Mahmoud and Child Support Registrar (Child support) - [2019] AATA 2709

Mahmoud and Child Support Registrar (Child support) [2019] AATA 2709 (19 August 2019)
Division:General Division
File Number(s):2019/1893
Re:Ahmed Mahmoud
APPLICANT

Child Support RegistrarAnd
RESPONDENT

DECISION
Tribunal:Senior Member K Millar
Date:19 August 2019
Place:Adelaide

The decision under review is set aside and the matter remitted to the Registrar for reconsideration in accordance with the direction that humanitarian grounds exist for the issue of a Departure Authorisation Certificate under 72L(3)(b)(i) of the Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1998.
.......[Sgnd]..................................
Senior Member K Millar
CATCHWORDS
CHILD SUPPORT – application for review of refusal to issue departure authorisation certificate – application for dismissal - where departure prohibition order in force – where no security given for applicant’s return to Australia – whether certificate should be issued on humanitarian grounds – decision under review set aside and remitted
LEGISLATION
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth)
Child Support Assessment Act 1989 (Cth)
Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988 (Cth)
CASES
Bettison and Child Support Registrar [2016] AATA 592
El Haroun and Child Support Registrar [2019] AATA 1920
Hart and Child Support Registrar [2014] AATA 282
QVRC and Child Support Registrar [2015] AATA 271
Shi v Migration Agents Registration Authority [2008] HCA 31
Tadela and Child Support Registrar [2017] AATA 957
Whittaker v Child Support Registrar (2010) 264 ALR 473
SECONDARY MATERIALS
Child Support Guide
DFAT Country Information
REASONS FOR DECISION
Senior Member K Millar
19 August 2019
BACKGROUND

