Mallegowda v The Transport Secretary

[2024] NSWCATEN 2

Civil and Administrative Tribunal

New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation:

Mallegowda v The Transport Secretary [2024] NSWCATEN 2

Hearing dates:

26 April 2024

Date of orders:

31 July 2024

Decision date:

31 July 2024

Jurisdiction:

Enforcement

Before:

Coleman SC ADCJ, Principal Member

Decision:

That the application filed on 2 April 2024 is dismissed.

Catchwords:

CONTEMPT — referral to Supreme Court pursuant to s 73(5) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 — whether Respondent’s conduct had a tendency to intimidate or threaten

Legislation Cited:

Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW)

Legal Profession Uniform Law Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules 2015 (NSW)

Cases Cited:

Attorney-General v Times Newspapers Ltd (1974) AC 273

Bhagat v Global Custodians Ltd [2002] NSWCA 160

DVI v ZTT [2021] NSWCATEN 4

Harkianakis v Skalkos (1997) 42 NSWLR 22

Lane v Registrar of Supreme Court of New South Wales (1981) 148 CLR 245; [1981] HCA 35

Novotny v Cropley [2005] NSWCA 26

Nuclear Utility Technology and Environmental Corp Inc (Nu-Tec) v Australian Broadcasting Commission (ABC) [2009] NSWSC 78

Wiltshire Smith v Votino Bros Pty Limited (1993) 41 FCR 496

Category:

Principal judgment

Parties:

Shashikanth Mallegowda (Applicant)
The Transport Secretary (Respondent)

Representation:

Solicitors:
Applicant (self-represented)
Spark Helmore (Respondent)

File Number(s):

2024/00124693

Publication restriction:

Nil

REASONS FOR DECISION

1. By application filed on 2 April 2024 Shashikanth Mallegowda (Applicant) sought orders pursuant to s 73(5) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act2013 (NSW) (CAT Act) referring the Transport Secretary for the State of New South Wales (Respondent) to the Supreme Court to be dealt with for contempt of the Tribunal.

2. The application pleaded that:

“The conduct of the Respondent in making threatened communication had a tendency, as a matter of practical reality, to interfere with the administration of justice, in that Respondent and their legal representatives’ conduct had a tendency to intimidate or threaten the Applicant and thereby to deter him from commencing and continuing the referral for contempt of court proceedings in NCAT for breach of implied undertaking. Therefore the alleged conduct of the Respondent and their legal representatives be referred for determination to the Supreme Court pursuant to s73(5) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act.”

3. The referral for “contempt of court” proceedings to which the application referred was the Applicant’s application filed 26 March 2024 in file number 2024/00116697. The Tribunal has given its decision dismissing that application prior to giving its decision in this application.

4. The grounds for the referral application pleaded by the Applicant asserted that:

“The Respondent and their legal representatives has threatened the Applicant to withdraw his earlier application for referral for contempt of court for breach of implied undertaking by giving deadline for 5.00pm on 02 April 2024 otherwise they will take several legal actions including claiming indemnity costs order payable forthwith and struck out my proceeding in Industrial Relation Commission.”

5. In support of his application, the Applicant filed an Affidavit dated 1 April 2024. Attached to the Affidavit was a copy of the communication from the Respondent which the Applicant submitted had the tendency alleged by him.

6. The Respondent denied that the letter written on its behalf on 28 March 2024 was capable of constituting a contempt of the Tribunal. Although nothing turns on it for present purposes, the allegedly offending letter was written on the Secretary’s behalf.

7. It is appropriate to set out in full the letter written on behalf of the Secretary which gave rise to the referral application:

“1   We refer to your recent correspondence dated 13, 14, 19 and 26 March 2024, addressed to Mr Martin Watts of Counsel, alleging the Transport Secretary (including its solicitors and Counsel) is in contempt of court as it breached the implied undertaking by providing a copy of your amended victimisation application (application) filed in the Industrial Relations Commission of NSW to the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal.

2   I also refer to the application filed by you in the Tribunal today seeking a referral of the allegation of contempt to the Supreme Court of New South Wales (referral).

