the braking of the bus and the acceleration of a bus from the stationary position. He said that in those circumstances the probability of injury would have been zero and the plaintiff's history of neck problems following the event could not be causally linked to the accident. He was then informed of the evidence of the defendant Mr Henderson. He had not been given the benefit of that evidence before. In his report, Mr Anderson assumed that the speed of the vehicle at contact would have been something in the order of 20 km/h. He was then shown the photographs of Henderson's vehicle and informed of the damage to the rear of the bus. He then said that doing a recalculation in his own mind, the speed of Henderson's vehicle at the point of collision would have been significantly less than 20 km/h. He explained his opinion. He said that if there was a rear-end collision the normal effect would be to throw a passenger in a vehicle backwards as the result of the application of force of the rear of the vehicle. The passenger may then surge forward to a point of stabilisation. The surge backwards would create a jerking motion of the head and neck of a passenger.
There were a number of differences in the event the subject of this claim. There was an effect of heave upon the bus. This can be seen from the camera angle looking out the front of the bus. It does not surge upwards but surges slightly downwards as a result of the application of the force. He explained that this occurred because it is an articulated bus of much greater mass than the vehicle that struck it and the transmission of the force through the bus caused it to dip rather than surge upwards. He said that the impact at the rear of the bus was so minor that the force of the impact was transmitted through the superstructure and did not cause a backwards surge for the passengers on the bus. He was able to identify some movement in the head of the woman reading the newspaper but he could not detect whether that was as a result of the application of force or part of ordinary movement.
In the end, the opinion that he formed was that the movement of passengers in the bus was no more than ordinary movement in an articulated vehicle.
This was confirmed by his view of the videotape and the absence of any damage to the vehicle. He confirmed his opinion that any effect upon the passengers of the bus was less than the forces that would have been applied to the bodies of those passengers from normal braking and accelerating patterns of a bus on a domestic route. In his opinion, the application of the force by virtue of the rear-end collision could not have caused the injury to the cervical spine because that application of force was much less than the normal operation of an articulated vehicle in ordinary domestic usage.
About a week after the accident Mr Manolakis attended a medical practitioner. He alleges that he told his doctor that he had suffered a minor whiplash injury but this is contradicted by what he told other medical practitioners as I have earlier set out.
In submissions, the defendant does not deny the plaintiff may have suffered symptoms in his neck following the accident but only on a chronological basis that is completely unconnected with the accident.
Almost four years later, on 1 March 2016, Dr Molloy performed a fusion of his neck, and later in the same year performed an operation to repair the right carpal tunnel syndrome, and then later a lumbar laminectomy fusion. For reasons which were not explained, Dr Molloy was not called to give evidence about, for example, the possible connection between the accident and the fusion in Mr Manolakis's neck. As a result, the evidence of Dr Osti may have been important but that evidence is not before the court following a deliberate decision by Mr Manolakis to refuse to call him. In those circumstances, the only medical evidence before the Court in relation to the effect of the collision upon Mr Manolakis is his own viva voce evidence and the reports of Dr Carney and Dr Guirguis.
Both of the reports of Dr Carney were received pursuant to s.34C of the Evidence Act. Original copies of those reports have been tendered. I was satisfied by proof tendered by the defendant that at the time of the trial Dr Carney was overseas on a holiday. The evidence before me disclosed that this holiday had been booked and paid for at least seven months prior to the date of the trial. By some error, Dr Carney was booked to give evidence on a day that he was to be overseas. I am satisfied that the requirements of s.34C of the Evidence Act have been established. I was satisfied on the balance of probabilities that Dr Carney was beyond the seas, that every effort had been made by the defendant to ensure that he was available but an error had occurred somewhere in the office of Dr Carney and not with the defendant's solicitors. I was satisfied on all of those bases that Dr Carney's reports should be tendered before the Court pursuant to that section.
These facts are important for a number of reasons. The only evidence, apart from that of Mr Manolakis, supporting any claim in relation to the neck symptoms was that given by Dr Guirguis and Dr Carney. Dr Carney has changed his opinion in light of this second report.
