Manny v Australian Postal Corporation; Manny v Commonwealth; Manny v University of Canberra

[2025] ACTCA 24

SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY

COURT OF APPEAL

Case Title: 

Manny v Australian Postal Corporation; Manny v Commonwealth; Manny v University of Canberra

Citation: 

[2025] ACTCA 24

Hearing Date: 

11 July 2025

Decision Date: 

17 July 2025

Before: 

Elkaim AJ

Decision: 

See [43]

Catchwords: 

APPEAL – APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT – Civil law – application for leave to appeal – appeal from interlocutory

decision – appeal to set aside judgment– leave refused

Legislation Cited: 

Supreme Court Act 1933 (ACT) s 37J
Capital Property Projects v PLA (ACT) [2008] ACTCA 9

Cases Cited: 

Manny v Australian Postal Corporation [2025] ACTSC 148
Manny v Commonwealth of Australia (No 2) [2025] ACTSC 146
Manny v Shiels [2022] ACTCA 22
Manny v University of Canberra (No 2) [2025] ACTSC 147

P and W v Manny & Anor [2010] ACTSC 50

Parties: 

Jeff Manny (Appellant)
Commonwealth of Australia (1st Respondent)

University of Canberra (2nd Respondent)
Australian Postal Corporation (3rd Respondent)

Representation: 

Counsel

Self-represented (Appellant)
W Sharwood (1st, 2nd, 3rd Respondents)

Solicitors

Self-represented (Appellant)
Moray and Agnew (1st, 3rd Respondents)

Thomson Cooper (2nd Respondent)

File Number: 

ACTCA 13 of 2025

Decisions Under Appeal: 

Court/Tribunal:	Supreme Court of the ACT
Before:	McWilliam J
Date of Decision:	14 April 2025
Case Title:  Citation:	Manny v Australian Postal Corporation

[2025] ACTSC 148

Court/Tribunal:	Supreme Court of the ACT
Before:	McWilliam J
Date of Decision:	14 April 2025
Case Title:	Manny v Commonwealth of Australia (No
2)
Citation:	[2025] ACTSC 146
Court/Tribunal:	Supreme Court of the ACT
Before:	McWilliam J
Date of Decision:	14 April 2025
Case Title:	Manny v University of Canberra (No 2)
Citation:	[2025] ACTSC 147

ELKAIM AJ:

Introduction

1․	I am sitting in this matter as the Court of Appeal constituted by a single judge pursuant
to s 37J of the Supreme Court Act 1933 (ACT).
2․	There is only one Court of Appeal file (AC 13 of 2025) which encompasses a number of
matters and a multitude of applications in proceeding. The primary decisions within AC
13 are:

(a)	Manny v Australian Postal Corporation [2025] ACTSC 148.
(b)	Manny v Commonwealth of Australia (No 2) [2025] ACTSC 146.
(c)	Manny v University of Canberra (No 2) [2025] ACTSC 147.

3․	All of the above decisions were made by McWilliam J. Mr Sharwood appeared for the
defendants in each matter. All three decisions are interlocutory in nature, necessitating
the obtaining of leave to appeal.
4․	There is also an application by Mr Manny in P and W v Manny & Anor [2010] ACTSC 50
(P and W) in which Mr Manny seeks leave to appeal. I’m not sure why it is included in
AC 13. Mr Sharwood, or his instructing solicitors, do not appear in the matter. It does not
appear to have been served. Nevertheless, it is an application which must so obviously
be dismissed that I will deal with it.
5․	The applications in proceeding seem to be:

(a)	Filed by the Australian Postal Corporation on 24 June 2025.
(b)	Filed by the Commonwealth of Australia on 24 June 2025.
(c)	Filed by the University of Canberra on 24 June 2025.
(d)	Filed by Mr Manny on 1 July 2025.
(e)	Three applications filed by Mr Manny on 3 July 2025.
(f)	Filed by Mr Manny on 4 July 2025.
(g)	Filed by Mr Manny on 7 July 2025 (in the P and W case).