3   I act for the Respondent, the Transport Secretary, in relation to the referral you have filed and the allegation of contempt you have raised. Accordingly, all future correspondence regarding the referral and the allegation against the Transport Secretary should be addressed to me. Please do not, going forward, send direct correspondence to Mr Watts of Counsel, Ms Edwards and Ms Galvin of Sparke Helmore, the Transport Secretary, or any other member of Transport for NSW in relation to the referral or allegation of contempt.

4   For abundant clarity, you should continue corresponding with Ms Edwards and Ms Galvin only in relation to your proceedings before the Commission. Again, that correspondence should not be sent to Mr Watts, the Transport Secretary, or any other member of Transport for NSW.

5   We also note that you have made complaints to the Office of the Legal Services Commissioner regarding the conduct of Mr Watts and Felicity Edwards and Elyse Galvin of this office. You are entitled to pursue such complaints, should you choose to do so.

Contempt allegation is misconceived and lacking in substance

6   The allegation of contempt you have made is a very serious one. For the reasons outlined below, the allegation, and your referral, is misconceived, an abuse of process and appears to have been improperly raised for collateral purposes, namely an attempt to pressure the Transport Secretary to engage in settlement discussions.

7   In particular, your allegation of contempt is without basis for the following reasons:

(a)   Firstly, the implied undertaking applies to documents produced under the compulsory process of the Court during the course of a legal proceeding. The referral is misconceived because your application is not a document that was produced under compulsion, pursuant to any order made by the Commission. It is a document you voluntarily filed in the Commission, initially to commence the proceedings, and in respect of the amended version, to set out the scope of the issues to be determined by the Commission in your application for relief from victimisation.

In your correspondence of 14 March 2024, you refer to a NSW Court of Appeal decision in Street & Ors v Herne & Anor [2007] NSWCA 113. That decision was subsequently appealed to the High Court of Australia. The High Court’s decision in Herne v Street (2008) 235 CLR 125, which it appears you have read, given you have referred to it expressly in the Affidavit filed in support of the referral, sets out the examples of documents the implied undertaking applies to. Notably, it does not include originating processes, such as the application. We draw your attention to paragraph [96] of the High Court’s decision (Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ) which you have expressly referenced at [32] of your Affidavit in support of the referral, but which is otherwise extracted below:

“Where one party to litigation is compelled, either by reason of a rule of court, or by reason of a specific order of the court, or otherwise, to disclose documents or information, the party obtaining the disclosure cannot, without the leave of the court, use it for any other purpose other than that for which it was given unless it is received into evidence. The types of material disclosed to which this principle applies includes documents inspected after discovery, answers to interrogatories, documents produced on subpoena, documents produced for the purposes of taxation of costs, documents produced pursuant to a direction from an arbitrator, documents seized pursuant to an Anton Piller order, witness statements served pursuant to a judicial direction and affidavits.”

We note the application does not fall within any of the types of material described above.

Further, the decision in Canterbury Bankstown Council v Payce Communities Pty Limited [2019] NSWSC 1419 (at [114]-[131]) specifically considered whether the implied undertaking applies to pleadings, such as the application, and found that it did not.

Likewise, Brereton J in Helicopter Aerial Surveys Pty Limited v Gary Robertson [2015] NSWSC 2104 at [35] stated:

“It has never been the case that pleadings have been regarded as subject to the implied undertaking, nor other evidence served in support of the pleadings, such as the claim book.”

We note that in your email dated 13 March 2024 you expressly stated that you had not yet “[dug] deeper to find the right authorities for breach of implied undertaking at this stage”. While it appears from your Affidavit that you have subsequently conducted further research, based on the authorities outlined above, we expect it will now be clear to you that your referral and contempt application has no basis and is misconceived, given the implied undertaking does not apply to your application.

(b) Secondly, a live issue before the Tribunal was the application of s96(2) of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977. In particular, you required leave for your discrimination complaint to proceed, to the extent that the issues in the complaint were issues the subject of the proceedings before the Commission. You plainly acknowledged as much in your oral submissions to the Tribunal, in which you expressly referred to the Commission proceedings and the relief being sought. In those circumstances it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that your application was relevant to the Tribunal’s assessment of leave, to objectively ascertain whether there was an overlap of issues between your discrimination complaint and the Commission proceedings. Indeed, the Tribunal concluded as much: decision at [54]-[60].

