Manning v State of South Australia

Link copied
Case Copied 21 min read

SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Civil: Application for Judicial Review)

MANNING v STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

[2015] SASC 164

Judgment of The Honourable Justice Nicholson

15 October 2015

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - JUDICIAL REVIEW - GROUNDS OF REVIEW - ERROR OF LAW

CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCE - POST-CUSTODIAL ORDERS - PAROLE - ELIGIBILITY AND RELEASE

CRIMINAL LAW - PARTICULAR OFFENCES - PROPERTY OFFENCES - BURGLARY, HOUSEBREAKING AND LIKE OFFENCES - ENTERING AS TRESPASSER OR WITH INTENT OR BEING FOUND WITH INTENT

Application for judicial review. The plaintiff pleaded guilty to the offences of theft and serious criminal trespass in a place of residence, pursuant to sections 134(1) and 170(1) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935, respectively. On 1 April 2014, the plaintiff was sentenced in the Magistrates Court to a term of imprisonment of 12 months with a non-parole period of three months. When eligible for parole, the plaintiff made an application to the Parole Board of South Australia and, on 30 October 2014, the Parole Board refused her application relying on the discretion available to it under section 67 of the Correctional Services Act 1992.

The plaintiff contends that, pursuant to section 66(1) of the Correctional Services Act 1992, she was eligible for automatic parole and, therefore, the Parole Board’s refusal to grant automatic parole constituted an error of law such that she was invalidly detained from the date of eligibility of release until she was released from custody on 15 December 2014. The plaintiff seeks an order in the nature of certiorari to quash the Parole Board’s decision and a declaration as to the application of section 66 of the Correctional Services Act 1992. 

The second defendant contends that the plaintiff was not entitled to automatic parole because the offence of serious criminal trespass in a place of residence comprised a “home invasion” and therefore an “offence of personal violence”, as defined in the Act, which rendered her ineligible for automatic parole pursuant to section 66. The plaintiff contends that the circumstances of her offending did not amount to a “home invasion” such as to bring her within the definition of “offence of personal violence”.

Held:

1.  Application refused.

2.  The term “home invasion” in section 66(3)(b) of the Correctional Services Act 1992 is to have its ordinary meaning such that it will include circumstances where an offender unlawfully enters a residence of a victim without permission.

3.  The plaintiff was not entitled to automatic parole pursuant to section 66(1) of the Correctional Services Act 1992, as she had committed an “offence of personal violence”. The decision of the Parole Board is valid.

Correctional Services Act 1992 (SA) s 66, s 67 ; Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 15, s 134, s 170; Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) s 20A, referred to.
Manning v Police [2015] SASC 49; Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority [1998] HCA 28, (1998) 194 CLR 355; Lippl v Haines (1989) 18 NSWLR 620; Entick…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Manning v State of South Australia and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2015] SASC 164
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Manning v State of South Australia, the plaintiff sought judicial review of a decision made by the second defendant, the Commissioner of Police in South Australia, regarding the plaintiff's eligibility for parole. The plaintiff, who had been convicted of a property offence involving criminal trespass, argued that the Commissioner had erred in determining that her offence constituted a "home invasion" and, consequently, an "offence of personal violence." This classification affected her parole eligibility under section 66 of the Corrections Services Act 1988. The primary issue before the court was whether the offence committed by the plaintiff constituted a "home invasion" and, if so, whether this should be classified as an "offence of personal violence."

The court examined the statutory definitions of "home invasion" and "offence of personal violence" in various contexts, including section 66 of the Corrections Services Act 1988, Division 2A of the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988, and section 15C of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935. The court noted that "home invasion" was not defined in section 66 but was defined in other statutes with different purposes. The court concluded that the presence of a victim in the premises was an essential requirement for a "home invasion" to be made out under Division 2A of the Sentencing Act. However, the definition under section 15C did not require the presence of a victim, which could potentially capture situations where the premises are empty during the trespass.