6․	When I endeavoured to clarify the scope of the hearing, and put to Mr Manny that he
faced a difficulty because he had never sought leave to appeal he said that he had in
fact sought leave, at least to file his appeals out of time. I understood this occurred on
15 May 2025. Unfortunately, when he presented his application to the registry it was not
appreciated that the original decisions had been interlocutory, therefore having a 7 day
limit to file a leave application. Rather the approach taken was that 28 days (the normal appeal time) was applicable and there was no need to file the application because the
appeals were actually in time.
7․	The applicants for the striking out of the appeals accepted that Mr Manny had tried to
file, at least an application to proceed out of time, and in turn accepted that the matter
should proceed as if an application for leave to appeal from an interlocutory decision was
before the court. I made orders accordingly and asked the parties how they wished to
proceed.
8․	All sides said they wished to proceed immediately. Mr Sharwood said:

What I was going to say was the respondents are very keen to have this matter dealt with today. (T 12.13)

9․	Mr Manny wanted to proceed because he feared that his ill-health would not permit him
to deal with the applications even if adjourned for only two weeks. This exchange
occurred:

MR MANNY: Your Honour, I am very sick. I don't think I'll survive two weeks. I might die. I haven't slept a minute last night. I am very, very sick.

HIS HONOUR: So you want to finish it up today as well?

MR MANNY: If I don't finish it, it will be finished without me.

HIS HONOUR: All right. I'll give leave to Mr Manny to seek leave today for leave to appeal against an interlocutory judgment and leave to appeal out of time. Okay?

MR MANNY: Okay. Thank you. (T 12.23)

10․	The above exchange begs the question of, if Mr Manny obtained leave, how his health
would allow him to run the appeals which would not come on for some time.
11․	Because of the request of the parties, I agreed to hear Mr Manny’s application for leave
to appeal. The application was opposed other than in respect of the time limits.
12․	Excepting P and W, the matters accordingly became applications by Mr Manny for leave
to appeal. For convenience, I will continue to refer to Mr Manny by his name and will
refer to the defendants in the above three cases as the respondents.

P and W

13․	P and W was a defamation case brought against Mr Manny by two plaintiffs. Gray J
found in favour of one of the plaintiffs. Mr Manny was ordered to pay a total of $26,200
in damages.
14․	Mr Manny made it very clear, and I accept, that his life has followed a downward spiral
ever since the decision in P and W and that the matters that came before McWilliam J
were all products, directly or indirectly, of P and W.
15․	In P and W, Mr Manny is, I think, seeking summary judgment or the right to appeal the
decision which he wants set aside. He cannot achieve either target. The case was
discussed in detail by McWilliam J in Manny v Commonwealth of Australia (No 2), from
[44]. I think it appropriate to quote from her Honour’s judgment and particularly note the
references to a previous attempt to appeal which was dealt with by Kennett J in Manny
v Shiels [2022] ACTCA 22:

44․ The plaintiff has alleged fraud and collusion against the Commonwealth as being liable for actions of its police officers. The allegations concern the P and W litigation and the underlying conduct that led to that defamation proceeding. The plaintiff alleges conduct constituting fraud or collusion before, during and after 27 August 2004, which led to the orders being made in 2010 by Gray J in P and W.

45․ The reason that the plaintiff cannot now run a separate claim against the Commonwealth is that the collusion or fraud that the plaintiff alleges concern the very facts that were traversed in P and W. The plaintiff (who was the first defendant in that

proceeding) expressly made allegations about the veracity of a police officer’s evidence

during the trial, including an apparent suggestion that the evidence was “corrupted”:

see P and W at [88]. That police officer was named again in the pleading here. The

court at first instance did not accept the plaintiff’s version of events: P and W at [101].

46․ The plaintiff unsuccessfully appealed the result in P and W by way of a cross- appeal: Shiels v Manny and Manny Pty Ltd; Manny v Shiels [2012] ACTCA 22

(Shiels). The grounds of the plaintiff’s cross-appeal were considered in Shiels at [20]

and following. There was no reference to fraud or collusion in the appeal pursued.