(c)   Thirdly, the referral is a duplication of an application already made and disposed of. You sought the same referral orally at the Tribunal on 13 March 2024 so much is apparent from the fact that the tribunal addressed that same oral application specifically in its decision to refuse leave for your complaint to proceed: Mallegowda v Secretary of the Department of Transport [2024] NSWCATAD 77 (Decision) at 55. As you must be aware, the Tribunal determined not to read or consider the application in deciding whether to grant leave for your discrimination and victimisation complaints to proceed: Decision at 55. Accordingly, you have been subject to no actual or practical disadvantage, and for that reason, the Tribunal has already indicated that your referral did not need to be decided. It is unclear on what basis you are seeking for that Decision to be revisited or reopened.

(d)   Fourthly, the contempt allegation is clearly an abuse of process. If you held any genuine concern about the alleged breach of the implied undertakings, that issue would have been raised by you prior to, or at the start of, the leave hearing in the Tribunal. We particularly refer you to paragraph [7] of your Affidavit in support of the referral, where you say the transcript records you being asked by Tibbey SM if you had the application sent through the previous evening, and you indicated you did. Notably, you did not say anything further, including not expressing any objection to that material being sent or relied upon by the Transport Secretary.

In this regard it is apparent that, by the time of the leave hearing, you had formed the view (incorrectly) that the implied undertaking applied to your Application, yet rather than complain about that document being emailed to the Tribunal at the outset of the hearing, you instead chose to stay silent, wait until your oral submissions in reply to make a flawed contempt application. Such conduct renders manifest that the referral is an abuse or process.

(e)   Fifthly, and following from the above, it is clear from your recent email correspondence that the contempt allegations have been raised for a collateral purpose in a misguided attempt to pressure the Transport Secretary and/or his legal representatives to engage in settlement discussions. This only solidifies the conclusion that your application amounts to an abuse of process.

In this regard, we take the opportunity to notify you that the mere inclusion of the words “without prejudice” on correspondence does not render it confidential and unable to be relied on as evidence. No such “without prejudice” privilege applies to communications that are plainly not designed to resolve the case. Your email correspondence of 19 March 2024 is such an example. The Transport Secretary reserves all of his rights to rely on such correspondence in the future, not only as to costs, but in any substantive proceedings, including in the Commission.

(f)   Sixthly, even if there was an implied undertaking that applied to the application (and there is not, for the reasons above), that would be an undertaking to the Commission and not the Tribunal. Accordingly there can be no contempt of the Tribunal, and your referral in this regard is also misconceived for that reason. The Commission is the proper place and jurisdiction in which any contempt application should have been, but has not been, raised.

8   In view of the above, our client offers you the opportunity to unreservedly withdraw your allegations of contempt against the Transport Secretary and his legal representatives, including sending correspondence to the Tribunal Registry withdrawing your referral forthwith. Any such correspondence should be sent by 5.00 p.m. on 2 April 2024.

9   In the event you wish to press on with your misconceived referral, we invite you to do so in the proper way, and proper jurisdiction. That involves withdrawing the present application to the Tribunal, properly particularising your allegations of contempt, and making an application to the Commission to deal with that contempt. We invite such an application to be made by no later than 5.00 p.m. on 2 April 2024.

10   If such an application is filed, you can expect it will be vigorously defended by the Transport Secretary. As part of that defence, we put you on notice that our client will seek orders that, if the implied undertaking applies to the application (which our client maintains it does not), then he will be released from that undertaking nunc pro tunc.

11   This correspondence will be relied upon by the Transport Secretary should the referral not be withdrawn, and in relation to any further application made by you to the Commission seeking any orders pertaining to contempt, including for the purpose of seeking costs in both jurisdictions. Such an application for costs may be made on an indemnity and payable forthwith basis.

12   We otherwise note, for completeness, that these allegations, even if maintained, do not prevent your substantive proceedings in the Commission from being heard. The Transport Secretary will be seeking a hearing date for the substantive proceedings at the next listing before the Commission. If you ask for the matter to be further adjourned, our client reserves the right to apply to have the entire proceedings struck out for want of due despatch.

13   We look forward to your urgent response.”

8. The Applicant responded to the letter later the same day. The crux of the response was that the Applicant intended to pursue his referral application.

