Major v Chief Executive, Department of Lands
[1995] QLC 95
•1 September 1995
|
BRISBANE
1 SEPTEMBER 1995
In the matter of an appeal against a valuation
Valuation of Land Act 1944
Valuation Roll No.: 1280/60000
Local Government: Redland (AV94-453)
Margaret J Major
v.
Chief Executive, Department of Lands
(Hearing at Brisbane)
D E C I S I O N
This appeal concerns land situated at Bigoon Road, Point Lookout, on North Stradbroke Island. As at a date of 30 June 1993 the Chief Executive had placed a value of $83,000 on the subject land. The appellant objected against this valuation and, having failed in that process, appealed to this Court contending for a valuation of $69,000. This figure, it transpired in evidence, was the value placed on the land as at 31 March 1992.
The land in question has an area of 708m2 and is situated about 400 metres south-east of Point Lookout Post Office. The land is located on Bigoon Road which is bitumen sealed with concrete kerbing and channelling and which provides easy access to the land. Power, telephone, reticulated town water and sewerage are available. The land is zoned "Residential B" in the Town Planning Scheme for the Shire of Redland, effective at the date of valuation, and was vacant. It is rectangular in shape, being an inside lot of low elevation having no views. It is near level and has a north-easterly aspect.
Donald Keith Major appeared for his wife, the appellant, and gave evidence in this matter. The grounds of appeal were expressed quite narrowly as follows:"Land prices on the Island have not increased by the percentage that the valuation has increased. This has been confirmed by real estate agents on the island. Potential resort developments in the area should have no influence over the valuation as profit is not supposed to be taken into account."
Mr Major expressed the appellant's concern at the percentage increase in valuations placed on the subject land for the past three annual valuations. Whilst Mr Major's evidence concerning the dates of earlier valuations was based on a misunderstanding, the evidence revealed that the subject land had a valuation of $49,000 placed on it as at 31 March 1990; $69,000 as at 31 March 1992 and $83,000 as at 30 June 1993. Mr Major calculated that the increase between the first two relevant dates was 40.81%, from then to the next 20%, and over the total period he calculated an increase of 69%. Whilst he said in evidence that this increase had occurred over a period of two years, the better evidence is that the increase occurred over three years and three months.
Mr Major argued that for a period purchasers had been prepared to pay exorbitant prices for land on the island, however, in recent times (and I take this to refer to times near the date of 30 June 1993) sales had all but ceased and values had dropped back. He related in evidence how he and his wife had visited real estate agents pretending to be prospective purchasers and had been told there were blocks on the market at prices of $85,000 to $90,000 which were not selling. He concluded, based on his understanding of the market and conversations with real estate agents, that the "boom" had tapered off in 1992, therefore values had returned to a reasonable level which he said was the $69,000 figure placed on the subject land at the previous annual valuation.
In addition to this evidence, Mr Major tendered a copy of an article headed "Valuation bungles add to rate charges - REIQ" which appeared in "The Courier-Mail" on 2 August 1995. The article refers to claimed errors in property valuations or in data concerning properties held in the valuation system in the Department of Lands. There is nothing in the article that says or implies that the value on the subject land resulted from an error of the type discussed in "The Courier-Mail" article. I find the article to be of no benefit whatsoever to me in considering the appeal. Furthermore, I would say that, at the conclusion of the case for the appellant, there was no evidence which would move me to the view that the valuation of the Chief Executive was wrong.
Valuation is not a discipline which involves the collection of general marketplace information of the type referred to by Mr Major to arrive at a view as to what figure ought to be placed on a piece of land. Rather, it is the practice of referring to comparable transactions in the marketplace which would indicate, by the application of expert analysis, what figure would be placed on the subject land were it to be sold at or near the relevant date by a voluntary bargain struck between two parties "willing to trade by neither of them so anxious to do so that he would overlook any ordinary business considerations". (Spencer v. The Commonwealth (1907) 5 CLR 418).
Evidence for the Chief Executive was led through Peter David Brown, a registered valuer, employed by the Department of Lands. In his written valuation Mr. Brown referred to three sales as the basis upon which he had arrived at a figure of $83,000 applying to the subject land. Sale 1, located in Bimba Street, had an analysed value of $90,500 applied to $88,000 and was seen by Mr Brown as superior to the subject due mainly to the views available on the sale block. The sale block is steeper than the subject land, making access a little more difficult and limiting the options for building. Mr Major pointed out that Sale 1 was about 150 metres closer to the beach than was the subject and he said that this was important in the market at Point Lookout.
Mr Brown's Sale 3, analysed to an unimproved value of $105,000, was applied at $100,000 and was seen by him to be superior to the subject in a comparison not challenged by Mr Major.
Sale 2 tendered by Mr Brown attracted most attention. This is a sale in Samarinda Drive, was analysed to $86,500 and $83,000 was applied. Whilst the sale was seen by Mr Brown to be superior in situation to the subject, being closer to "Main Beach", the subject's near level topography compared with the steepness of the sale which gave rise to the same limitations applying to Sale 1, offset the situation advantage. Mr Major was of the view that Sale 2 is in an area of newer development than the subject, however, this was disputed by the Chief Executive who pointed out that the subdivisional plan numbers applying to the Sale 2 locality and to the subject locality were indicators that subdivision had occurred at around the same dates. Mr Major gave evidence, however, that one house described as an old fibro cottage occupied at one time by a house painter almost opposite the subject land was quite unattractive and that there were other old houses across the road from the subject. Evidence for the Chief Executive was that there was similarly unattractive properties, if not across the road from Sale 2 but in the vicinity, and that these would have a somewhat similar impact on the value of that sale as would the neighbourhood of the subject have on its value.
As I appreciate the evidence on this point, it is not a matter that would loom so large in the mind of a prudent purchaser of the subject land that the price that he would pay for the subject, as if it were unimproved, would fall below the figure of $83,000 placed on it by Mr Brown. In saying this, I have in mind firstly, the fact that Mr Brown is an expert in the matter of valuing land; secondly, that throughout the matter he evidenced a comprehensive and professional appreciation of the market and influencing factors on North Stradbroke Island.
There were various other sorties into evidence which I find had either tenuous connection or no connection with the issue of determining the value to be placed on the subject land. I do not intend reciting that evidence here.
In matters such as this, the Valuation of Land Act 1944 provides in section 45(4) -"Such notice shall state the grounds of appeal and the appeal shall be limited to the grounds so stated and the burden of proving any and every such ground shall be upon the owner."
The onus of proof which is placed on the appellant can be discharged by showing that the valuation of the Chief Executive was based either on an error in principle or on a serious error of fact. This view was expressed by the High Court in Brisbane City Council v. The Valuer-General (1978) 5 QLCR 283 at 303. I find in the instant case that the appellant has failed to discharge the burden of proof and has not convinced me that Mr Brown has acted on a wrong principle or made any serious error of fact. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed and the valuation of the Chief Executive is affirmed.
RP SCOTT
MEMBER OF THE LAND COURT
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