The court found that the plaintiff's offence did not constitute a "home invasion" as defined in Division 2A of the Sentencing Act because there was no victim present in the premises at the time of the trespass. The court held that the statutory definition in section 15C, which did not require the presence of a victim, did not apply to the classification of offences under section 66. Consequently, the plaintiff's offence did not qualify as an "offence of personal violence" for the purposes of determining her parole eligibility. The court dismissed the plaintiff's application for judicial review.

The court ordered that the plaintiff’s application for judicial review be dismissed and that no orders for damages be made, as the plaintiff had not established a basis for such an award. The court did not need to determine whether the plaintiff would have been entitled to seek damages in another forum or through separate proceedings.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

NICHOLSON J
I agree that, by reference to the matters pleaded by the plaintiff, no basis upon which the Court could award damages has been established, even if the plaintiff had been wrongly imprisoned. However, whether or not the plaintiff, had she succeeded with judicial review, would have been entitled to seek damages in some other forum or through separate proceedings is not a matter I need to determine.Conclusion The plaintiff’s application for judicial review is dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: NICHOLSON J

It is to be accepted that the factual basis of the plaintiff’s offending gave rise to a serious criminal trespass in a place of residence very much at the low end of the spectrum for offences of this nature. No element of personal violence was, in fact, involved. Only in the most technical sense, might it be said that an element of violence towards, or with respect to, property was involved. Nevertheless, by relying on the phrase “home invasion” in its literal sense, the second defendant contends that a home was invaded and that, by force of the statutory definition, an “offence of personal violence” was committed. The plaintiff contends that the offence as committed by her, on its facts, did not constitute a “home invasion”. The plaintiff further contends, in the alternative, that on its proper construction, “an offence of personal violence” does not include a “home invasion” of the type committed by the plaintiff where no violence is involved.Consideration An immediate difficulty when considering the proper construction of the exception “offence of personal violence” arises from the fact that its included component “home invasion” is not itself defined for the purposes of section 66. The notion of “home invasion” is defined for the purpose of its inclusion as a “category A serious offence” within Division 2A of the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988. It is also defined for the purpose of section 15C of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935. Section 15C provides, inter alia, that the requirement of reasonable proportionality is not to apply in certain circumstances where a defendant has engaged in violent conduct by way of defence against a home invasion. In each case, the term “home invasion” is used in a context and for an underlying purpose which is very different from that pertinent to section 66 of the CSA. However, of momentary interest is the fact that the statutory definition in each case is different. Under Division 2A of the Sentencing Act, an offender who has committed one or more “category A serious offences” may, in appropriate circumstances, be declared a serious repeat offender with adverse consequences for that person with respect to future sentencing outcomes. A “category A serious offence” includes a “home invasion” which term is itself defined for this purpose to mean “a criminal trespass committed in a place of residence while a person is lawfully present in the place and the trespasser knows of the person’s presence or is reckless about whether anyone is in the place”.[8] It can be seen that the presence of a victim (and appropriate knowledge in the defendant) is an essential requirement for a “home invasion” to be made out. In these circumstances, the risk of physical violence occurring, or of the victim having a fear and apprehension that physical violence may occur, is enhanced. [8] Section 20A(1) of the Sentencing Act. By way of contrast, the defence available under section 15C to an occupant who engages in violent conduct in defence of a home invasion will apply in circumstances where the notion of “home invasion” is defined differently, namely, and merely, “a serious criminal trespass committed in a place of residence”.[9] In this case, Parliament defined the term “home invasion” in a way that does not require a victim to be present in the premises. Of course, it might be put that this situation is quite unlikely to occur. If one is talking about a victim taking physical action to defend against a home invasion, ipso facto, the victim will be present. To this extent, it would be unnecessary to include this element in the definition of “home invasion”. It is not necessary, for present purposes, that I form a conclusion as to a proper construction or understanding of the term “home invasion” as used in section 15C. However, it may be that Parliament intended to employ a wider definition here in order to capture, for example, the situation where the premises are empty at the time of the home invasion but the occupant returns as the invaders are leaving. They may engage one another in the front yard or in the street and the circumstances may be such as to involve conduct that is genuinely in defence of property.[9] Section 15C(3) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act.