Mahrous v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Mahrous v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1876

Appeal from: Mahrous v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 1146
File number: NSD 872 of 2018
Judge: GLEESON J
Date of judgment: 29 November 2018
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from Federal Circuit Court of Australia decision to dismiss application for review of Administrative Appeals Tribunal decision to affirm decision to refuse appellant a partner visa – whether Tribunal erred in finding no “compelling reasons” existed for not applying Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) Sch 3 criterion 3001 – no appellable or jurisdictional error identified – appeal dismissed
Legislation:

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) Sch 2 cl 820.211(2)(d), Sch 3 criterion 3001

Migration Regulations (Amendment) 1996 No 75 (Cth)

Cases cited:

Babicci v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 77; 141 FCR 285

Choi v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 291

Waensila v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 32; (2016) 241 FCR 121

Date of hearing: 21 November 2018
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 54
Counsel for the Appellant: The appellant appeared in person
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr MJ Smith
Solicitor for the First Respondent: DLA Piper

ORDERS

NSD 872 of 2018
BETWEEN:

EHAB MOHAMED MOUSTAFA KAMAL MAHROUS

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

GLEESON J

DATE OF ORDER:

29 NOVEMBER 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

GLEESON J:

  1. The appellant appeals from a decision of a judge of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (“FCCA”) dismissing the appellant’s claim for relief in relation to a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“AAT”), affirming a decision of a delegate of the first respondent (“Minister”) not to grant the appellant a Partner (Temporary) (Class UK) Subclass 820 visa (“partner visa”): Mahrous v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 1146.

  2. The last substantive visa the appellant held expired on 30 March 2012, more than one year before he applied for the partner visa on 20 June 2013.

  3. As he was not the holder of a substantive visa at the time of the visa application, cl 820.211(2)(d) of Sch 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (“Regulations”) required the appellant to satisfy, relevantly, the criterion 3001 in Sch 3 to the Regulations unless the Minister was satisfied that there were compelling reasons for not applying those criteria.

  4. There was no dispute that the appellant did not satisfy criterion 3001 because the visa application was not made within 28 days of the “relevant day”, being the date that his last substantive visa expired.

  5. Accordingly, the appellant was required to satisfy the decision-maker that there…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 1876
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Mahrous v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involved the appellant, Mr Mahrous, appealing against the Federal Circuit Court's decision to dismiss his application for judicial review of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal's decision affirming the Minister's refusal to grant him a partner visa. The central issue was whether the Tribunal erred in determining that no compelling reasons existed for not applying a specific criterion under the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth). The court was tasked with determining if there was any error in the Tribunal's consideration of the appellant's longstanding relationship with his sponsor, Ms Deng, as a compelling reason for the waiver.

The court reviewed the submissions and found that the Tribunal had indeed considered the length of the appellant's relationship with Ms Deng, as evidenced by the Tribunal's decision record. Additionally, the court noted that the Tribunal also considered the appellant's wife's mental health issues and her fear of courts and tribunals. However, despite these considerations, the Tribunal concluded that the relationship was troubled and that Ms Deng's evidence did not support a compelling reason for the waiver. The court found no legal or jurisdictional error in the Tribunal's decision.

In conclusion, the court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the appellant pay the Minister's costs of the appeal. The court held that the Tribunal's reasoning and decision were sound, and no grounds for appeal were substantiated.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