47․ More recently before Kennett J, the plaintiff unsuccessfully sought a further opportunity to appeal P and W out of time: Manny 2022. One of the grounds on which the plaintiff relied was that the judgment in P and W constituted a grave miscarriage of justice which should not be allowed to stand in the public interest: Manny 2022 at [13]. Kennett J described the underlying facts of P and W at [3]-[5]:

3.         In 2004, Peter Shiels (the first respondent) and his son, Warwick Shiels (the second respondent), operated a karate school in Belconnen. At that time, Peter Shiels was a retired lawyer and Warwick Shiels was a Senior Constable in the

Australian Federal Police. Mr Manny’s three sons were students at the karate

school. On 27 August 2004, there was a physical altercation at the school. Mr Manny reported the incident to the Police, claiming that he had been assaulted by both Peter Shiels and Warwick Shiels.

4.         Peter Shiels alleged that he subsequently received threats from Mr Manny over the telephone. That matter was reported to the Police and Peter Shiels obtained a protection order against Mr Manny.

5.         In the weeks that followed, Mr Manny wrote two letters which he sent to the Australian Federal Police. The first letter, dated 1 September 2004, alleged that both Peter and Warwick Shiels had assaulted him on 27 August 2004. The

second letter, dated 9 November 2004 and sent on the letterhead of “Jeff

Manny Pty Ltd ABN 90 097 755 916”, also referred to the alleged assault and

contained further allegations: that Peter Shiels was a paedophile, had molested

young boys including Mr Manny’s children, and had threatened to harm Mr

Manny and his children; and that Warwick Shiels molested girls and had

engaged in “mental and physical assault” against boys. When this letter came

to the attention of the respondents, they sued Mr Manny and Jeff Manny Pty
Ltd for defamation.

48․ Kennett J later referred to the appeal in Shiels and stated at [17]:

The judgment of Gray J has become merged in the judgment of the Court of

Appeal: Wishart v Fraser (1941) 64 CLR 470, 478 (Starke J), 482–483 (Dixon J), 487

(McTiernan J), 491 (Williams J); Theiss Pty Ltd v Industrial Court of New South Wales [2010] NSWCA 252; 78 NSWLR 94, [74] (Spigelman CJ). It is the latter which now binds the parties. The judgment of Gray J is not amenable to any further appeal to this Court; nor could this Court entertain an appeal from its own judgment.

49․ His Honour found that a grant of leave would be futile in the absence of fresh

evidence: Manny 2022 at [18]. Kennett J dealt with the proposed miscarriage of justice
ground, stating at [19]:

… The argument that the judgment constituted a miscarriage of justice was not

supported except by Mr Manny’s own assertions about things that had occurred during

the trial and in the pre-trial dealings between the parties; and it was not suggested, for example, that Mr Manny had only recently become aware of these matters. Finally, while the judgment was adverse to Mr Manny and no doubt a source of pain and trouble for him, the suggestion that it is the source of all of his problems appears overstated; and, even if it be correct, it does not take the matter anywhere except as an adjunct to his claim of a miscarriage of justice.

16․ I particularly note these words by Kennett J:

The judgment of Gray J is not amenable to any further appeal to this Court; nor could this

Court entertain an appeal from its own judgment.

17․	Nothing has changed. Mr Manny made much of a bundle of documents which he said
had been handed to him by McWilliam J and which contained evidence to counter the
original decision of Gray J. In particular he was concerned about the many findings of
Gray J concerning malice on Mr Manny’s part. One of the documents he referred to was
a letter sent by Mr Manny to P and W’s lawyers on 30 August 2025 in which Mr Manny
expresses sentiments inconsistent with malice.
18․	I am not satisfied that this letter, or in fact any of the other material included with the
application in proceeding filed on 7 July 2025 amounts to fresh evidence. Firstly, I am
not satisfied that Mr Manny received this material before the hearing before Kennett J.
Secondly, and more importantly, the letter and much of the other material has a notation
to the effect that it is an exhibit. It must have been before the court. It is not fresh.
19․	There is no scope for an appeal in P and W. I will make an order that Mr Manny’s
application in proceeding is dismissed.