In his evidence, Dr Guirguis said that having reviewed the videotape he could not detect any movement in the head or neck of Mr Manolakis sufficient to justify the expression of his opinion within his report and he would no longer stand by that opinion. He said that in order for there to be an injurious effect to a neck as complained of by Mr Manolakis he would expect there to have been some discernible jerk or sudden motion such as a jarring of the head of Mr Manolakis at the time of the collision. He said that none could be detected. Having based his opinion upon the creditworthiness of the version of events given to him by Mr Manolakis and that version now having been dispelled to his satisfaction by virtue of the videotape, he would not stand by his opinion.
I have earlier indicated that Mr Manolakis attended a general practitioner allegedly complaining about neck pain. There was no other evidence of any complaint by him of any neck pain caused by the accident and some of this evidence contradicts this assertion by Mr Manolakis.
In his report, Dr Guirguis referred to having received a letter from solicitors on 16 May 2013. The defendant contends, and I agree, that the medical evidence discloses that Mr Manolakis allegedly made one complaint about his neck on 24 December 2012 but that was connected with his compensation claim and he had a further investigation of his neck on 27 May 2013 also connected with the compensation claim. The defendant contends that these consultations are associated with the running of his home maintenance business.
Mr Manolakis informed some medical practitioners prior to and after 17 December 2012 that he was operating the home maintenance business that he had been operating since 2002. He said that he took time off in 2012 and 2013 to study but he also gave another version of those facts to Dr Osti.
The defendant contends that the evidence of the plaintiff about consulting with a doctor on 24 December 2012 for a neck condition connected with the collision cannot be accepted. Mr Manolakis did not call Dr Turner, his general practitioner. She was the person with whom he consulted on 24 December 2012. There was no explanation about why she was not called to give evidence.
The principal thrust of the defendant's submission is that pursuant to the terms of s.52 of the Civil Liability Act it is necessary for Mr Manolakis to prove, on the balance of probabilities, that he was significantly impaired for a period of at least seven days in the six months following the accident or, alternatively, to prove that medical evidence of the prescribed minimum has been previously incurred in connection with that injury.
Under s 52 of the Civil Liability Act 1936, I may award damages for non-economic loss only if I am satisfied on the balance of probability that the ability of Mr Manolakis to lead a normal life has been significantly impaired by an injury for a period of seven days or that medical expenses of the prescribed minimum have been reasonably incurred in connection with the injury. There was no evidence concerning the medical expenses allegedly incurred by Mr Manolakis. The question is whether or not his ability to lead a normal life has been significantly impaired for a period of seven days.
At paragraph [10,240.5] of the text Civil Procedure in South Australia the learned author says relevantly as follows:-
The following commentary relates to authorities under the repealed similar s 35A(1)(a). ‘Significantly impaired’ requires proof of some meaningful deterioration and not merely trivial deviation, from the plaintiff’s capacity to lead his or her normal life, but it does not require complete interruption of normal life: Speyer v Ballantyne (1990) 159 LSJS 179. ‘Significant impairment’ must be something more than appreciable impairment and must connote something which has an adverse effect on the ability of the plaintiff to lead the sort of life which he or she normally led: SGIC v Fiorente (1991) 160 LSJS 416. ‘Normal life’ as used in s 43(3)(b) of the Workers’ Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1986 means: ‘the life which the individual would have been capable of leading and would be expected to lead, if he had not suffered the disability …’ i.e. a subjective approach: Workers’ Rehabilitation and Compensation Corp v Phillips (1991) 160 LSJS 251 at 253. The period must be a continuous period of seven days, but it need not run from immediately after the injury: Custance v Prass (1989) 155 LSJS 136 and it need not bear any necessary relationship to absence from employment: Koulias v Reid (1992) 164 LSJS 20 at 29’.
The medical evidence indicates that there has been no meaningful deterioration in the neck condition of Mr Manolakis. Dr Carney was prepared to accept that merely because of pre-existing conditions, there may have been some trivial deviation from the ordinary position but that would have resolved within a day or two. It would not have been an interruption of the normal life of Mr Manolakis. There was no evidence that Mr Manolakis suffered an adverse effect on his ability to lead a normal life and he does not appear to have been absent from his employment as a result of the collision.