In Choi v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 291 at [30] and following, Allsop CJ noted that although consideration of “compelling reasons” seems, in principle, not to be limited to hardship, hardship is the element most often referred to and set out reasons why this is so. At [36], the Chief Justice recognised that hardship is not the only factor to be considered and contemplated that an applicant’s connection to Australia can give rise to compelling reasons or circumstances.BACKGROUND FACTS The appellant first arrived in Australia in August 2007 on a student visa that was valid until 6 February 2010. He departed Australia on 11 July 2010 and returned on another student visa which was granted on 1 March 2010 and valid until 30 March 2012. On 3 June 2013, the appellant lodged an invalid partner visa application. On 20 June 2013, he applied for the visa in issue on this appeal, on the ground of his spousal relationship with the sponsor, Ms Deng. At [3] of the his Honour’s reasons, the FCCA judge set out the following notation made by the FCCA on 2 December 2016, when the appellant’s case was sent to the AAT for a third hearing:THE COURT NOTES THAT:The First Respondent concedes that the decision of the Second Respondent (the Tribunal) fell into jurisdictional error because it misunderstood the operation of clause 820.2l1(2)(d)(ii) of Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth). In considering the operation of clause 820.211(2)(d)(ii), the Tribunal erroneously concluded that being in a longstanding genuine relationship, on its own, is not sufficient to establish compelling reasons for the waiver. The First Respondent concedes that there is no statutory basis for the Tribunal to reach the conclusion that the existence of a long term relationship on its own, could not give rise to a “compelling reason” for waiving the requirement that the applicant satisfy Schedule 3 criterion 3001.THIRD TRIBUNAL’S DECISION The third Tribunal decision recorded that the AAT had considered documents in the Department’s visa application file, as well as the documents provided to the MRT and the AAT for all three tribunal hearings. The third Tribunal decision also recorded that the AAT had listened to recordings of the 2015 MRT hearing and the 2016 AAT hearing, and that the appellant and the sponsor gave evidence at the third hearing. The appellant was represented by a lawyer at the third Tribunal hearing. The AAT noted that the appellant and the sponsor married in May 2013 and that the appellant had consistently given evidence that they met on New Year’s Eve 2010 and lived together from December 2012. The Tribunal recognised that the appellant and the sponsor would live apart for a lengthy period if the appellant was required to return to his home country, Egypt, because the sponsor would remain in Australia and the processing time for the visa was likely to be 18 to 24 months. At para 20 of its decision record, the Tribunal accepted that if the appellant and the sponsor have a long and loving relationship, they are both likely to suffer some emotional hardship during any lengthy separation. However, the Tribunal noted that the evidence on that issue was inconsistent.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