Manny v Commonwealth of Australia, The Australian Postal Corporation and the

University of Canberra.

20․	Although each of these matters led to a separate judgment I will deal with them at the
same time because, in seeking leave, Mr Manny put his submissions on leave together
for all three cases.

21․ In Manny v Commonwealth of Australia, McWilliam J dismissed Mr Manny’s

(consolidated) proceedings which involved allegations against police officers.

22․	In Manny v Australian Postal Corporation, the filed proceedings were struck out and the
overall proceedings were dismissed.
23․	Again, in Manny v University of Canberra, the filed pleadings were struck out and the
overall proceedings were dismissed.
24․	The Commonwealth matter was a consolidated proceeding bringing together seven
separate proceedings.
25․	There is no issue that this decision, as well as the decisions against the University of
Canberra and the Australian Postal Corporation were interlocutory decisions in which
the proceedings were dismissed as being either vexatious or an abuse of process. Mr
Manny himself states in his affidavit of 15 May 2025, at [11], that:

“Her Honour’s reason to dismiss all the matters Jeff Manny v Commonwealth was that they

are abuse of process without any legitimate grounds.”

26․	In Capital Property Projects v PLA (ACT) [2008] ACTCA 9, Refshauge J examined the
requirements for the granting of leave, commencing at [30]. Clearly the onus is on the
person seeking leave to demonstrate that the primary decisions are “attended with
difficulty” and a major injustice would ensue if leave was not granted.
27․	Mr Manny put forward, in a very roundabout manner, five reasons why leave should be
granted:

1.       McWilliam J should not have heard the cases. He said he made an application

in 2023 for her Honour to recuse herself because her husband was a solicitor

in the same firm as the one acting for the defendants.

2.       The decisions contained “lots of deliberate mistakes.”

3.       McWilliam J had encouraged him not to sue a Mr Lardner because Mr Lardner

was not insured. Alternatively he was encouraged to sue the Commonwealth.

4.       There had been discrimination against him.

5.       Ever since 2004, but in particular since the 2010 decision of Gray J, Mr Manny

and his family had suffered significantly so that it would be unjust if he could not

pursue his rights.

28․	I will deal with each of the above reasons in turn.
29․	There is no evidence that Mr Manny ever made an application that McWilliam J should
not hear his case. It is correct that her Honour, appropriately, disclosed that her partner
worked in the firm of solicitors representing the defendants. However, her Honour made
it clear that he worked in the Sydney office and not in the Canberra office and had no
connection whatsoever with the case. More importantly Mr Manny did not take any point
of objection.
30․	Quite to the contrary, as is shown by this excerpt from the transcript on 13 October 2023:

HER HONOUR: Just one moment. Mr Manny, can I just tell you something. I just want to tell you something. Are you instructed by Moray & Agnew in that matter?

MR PAGE: I am, your Honour.

HER HONOUR: In the Canberra office?

MR PAGE: Yes.

HER HONOUR: All right. Mr Manny, my husband works for Moray & Agnew. My husband works for Moray & Agnew.

MR MANNY: Nice.

HER HONOUR: He works for the Sydney office. He is a partner of the Sydney office. He’s

not a partner of the Canberra office. He has nothing to do, no financial interest, in the Canberra office. Knowing that, do you have any objection to me listing a matter for hearing that involves the Canberra office of Moray & Agnew?

MR MANNY: I don’t have any objection to anything you do, your Honour.