9. The Applicant’s submissions in support of the referral application engaged with the asserted merits of his referral application of 24 March 2024. The Tribunal decided in those proceedings that the referral application with respect to the alleged breach of an implied undertaking be dismissed. The ambit of this application is narrower. Although dismissal of the earlier referral application is unhelpful to the Applicant in this application, it does not necessarily mean that this application must fail.

The Applicant’s submissions

10. In this application, the Applicant submitted that the Respondent’s “threat to seek costs or indemnity costs payable forthwith” was capable of constituting a contempt of the Tribunal. The Applicant relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Nuclear Utility Technology and Environmental Corp Inc (Nu-Tec) v Australian Broadcasting Commission (ABC) [2009] NSWSC 78. In that case, at [47] the Court recorded that the alleged contempt was submitted to relate to the “timing of the threats and the applications made, the vigour with which they were pursued, the tone of the communications and the mixing of the threatened costs applications with settlement offers”. The Court accepted [48] that “contempt can be committed by a solicitor exerting improper pressure on an opponent, whether what is threatened is lawful or unlawful conduct” (see Bhagat v Global Custodians Ltd [2002] NSWCA 160).

11. It was alleged that the defendant’s letter “amounted to improper pressure”. The Court accepted at [49] that the conduct complained of must also be considered “in the context of the events” to which it related and that it was necessary “to have regard to all of the circumstances of the case in order to determine whether the pressure sought to be applied can be described as improper”. As is not in doubt, the case involved a foreshadowed application for costs against an opposing solicitor prior to the conclusion of the proceedings. The relevance of the case is accordingly limited for present purposes.

12. The Applicant submitted, correctly, that “the mere fact that something that is lawful is threatened does not mean that the pressure is necessarily proper”. The crux of his allegation was expressed as being that the Respondent’s solicitor’s letter “had a tendency, as a matter of practical reality, to interfere with the administration of justice, in that the Respondent’s conduct had a tendency to intimidate or threaten the Applicant and thereby to deter him from continuing the referral for contempt of court proceedings in NCAT for breach of implied undertaking”. Although the fate of the present application does not turn on it, the evidence reveals that the Respondent’s solicitor’s letter did not have the impact on the Applicant which he alleges, as his reply to the letter 3 hours after it was received confirms. That is relevant to, but not determinative of whether the letter had the requisite tendency.

13. In his written submissions filed on 27 May 2022 the Applicant asserted that the statements made by the Respondent in the letter of 28 March 2024 were “manifestly inappropriate for legal correspondence, especially in being drafted by Senior Counsel to a self-represented litigant”; and “to be of a tendency to interfere with the administration of justice and good conduct of proceedings”.

14. The Applicant asserted that the Respondent’s letter “came to pose a considerable source of personal stress and duress to the Applicant, who was already facing the current stress of the ongoing proceedings, alongside the impacts of his bipolar, manic episodes, and acute stress diagnoses associated with an ongoing workplace injury for which he is being treated under workers compensation”. Those impacts were asserted to have been “medically documented” by the Applicant’s medical practitioners, who have provided material to this effect as contained in the Applicant’s affidavits.

15. The Applicant alleged that the Respondent employed “aggressive language used to treat with legal implications on unrepresented applicant” which constituted “an interference with the due course of justice because it was inherently likely to bring improper pressure to bear on him and ultimately prevent him from continuing to act as applicant in the proceedings”. As noted earlier, there is no evidence that the Applicant, because of any pressure placed on him by the Respondent or otherwise, was prevented from continuing to act as Applicant in the proceedings.

10. The Applicant submitted that the letter was “construed as an attempt to exert pressure on him personally to bring about a resolution of the proceedings”. That contention is misconceived. The letter made clear that all that the Respondent was suggesting to the Applicant was that his referral application in reliance upon the alleged breach of the implied undertaking was unmeritorious and should be withdrawn. The letter made quite clear that it was not referring to any substantive proceedings which the Applicant had commenced in any court or tribunal. The Applicant submitted, correctly, that the power of the Supreme Court to punish for contempt operates to protect the public interest by punishing parties or entities who place improper pressure on a party.

