SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Magistrates Appeals: Criminal)
MAIER v POLICE
Judgment of The Honourable Justice White
19 November 2004
CRIMINAL LAW - JURISDICTION, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - JUDGMENT AND PUNISHMENT - SENTENCE - FACTORS TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT - MISCELLANEOUS MATTERS - ABNORMAL MENTAL CONDITION
POST AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS - POSTAL SERVICES - OFFENCES
Appellant pleaded guilty to 18 offences of using a carriage service to harass - Offences consisted of ringing women and asking about their underwear - Magistrate sentenced appellant to 18 months imprisonment, suspended after eight months upon appellant entering into a bond - Appellant had prior record of offences involving offensive telephone calls - Appellant suffered from a series of mental and physical health disorders - Sentence unduly severe - Magistrate gave insufficient weight to appellant's mental condition and doctor's report as to effect of imprisonment - Offences could be properly described as a single course of conduct - Appellant had now spent six weeks in custody - Appellant re-sentenced to imprisonment for 18 weeks, suspended upon entering into a bond including a term that the appellant perform community service.
Magistrates Court Act 1991 (SA) s 42; Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 4B, s 4K, s 19AC, s 20, s 85ZE; Summary Offences Act 1953 (SA) s 41, referred to.
Mason-Stuart v The Queen (1993) 61 SASR 204, considered.
MAIER v POLICE
[2004] SASC 367Magistrates Appeal
WHITE J
Introduction
This is an appeal, pursuant to s 42 of the Magistrates Court Act 1991 (SA), against a sentence imposed by a Magistrate in the Victor Harbour Magistrates Court on 4 August 2004.
The appellant pleaded guilty to eighteen offences of intentionally using a carriage service (the telephone) with the result that another person was harassed, contrary to s 85ZE(1)(a) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), and to one offence of unlawful possession, contrary to s 41(1) of the Summary Offences Act 1953 (SA). Each of the offences against s 85ZE(1)(a) of the Crimes Act carried a maximum penalty of 1 year imprisonment. Section 4B of the Crimes Act empowered the Magistrate to impose fines either in the alternative, or in addition to, a sentence of imprisonment. The offence of unlawful possession carried a maximum penalty of $10,000 fine or imprisonment for two years.
In relation to the Commonwealth offences, the Magistrate imposed, pursuant to s 4K of the Crimes Act, a single sentence of imprisonment of 18 months. But for the appellant’s guilty pleas he would have imposed a sentence of 20 months imprisonment. Pursuant to s 20(1)(b) of the Crimes Act, he ordered that the appellant be released after serving eight months of that sentence, on the condition that the appellant enter into a recognizance in the sum of $1000 to be of good behaviour for the unexpired balance of the period of imprisonment, namely ten months. In relation to the offence of unlawful possession, the Magistrate convicted the appellant and ordered that he enter into a bond to be of good…
Continue reading Maier v Police
Sign in free to access the full text
- AGLC
- Maier v Police [2004] SASC 367
- Case
- [2004] SASC 367
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was tasked with determining whether the sentence imposed by the Magistrate was appropriate and whether the Magistrate had sufficiently taken into account the appellant's mental health and the impact of imprisonment on his condition. The court also had to consider if the Magistrate erred in not suspending the sentence.
The court found that while the Magistrate correctly identified the aggravating factors of the offences, he had not given adequate weight to the appellant’s mental condition. The appellant's mental state, including his impulsivity and limited cognitive control, were significant factors in the commission of the offences. The court noted that in cases of diminished responsibility, the need for public protection and deterrence is less critical compared to the necessity of protecting the offender's health. The court concluded that the 18-month imprisonment sentence was unduly severe and re-sentenced the appellant to 18 weeks imprisonment, suspended upon the appellant entering into a bond that included terms for community service.
Orders
Orders of the court
Full text does not contain this section.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Thirdly, it was submitted that whilst the appellant had an unfortunate history of offending, he had never previously been sentenced to imprisonment. He had not therefore ever previously experienced the salutary effect which a sentence which is suspended has on a defendant. Fourthly, it was submitted that the discount for the plea of guilty, being 10 per cent, was inadequate. Finally, it was submitted that independently of identified errors, a sentence of 18 months imprisonment, following a starting point of 20 months, for these offences was excessive.Consideration of the Offences In my opinion, the appellant’s offending had a number of aggravating factors. These included the repetitive nature of the conduct, the fact that there were nine different victims, the fact that the last telephone call occurred after the appellant was spoken to by the police, the appellant’s record, and the fact that many of the victims were known to the defendant. The Magistrate had evidence of the reaction of some of the victims to the calls: in general they regarded them as offensive and some victims had feelings of fear and apprehension which may readily be understood.The Sentence of Imprisonment In my opinion, the sentence of 18 months imprisonment imposed by the Magistrate is unduly severe. Whilst the Magistrate was correct in identifying the aggravating features of the offending, and whilst he was correct in stating the importance of considerations of personal deterrence in this case, the Magistrate failed, in my opinion, to have adequate regard to the appellant’s mental condition. The appellant’s mental condition, and his psychiatric state, explain, in part, the commission of these offences. The appellant’s impulsivity and his limited cognitive behavioural control appear, at least in part, to be manifestations of the conditions from which he suffers. This was a case in which it was appropriate, in my opinion, for the Court to reduce the sentence on account of the appellant’s mental state. In Mason-Stuart v The Queen (1993) 61 SASR 204, King CJ said of a defendant of low average intelligence with a substantial degree of diminished responsibility that “… the degree of the appellant’s subjective responsibility is so diminished by the damage to the brain which he has suffered, that a court must try to find some way of protecting the public which does not impose the heavy burden of a long period of imprisonment upon a person whose subjective responsibility has been so diminished. It is a problem of reconciling the mercy which ought to be shown to a person whose subjective moral responsibility is low with a need to protect the public from this sort of act of which the appellant was guilty. The importance of fixing a sentence which is proportionate to the gravity of the crime and which operates as a deterrent to other members of the public, is considerably less when the court is dealing with a person of diminished responsibility than it otherwise would be.”