Mainbanner Pty Ltd v Dadincroft Pty Ltd
[1988] FCA 586
•10 Apr 1988
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JUDGMENT No ...5. Eh!/. ... 8%- IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY 1 QLD G55 Of 1988
DIVISION GENERAL )
BETWEEN: NAINBANNER PTY LTD
First Applicant
AND: ROBERT BERNARD LUBKE
Second Applicant
AND: ANNETTE LUBKE
Third Applicant
AND: DADINCROFT PTY LTD
First Respondent
Second Respondents
MINUTES OF ORDER
JUDGE MAKING ORDER: PINCUS J. DATE OF ORDER: 4 OCTOBER 1988 WHERE MADE: BRISBANE
on or before 8 November 1988;
THE COURT ORDERS THAT: 1. the appllcants have leave to file and serve an
amended statement of claim on or before 11 October 1988;
2. the application for security for costs be refused;
3 . the defence and cross-claim, if any, be filed and served on or before 25 October 1988;
4 . the reply and answer, if any, be filed and served
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5. discovery be made on or before 22 November 1988;
6 . inspection take place on or before 6 December 1988;
l . the matter be further mentioned on Monday, 12 December 1988 at 9.30 a.m.;
8. the costs of today be the respondents' costs in the proceedings.
NOTE : Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in - Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
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IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA 1
QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY 1 QLD G55 Of 1988 GENERAL DIVISION 1
BETWEEN: MAINBANNER PTY LTD
First Applicant
AND: ROBERT BERNARD LUBKE
Second Applicant
AND: ANNETTE LUBKE i-
Third Applicant i /I
AND: DADINCROFT PTY LTD
First Respondent
AND: OSWALD HENRY BLACKER and I '
DOROTHY CLAIRE BLACKER
Second Respondents
PINCUS J. 4 OCTOBER 1908
EX TEMPORE REASONS FOR JUDGMENT !.
By this notice of motion the respondents seek, among
other things, an order for security for costs and relief with
respect to the statement of claim. As to the latter, I understandthat the applicants propose to amend to meet the objections which
have been made to the statement of claim and it is intended that an amended statement of claim will be delivered within seven days. To cover that aspect of the notice of motion it seems to me
! sufficient to order, and I do order, that the applicants have I.
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! leave to flle and serve an amended statement of claim on or before i _ I c .
1988. , . 11 October
That leaves for determination the only issue which is . .- contentious, and that is an application for security for costs.
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On that question I have had substantial assistance from counsel
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who have argued the matter carefully. I . !
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The principal application seeks a declaration under s.87 '. of the Trade Practices Act 1974 that certain contracts are void,
and an order for repayment of certain moneys paid thereunder,reconveyance of property, and damages.
The present form of the statement of claim which, I
gather from discussion wlth counsel, is not llkely to be changed
in a way which affects the matter I am presently considering,
asserts that various contracts were made induced by
misrepresentatlons on the part of Mr O.H. Blacker on behalf of the I. . first respondent, he being one of the second respondents. The
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posltion of the applicants is that they entered lnto the contracts L .
m / in question by way of achieving the overall purpose of purchasing a business which was for sale and which was bought by the first
applicant. The roles of the second and third applicants in the
matter is that they were vendors of a property for the sum of
$60,000, and the contract in question was made conditional upon .
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another contract, namely, that between the first respondent and
nr R.P. Lubke. The contract between the first respondent and
Mr R.P. Lubke related to the sale of the business. So the two . e , I
together. < tied were contracts
The matter was before me in March 1988 when an attempt
was made to restrain the exercise of security rights under a bill I
of sale given in respect to part of the purchase price. I refused
that application. Mr R.P. Lubke, the second applicant in these
proceedngs, gave some evidence before me and I made a comment upon
his evidence in the reasons for judgment in that interlocutory application. I have read the reasons for judgment and have also
read the affidavits which were used on that occasion and were used today also. It is unnecessary for the purpose of disposition of this
matter to go into detail with respect to the prospects of success, but I should say that so far as the material before me shows, the
applicants' case does not appear to be a very strong one. It may
be that it will strengthen with discovery and interrogatories, or
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in some other way, but going simply on the material I have, one I i would be a llttle surprised to see the claim succeed. That is, as
was argued by Mr Doyle, a circumstance which should incline one I towards granting an order for security.
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A second question whlch was debated, of a factual kind, L :
is whether or not there is some risk that if the respondents L~ , , succeed they will not be able to obtain from the applicants, and 1% i . in particular the first applicant, such a sum as would represent .
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the likely costs of the suit. On that point, also, mys opinion is in favour of the respondents; that is, I am of the opinion that . /
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there is a risk that if the respondents succeed they will not
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recover their costs of the suit. I ,
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i In those circumstances, it would seem to me a proper
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course to order security against the first applicant were it not .,
for a point raised by Mr Savage, with which I have had some little difficulty, and that is the way in which the presence of the
second and third applicants affects the matter.
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Mr Doyle contended, and I think it is correct, that on
the authorities the presence of the second and third applicants
does not destroy the Court's discretion to order security againstthe first applicant.