The defendant contends that Mr Manolakis has not demonstrated significant impairment for seven days. On his evidence, he said that he had suffered neck pain on the evening of the accident which did not resolve over the next seven days. There was no evidence led from his GP and according to the material before the Court, the earlier plan to call the GP was not followed up, even though the records of that GP were subpoenaed and available to the Court.
It follows that the only evidence before the Court as to a possible injury suffered by Mr Manolakis is that of Dr Carney who opined that it was possible there was some discomfort in the neck as a result of the collision simply because of pre-existing conditions. Dr Jackson did not agree with that view. In his opinion there were a number of factors which indicated that any neck condition suffered by Mr Manolakis in that period was directly attributable to the pre-existing neck conditions which appeared to have first become manifest from 1995.
I think there is no doubt that at the time of the collision Mr Manolakis was suffering a pre-existing injury to his neck. It could have been but was not exacerbated by the rear-end collision. I am not satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, having regard to the whole of the evidence, that Mr Manolakis has proved that there was an aggravation or exacerbation of a pre-existing condition in his neck at the point of the cervical spine as a result of the injury the subject of the claim. I have formed that view based upon the video evidence D17, the opinions expressed by Mr Anderson, the changes of opinion by Dr Carney and Dr Guirguis, the opinions expressed by Dr Jackson and the absence of any evidence led by the plaintiff concerning his attendance upon his general practitioner.
I turn then to economic loss. I have found that, having full regard to Exhibit D17 and the views expressed by the experts that I have described, there was not sufficient force applied to the head or neck of Mr Manolakis in the collision to cause him any injury or an exacerbation of an existing injury. Accepting only for the sake of discussion the opinion expressed by Dr Carney that whatever effect there may have been from the collision, that it would only have been transient, even for a person such as Mr Manolakis with his pre-existing conditions, there is no evidence before me to support a finding of an assessment under s.52 of the Civil Liability Act of any assessment greater than zero. This is because Dr Carney has expressed the view that at best, whatever may have been suffered by Mr Manolakis would have resolved in a couple of days and there is no disability for a period of seven days.
I acknowledge that the period of seven days does not have to be continuous, however I am satisfied on all the evidence that whatever condition was suffered by Mr Manolakis in his neck, it was as a result of the work that he was doing in his business, which I am satisfied he was conducting from 2002 onwards. There is no basis to make a finding of any mental injury. There is no basis to make any other assessment in relation to the claims of Mr Manolakis in his pleadings.
Turning then to economic loss, Mr Manolakis informed me that he had qualified as an accountant and wished to have an assessment as if he was an accountant. He said he was not working as an accountant because he had uncovered fraudulent activity in his place of employment and was asked to leave. All of that evidence is so vague and unreliable and I cannot make any findings relying upon it; I do not accept the evidence in any event.
In the period 2002 to 2004, he carried on his own consultancy which was unsuccessful and led to his bankruptcy. He also carried on the home handyman business at that time. He has provided no information to support his earnings prior to the accident as ordered by Judge Chivell. Notwithstanding, he was able to tell medical practitioners he had been self-employed for a number of years prior to the accident. It is impossible to reconcile why he has not followed the orders of the Court and why he has not put financial information before the Court.
It was to Dr Jackson that Mr Manolakis said that not only was he carrying on his consultancy from 2002 but he was also carrying on a business as a self-employed home maintenance man. That lasted until 2013. The evidence is that this work was casual and also involved installing television aerials which, as is obvious, is dangerous work that requires a high level of agility. He said that in a number of periods he did different things. Between 2005 and 2006 he did mainly lawn mowing and maintenance work. He seems to have done gardening work on a permanent retainer with Aveco retirement village. There was no evidence what salary he received for that work. The work was plainly not gratuitous and I would have expected there to be financial records associated with the payment received by him on an employment basis or a subcontract basis.
There is evidence as well that at the time of the accident Mr Manolakis was undertaking study. I have described that earlier in these reasons. He was able to tell Dr Guirguis, however, that he was working variable hours depending upon the demands of his business and he told Dr Guirguis that he might need to take some time off work because he was in significant pain, but he managed it most of the time.
