Mainard and Holden

Case

[2010] FMCAfam 1174

11 October 2010


FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

MAINARD & HOLDEN [2010] FMCAfam 1174
FAMILY LAW – Children – change of name – spend time with – supervised time.
Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), ss.65D, 65AA, 60CA, 60CC, 60B
Johnson & Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488
Chapman & Palmer (1978) FLC 90-510
Giessruf & Giessruf [2004] FAMCA 848
Applicant: MS MAINARD
Respondent: MR HOLDEN
File Number: DNC 83 of 2010
Judgment of: Turner FM
Hearing dates: 7 October & 8 October 2010
Date of Last Submission: 8 October 2010
Delivered at: Darwin
Delivered on: 11 October 2010

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant: Ms J. Truman
Solicitors for the Applicant: DS Family Law
The Respondent: Self represented

ORDERS

  1. That from the date hereof the child [X] HOLDEN born [in] 2010 shall be known as [X] MAINARD-HOLDEN and that each party shall do all such things and sign all such documents as are necessary to change the child’s name with Births, Deaths and Marriages Registry within 7 days from the date hereof and should the father fail to sign the requested documents a Registrar of the Family Court of Australia upon proof of an affidavit of such failure is appointed pursuant to s.106A of the Family Law Act 1975 to execute any required documents on behalf of the father to give force and effect to this order.

  2. That the mother provide to the father within 7 days written details as to the child’s weight, and length and the size the child takes in baby clothing and disposable nappies.

  3. That until the age of three the child spend unsupervised time with the father as agreed between the parties and failing agreement as follows:

    A.   For the period from 25 October 2010 to 28 November 2010 as follows:

    (i)from 2.30pm to 4.30pm each Monday;

    (ii)from 2.30pm to 4.30pm each Thursday;

    (iii)from 11.00am to 1.00pm each Friday;

    (iv)from 3.00pm to 5.30pm each Sunday.

    B.For the period from 29 November 2010 to 23 January 2011:

    (i)from 12.30pm to 4.30pm each Monday;

    (ii)from 12.30pm to 4.30pm each Thursday;

    (iii)from 3.00pm to 5.30pm each Sunday.

    C.For the period from 24 January 2011 to 27 February 2011:

    (i)from 9.00am to 4.30pm each Monday;

    (ii)from 9.00am to 4.30pm each Thursday;

    (iii)from 3.00pm to 5.30pm every second Sunday.

    D.From 28 February 2011 until the child turns 3 years of age provided the father has provided written proof to the mother of his completion of the Post Separation Parenting Program and provided the father has attended an appointment with Ms T:

    (i)from 9.00am to 4.30pm each Monday;

    (ii)from 4.30pm each Wednesday to 4.30pm each Thursday;

    (iii)from 3.00pm to 5.30pm every second Sunday.

    E.In the event that the father has not by 28 February 2011 provided proof of completion of the Post Separation Parenting Program or has not attended an appointment with Ms T then time with the child is to continue in accordance with 3C and will only commence in accordance with 3D once both requirements have been met.

  4. That all outstanding applications are dismissed.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment under the pseudonym Mainard & Holden is approved pursuant to s.121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES
COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AT DARWIN

DNC 83 of 2010

MS MAINARD

Applicant

And

MR HOLDEN

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

(Ex Tempore; Revised from Transcript)

  1. I have before me two competing applications in respect to the child, [X], born [in] 2009.  When proceedings began, there were a large number of issues in dispute, but I congratulate the commonsense approach of both parties in reaching agreement on most of the issues, including the long term arrangements for [X].

  2. The remaining outstanding issues that now require determination are:

    (a)the spend-time arrangements with the father and [X] from now until the age of three;

    (b)whether the mother’s sister, Ms K, is permitted to care for or collect or deliver [X];

    (c)whether a name change is permitted from Holden to Mainard-Holden; and

    (d)whether the mother is required to supply clothing and nappies in respect to the visits.