11. The Applicant submitted that the Respondent was aware that he is suffering from Bipolar Disorder illness, and that the “threats” contained in the letter created “anxiety, depression, and conflict whether to continue the proceedings or discontinue due to legal consequences of indemnity costs payable forthwith as threatened by the Respondent and improperly placed me under pressure and made me to obtain legal advice on the consequences of the legal threats if I continued to proceed”. As noted earlier, within hours of receiving the letter, the Applicant responded, such response making clear that he would not be discontinuing the proceedings. There is no evidence that the Applicant obtained legal advice during that period. Even if he had, that would not advance the Applicant’s referral application.

12. The Applicant submitted that the “lawfulness” of the Respondent’s statements was “largely irrelevant”. Whether they are or not, nothing to which the Applicant has referred, or the Tribunal has discerned for itself, suggests that any representation made on behalf of the Respondent in the letter was unlawful. The Tribunal accepts that the Applicant does not need to show whether the Respondent and the Respondent’s legal advisers were “successful in their attempt so far as actually influencing the Applicant’s conduct” (Harkianakis v Skalkos (1997) 42 NSWLR 22). Whilst that is correct, that does not mean that the conduct of the Applicant after receiving the letter is irrelevant in determining whether the statements made on behalf of the Respondent in the letter had the tendency to exert pressure on the Applicant to discontinue.

13. The Applicant summarised his complaints against the Respondent as having “directly and repeatedly”:

“(a)   accused the Applicant of acting in bad faith; and

(b)   accused the Applicant of being incorrect to the point of vexatiousness; and

(c)   addressed various aspects of the legal processes in needlessly complicated terms (at one point using Latin), despite writing to a self-represented lay person; and

(d)   threatened the Applicant with considerable costs and expense, should he not withdraw his application.”

20. The Applicant relied on a number of provisions of the Legal Profession Uniform Law Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules 2015 (NSW), in particular:

1. Rule 3 – a solicitor’s duty to the court and the administration of justice is paramount and prevails to the extent of inconsistency with any other duty;

2. Rule 4.1.2 – a solicitor must also be honest and courteous in all dealings in the course of legal practice;

3. Rule 5.1.2 – a solicitor must not engage in conduct, in the course of legal practice or otherwise, which is likely to a material degree to be prejudicial to, or diminish the public confidence in, the administration of justice, or bring the profession into disrepute;

4. Rule 34.1.1(ii) – a solicitor must not in any action or communication associated with representing a client make any statement to another person which misleads or intimidates the other person;

5. Rule 34.1.3 – a solicitor must not in any action or communication associated with representing a client use tactics that go beyond legitimate advocacy and which are primarily designed to embarrass or frustrate another person.

Respondent’s Submissions

21. The Respondent referred to the decision of the High Court in Lane v Registrar of Supreme Court of New South Wales (1981) 148 CLR 245; [1981] HCA 35 in which the High Court accepted, at [9] that “action or inaction amounting to an interference with, or obstruction to or having a tendency to interfere with or obstruct the due administration of justice, using that term in a broad sense” could constitute contempt of court.

22. In Bhagat v Global Custodians Ltd [2002] NSWCA 160 Spigelman CJ said at [36], in reliance upon the decision in Attorney-General v Times Newspapers Ltd (1974) AC 273, that “seeking to dissuade a litigant from prosecuting or defending proceedings by threats of unlawful action, by abuse, by a misrepresentation of the nature of the proceedings or the circumstances out of which they arose and suchlike, is no doubt a contempt of court, but if the writer states the facts fairly and accurately, and expresses his view in temperate language the fact that the publication may bring pressure – possibly greater pressure – to bear on the litigant should not make it a contempt of court”. The Chief Justice accepted that whether pressure in a particular case can be described as “improper” depended upon all the circumstances of the case and that statements in letters needed to be read “in the whole context”. His Honour accepted at [39] that a firm assertion that a party “must lose and a reasonable statement of the consequences of loss is not a contempt, even if it does exert pressure on a party to withdraw the proceedings”, but that the position was “otherwise if a demand of that character is accompanied by improper threats or assertions”. The critical question in each case was submitted to be whether the conduct was intended to intimidate, or seek retribution from, the person who is engaged in the litigation, or whether, as a matter of practical reality, it had a real tendency to have that effect (Novotny v Cropley [2005] NSWCA 26). The test was submitted, correctly, to be objective (Wiltshire Smith v Votino Bros Pty Limited (1993) 41 FCR 496). The impugned conduct must be understood as a whole in its context and balancing various interests as was accepted in Harkianakis.