31․	Accordingly, there is no substance in the assertion that McWilliam J should not have
heard the case.
32․	I repeatedly asked Mr Manny to identify at least some of the deliberate mistakes made
by her Honour. He did not do so. Rather he concentrated on a theme which was that her
Honour had inappropriately conflated the various proceedings that had been
consolidated into the Commonwealth matter and had not dealt with them on an individual
basis.
33․	An examination of the decision shows that the assertion is quite wrong. Her Honour has
carefully examined each of the matters and dealt with them.
34․	Another so-called deliberate error, which applies to all of the proceedings, is that Mr
Manny often complained that applications in proceeding that he had filed, usually in
response to an application filed by the opposing side, had not been dealt with. He has
obviously failed to appreciate that an application made to challenge an earlier application
may not be dealt with if the earlier application is successful. For example, an application
to strike out a proceeding, if successful, will have the consequence that an opposing
application filed later in time (but before the first application is heard) will not be dealt
with because the proceedings had been struck out.
35․	A particular example of this error was that Mr Manny said that he had filed applications
in proceeding to defeat applications to strike out his cases. He understood his
applications would come before McWilliam J on 14 April 2025. However, on that date her
Honour delivered judgment, apparently ignoring Mr Manny’s applications. In reality, and
not understood by Mr Manny, was that her Honour had noted there was no need to deal
with his applications because of the success of the defendants’ respective applications.
36․	As to the encouragement not to sue Mr Lardner there is simply no evidence to that effect
and no evidence to establish anything incorrect, or inappropriate, in her Honour’s
judgment.
37․	I do not know if there has been discrimination against Mr Manny over the last 21 years.
There may well have been. But this has nothing to do with the decisions made by her
Honour. No element of discrimination is apparent in anything done or said by her Honour.
38․	Finally, Mr Manny said that he had been “flying” in 2004 and that his current unfortunate
circumstances, which included impoverishment and ill-health, were a product of the
events in 2004 and in particular the decision of Gray J. He identified the findings of malice
as having spread to many areas of his life, both personal and business, and resulted in
him being persecuted and having to abandon his enterprises, including an air-
conditioning business.
39․	Even accepting that Mr Manny is correct, as has been seen above, the decision by Gray
J has been subject to an appeal and has also been through a process to reopen it, as
considered by Kennett J. In addition, the connection between the historical events and
the decision of McWilliam J may be to inform the background to the decisions, but cannot
be seen as any demonstration of error within the decision.
40․	I am not satisfied that Mr Manny has established that leave should be given in the
Commonwealth matter.
41․	Mr Manny did not identify any specific error in the Australian Postal Corporation matter
and scrutiny of the judgment does not reveal any error. Her Honour’s findings of an abuse
of process is well reasoned and in my view, beyond reproach.
42․	The same is true of the University of Canberra matter. Very little was advanced by Mr
Manny to impeach this judgment. The judgment also ends with a finding of an abuse of
process. Her Honour said, at [46]:

As will be apparent from the reasons above, on the material facts disclosed involving the

plaintiff’s interaction with the University, there is no claim raised by the plaintiff (even faintly)

which is capable of being argued against the University. In those circumstances, it is

appropriate to dismiss the proceeding.

43․	Mr Manny has failed to establish that there is any basis, or even close to a basis, to show
that her Honour’s reasons are subject to doubt.

Final orders

44․ I make the following orders:

1.       The hearing before me, in respect of the judgments involving the

Commonwealth of Australia, the Australian Postal Corporation and the

University of Canberra are to be treated as applications by Mr Manny for leave

to appeal from an interlocutory judgment.

2.       To the extent that it is necessary, Mr Manny has leave to proceed out of time in

his applications for leave to appeal against the interlocutory judgments.

3.       The application in proceeding filed by Mr Manny on 7 July 2025 in respect of

the judgment in P and W v Manny and Anor [2010] ACTSC 50 is dismissed.

4.       Leave to appeal in each, and all, of the proceedings falling within ACTCA 13 of

2025 is refused.

5.       Mr Manny is to pay the costs of the respondents in matter number ACTCA 13

of 2025.

I certify that the preceding forty-four [44] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of his Honour Acting Justice Elkaim

Associate: N Dwyer

Date: 22/07/2025