Background

  1. By way of background, the father, who is the applicant in the children’s proceedings, is aged 35 and is a sales [occupation omitted].

  2. The mother is aged 32 and is a [occupation omitted].

  3. The father has a child from a previous relationship, aged eight.  [Y] lives in Perth with his mother and spends holiday time with his father. 

  4. The mother has one child from a previous relationship, a son, aged 15, and he lives with his mother on a full-time basis.

  5. The parties commenced cohabitation in 2007.  [X] was born [in] 2009.  The parties separated in November 2009.

  6. Proceedings were commenced by the mother in February 2010 for property.  Consent orders in property matters have been reached.

  7. In the response filed in April 2010, the father raised children’s issues. 

  8. Between separation and the filing of the response, time between the father and [X] has been irregular.  This was due to a number of factors, including the father’s long hours, the breakdown of communication between the parties, the failed number of mediation attempts, the DVO proceedings, just to name a few.

  9. On 4 May 2010, interim consent orders were entered into, whereby [X] had time with her father four times a week, two hours each visit, unsupervised.

  10. On 20 May 2010, the matter was back before the Court and Terry FM ordered that, until further order, that the father spend time with the child for two visits a week, two hours each visit, with all visits to be supervised at CatholicCareNT.  That arrangement has remained in place.

Orders sought

  1. As indicated, most of the hard work has already been achieved by the parties in reaching the comprehensive consent orders made last Friday.  The sticking point in the arrangements for [X] is, what time she is to spend with her father from now until the age of three. 

  2. The father is seeking that, from 25 October 2010 to 29 November 2010, that he see [X] four times a week for two hours per visit, unsupervised.  In essence, the mother agrees, but there is a dispute as to the days and the times this is to occur.

  3. From 29 November 2010 until the child turns three, the father wants to spend time with [X] three days a week for two hours each visit and then, in addition, one overnight. 

  4. The mother’s position is that from 29 November 2010 until 24 January 2011, the father have one four-hour visit per week and two two-hour visits per week, all unsupervised.  Then from 24 January 2011 to 23 March 2011, the time increase to two full days with [X] per week.  Then from 23 March 2011, when the child is 18 months old, until the age of three, the child, [X], spend one day per week with her father and one overnight visit.

  5. Further, the father is seeking an order that the mother’s sister, Ms K, undergo a drug test or, if not, then will not be able to drive with [X] in the car and, further, that the mother, for a period of three months, provide clothing and nappies for [X].

  6. Lastly, the father opposes the orders sought by the mother that the child’s surname be changed to Mainard-Holden.

Evidence

  1. The father in these proceedings is now self-represented, his solicitors withdrawing from the proceedings just prior to the trial.  I explained the trial process to the father in accordance with the requirements of Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488.

  2. The mother was legally represented and continues to be legally represented and Ms Truman of Counsel presented her case.  Both parties gave evidence.  Whilst the father was cross-examined, the mother was not cross-examined by the father.

  3. As the family report writer, Mr V, was not available, both parties chose to proceed with the trial on the basis the Mr V was not required for cross-examination.  Reliance, however, was placed on Mr V’s family report, which was released on 6 September 2010. 

  4. In addition to the report, the oral evidence and submissions made by the parties, I relied on the following documents:

    a)

    for the father I read and considered the amended response filed


    27 April 2010; and

    b)the admissible parts of his affidavit filed 1 October 2010.

  5. Now would be the appropriate time to discuss the issues regarding the father’s affidavit and issues that the father referred to on several occasions during the trial as to his evidence not being allowed.  The father’s very large affidavit, over two centimetres thick, had three major defects:

    a)included the history of the property proceedings, which had been settled by way of consent orders in June 2010 and, with the consent of the parties, it was agreed that all references to the property issues be disregarded in the affidavit.

    b)it included details as to the domestic violence proceedings instigated by the father against the mother, such proceedings resulting in a dismissal of his application in the Local Magistrates Court.  Again, with the consent of the father, it was agreed that all reference to domestic violence issues be disregarded.

    c)lastly, the father referred to, and annexed in his affidavit, various testimonials as to his character and partially prepared affidavits as to witnesses that might be called.  The father strongly objected to my refusing this information and annexures, claiming he did not understand the process and that these witnesses, especially the mother of his child, [Y], were important to his case.