I consider that a clear inference arises from all of the evidence that at least he had some form of continuity of work. For example, he told Dr Carney that he continued to work as a self-employed maintenance person but some hours were restricted and dependent on the particular days. He was, by then, receiving a disability support pension. The evidence of Mr Manolakis was that apart from a break from study, he resumed work in 2013. The defendant contends that Mr Manolakis was doing full-time home maintenance work following the accident and that the Court should find that he was doing more than simply some home maintenance work, but was fully engaged in a business.
I accept that submission of the defendant. I refer to Exhibits P19 and P20. These are certificates of insurance that show that Mr Manolakis was fully engaged in a business in the relevant period. There is other evidence that Mr Manolakis was representing to other agencies that he was working on largely a full-time basis during the last half of the calendar year in 2014.
Exhibit D5 is a series of emails between Mr Manolakis and Jobs Statewide, Norwood. The document discloses regular employment undertaken by him at the time he was granted the disability support pension on 20 November 2014. There is other evidence before the Court which suggests that in the same period he was actively involved in the undertaking of work.
Exhibit D2, p.32 shows that Mr Manolakis had joined the internet entity HI Pages, which actively advertises services provided under the De George Services banner. It lists the services Mr Manolakis provides, his availability to the public generally and the type of work he could undertake, such as repointing of roofs, roof restorations, roof guttering and repairs, lawn rejuvenation and landscaping, TV antennae and fibre optics. There is a reference to De George Services undertaking stone masonry, brick work, repointing, pressure cleaning and acid washing. Mr Manolakis said he had the necessary skills and capacity to do stone masonry and brick work generally.
He is advertised as being a master cable tradesman with over 20 years of relevant experience and having a list of professionals available to work with him. In his evidence Mr Manolakis was asked to provide details of these other tradesmen. He was not able to give an answer directly to that question and I formed the clear impression he was being evasive about those matters.

The same website also advertised that Mr Manolakis will be available to work between Mondays to Saturdays, 8 am to 6 pm and he provides a 10-year guarantee on workmanship. I asked him to explain how he could provide a 10-year guarantee on workmanship and he was not able to give me an answer, except to say if there was a guarantee there, he would honour it. The important issue is the impression that would be obtained by the ordinary objective reader of all of these services that are advertised to be provided. The list of them is very thorough and is very broadly based. The impression that would be created in the mind of the ordinary objective reader would be of a specialist service involved in general building work with employees or contractors would could carry out that very broad range of work. The work being done by him came to the attention of the Commissioner of Consumer Affairs who issued a public warning notice on 30 December 2016 and then more lately a media release.
The defendant arranged for video surveillance of the plaintiff: Exhibit D17. It shows Mr Manolakis working very actively on 16 May 2017 in roof rejuvenation work. It is dangerous work, on a roof, some parts of which are quite sharp. Mr Manolakis did not disagree with the film showing him operating in a largely unrestricted way in those circumstances.
Mr Manolakis also advertised his services on other websites. Another, called ‘Home Improvement Today’ carries his advertisements for provision of services of stump removal, irrigation systems and landscape retaining walls. He said that he has undertaken this work since the accident but not very much. However, due to the absence of any disclosure about those matters, it is impossible to form any particular view about that evidence.
Another website was ‘ShowMeLocal’ which advertises his services as a television antennae retailer and installer. Another is ‘True Local’ as the provider of landscape services. There was another internet service called ‘goguide’ in which he advertises as a landscaping design consultant. That carries a direct link to his website under the De George Services name. Then, finally, he advertises himself as a roof installer on the website ‘Find a Tradie’.
The impression I obtained is that he is generally and broadly advertising his services to attract the highest number of customers possible to his business. It is not the advertising profile of someone who is operating a minor business. I am satisfied that Mr Manolakis is aggressively attempting to attract trade to his business. That is inconsistent with the impression that he attempted to give me in evidence of running only a small business and to a limited extent. He has no building licence.
The important point is that he had an obligation to give disclosure about all of these matters. This was at the heart of the discussions before Judge Chivell. He did not make that disclosure. For example, he made no disclosure in relation De George Services. All that is known from the evidence is that he has been advertising his businesses and been involved, on a largely full-time basis, since he obtained the disability support pension.
In light of the absence of the material provided about the financial performance of the businesses and having regard to my significant doubts about the accuracy and reliability of his evidence, it is open to me to find that Mr Manolakis has been involved in the business generally on a full-time basis for a number of years. I do not accept his version of events suggesting that there was some watershed moment in 2013. I am unable to say for how long the businesses operated, as there was no evidence put of the registration of a business name. All that can be said is that he has operated a business, that it is earning income and quite apparently incurring expenses.
