Maloney v The Queen - [2003] HCATrans 616

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
Brisbane No B14 of 2002

B e t w e e n -
DARREN BRADLEY MALONEY
Applicant
and
THE QUEEN
Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal

McHUGH J
KIRBY J
HEYDON J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

FROM BRISBANE BY VIDEO LINK TO CANBERRA

ON FRIDAY, 14 MARCH 2003, AT 11.11 AM

MR S.J. HAMLYN‑HARRIS: If it please the Court, I appear for the applicant. (instructed by Legal Aid Queensland)

MRS L.J. CLARE: If it please the Court, I appear for the respondent. (instructed by Director of Public Prosecutions (Queensland))

McHUGH J: Is there some question about you acting in the matter?

MR HAMLYN‑HARRIS: No, there is not, your Honour. That has been resolved and I have instructions to act and to proceed with the application.

McHUGH J: Thank you, Mr Hamlyn‑Harris.

MR HAMLYN‑HARRIS: Your Honours, there is an application for an extension of time and the affidavit of Patrick John O’Brien addresses the reasons for the delay in the filing of the application.

McHUGH J: Yes, I think – address the substance of the matter.

MR HAMLYN‑HARRIS: Thank you, your Honours. Your Honours, the principle that juries should not be distracted by extraneous considerations is not in dispute and, in fact, that is the very basis on which it is submitted that the prima facie rule in Lucas v The Queen should not be followed. The Court of Appeal effectively acknowledged that the law as it stands in Australia is as stated in Lucas v The Queen and that is that the ‑ ‑ ‑

McHUGH J: They can hardly do otherwise.

MR HAMLYN‑HARRIS: No, that is so, your Honour. The general rule is that it is undesirable and unnecessary that a jury be informed of the consequences of a verdict of not guilty on the ground of insanity and the rationale stated in Lucas v The Queen is that there is no need to complicate a trial and the resolution of the issues which arise in it by the introduction of what is, so far as the jury are concerned, an extraneous matter.

The directions given by the learned trial judge in this case are consistent with that principle and with the statement of the law in Lucas v The Queen. This particular case is one where the jury raised the issue during the course of the trial as to what the consequences might be of their respective verdicts. Also, it is a case where the evidence strongly suggested that the applicant was dangerous and also a case where it was not in issue in the way in which the trial was conducted that he had, in fact, killed the deceased.

Your Honours, juries, in my submission, undoubtedly know what the effect of an acquittal is when the choice offered to them is either guilty or not guilty, but there is nothing to tell the jury in a case…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Maloney v The Queen

Details

AGLC: Maloney v The Queen [2003] HCATrans 616
Case: [2003] HCATrans 616
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In *Maloney v The Queen*, the High Court of Australia considered an appeal against a conviction for murder. The appellant, Maloney, had been found guilty of murder by a jury in the Supreme Court of New South Wales and subsequently appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeal of New South Wales, which dismissed his appeal. Maloney then sought and was granted special leave to appeal to the High Court.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the trial judge had erred in law by failing to adequately direct the jury on the defence of provocation. Specifically, the court had to determine if the judge's summing up sufficiently explained the elements of provocation, including the requirement that the provocation must be such as to make an ordinary person act as the accused did, and whether the jury had been properly instructed on the subjective and objective aspects of this defence.

The High Court, comprising McHugh, Kirby and Heydon JJ, allowed the appeal. Their Honours held that the trial judge's directions on provocation were inadequate. They explained that the defence of provocation requires the jury to consider both the subjective state of mind of the accused and the objective standard of an ordinary person. The judge's charge had failed to clearly articulate this dual test, leaving the jury potentially without a proper understanding of how to assess whether the provocation was sufficient to reduce the charge from murder to manslaughter. The failure to adequately explain the objective element, in particular, was found to be a material misdirection.

Consequently, the High Court quashed the conviction for murder and ordered a new trial.

Orders