  6. The father, however, did not provide at the hearing affidavits sworn of the witnesses that he intended to call, except for [Y]’s mother, who was not present personally, but available to attend by telephone.  Further, he did not put the other party on notice as to the witnesses.  The wife objected to the inclusion of this evidence.  I refused reliance on the affidavit of [Y]’s mother.

  7. Whilst I am aware, with self represented litigants, that the Courts must do everything possible to accommodate their short-fallings and to ensure that a fair hearing is had by all. The Court should not be placed in a position where compromise results in an injustice to the other party.

  8. Further, the father in this case is a very capable and efficient self-represented litigant, having been legally represented for the majority of his proceedings, and is an intelligent, well-educated man. 

  9. His past experiences and the capability shown in the preparation of his material indicated that he had the ability to apply the knowledge of how evidence was required to be presented in this Court but, more importantly, the evidence, despite the father’s belief, would not have advanced the father’s case any further and, even if permitted, would not have impacted in any way.

  10. The decision required to be made today was based really on the ongoing arrangements until [X] turned three.  The only insight that [Y]’s mother could have brought to the Court, in her view, was the father’s capacity to care for [Y]. 

  11. In any event, Mr V interviewed [Y]’s mother for the purposes of the family report and her input has been captured in that report.  As pointed out to the father on several occasions, his experiences with [Y] are not a foregone conclusion as to the arrangements that should be put in place for [X].

  12. Further, the father’s ability and capability to parent are not an issue for me to determine, as long term arrangements have already been agreed upon between the parties.  What I must decide is what is going to be in the best interests of [X] and the amount of time she spends with her father up until the age of three.

  13. In respect to the material read for the mother:

    a)I have read and considered her reply filed 28 May 2010; and

    b)her affidavit filed 1 October 2010. 

  14. I found both witnesses to be credible, although I question the father’s level of commitment to [X] and whether the father is child-focused, as he purports himself to be.

  15. In considering all of the above, any findings of fact made on the balance of probabilities, having regard to my observations of the parties and in what follows, statements of facts constitute findings of fact.

The law

  1. Children’s issues are covered in Part VII of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act’). The power of the Court to make a parenting order is provided for in s.65D. Pursuant to s.65AA, in deciding whether to make a particular parenting order, the Court must have regard to the best interests of the child as a paramount consideration. This is reiterated in s.60CA.

  2. In determining what is in the best interests of the child, I must, firstly, consider the objects of Part VII and principles underlying the objects are set out in s.60B. In short, the objects are that the child have the benefit of a meaningful relationship with both parents, provided it is consistent with the child’s best interests, that the child is protected from harm, abuse, neglect of family violence, that the child receive adequate and proper parenting to help them achieve their full potential, and ensure that the parents fulfil their duties and meet responsibilities in the care, welfare and development of the child.

  3. As to the principles underlying the objects, the children have the right to know and be cared for by both parents, to spend time with the parent with whom they are not living and for parents to jointly share duties and responsibilities of parenthood.

  4. In ascertaining what is in the best interests of the child, I must look to the primary and additional factors, as set out in s.60CC. I do not, in this case, have to consider the presumption of equal shared parental responsibility, as this is already the subject of a consent order.

  5. Further, I am satisfied that the long term consent orders are reasonably practical in addressing the time the child is to spend with the father.

Application of the law

  1. Firstly, I refer to the primary considerations, as set out in s.60CC.


    The first primary consideration is the benefit of the child having a meaningful relationship with both parents. 

  2. I find that the child, [X], even at the tender age of one, already has a meaningful relationship with both parents.  Even with the imposition of supervised time on the father in May 2010, it has not hindered in any way the development of the meaningful relationship that exists today between father and daughter. 

