FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Mahrous v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1876
Appeal from: Mahrous v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 1146 File number: NSD 872 of 2018 Judge: GLEESON J Date of judgment: 29 November 2018 Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from Federal Circuit Court of Australia decision to dismiss application for review of Administrative Appeals Tribunal decision to affirm decision to refuse appellant a partner visa – whether Tribunal erred in finding no “compelling reasons” existed for not applying Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) Sch 3 criterion 3001 – no appellable or jurisdictional error identified – appeal dismissed Legislation: Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) Sch 2 cl 820.211(2)(d), Sch 3 criterion 3001
Migration Regulations (Amendment) 1996 No 75 (Cth)
Cases cited: Babicci v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 77; 141 FCR 285
Choi v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 291
Waensila v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 32; (2016) 241 FCR 121
Date of hearing: 21 November 2018 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 54 Counsel for the Appellant: The appellant appeared in person Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr MJ Smith Solicitor for the First Respondent: DLA Piper ORDERS
NSD 872 of 2018 BETWEEN: EHAB MOHAMED MOUSTAFA KAMAL MAHROUS
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
GLEESON J
DATE OF ORDER:
29 NOVEMBER 2018
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
GLEESON J:
The appellant appeals from a decision of a judge of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (“FCCA”) dismissing the appellant’s claim for relief in relation to a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“AAT”), affirming a decision of a delegate of the first respondent (“Minister”) not to grant the appellant a Partner (Temporary) (Class UK) Subclass 820 visa (“partner visa”): Mahrous v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 1146.
The last substantive visa the appellant held expired on 30 March 2012, more than one year before he applied for the partner visa on 20 June 2013.
As he was not the holder of a substantive visa at the time of the visa application, cl 820.211(2)(d) of Sch 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (“Regulations”) required the appellant to satisfy, relevantly, the criterion 3001 in Sch 3 to the Regulations unless the Minister was satisfied that there were compelling reasons for not applying those criteria.
There was no dispute that the appellant did not satisfy criterion 3001 because the visa application was not made within 28 days of the “relevant day”, being the date that his last substantive visa expired.
Accordingly, the appellant was required to satisfy the decision-maker that there…
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- Case
- [2018] FCA 1876
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court reviewed the submissions and found that the Tribunal had indeed considered the length of the appellant's relationship with Ms Deng, as evidenced by the Tribunal's decision record. Additionally, the court noted that the Tribunal also considered the appellant's wife's mental health issues and her fear of courts and tribunals. However, despite these considerations, the Tribunal concluded that the relationship was troubled and that Ms Deng's evidence did not support a compelling reason for the waiver. The court found no legal or jurisdictional error in the Tribunal's decision.
In conclusion, the court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the appellant pay the Minister's costs of the appeal. The court held that the Tribunal's reasoning and decision were sound, and no grounds for appeal were substantiated.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The appellant made lengthy oral submissions which may be summarised as follows:(1)The AAT did not consider whether the appellant’s longstanding relationship with his wife, on its own, was sufficient to amount to a compelling reason to waive the Sch 3 criterion.(2)The appellant’s wife’s mental health has deteriorated since the date of the AAT decision. She cannot work as a result of her mental illness. This provides a compelling reason to waive the Sch 3 criterion.(3)The AAT should not have preferred the appellant’s wife’s oral evidence over her written statement and his oral evidence to the contrary because:(a)The appellant’s wife is mentally ill.(b)The appellant’s wife is afraid of courts and tribunals, finding attendance highly stressful.(c)The appellant and his wife live together. In the appellant’s submission, it is nonsensical for a person to choose to live with someone who threatens them and of whom they are afraid. (d)The appellant did not coerce his wife into writing the statement recanting her oral evidence. The Tribunal should not have inferred that this may have been the case. Rather, the wife felt guilty and, of her own volition, wished to correct what she had said.CONSIDERATIONFirst ground of appeal The first ground is that the FCCA judge fell into legal error by not considering the grounds in the appellant’s judicial review application. The Minister submitted that this contention is not correct, as the FCCA judge dealt with the two grounds of review that were raised before him. I agree with that submission. The manner in which the FCCA judge considered the grounds of review raised by the appellant is set out above. Accordingly, this ground of appeal fails.Second ground of appeal The second ground is that the AAT fell into jurisdictional error by not considering the length of the parties’ period of cohabitation. The Minister submitted that the AAT did address the issue of the parties’ cohabitation and, accordingly, there was no such jurisdictional error. I also agree with this submission. At para 12 of its decision record, the AAT noted the appellant’s evidence that he and the sponsor lived together from December 2012. There was a conflict between the evidence of the appellant and the sponsor as to the more recent position, which the Tribunal identified at paras 16 to 18 of its decision record as follows:16. Ms Deng has no income other than income support from Centrelink and he said she could not manage financially without him. In particular, he said she could not afford to live independently because of the cost of accommodation in Sydney and she could not live with her parents and siblings because their home is overcrowded and because of her conflict over their relationship with her siblings. However, Ms Deng said she has her own room in the family home and lives there a lot of the time. She said she has good relationships with her siblings, that her family generally supports her emotionally and that she would live with them all the time if Mr Mahrous went to Egypt.17. The Tribunal invited Mr Mahrous to comment on Ms Deng’s evidence. He said her evidence is incorrect and that Ms Deng does not have her own room because there are eight family members living in a three-bedroom home. He said she has complained about overcrowding and lack of privacy and that her siblings have asked her to live with him because it is overcrowded. He said that she does not have a good relationship with her siblings and that they argue constantly and do not like him because of his race and religion.18. The home might be overcrowded and she might not have as much privacy or space as at the home that she lives in with Mr Mahrous. However, the Tribunal prefers Ms Deng’s evidence that she is welcome in her family home, that she lives there for some of the time and that she would live with family if Mr Mahrous returns to Egypt (whether or not she has her own room). In that case, she would not suffer financial hardship as she would have accommodation and could meet her personal expenses from income support payments.