Malgorzata Urbaniak‑Bak v Dean Alexander Prail

[2015] HCASL 216

MALGORZATA URBANIAK‑BAK

v

DEAN ALEXANDER PRAIL

[2015] HCASL 216
C10/2015

1. The applicant and the respondent, a solicitor, entered into a costs agreement on a "no win no fee" basis, which required the applicant to pay disbursements regardless of the outcome of her case.  In the course of the proceedings to which the agreement pertained, a disagreement arose between the applicant and the respondent and the respondent purported to terminate the retainer.  The proceedings were eventually dismissed.

2. The respondent commenced proceedings against the applicant in the Magistrates Court of the Australian Capital Territory (Magistrate Cook), claiming fees and disbursements.  On 6 December 2013, the applicant was ordered to pay the respondent $21,847.19.

3. On 18 July 2014, a Master of the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory (Mossop M) allowed the applicant's appeal in part.  His Honour held that the respondent did not terminate the agreement in accordance with its terms and that, as a result, he was not entitled to recover his professional fees or certain disbursements he had claimed.  The applicant was ordered to pay the respondent $7,701.95 for recovery of disbursements plus interest.

4. On 14 August 2015, the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory (Refshauge, Burns and Rangiah JJ) dismissed the applicant's appeal.  The Court of Appeal held that the applicant's obligation to pay the disbursements incurred by the respondent survived the respondent's wrongful termination of the agreement.  The Court of Appeal also held that it was open to the Magistrate to find that no vitiating factors were present when the applicant entered into the agreement, and that the applicant's allegations of negligence against the respondent were inappropriate to raise on appeal.

5. The applicant seeks special leave to appeal to this Court.  The applicant's draft notice of appeal does not advance any question of law that would justify a grant of special leave.  The application involves the interpretation of a contract in accordance with settled principle.  There is no reason to doubt the correctness of the decision of the Court of Appeal.  Special leave is refused.

6. Pursuant to r 41.10.5 we direct the Registrar to draw up, sign and seal an order dismissing the application.

S.M. Kiefel
10 December 2015 P.A. Keane