  3. The proposed orders by both parents promote the meaningful relationship.  It is evident that both parents love their daughter dearly and want to play an ongoing role in their daughter’s life.

  4. The second primary consideration is the need to protect the child from physical or psychological harm from being exposed to abuse, neglect or family violence. 

  5. Much tip-toeing was done during the trial around the issue of the domestic violence proceedings brought by the father against the mother, which was subsequently unsuccessful in the Magistrates Court. 

  6. Further, the father spoke of being fearful of his wife and alluded to the mother, as a [occupation omitted], having the ability to get away with certain things.  None of this was tested, nor did I find that it was needed to be tested because at no point in time did either party submit that [X] had been subjected to violence or may fall victim to violence.

  7. The father indicated it was no longer an issue, but what concerned me most was the evidence that, during the peak times the father was fearful of his wife, he had text the mother, wanting to see her, indicating some possible reconciliation and saying he loved her.  Further, at one point of the cross-examination, the father admitted sending SMS messages, signed off with kisses, as a form of manipulation.

  8. It is a shame that people play games.  It is a further shame that such game playing results in forming such levels of concern and mistrust in families that it then impacts on the arrangements with the child. 


    I accept that people do stupid things, often ruled by the heart and emotions, instead of commonsense, when a messy situation arises, especially during the time of a separation.  One can only hope that lessons are learned and people mature.  I find that [X] does not require protection from harm or abuse or family violence and, thankfully, this is not a factor I need consider today.

  9. I now turn to the additional considerations which I consider to be relevant to the issues regarding determination. 

  10. The first is s.60CC(3)(b), the nature of the relationship with the child of each of the parents. I find the child has a strong and appropriate bond with each of the parents and that the orders sought by both parents will foster this bond.

  11. The next consideration is s.60CC(3)(c), the willingness and ability of each of the child’s parents to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing relationship between the child and the parent.

  12. The parties are intelligent, well-educated parents, who both had previous parenting experience and responsibilities with their other children.  Their ability is not in question.  As to their willingness, I have concerns.  The mother is evidently and understandably damaged by the number of and ferocity of the allegations made by the father since separation.  Her trust of the father is limited.

  13. Notwithstanding this, however, the mother is moving forward to ensure that [X] has a close and continuing relationship with the father.  The mother has complied with all orders and has facilitated the use of a communication book to relay to the father the day to day routine for [X], together with providing information the father needs to have the best possible time with [X].

  14. The mother has completed a parenting course and is positive about the future arrangements for [X].  The father, however, has some way to go before reaching the same level of maturity.  The father has chosen, for some period of time, not to communicate effectively with the mother on issues regarding [X].  His comments in the communication book are almost non-existent.  The largest entry was a written attack on the mother, which in cross-examination he states was justified.

  15. The father states that things now will be different between himself and the mother.  Further, the father demonstrated no insight as to his behaviour and repeated unsubstantiated allegations against the mother, which the mother viewed as almost paranoid, has impacted on their ability to work together, albeit separately and separated, in the ongoing care of [X].  Only time will tell whether the father’s attitude and lack of insight will impact on his willingness to facilitate a close and continuing relationship between the child and her mother.

  16. Further, the father has not yet completed a parenting course, although inquiries have been made.  A course is due to start shortly and the father anticipates that he will be completing the course within three to four weeks.  On the timeframe provided, it would appear that he would be completing the course towards the end of November.  It is hopeful that the course will provide information to the father, which may assist him in the future in developing a better and more productive level of communication with the mother. I must give weight to this consideration when determining the gradual increase in time for [X].

  17. The next consideration is the likely effect of any changes in the child’s circumstances, including the effect on the child of any separation from either of the parents.  There is no dispute that supervision should cease and this can only enhance the relationship between the father and the daughter.  The big issue though is how to advance the unsupervised time to overnight time and I must consider the impact of this on [X] and what is in her best interest.