All of the evidence of Mr Manolakis is that he is now capable and I think for some time has been capable of operating in the business and performing the tasks required of it. He did not suggest that he was prevented from undertaking that work, at least since the surgery in 2016.
Mr Manolakis was a qualified accountant. It may be presumed that he, in that role, was aware of the obligations upon all Australians earning income in accordance with the Income Tax Assessment Act. He would also have had a clear understanding of the obligations of contractors running a business to report on a quarterly basis in relation to GST. He would have been very familiar with this, at least from 2002. I would not accept a contention to the opposite effect.
Mr Manolakis made no disclosure of his tax returns. He said he had not filed tax returns for many years, probably at least since 2014. He could not explain why. I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that he has not been declaring the whole of his income that he has been earning, either to Centrelink or to the Commissioner of Taxation. He was the subject of a number of orders for pre-trial disclosure and then in the management of the action to trial for provision of material concerning economic and non-economic loss.
Eventually, he asserted in his evidence that he did comply with his BAS requirements, but there was no evidence to support that assertion. He said he did not provide bank records and financial statement because of privacy issues. I find that explanation specious and I reject that evidence. I consider that Mr Manolakis was deliberately attempting to avoid the orders of the Court contumaciously; his evidence on that topic, I think, was an attempt to deliberately mislead the Court.
Part of Exhibit D7 is a page of material provided to a customer at Kilburn. It states that he must be paid cash because to be paid in cash means he does not have to put the job through his books. He tried to explain that document to me and said that people always understand if a price is put in cash, then it would be cheaper than a price plus GST; so much is obvious. Mr Manolakis then attempted to persuade me that notwithstanding the exhortation within the quote to be paid in cash, and the fact that he would not be putting the transaction through his books, he would declare the transaction in his taxation statements. A number of things follow.
The first is that there is a suggestion that Mr Manolakis has books. None have been disclosed. No information has been provided which would indicate that there is any source of financial records or books from which information may be obtained as a source of a declaration to the Commissioner, either on a quarterly BAS return or on an annual taxation return. I consider that the suggestion by Mr Manolakis that he would return that income, at least in his annual taxation returns, is also specious.
Mr Manolakis has not filed any taxation returns for a long time. The same applies to the businesses of De George Services. Despite being an accountant he did not recognise that insofar as he provides goods and services to customers, he is required to charge the relevant GST amount, to lodge a quarterly BAS return and for there to be a remittance of any excess to the Commissioner of Taxation. He is also required, like all citizens, to provide an annual tax return.
I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the Australian Taxation Office and Centrelink have not been informed of this conduct, these receipts or any expenses that may have been incurred by Mr Manolakis in carrying out this work. I would be similarly satisfied if the burden of proof was the criminal onus of beyond reasonable doubt.
In light of those findings and on the authorities that bind me, I am required to scrutinise Mr Manolakis' evidence with special care. I am satisfied that he has failed to honestly comply with the taxation laws of our country and that this failure reflects adversely on his credit. I may reject his evidence as being untrustworthy, at least about income. I would not speculate in his favour. I am satisfied and in light of the fact that he has informed the Court that he has not paid any income tax in the three years prior to the accident, despite for most of that period having operated a business, that there is no basis to assess any loss allegedly suffered by him.
Mr Manolakis asked for his damages to be assessed on the basis of his earnings as an accountant. He led no evidence about comparative earnings of accountants. There is no evidence about the level at which he would have been operating. There is no point of reference to be used by the Court in making an assessment of this loss. In relation to his position as an accountant, there is no evidence of him having attempted to obtain any employment using these skills that he obtained as an accountant.
He had also publicly criticised a number of public officials. I have earlier set out the accusations that have been made against the former Chief Justice and the current Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of South Australia and against a Senator. He agreed that if a search was made by an ordinarily competent human resource officer, that such material would become available and come to the notice of that officer.
