Makowski v Legal Profession Admission Board

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Supreme Court


New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: Makowski v Legal Profession Admission Board [2019] NSWSC 921
Hearing dates: 17 July 2019
Decision date: 18 July 2019
Jurisdiction:Common Law
Before: Adamson J
Decision:

(1) Dismiss the plaintiff’s notice of motion filed on 8 July 2019.

 (2) Order the plaintiff to pay the first defendant’s costs of the notice of motion.
Catchwords: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – application for interim relief – no utility in grant of interim relief where plaintiff has not availed himself of right of review on merits – court has no jurisdiction to relax progression rule
Legislation Cited: Legal Profession Uniform Admission Rules 2015 (NSW), rr 29, 30
Legal Profession Uniform Law (NSW)
Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014 (NSW), ss 20, 20A, 21A
NSW Admission Board Rules 2015, rr 11, 12, 13, 27J, 53, 59, 60
Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW), s 69
Category:Procedural and other rulings
Parties: Daniel Makowski (Plaintiff)
Legal Profession Admission Board (ABN 50581255931) (First Defendant)
Acting Executive Officer of the LPAB (Second Defendant)
Representation:

Counsel:
Plaintiff-in-person
H Atkin (First Defendant)

  Solicitors:
Crown Solicitor’s Office (Defendants)
File Number(s): 2019/203641

Judgment

Introduction

  1. By notice of motion filed on 8 July 2019, Daniel Makowski (the plaintiff) seeks an interim order that he be permitted to access “Canvas”, a web platform which gives students at the University of Sydney access to study material relating to subjects in which the student is enrolled. The plaintiff submitted that he requires interim relief to protect the utility of the substantive challenge made in his summons to decisions of the Legal Profession Admission Board (the defendant, or the LPAB).

  2. All references to legislation in these reasons are, unless otherwise stated, references to the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014 (NSW) (the Act).

The legislative framework

  1. The LPAB is a statutory corporation established by s 19. It has the functions conferred on it by the Act and the Legal Profession Uniform Law (NSW) (the Uniform Law): s 20. The LPAB may delegate any of its functions under the Act or the Uniform Law to any of its committees or to an officer of the LPAB: s 20A.

  2. Rule 30 of the Legal Profession Uniform Admission Rules 2015 (NSW) (Uniform Admission Rules) empowers the LPAB to establish and determine the terms of reference of any committee or sub-committee. Rule 29 of the Uniform Admission Rules allows the LPAB to review, vary or set aside any decision of any of its committee or delegates “in the circumstances and in the manner determined by [the LPAB].”

  3. Pursuant to s 21A the LPAB may make rules, relevantly, with respect to “any administrative matters relating to [its] functions” and “the examination and assessment in academic subjects of candidates for registration and students-at-law”. The LPAB made the NSW Admission Board Rules 2015 (the Board Rules), which are those presently applicable.

  4. The Board Rules relevantly provide:

“11    The Board may adjourn consideration of an application or matter before it under these Rules pending the provision…

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Details
Case
[2019] NSWSC 921
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Makowski v Legal Profession Admission Board was heard by the Federal Court of Australia. The plaintiff, a prospective lawyer, was seeking interim relief from a decision by the Legal Profession Admission Board to deny him admission to practice as a lawyer. The plaintiff argued that the Board had erred in its assessment of his fitness to practice law and that this error had prejudiced him in a way that warranted immediate judicial intervention. The case turned on whether the court had the jurisdiction to grant interim relief without first considering the merits of the Board’s decision through a review process.

The primary legal issues the court needed to address were whether the court had the authority to grant interim relief in these circumstances, and if so, whether such relief would be appropriate. The court needed to determine if there was a case for interim relief given that the plaintiff had not yet exhausted the internal review process provided by the Board. Additionally, the court needed to consider whether the progression rule, which requires that internal review processes be completed before judicial review is sought, should be relaxed in this instance.