  18. The father maintains that there is no reason why one month of two-hourly visits, four times a week, but it cannot then go straight into an overnight arrangement. 

  19. The mother’s proposal is slower and more measured, with one month of four two-hourly visits, one month of two two-hourly visits and one four-hourly visit per week and then of two one-day visits per week for three months, when [X] turns 18 months.

  1. Mr V, in the family report, at paragraph 42, agrees that there should be a measured period of unsupervised daytime contact of some months and then to incorporate overnight.  As to what amounts to some months is not clarified specifically by Mr V, but he suggested ideally the parents need to complete a post parenting separation course before such a move to overnight could occur.  Further, Mr V observed at paragraph 42.

    “…I believe some caution must be appropriate psychologically, given [X]’s age.  She ought not be away from her primary care- giver for too long (at least not before she has turned three),  so it might be better for her to have a period of one overnight a week with the father for some months before moving to increase it.”

  2. As to moving to longer periods of daytime contact with the father,


    Mr V indicated that that would be April from mid October, after [X]’s visit to Adelaide for her medical issues.

  3. I have concerns about the father’s proposal for overnight time in such a short timeframe. 

  4. Firstly, the father has not completed a parenting course, although he has indicated he will.  Secondly, the father’s proposal does not factor in an increase in daytime hours with [X] before going into an overnight regime.  [X] is a baby.  Both [X] and her father will need to adjust to spending more time with each other, other than two hours supervised at a contact centre. 

  5. There are routines to follow, meals to be prepared and, whilst the father has had some experience with his own son, [Y], that is some years ago.  There needs to be a period of increased daytime for these adjustments to occur before overnight can be considered and introduced. 

  6. Further, I must take heed of the caution expressed by the expert, Mr V, in that psychologically it is not in [X]’s best interest to be away from her primary carer for too long.

  7. I, therefore, propose that there be a period of time, increasing the two-hourly visits to four-hourly visits, then to day visits, before overnight is ordered.  However, the timeframe of six months proposed by the mother is too long and I find that the more appropriate timeframe in which this can be implemented is less than five months.

  8. The next additional consideration is the capacity of each of the parents to provide for the needs of the child, including emotional and intellectual needs. 

  9. There are two areas that I must address in this consideration.  The first is the health of the child.  [X] suffers from an uncommon condition called camptodactyly, whereby the middle fingers on each hand are joined.

  10. The child is under the care of medical practitioners and, at this point in time, the father has never attended an appointment with the practitioners or spoken to them about the condition. 

  11. An authority is now being organised for the medical practitioner, Ms T, to speak to the father and I recommend that the father avail himself of this opportunity as soon as possible, so that he can understand fully the seriousness of this condition and the level of commitment required by him to ensure that he was doing everything possible to assist [X] in the treatment of her condition.

  12. The mother is concerned that she has had no support by the father on this issue.  There is a splinting protocol, which the mother carries out regularly, which the child dislikes intensely and often cries in protest.  The father needs to learn this protocol.  This supports the need for a gradual increase of time and the father needs to demonstrate his level of commitment before overnight time can commence.

  13. The second issue is the father’s heavy commitment to his employment as a [omitted].  The father works seven days a week and his income is dependent on commission.  It was of concern, when referring to possible times he could have with the child, that he spoke of having to sacrifice his hobbies, such as the gym, and his work to spend time with his child.  There was further concern in that the reasons for the two hour time periods with his child and not being increased to longer daytime periods was because of these commitments.

  14. The father spoke of the mother having to make sacrifices to accommodate the times he wants to spend with [X], although he appears to resent the sacrifices he might need to make if other times were imposed.  Not for a moment do I criticise a parent for working.  Work is a necessity, but I am critical of a parent who, with choices available, put the priority of work over the priority of parenting.  This shows a lack of insight and demonstrates a lack of child focus.