I do not accept that there is any evidence before the Court that any proper assessment of damages, were it to be made, could be based on a level of income as may be obtained by a qualified accountant. He has not proved that he has the wherewithal or capacity to work in such a role. He has not proved by any form of evidence, that such roles are available to him and could have been undertaken by him at the relevant period. He has not proved what remuneration might have been available if he had undertaken such roles and he has not called any evidence of an expert nature from, for example, a human resources officer to say what other adverse information there may be in the market place about him that would not necessarily affect his chances of obtaining employment. There is no evidence on this and so many other topics and so a claim for economic loss on that basis and on all bases must be refused, and I do so.
There is no evidence before me concerning medical treatment and I make no assessment of special damages as claimed in the statement of claim. As a result of the appearance before Judge Chivell on 6 November 2018, Mr Manolakis was aware that it was necessary for him to prove special damages. He said he understood his obligations and he has not fulfilled any of them. He has not led any evidence of gratuitous services provided to him by a parent, spouse, domestic partner or child. There is no evidence that he received or required such services and so no assessment could be made, even if I accepted there was some injury sustained by him.
Mr Manolakis has not proved any need for ongoing care in the future. He said he has recovered from his neck injury, that he had had further treatment on his lumbar spine and on other injuries.
The video material shows he has fully recovered sufficiently from knee surgery to be able to climb up, on and across roofs. Any assistance which would have been required would have been associated with further surgery that he underwent with Dr Molloy. There is no evidence of future domestic assistance required for those matters. The evidence contraindicates such a requirement because of his capacity to carry out the work as indicated on Exhibit P17.
There was no evidence to support any claim for travel costs, nor for interest in any event because he has not proved any past economic loss and so interest would not be payable.
In his written submissions, Mr Manolakis described his medical history. He then criticised the use of the video (P17) and the views formed by the experts. He made a specific criticism of those who viewed the video (P17) and could detect no movement or no significant movement in his head at the time of the collision. He said that when the defence and its representatives examined the video, they did so in a grossly improper manner and without due care to the point of being indifferent and careless or alternatively, if it be presumed that those persons had adequately examined the video, then the defendant has deliberately misled the Court.
His written submissions then went on to attempt to justify these criticisms. He said that Dr Robin Jackson, orthopaedic surgeon, had examined the video carelessly and in breach of his duty as an independent medical expert and with a careless indifference to the ascertainment of the facts. He alleged that Dr Jackson was under a duty to inform the Court of his limitations as a viewer of a video and that he was required to seek expert assistance in that examination so that it was done in an open and unbiased manner. He submitted that if Dr Jackson had done that, he would have seen that on the video, the plaintiff’s head would have jerked as described in the Statement of Claim. His inappropriate viewing of the video meant that his mind was poisoned and this was exacerbated by the untested opinion of Dr Carney. As a result, Dr Jackson had a poisoned and closed mind, he could not provide an unbiased examination of the video and his evidence should not be accepted.
I have earlier summarised the evidence of Dr Jackson. There is no factual or other basis for the criticisms of Dr Jackson as made by the plaintiff. There is certainly no evidence to suggest that he had a ‘… poisoned and closed mind (and) could not provide an unbiased examination of the unbiased examination of the video …’ I reject those submissions.
Mr Manolakis made similar criticisms of Adjunct Associate Professor Anderson (Mr Anderson). He argued that the collision between the bus and the vehicle driven by the defendant would have created a force on the bus similar to the bending force applied to a bow when a string is pulled back. The force exerted by the collision was no mere push from behind and was applied largely to the right hand side of the bus, the same side on which the plaintiff was sitting at the time. He alleged that Mr Anderson had failed to consider how the force of the collision was applied at the relevant time. Mr Manolakis alleged that when Mr Anderson lowered his estimate of the speed of the defendant’s vehicle at the time of the collision, he failed to exercise due care as an expert, that his mind was poisoned by his receipt of the reports of Dr Carney and that he had failed to consider the force of the collision on the back right hand side of the bus. It appears that Mr Manolakis is suggesting that Mr Anderson failed to make a proper assessment of the physical effect of the collision upon the bus. He alleged that he had not viewed the occupants of the bus in the video with any proper care. This was, on Mr Manolakis’ argument, self-evident because he needed to re-examine the video in the Court and in that process, his mind had been poisoned by the untested opinion of Dr Carney. He could not provide an unbiased examination of the video because he had not properly examined it earlier.