23. The Respondent submitted that when read as a whole the letter was based on objective facts and was expressed “in a measured tone”. The Respondent submitted that it was “reasonable and proper for the Respondent to draw to the Applicant to advance its position that the referral application was misconceived, particularly noting it had been made in the wrong jurisdiction”. The Respondent submitted, correctly, that the letter invited the Applicant to “pursue” his complaint in the proper jurisdiction if he wished to do so. It was further submitted on behalf of the Respondent that it was “prudent, in the interests of transparency and fairness, for the Respondent to bring” to the Applicant’s attention that the referral application was brought in the wrong jurisdiction, and to have put the Applicant on notice of the risks of an adverse costs order if he was found to have unreasonably caused the Respondent to incur unnecessary legal costs, which the Respondent submitted has now occurred.

24. The purpose of the letter was submitted to have been to explain the relevant authorities to the Applicant, with the intention of assisting him to understand that the referral application had no merit thereby minimising the Applicant’s exposure to a costs application. The letter was submitted, correctly, to also have served to have avoided the “potential that the Applicant would feel ambushed because he had not been alerted to the Respondent’s view about the deficiencies in his referral application”. The Respondent placed some reliance upon the absence of impact on the Applicant of any of the consequences which he asserted that the Respondent’s letter was likely to have had for him. The Respondent submitted that the evidence relied upon by the Applicant was not capable of establishing a contempt in accordance with the criminal standard of proof which, correctly, the Respondent submitted would apply if the application was referred to the Supreme Court.

Consideration

25. The Applicant has sought to enliven the appropriate provision of the CAT Act. The principles governing the referral application are not in doubt and they appear to be understood by the Applicant having regard to the contents of his written submissions.

26. It is no part of the Tribunal’s function to determine the merits of the application, but simply whether the conduct complained of by the Applicant is “capable” of establishing contempt (DVI v ZTT [2021] NSWCATEN 4). The rules of evidence apply in these proceedings (ss 33 and 38(3) of the CAT Act). As Armstrong J accepted in DVI, the power to refer a contempt application to the Supreme Court is discretionary, and underlined by a consideration that the power to punish for contempt is appropriately invoked “sparingly and only in serious cases”.

27. The Tribunal is not persuaded that the content of the Respondent’s letter, how that content was articulated, or any aspect of the letter is capable of establishing beyond reasonable doubt that the letter, or anything asserted in it, was capable of amounting to an interference with or obstruction to the due administration of justice, or had a tendency to interfere with or obstruct the due administration of justice. In particular, and having regard to the whole of the evidence, including the evidence of the Applicant’s response to it, and the time within which he did so, the evidence is not capable of establishing that, applying an objective test, the letter or anything asserted in it sought to, or had the effect of seeking to dissuade the Applicant from prosecuting his referral application with respect to the alleged breach of an implied undertaking. The letter clearly, and in unexceptional terms, endeavoured to explain to the Applicant why the Respondent considered the referral application to be without merit.

28. It was entirely reasonable for the Respondent to point out that, if put to the expense of resisting the application, having directed the Applicant to the asserted deficiencies in the application, relevant legal principles and authorities establishing them, the Respondent may seek indemnity costs if, notwithstanding those matters being pointed out to him, the Applicant elected to persist with his application.

29. It was not improper for the Respondent to suggest that, irrespective of the asserted absence of merit, if the Applicant wished to pursue his referral application alleging breach of an implied undertaking the appropriate forum in which to do so was the Industrial Commission. Even if that suggestion was incorrect, about which the Tribunal does not express, or need to express a concluded view, that would not change anything. The letter pointed out, correctly, that, wherever it was or should have been brought, the Applicant’s contempt application lacked merit.

30. The evidence relied upon by the Applicant is not capable of establishing a contempt of the Tribunal in accordance with the criminal standard of proof and will be dismissed.

Orders

1. That the application filed on 2 April 2024 is dismissed.

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I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales.

Registrar

Decision last updated: 31 July 2024