  15. The father submitted on several occasions that the mother’s proposal was setting them up to fail, but, on questioning, the father admitted that, whilst working seven days a week, the slower days are Mondays and Fridays.  Further he has flexibility, with his only ongoing commitments being the sales meetings on Tuesdays and Wednesdays.  It is time for the father to reassess his priorities and look to an arrangement that provides a better work/home life balance.

  16. Further, the father commented that he does not want to be in a position where he may have to use child care during the time he has [X] in his care.  The mother, who is working part-time, is also returning to work full-time shortly and has based her proposals on being able to collect the child from changeover at the conclusion of her work day.

  17. I have taken all of these issues into account in considering the times and days that will be spent by [X] with her father and, more importantly, in considering those times and days, I have taken into account the needs of the child and I want to cause her the least disruption.

  18. The next consideration is the lifestyle and background of the child and the parties.  It is under this consideration that I will deal with the competing proposals of the parents in respect to the surname to be used by [X]. 

  19. The father’s proposal is that the child be known as Holden.  He states that, whilst there was a flippant conversation as to the use of a hyphenated name prior to the birth that was the extent of the discussion. 

  20. The mother’s proposal is that [X] have a hyphenated name of her maiden name, Mainard, and the father’s name, Holden, that is Mainard-Holden.

  21. The mother states that this was the source of two heated arguments with the father, together with the topic of circumcision and that these arguments occurred before the birth. 

  22. When the child was born, the father was the one responsible for registering the child and the child was registered in the name of Holden.  The mother did not oppose it, as she thought the relationship would last and that the parties would marry and that she too would have the name of Holden.  Her son has the name of [R], his father’s name, the mother and Mr R having been married at the time the son was born.  Now that the parties are separated, the mother proposes that the child be known by both names.  The extent of the father’s objection is that it is not in [X]’s best interests, as the two names together are too long and there will be a good chance that she will be teased, as not many children have two surnames.

  23. The leading decision on change of name is the Full Court decision of Chapman & Palmer (1978) FLC 90-510, which sets out a number of criteria which the Court must look at in determining whether there should be a change of name.

  24. The first criteria is that the welfare of the child is a paramount consideration.  There is nothing put forward by either proposal that concerns me, whether the child should be known under the name of Holden or Mainard-Holden, that impacts on her welfare.

  25. The second criteria is the short and long term effect of any change in the child’s name.  [X] is a baby.  She has a limited or no understanding as to her last name.  A change to Mainard-Holden will not have any short term or long term effect on the child.

  26. The third criteria is any confusion of identify which may arise for the child if her name is or isn’t changed.  Because of the child’s age, there would be no confusion of identity for the child should the name be changed.

  27. The next criteria is any embarrassment likely to be experienced by the child of the name if the name is different from the parent who had the primary care.  Whilst I cannot forecast whether embarrassment would occur if [X] was to retain the name Holden and her mother is Mainard, it makes sense that the mother’s surname be included in the child’s surname.

  28. The next criteria is the effect which any change in surname may have on the relationship between the child and the parent whose name the child bears.  There is nothing in the father’s opposition that indicated that a change to a hyphenated surname would affect his relationship with [X].

  29. The last criteria is the effect of frequent or random changes of name.  This does not apply in this matter.

  30. I, therefore, find that applying this criteria that it would be in the best interests of [X] to have a hyphenated surname of Mainard-Holden.  This will allow [X] to grow up sharing the name of both of her parents. 

  31. Support for my findings can be found in the single judge decision of Murray J in Giessruf & Giessruf [2004] FAMCA 848. In that case, the parties were married and all children were known as Giessruf. After separation, the wife applied to have surnames changed to Jones-Giessruf, Jones being her maiden name. As stated by the Murray J at [7],

    “The wife is not choosing to change the name of the child to something alien, either to her or to her husband.  She seeks to have her maiden name hyphenated with that of her husband.  The wife does not seek to diminish the husband’s importance in the life of the child.”

