Maloney v Hales [2003] NTSC 82
PARTIES:MALCOLM JAGAMARRA MALONEY
v
PETER WILLIAM HALES
TITLE OF COURT: SUPREME COURT OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY
JURISDICTION: SUPREME COURT OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY exercising Territory jurisdiction
FILE NO:JA 53/03 (20218431)
DELIVERED: 23 July 2003
HEARING DATES: 13 June 2003
JUDGMENT OF: THOMAS J
CATCHWORDS:
CRIMINAL LAW – appeal against sentence- whether magistrate erred in the conduct of proceedings when dealing with an unrepresented offender – whether magistrate erred in failing to give weight to factors in mitigation – whether the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive.
Criminal Code 1983 (NT) s 188 (2)
Brown v Smith (1974) 4 ALR 114, applied
Cooling v Steel (1971) 2 SASR 249; Bates v Hayman (1988) 90 FLR 55; Ross v Peach [2000] NTSC 19, considered.
REPRESENTATION:
Counsel:
Appellant:S Lacy
Respondent: T Austin
Solicitors:
Appellant:North Australian Aboriginal Legal Aid Service
Respondent: Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions
Judgment category classification: C
Judgment ID Number: tho200326
Number of pages: 18
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY
OF AUSTRALIA
AT DARWINMaloney v Hales [2003] NTSC 82
No. JA 53/03 (20218431)
BETWEEN:
MALCOLM JAGAMARRA MALONEY
Appellant
AND:
PETER WILLIAM HALES
Respondent
CORAM: THOMAS J
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Delivered 23 July 2003)
This is an appeal against the sentence of a stipendiary magistrate imposed in the Court of Summary Jurisdiction at Darwin on 13 March 2003.
The appellant entered a plea of guilty to the following charge that: On 7 December 2002 at Darwin in the Northern Territory of Australia unlawfully assaulted Sharon Smith. and that the said unlawful assault involved the following circumstances of aggravation namely:
(i)that the said Sharon Smith suffered bodily harm.
(ii)that the said Sharon Smith was a female and the said Malcolm Maloney was a male.
Contrary to s 188(2) of the Criminal Code.
The learned stipendiary magistrate convicted the appellant, he sentenced him to imprisonment for a period of 12 months commencing 13 March 2003. The sentence was to be suspended on 13 April 2003, that is after serving one month of actual imprisonment.
The learned stipendiary magistrate specified pursuant to s 40(6) of the Sentencing Act a period of 25 months, that is two years and one month from 13 March 2003 during which the offender is not to commit another offence punishable by imprisonment if the offender is to avoid being dealt with under s 43 of the Sentencing Act.
Count 2 on the Information which was an allegation of unlawfully cause grievous harm to Sharon Smith was withdrawn and the defendant discharged.
The grounds of appeal are as follows:
“1.The learned Magistrate erred in failing to accord the appellant the opportunity for legal representation, given the particular circumstances of the case and further erred in the conduct of proceedings in dealing with an unrepresented defendant.
2.The learned Magistrate erred in failing to give any or sufficient weight to the mitigating features of:
i)previous good character;
ii)rehabilitation; and
iii)remorse.
3.The learned Magistrate erred in placing too much…
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- AGLC
- Maloney v Hales [2003] NTSC 82
- Case
- [2003] NTSC 82
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues addressed by the court were whether the magistrate erred in managing the proceedings without a legal representative for Maloney, whether the magistrate failed to adequately consider mitigating factors, and if the sentence imposed was excessively harsh. The court needed to determine if the magistrate’s considerations of general deterrence, denunciation, retribution, and protection of the community were appropriately balanced and if the sentence fell within the bounds of judicial discretion.
In its reasoning, the court found that the magistrate did not err in the conduct of the proceedings, as the considerations of general deterrence, denunciation, and protection of the community were appropriately weighed. The court also held that the magistrate did not fail to give sufficient weight to mitigating factors such as Maloney’s remorse and efforts toward rehabilitation, as evidenced by the partial suspension of the sentence. Furthermore, the court concluded that the sentence of 12 months imprisonment, suspended after one month, was not manifestly excessive, particularly in light of the nature of the offence. Thus, the appeal was dismissed, and the original sentence upheld.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
I would dismiss this ground of appeal.Ground 3: The learned magistrate erred in placing too much weight on considerations of: (i) general deterrence; (ii) denunciation; and (iii) protection of the community. In his reasons for sentence the learned stipendiary magistrate did make reference to the aspect of general deterrence, denunciation of the offence and protection of the community. These are all matters the learned stipendiary magistrate was properly required to consider and to take into account. I do not consider he placed too great a weight on these factors. His Worship stated the aspect of retribution had a minor role to play in this case. The learned stipendiary magistrate emphasised the appellant’s contribution to the community, his sense of remorse and the steps he had taken to rehabilitate himself. These matters were all taken into account in the decision to suspend all but one month of the 12 month term of imprisonment. This ground of appeal is not made out.Ground 4: In all the circumstances of the case, the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive. This is not a sentence which on its face can be said to be manifestly excessive. Violent offences particularly by men upon women are continually the subject of condemnation by this Court. The sentence of 12 months imp suspended after one month was within discretion. I am not persuaded it was manifestly excessive. The appeal is dismissed.