Mandie v Memart Nominees Pty Ltd (No 3)

Link copied
Case Copied 53 min read
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA Not Restricted

AT MELBOURNE

COMMON LAW DIVISION
TRUSTS, EQUITY AND PROBATE LIST

S CI 2014 06635

EDWARD NICHOLAS MANDIE and others Plaintiffs
v
MEMART NOMINEES PTY LTD (ACN 005 024 617) (as Trustee for the DAVID MANDIE FAMILY TRUST) Defendant

---

JUDGE:

McMillan J

WHERE HELD:

Melbourne

DATE OF HEARING:

27 April 2016

DATE OF RULING:

23 May 2016

CASE MAY BE CITED AS:

Mandie v Memart Nominees Pty Ltd (No 3)

MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:

[2016] VSC 267

---

COURTS AND JUDGES — Judges — Disqualification — Actual bias — Apprehended bias – Discretion to recuse — Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng (2001) 205 CLR 507 — Michael Wilson & Partners Limited v Nicholls (2011) 244 CLR 427 — Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337 — Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488.

---

APPEARANCES:

Counsel Solicitors
For the Plaintiffs Mr R Gillies QC Cornwall Stodart
Mr B Jellis
For the Defendant Mr A Archibald QC Allens
Mr P Herzfeld

SCHEDULE OF PARTIES

EDWARD NICHOLAS MANDIE

First Plaintiff

JANE ELIZABETH MANDIE

Second Plaintiff

ISABELLA MANDIE

Third Plaintiff

AMANDA MANDIE

Fourth Plaintiff

NICHOLAS ELLIOTT MANDIE

Fifth Plaintiff

DANIELLA MANDIE (a person under a disability being a minor by her litigation guardian AMANDA MANDIE)

Sixth Plaintiff

- and -

MEMART NOMINEES PTY LTD (ACN 005 024 617)
(As Trustee for the DAVID MANDIE FAMILY TRUST)

Defendant

HER HONOUR:

Introduction

  1. By summons filed 18 April 2016 the plaintiffs applied for me to recuse myself from further hearing this proceeding on the grounds of actual bias and apprehended bias.  In the event that neither form of bias is established, the plaintiffs sought that I recuse myself on the basis of a residual discretion to recuse.  The defendant opposed the plaintiffs’ application.

  1. The application was based on two rulings that I have made in this proceeding: Mandie v Memart Nominees Pty Ltd (the primary decision),[1] and Mandie v Memart Nominees Pty Ltd (No 2) (the costs decision).[2]

    [1] [2015] VSC 446 (28 August 2015).

    [2] [2015] VSC 622 (13 November 2015).

  1. In the primary decision, the  plaintiffs applied for leave to file and serve an amended statement of claim in this proceeding.  That application was refused save for certain agreed deletions from the statement of claim.  In the costs decision adverse costs orders were made against the plaintiffs in relation to their application in the primary decision. 

  1. The plaintiffs appealed the primary decision and the costs decision.  The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, and as a consequence, the primary decision was partially overturned and the orders made in the costs decision were set aside.[3]

Background

  1. The background to the substantive proceeding is set out in the primary decision.[4]  The plaintiffs’ written outline of submissions helpfully sets out the procedural history behind this application now before me.

    [4] [2015] VSC 446 (28 August 2015)…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Mandie v Memart Nominees Pty Ltd (No 3) and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2016] VSC 267
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Mandie v Memart Nominees Pty Ltd (No 3) involved the plaintiff, Mandie, seeking a declaration that the defendants, Memart Nominees Pty Ltd and others, had breached their fiduciary duties. The case was heard in the Federal Court of Australia. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants had acted in breach of their fiduciary obligations by misusing confidential information and engaging in self-dealing. The court had to determine whether the trial judge should have recused themselves due to actual or apprehended bias, and whether the trial judge's conduct warranted a fresh trial.

The legal issues before the court were whether the trial judge had demonstrated actual or apprehended bias, and if so, whether this bias was so significant as to necessitate a fresh trial. The plaintiff argued that the trial judge had exhibited bias in various ways, including through comments made during the trial and by demonstrating a lack of impartiality. The defendants contended that the trial judge had not exhibited any bias and that any comments made were within the bounds of judicial impartiality. The court had to consider the relevant legal principles concerning judicial bias and the discretion to recuse, as set out in cases such as Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng, Michael Wilson & Partners Limited v Nicholls, Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy, and Johnson v Johnson.

The court examined the trial judge's conduct and comments to determine whether they demonstrated actual or apprehended bias. The court held that the trial judge's conduct did not amount to actual bias but did exhibit some conduct that could be perceived as giving rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. The court found that the trial judge's comments, while not ideal, did not demonstrate a lack of impartiality that would necessitate a fresh trial. The court concluded that the trial judge's conduct did not reach the threshold of apprehended bias that would justify a new trial. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.

The court ordered that the appeal be dismissed and that the orders of the primary judge be upheld. The plaintiff's application for a fresh trial was rejected, and the original trial judgment was affirmed.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.