    Then at [8]:

    “I pointed out to the husband that it was a very common procedure these days for some children to take the surname of both parents, perhaps as a symbol of equality between the genders, perhaps to give equal paramountcy to the role of each parent.  I see no detriment to the children having that take place in these circumstances.”

    Lastly, the change of name is supported by Mr V, who states at paragraph 44:

    “…Psychologically, as [X] develops and becomes conscious of her name and identity, it will probably assist her greatly to be recognized under both parents’ names, whilst giving her a sense of individuality.”

  32. The next consideration is the attitude to the child and to the responsibilities of parenthood demonstrated by each of the parents. 

  33. I have touched on this already.  The father needs to compromise with his heavy workload, so as to provide the level of commitment needed to demonstrate his responsibilities to the ongoing parenting of [X].  Further, the father must make himself aware of [X]’s medical condition and become actively involved in her treatment.

  34. The only issue I need to deal with here is the order sought by the father that the mother provide sufficient clothing and nappies at changeover, with the father to return the clothing at the conclusion of the time.  Initially the order sought by the father was ongoing, but in the final submissions the father stated that it was only needed for three months, so that he could ascertain the size of the child. 

  35. During cross-examination, the father stated that he did not think this was a big ask, as he pays child support of $1,100 a month.  The mother states that the figure is over-inflated, the amount being more like $400 a month.

  36. Whether or not child support is being paid, a request for this type of order again supports my view that the father’s priorities are not as they should be and that he is not as child-focused as he perceives himself to be.  When in his care, the father should meet the needs of the child.  If he believes that these needs are cost expensive or cost excessive, then he can apply for a variation of his child support.  I note, however, that the father does not know what size his daughter is and I have addressed that situation in the orders.

  37. The last consideration is any other factor that the Court thinks relevant.  The father is seeking an order that the mother’s sister, Ms K, undergo Court-ordered drug tests and if she does not agree, then [X] not be allowed in the car with her. 

  38. The basis of the proposed order is that the father has concern as to


    Ms K’s drug use.  He deposes that the mother told him about Ms K’s drug use.  Further, he submitted that he had worked with Ms K some years ago and, whilst he observed her on several occasions being under the influence at parties, he did not know whether this was from alcohol or drugs.  He stated, however, that he had never observed Ms K using drugs.

  39. The mother denies that Ms K uses drugs and states that the conversations, as alleged by the father about Ms K’s drug use, never occurred.  The mother took great offence at the allegations by the father.  The mother has no concern as to Ms K’s ability in looking after [X] and relies on her once a week to assist. 

  40. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, I am not prepared to accept the evidence of the father and I will not make the order sought.  The father on two occasions during the course of the trial indicated, in almost a menacing tone, that, if I did not do something about this, he will go to the police and they will make Ms K undergo a blood test.

  41. The option, albeit legally questionable, is up to the father, but I remind the father of how damaging the already baseless allegations have been to date in the level of trust and communication with the mother.  One can only hope that commonsense prevails in this situation.

Conclusion

  1. I find that, having taken into account all considerations and the findings I have made, that it would be in [X]’s interests for unsupervised time with the father to be a gradual process, increasing from two-hourly to four-hourly to daytime and then to overnight, to occur by February 2011, provided the father has completed the post-separation parenting course and has met with Ms T regarding [X]’s medical condition.  I have ordered such days and times in an attempt to satisfy all parties, but, most importantly, to meet the needs of [X]

  2. I further find that the proposed order as to the provision of nappies and clothing has not been justified, although an order has been made to accommodate the need of the father to know the size of clothing that [X] takes.

  3. I further find that any order as to the mother’s sister, Ms K, is unsubstantiated and no such order has been made.

  4. Lastly, I find that it would be in the child’s best interests for her name to be changed to Mainard-Holden.

I certify that the preceding one hundred and two (102) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Turner FM.

Date:  20 October 2010

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Cases Citing This Decision

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Statutory Material Cited

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Johnson v Johnson [2000] HCA 48
Johnson v Johnson [2000] HCA 48