At [3] of the his Honour’s reasons, the FCCA judge set out the following notation made by the FCCA on 2 December 2016, when the appellant’s case was sent to the AAT for a third hearing:THE COURT NOTES THAT:The First Respondent concedes that the decision of the Second Respondent (the Tribunal) fell into jurisdictional error because it misunderstood the operation of clause 820.2l1(2)(d)(ii) of Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth). In considering the operation of clause 820.211(2)(d)(ii), the Tribunal erroneously concluded that being in a longstanding genuine relationship, on its own, is not sufficient to establish compelling reasons for the waiver. The First Respondent concedes that there is no statutory basis for the Tribunal to reach the conclusion that the existence of a long term relationship on its own, could not give rise to a “compelling reason” for waiving the requirement that the applicant satisfy Schedule 3 criterion 3001.THIRD TRIBUNAL’S DECISION The third Tribunal decision recorded that the AAT had considered documents in the Department’s visa application file, as well as the documents provided to the MRT and the AAT for all three tribunal hearings. The third Tribunal decision also recorded that the AAT had listened to recordings of the 2015 MRT hearing and the 2016 AAT hearing, and that the appellant and the sponsor gave evidence at the third hearing. The appellant was represented by a lawyer at the third Tribunal hearing. The AAT noted that the appellant and the sponsor married in May 2013 and that the appellant had consistently given evidence that they met on New Year’s Eve 2010 and lived together from December 2012. The Tribunal recognised that the appellant and the sponsor would live apart for a lengthy period if the appellant was required to return to his home country, Egypt, because the sponsor would remain in Australia and the processing time for the visa was likely to be 18 to 24 months. At para 20 of its decision record, the Tribunal accepted that if the appellant and the sponsor have a long and loving relationship, they are both likely to suffer some emotional hardship during any lengthy separation. However, the Tribunal noted that the evidence on that issue was inconsistent. The Tribunal recorded the following matters concerning the relationship of the appellant and the sponsor:21. At hearing, Ms Deng firstly said that she does not want Mr Mahrous to leave Australia and confirmed his evidence that he provide her with emotional support. However, when the Tribunal asked for more details, she asked to give evidence in confidence. The Tribunal explained it was not possible to take evidence without disclosing the details to Mr Mahrous and asked her why she did not want to speak in front of him. She said that she is afraid of Mr Mahrous and that he had threatened her. The Tribunal advised her she was not obliged to give evidence and she chose not to say anything further.22. After the hearing, the Tribunal provided an opportunity for Mr Mahrous to comment on Ms Deng’s statements. Mr Mahrous denied she is afraid of him and restated his evidence that they have a long and loving relationship. He said Ms Deng had withdrawn a similar complaint to the NSW Police on the weekend before the hearing and he provided a statement from her withdrawing the allegations made to the Tribunal. It states Mr Mahrous has never threatened her and that she made unfounded allegations because of mental health issues and a fear of “the court”. Mr Mahrous’ statement provided the following explanation:I believe the story she made up in the hearing about threatening her is just an act to get out of a situation that I don’t understand … I wish to further stress that my partner suffers from mental disorders (Mr Mahrous’ emphasis)… I wish to conclude that my wife has a phobia from attending the hearings. She was suffering being a part of the application. 23. Mr Mahrous also pointed out that they had spent the weekend before the hearing together at a hotel in the city and provided a written statement from Ms Deng. In the ordinary case, fear and anxiety do not explain giving false evidence and the explanation provided after hearing is unlikely. 24. There is medical evidence that Ms Deng has issues with alcohol and has been prescribed medication for depression. It accepts those matters might have made it more difficult for Ms Deng to give evidence. However, there is no evidence she has mental health issues (with symptoms such as psychosis or serious phobia) that might explain why she would make serious allegations that were not true. The Tribunal does not accept the explanations provided and finds her statement resiling from her allegations is unconvincing. It prefers her oral evidence at hearing that she was afraid of Mr Mahrous and that he had threatened her. 25. Ms Deng might continue to be afraid of Mr Mahrous and she might have withdrawn her police complaint and made the statement after hearing under duress. Alternatively, they might have resolved any differences and she might have made the statement because she wished to repair any damage she has done to Mr Mahrous’ case for the grant of a visa. In either case, the Tribunal infers any relationship is troubled and that Ms Deng did not support his application for review at the time of hearing or in the previous days when she made her complaint to NSW Police. This casts significant doubt on evidence of a loving relationship, which makes it unlikely that Ms Deng would suffer emotionally during any separation from Mr Mahrous or that Mr Mahrous’ absence would have a negative impact on her mental health or her capacity to manage her alcohol intake.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The appellant made lengthy oral submissions which may be summarised as follows:(1)The AAT did not consider whether the appellant’s longstanding relationship with his wife, on its own, was sufficient to amount to a compelling reason to waive the Sch 3 criterion.(2)The appellant’s wife’s mental health has deteriorated since the date of the AAT decision. She cannot work as a result of her mental illness. This provides a compelling reason to waive the Sch 3 criterion.(3)The AAT should not have preferred the appellant’s wife’s oral evidence over her written statement and his oral evidence to the contrary because:(a)The appellant’s wife is mentally ill.(b)The appellant’s wife is afraid of courts and tribunals, finding attendance highly stressful.(c)The appellant and his wife live together. In the appellant’s submission, it is nonsensical for a person to choose to live with someone who threatens them and of whom they are afraid. (d)The appellant did not coerce his wife into writing the statement recanting her oral evidence. The Tribunal should not have inferred that this may have been the case. Rather, the wife felt guilty and, of her own volition, wished to correct what she had said.CONSIDERATIONFirst ground of appeal The first ground is that the FCCA judge fell into legal error by not considering the grounds in the appellant’s judicial review application. The Minister submitted that this contention is not correct, as the FCCA judge dealt with the two grounds of review that were raised before him. I agree with that submission. The manner in which the FCCA judge considered the grounds of review raised by the appellant is set out above. Accordingly, this ground of appeal fails.Second ground of appeal The second ground is that the AAT fell into jurisdictional error by not considering the length of the parties’ period of cohabitation. The Minister submitted that the AAT did address the issue of the parties’ cohabitation and, accordingly, there was no such jurisdictional error. I also agree with this submission. At para 12 of its decision record, the AAT noted the appellant’s evidence that he and the sponsor lived together from December 2012. There was a conflict between the evidence of the appellant and the sponsor as to the more recent position, which the Tribunal identified at paras 16 to 18 of its decision record as follows:16. Ms Deng has no income other than income support from Centrelink and he said she could not manage financially without him. In particular, he said she could not afford to live independently because of the cost of accommodation in Sydney and she could not live with her parents and siblings because their home is overcrowded and because of her conflict over their relationship with her siblings. However, Ms Deng said she has her own room in the family home and lives there a lot of the time. She said she has good relationships with her siblings, that her family generally supports her emotionally and that she would live with them all the time if Mr Mahrous went to Egypt.17. The Tribunal invited Mr Mahrous to comment on Ms Deng’s evidence. He said her evidence is incorrect and that Ms Deng does not have her own room because there are eight family members living in a three-bedroom home. He said she has complained about overcrowding and lack of privacy and that her siblings have asked her to live with him because it is overcrowded. He said that she does not have a good relationship with her siblings and that they argue constantly and do not like him because of his race and religion.18. The home might be overcrowded and she might not have as much privacy or space as at the home that she lives in with Mr Mahrous. However, the Tribunal prefers Ms Deng’s evidence that she is welcome in her family home, that she lives there for some of the time and that she would live with family if Mr Mahrous returns to Egypt (whether or not she has her own room). In that case, she would not suffer financial hardship as she would have accommodation and could meet her personal expenses from income support payments.