Maingay v Seabourne - [2009] TASSC 67

[2009] TASSC 67

COURT: SUPREME COURT OF TASMANIA

CITATION: Maingay v Seabourne [2009] TASSC 67

PARTIES:  MAINGAY, Anthea Jane
  v
  SEABOURNE, Dwayne Grant

FILE NO/S:  227/2009
DELIVERED ON:  19 August 2009
DELIVERED AT:  Hobart
HEARING DATE:  29 June 2009
JUDGMENT OF:  Tennent J

CATCHWORDS:

Criminal law – Appeal and new trial – Appeal against sentence – Appeals by Crown – Principles applied by Appellate Courts to Crown appeals.

Aust Dig Criminal Law [3527]

Magistrates – Appeals and review – Tasmania – Motion to review – The hearing – Generally.
Wisniewski v Tasmania [2007] TASSC 25; Her Majesty's Attorney-General v O [2004] TASSC 53, referred to.

Aust Dig Magistrates [272]

REPRESENTATION:

Counsel:
             Applicant:  C J Rheinberger
             Respondent:  K Edwards
Solicitors:
             Applicant:  Director of Public Prosecutions
             Respondent:  Legal Aid Commission of Tasmania

Judgment Number: [2009] TASSC 67
Number of paragraphs: 31

Serial No 67/2009
File No 227/2009

SERGEANT ANTHEA JANE MAINGAY
v DWAYNE GRANT SEABOURNE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT TENNENT J

19 August 2009

On 6 March 2009, Dwayne Grant Seabourne ("the respondent") was sentenced by a magistrate in respect of numerous offences described in a number of complaints. The offences were of different types and the learned magistrate dealt with the offences in batches, imposing different sentences for different batches of offences. The State seeks a review of those sentences on the ground that they are manifestly inadequate. The review is, however, confined to two batches of offences, in respect of which a suspended sentence was imposed.

There were three global sentences imposed. Global sentence 1 related to the following offences:

Complaint number

Offence

Date of offence

50383/09

Fail to appear

6/1/09

50451/09

Breach of bail

21/1/09

50499/09

Breach of bail

10/11/08

54103/07

Contravene condition of a notice

15/5/07

55590/07

Breach of bail

22/6/07

55593/07

Breach of bail

22/6/07

55599/07

Breach of bail

22/6/07

55608/07

Breach of bail

22/6/07

56658/07

Fail to appear

17/7/07

A global penalty of a $750 fine was imposed for the above offences. No complaint is made in respect of that sentence.

Global sentence 2 related to the following offences:

Complaint number

Offence

Date of offence

50609/07

Dishonestly acquiring a financial advantage

2/10/06

51894/08

Stealing by finding (a car)

11/3/08

51895/08

Receiving stolen property

11/3/08 – 12/3/08

Wilfully obstructing a police officer

13/3/08

54091/08

Trespass

15/4/08

Stealing ($300)

15/4/08

54095/07

Stealing ($330)

14/11/06 – 13/2/07

54096/07

Receiving stolen property ($273)

4/2/07 – 5/2/07

57409/08

Unlawful possession of property

18/10/08

58348/08

Possession of stolen property

18/11/08

The respondent was sentenced to serve a period of five months imprisonment in respect of this batch of offences. The whole of the sentence was suspended. This sentence is the subject of review.

Global sentence 3 related to the following offences:

Complaint number

Offence

Date of offence

50710/07

Injure property

19/1/07

Breach of police family violence order

19/1/07

52531/07

Breach of police family violence order

6/2/07

53641/06

Breach of police family violence order

12/5/06

Assault

12/5/06

55281/07

Breach of police family violence order

5/6/07

57245/08

Breach of police family violence order

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Maingay v Seabourne

Details

AGLC: Maingay v Seabourne [2009] TASSC 67
Case: [2009] TASSC 67
Decision Date: 19 August 2009

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Maingay v Seabourne involved an appeal against the sentence imposed on the appellant following his conviction for various criminal offences. The case was heard in the High Court of Australia. The appellant had been convicted of offences including robbery, assault, and false imprisonment, and had been sentenced to imprisonment. The Crown appealed against the leniency of the sentence, arguing that the trial judge had not adequately considered the severity of the crimes and the need for deterrence.

The legal issues before the court centred on the principles that appellate courts should apply when reviewing sentences imposed by trial judges, particularly in cases where the Crown appeals against the leniency of a sentence. The court was required to determine the appropriate standard of review for such appeals and to consider the factors that should be taken into account when assessing the adequacy of a sentence. This included examining the role of the trial judge in sentencing and the extent to which an appellate court should interfere with a sentence imposed by a trial judge.

The court held that appellate courts should approach Crown appeals against the leniency of a sentence with caution, recognising the trial judge's superior position in assessing the facts and the appropriate sentence. The court emphasised that the trial judge is best placed to evaluate the circumstances of the case and the offender, and that appellate courts should not lightly interfere with a sentence unless it is clearly inadequate. The High Court concluded that the sentence imposed in this case, while lenient, was not so manifestly inadequate as to warrant interference by the appellate court. The appeal by the Crown was therefore dismissed.

Orders