I am unable to accept these submissions. I am satisfied that Mr Anderson very carefully considered all of the relevant physical circumstances involved in the collision and formed his opinion based on the objectively available material facts.
Mr Manolakis then made criticisms of the reports of Dr Carney. The principal criticism was that Dr Carney had prepared reports suggesting that Mr Manolakis be conservatively managed. Very soon after those reports were prepared, Dr Molloy performed a number of surgeries upon the neck and later the back of Mr Manolakis. This appears to be an attack upon the competency of Dr Carney. I am unable to accept that submission plainly because it is well understood that two different surgeons can come to entirely different views about the management of medical conditions. Merely because they have a different view does not mean that one or other of them is not competent.
Mr Manolakis then criticised Dr Carney for producing the report of 11 October 2016 having reflected upon the video tape. He alleged that there is evidence before the Court that there was a jerking motion between 8.49.02 and 8.49.03 hours. I am unable to accept that submission. The video was in a continual reel and there is no evidence at all of any jerking of the head of Mr Manolakis at that time or at any other time. Mr Manolakis then asserted that Dr Carney had examined the video with complete carelessness and in clear breach of his duty as an independent medical expert and with a careless indifference to the ascertainment of the facts. He alleges that it was his duty to seek assistance to properly view the video. For the same reasons I am unable to accept that submission of Mr Manolakis.
In his further submissions Mr Manolakis criticises the methods used by Mr Ward in the cross-examination of Dr Guirgius. I have earlier dealt with that matter in the first decision in this action and I am unable to accept that submission. I intervened in the course of the cross-examination at the time that I thought appropriate. The criticism is misplaced. Mr Manolakis then goes on to make further criticisms of Mr Carney which I am unable to accept. Even if I accepted them, my decision would not change. Every opportunity was then given to Mr Manolakis to make further oral submissions in support of his written submissions.
As I have earlier indicated, in his written submissions Mr Manolakis made allegations tantamount to fraud by the defendant. Mr Manolakis appears to suggest that there had been a deliberate obfuscatory view taken of the video material within the bus that has infected the opinions that have been expressed in relation to it and that, as a result, the views have been poisoned. This is tantamount to an allegation of a deliberate fabrication of a view notwithstanding the evidence. I reject that submission as unsubstantiated. I am of the view that any unsubstantiated allegation of that nature is an abuse of process and I also reject it on that further basis.
Having reviewed all of the evidence led by the defendant and in particular the medical reports of Dr Carney, the details in relation to the employment of Mr Manolakis, the reports of Dr Jackson, the report of Mr Anderson and having heard the evidence of Dr Guirguis in the Court, I am satisfied that the plaintiff has failed to prove that as a result of a collision on the day on 17 December 2012, he has sustained any injury or any exacerbation of any injury.
I therefore reject the plaintiff's claim for personal injuries, loss and damage as pleaded in paragraphs 11, 12, 13 and 14 of the statement of claim. I am satisfied on the whole of the evidence that whatever effect the collision had upon Mr Manolakis, it was so minimal that it had no effect upon him physically.
As Mr Anderson informed the Court, the effect of the collision, when properly measured, having regard to objective criteria, was much less than the effect on a passenger on a bus of it braking or accelerating from a stationary position.
I dismiss the plaintiff's claim.
Earlier in these reasons I have identified my dissatisfaction with the evidence given by Mr Manolakis, his evidence about his failure to lodge either annual taxation returns or quarterly BAS Statements. My assessment of the evidence is that he has failed to properly disclose all of his income to either the Commissioner of Taxation or to the Centrelink authorities.
I order that these reasons together with all of the exhibits and the transcript be made available to the appropriate authorities for further investigation if thought fit. I authorise that a copy of these reasons be forwarded to the appropriate representative of the Commissioner of Taxation in South Australia and of the appropriate representative of Centrelink South Australia.
In the absence of any submissions to the contrary, and in the usual course, I order that the defendant has the costs of these proceedings. At the time of announcing my judgement the defendant informed me that he wished to seek an elevated order for costs. In those circumstances, I give leave to the defendant to bring any further costs application as he sees fit and I will hear the parties further on 7 February 2019.