The cases to which I have been referred are two: one is
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the decision of Sir Robert Megarry in Pearson v. Naydler in [l9771 :.
3 All E.R. 531. There the Vice-Chancellor was faced with a
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submission that, just as in the case of orders for security against plaintiffs resident out of the jurisdiction, the presence
of a co-plalntiff within the jurisdiction deprived the Court of its jurisdiction, similarly, the presence of a natural person as
co-plaintiff deprived the Court of jurisdiction to order security
against a plaintiff company.
The judge was against that contention, as he points out
at p.536 - a view which he adopted without regard to the particular facts of that case. Nevertheless, it is right to i ,-
notice the particular facts of that case, where an order for security was made. They were that the plaintiff company was i
argued to be in truth the only real plaintiff, and in that
submission, the judge thought, there was considerable force. He .I.
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added that he had already decided the point on broader and more
general grounds:
A second particular circumstance existing in Pearson v.
Naydler which is not present here is referred to immediately after
the passage I have just mentioned at p.536. I do not think it is necessary to explain what it was.
The second case I was referred to is the decision of the
Full Court of the Queensland Supreme Court in Harpur v. Ariadne Australia Limited [l9841 2 Qd.R. p.523. The principal ludgment in
that case was written by Connolly J. It is true that parts of his
Honour's reasoning suggest that he was of the view that the presence of a natural person plaintiff with the incorporated plaintiff was sufflcient to defeat an application for costs. His
Honour said, for example, at p.531:
"The court cannot by orders its guarantee a successful outcome In a practical sense to any
party. It thus isno answer when security for
costs is sought t o say that a person of apparent
substance may be able to make away with his assets within the jurisdiction ..."
His Honour goes on to discuss those cases. He seems inclined to apply their spirlt, at least.
It is, on the other hand true and important, s Mr,Doyle
pointed out, that Mr Harpur, who was the natural person plaintiff
in that case, was a man of substance. He was, it appeared, able
to meet any order for costs. This case, then, differs as to the facts from both of those to which I ave referred. It seems to me
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that as against the applicants as a group, the respondents are at , i risk as to costs. There is also the circumstance which should be taken into account in favour of granting security, that the
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applicants' case is not one of great strength. i
In the English case, the precise form of order made is
not set out. The reasons conclude:
"Doing the best I can, I order the plaintiff company
to give security for the defendants' costs in the sum of E7,500, the security being in respect of
those costs up to and Including the first day of
the trial. I will hear counsel on the details of the order."
Then there is noted "Order accordingly". It is not absolutely clear to me how one handles an order of this sort. Here, it could not be contended that the second and
third applicants are not properly joined. It seems to me that " ' they are essential parties. If an order were made in the form which Sir Robert Megarry used, then presumably it would follow, if
the order for security were not complied with, that the Mainbanner
part of it would be stayed. That would leave Mr and Mrs Lubke with a suit in which they apparently would, as I read the
statement of claim, seek to have their contract rescinded and to
have damages on the basis precisely of the same
misrepresentations. That seems to me to be quite an inconvenient outcome, so far as the Court is concerned. l .._ I _
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In the papers, It appears that the respondents are owed
a substantial sum still, and it is likely, as Mr Savage contended, that a claim will be made, either in this Court or elsewhere, for that sum. Again, there would be something slightly anomalous, as it seems
to me, if that occurs, in having the respondent or defendant in that case unable to set up by way of cross-claim the matters presently advanced in the statement of claim.
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That aspect of it, that is, the awkwardness which would !:
arise if the respondents made a cross-claim, is in my view
subsidiary, because they have not yet done so. The principal point, and I think the only substantial reason against an order
for security in a case of this sort where you have natural persons necessarlly ~oined as applicants is how one handles the suit as a L -
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practical matter. I am of the view that the question raised 1s j :
essentlally one of principle. As a matter of principle I feel,
somewhat reluctantly, impelled towards the conclusion pointed to ’ ./ by Mr Savage that an order for security for costs should not be made leaving a truncated suit whlch cannot be properly handled by the Court. I would add that the question of principle I mentioned does not seem to arise in cases such as those dealt with by Sir Robert Megarry where the natural person plaintiff was added, as it
appears, simply with cost considerations in mind.
I therefore propose to refuse the application for
security on the ground which I have-mentioned. i ’ 1
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I had intended to make the costs, costs in the , , b : ,- I.'
proceedings, but I have been persuaded I should not do that. I
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think the fairer order would be to make the costs of today, in 1.
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toto, the respondents' costs in the proceedings. : , I. . The other orders I will make are that the defence and
cross-claim, if any, be filed and served on or before 25 October
1988; the reply and answer, if any, be filed and served on or
before 8 November 1988; discovery be made on or before 22 November 1988; inspection take place on or before 6 December 1988; and the , matter to be relisted for further mention on Monday, 12 December 1988, at 9.30 am before me.
'i certify tiiat this and the 7 preceding
Pages ars a trua copy of the reasons for
judgment herein of His Honour
Mr. Justice Pincus
&,L, % L d z y fl &soclate
Dated + cc+cbe-- FtSE
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