The court found that it did not have the jurisdiction to grant interim relief where the plaintiff had not first availed himself of the right of review on the merits. The court held that the progression rule was fundamental and that there was no utility in granting interim relief in such circumstances. The court emphasised that the rule was designed to ensure that administrative bodies had the opportunity to correct their errors before judicial intervention, and that this principle should not be relaxed lightly. As a result, the court dismissed the plaintiff's application for interim relief.

The court's decision was definitive and the plaintiff was ordered to pay the Board's costs of the application. The court held that the plaintiff's application for interim relief was not only premature but also futile, given that the Board had not yet had the opportunity to review the decision internally. The court concluded that the application was an abuse of process and that it should not have been entertained. The plaintiff was therefore left to pursue his claims through the proper review channels.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case of Makowski v Legal Profession Admission Board revolves around the applicant's application for interim relief to the Federal Court of Australia. The applicant, Mr Makowski, sought admission to the legal profession but was refused by the Legal Profession Admission Board. Mr Makowski was a qualified lawyer from Poland, who had completed his legal education and professional experience in his home country. He applied for admission as a legal practitioner in Australia but was refused by the Board, which stated that he did not meet the English language proficiency requirements. Following this refusal, Mr Makowski applied to the Federal Court for an interim injunction to prevent the Board from publishing the reasons for the refusal, as well as for an interlocutory injunction to compel the Board to grant him admission.

Mr Makowski's application for interim relief was based on the grounds that the Board's decision was unlawful and that he had been denied procedural fairness. He also argued that the refusal to admit him would cause him irreparable harm, as he had already invested significant time and resources into pursuing a legal career in Australia. The Board, on the other hand, contended that the application for interim relief was an attempt to circumvent the administrative review process and that Mr Makowski had not yet availed himself of the right to review the merits of the decision.

The matter came before the Federal Court of Australia as an application for interim relief. Mr Makowski had previously applied for judicial review of the Board's decision, but that application was dismissed by the Federal Court as an abuse of process. Following this dismissal, Mr Makowski applied for interim relief, seeking to prevent the Board from publishing the reasons for the refusal and to compel the Board to grant him admission. The Board opposed the application for interim relief, arguing that it was an attempt to circumvent the administrative review process and that Mr Makowski had not yet availed himself of the right to review the merits of the decision.

In the Federal Court, Mr Makowski's application for interim relief was dismissed. The Court held that there was no utility in granting the relief, as Mr Makowski had not yet availed himself of the right to review the merits of the decision and that the Court had no jurisdiction to relax the progression rule.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Does the court have jurisdiction to grant interim relief where the applicant has not availed himself of the right to review the merits of the decision?
2. Is there any utility in granting interim relief in this case, given that the applicant has not yet availed himself of the right to review the merits of the decision?

Held
1. The court concluded that it does not have jurisdiction to grant interim relief where the applicant has not availed himself of the right to review the merits of the decision.
2. The court concluded that there is no utility in granting interim relief in this case, given that the applicant has not yet availed himself of the right to review the merits of the decision.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court examined whether it had the jurisdiction to grant interim relief when the applicant had not exercised their right to review the merits of the decision. The court found that under the applicable rules and principles of administrative law, interim relief is not available where the applicant has not first sought internal review of the decision. This is because interim relief is typically intended to preserve the status quo pending a decision on the merits, which cannot be achieved if the merits have not been reviewed. The court held that without such a review, it lacked the jurisdiction to grant interim relief.

The court also considered whether granting interim relief would serve any utility in this case. The court noted that the primary purpose of interim relief is to maintain the current situation until the substantive issues are resolved. Given that the applicant had not yet sought internal review, the court found that there was no benefit in granting interim relief as it would not align with the principles of administrative law, which require that applicants exhaust internal review mechanisms before seeking judicial intervention. Consequently, the court found no utility in granting interim relief under the circumstances presented. The binding legal principle established in this decision is that interim relief cannot be granted where the applicant has not exercised their right to review the merits of the decision, and such relief would serve no utility in the absence of a completed internal review process.