Mr Mahmoud has a child support debt of $75,463.39 (excluding late payment penalties) to the Commonwealth. A Departure Prohibition Order (DPO) was issued on 27 June 2016 which prevents him travelling overseas.
Mr Mahmoud applied for a Departure Authorisation Certificate (DAC) to travel overseas, and on 25 March 2019 his application for a DAC was refused. Mr Mahmoud has sought a review of the decision to refuse to issue a DAC.
APPLICATION TO DISMISS
The Registrar sought to have the application dismissed under s 42B(1)(a) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (the AAT Act). This provision allows the Tribunal to dismiss an application if satisfied that the application is frivolous, vexatious, misconceived or lacking in substance.
This matter was first listed before me on 17 May 2019 for directions, by which time the date of the proposed travel had passed.
The Registrar submits that as Mr Mahmoud sought a DAC for the period 27 March 2019 until 6 May 2019, and that period has now passed, the Tribunal cannot make an order of any utility to Mr Mahmoud. This requires some analysis of the decision under review and the powers of the Tribunal on an application to review a decision.
The decision under review
The first step is to identify the decision under review, as this defines the scope of the review. In this case, if the decision under review is to refuse to issue a DAC, the decision may be reviewed. If it is a decision to issue a DAC for particular dates, and the dates have passed, the decision may have no utility as submitted by the Registrar.
The starting point is the terms of the Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988 (the Act).
Section 72K of the Act allows a person to apply for a certificate authorising the person to depart from Australia for a foreign country. The application must be in the approved form.
Section 72L of the Act provides for the issue of a DAC and states:
72L When Registrar must departure authorisation certificate
(1)This section applies if a person makes an application under section 72K for a departure authorisation certificate.
(2) The Registrar must issue the departure authorisation certificate if the Registrar is satisfied:
(a) that, if the certificate is issued:
(i)it is likely that the person will depart from Australia and return to Australia within a period that the Registrar considers appropriate; and
(ii)it is likely that, within a period that the Registrar considers appropriate, the Registrar will be required by subsection 72I(1) to revoke the departure prohibition order in respect of the person; and
(b)that it is not necessary for the person to give security under section 72M for the person’s return to Australia.
(3)If the Registrar is not satisfied as mentioned in subsection (2), the Registrar must nevertheless issue the departure authorisation certificate if:
(a)the person has given security under section 72M for the person’s return to Australia; or
(b)if the person is unable to give such security, the Registrar is satisfied:
(i)that the certificate should be issued on humanitarian grounds; or
(ii)that refusing to issue the certificate will be detrimental to Australia’s interests
Section 72N of the Act sets out what a DAC must authorise as follows:
(1) A departure authorisation certificate in respect of a person must authorise the departure of the person on or before the seventh day after a day specified in the certificate.
(2) The day specified in the certificate must be a day that is after the day on which the certificate is issued, but not more than 7 days after that day.
Section 72T(1) of the Act states that an application may be made to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal for review of a decision of the Registrar under section 72I, 72L or 72M. The term “decision” is defined in s 72T(2) as having the same meaning as in the AAT Act.
Section 3(3) of the AAT Act states the reference to a decision includes refusing to give a certificate.
The Registrar relies on QVRC and Child Support Registrar[1] (QVRC) and Hart and Child Support Registrar[2] (Hart) in support of its application that this matter is dismissed under s 42B of the AAT Act as the period of proposed travel had passed. Since the hearing of this matter, a further decision has been made dismissing an application for review of a decision not to issue a DAC in El Haroun and Child Support Registrar (El Haroun).[3]
[1] [2015] AATA 271.
[2] [2014] AATA 282.
[3] [2019] AATA 1920.
Section 42B of the AAT Act provides that the Tribunal may dismiss an application if (among other things) the application is frivolous, vexatious, misconceived or lacking in substance; or has no reasonable prospect of success.
In QVRC, the applicant sought a DAC on the basis that he had offered security, being a charge over property registered in a company name. The application for review was not dismissed under s 42B of the AAT Act; it was set aside. In setting aside the decision, the Tribunal noted that as the proposed period of travel has now passed, any future application for a DAC would have to be appraised in light of the circumstances as they exist at that future time.
The issue in QVRC was whether the security offered by the applicant was adequate security for his return to Australia, which is arguably a decision under s 72M of the Act. A decision under s 72M is specified in s 72T as a decision that can be reviewed by this Tribunal. As the application was not in fact dismissed, this does not support the dismissal of this application.
In Hart, the application was dismissed under s 42B of the AAT Act on the basis that it was frivolous or vexatious, in the sense that the outcome of the proceedings would be devoid of any practical effect. The decision was also expressed as setting aside the decision under review while noting that this decision is rendered redundant by the fact that the period of proposed travel has now passed; and that any future application for a DAC would have to be reappraised in light of the circumstances as they exist at that time.[4] In that case, the Registrar did not press for dismissal, and the Tribunal dismissed of its own volition.
[4] Above n 2, at [38].
In El Haroun, the application was dismissed under s 42B of the AAT Act on the basis that it had no reasonable prospect of success (s 42B(1)(b)). The Tribunal found in this case that it was unable to make an order of any utility to Mr El Haroun as the relevant period of the DAC had passed.
These cases can be contrasted with Tadela and Child Support Registrar[5] and Bettison and Child Support Registrar[6] in which the issue was defined as whether the applicant should be issued a DAC, and a substantive decision was made by the Tribunal in each of these matters on a date that fell outside the proposed travel dates of the applicant.
[5] [2017] AATA 957.
[6] [2016] AATA 592.
None of these cases involve a detailed analysis of the provisions in the Act that identify the decision under review, or of the powers of the Tribunal in respect to a reviewable decision.
In this case, as defined in s 3(3)(b) of the AAT Act, the decision under review is the decision to refuse to issue a certificate. The decision to issue a certificate is made under s 72L of the Act. A decision under s 72L of the Act can be reviewed by the Tribunal under s 72T.
The provisions about what a certificate must contain, and the dates of the certificate, are provided for in s 72N. There is no power in the Act to review a decision made under s 72N. The Registrar conceded this did not support the submission that the application should be dismissed.
The Registrar relies on an argument that, following Shi v Migration Agents Registration Authority (Shi),[7] the appropriate time to determine whether the DAC should be granted is the date of the application. This is because s 72N of the Act provides that a DAC must authorise the departure of a person on or before the seventh date specified in the certificate, and the day specified in the certificate must be a day after the certificate is issued, but not more than seven days after that day. It is argued that this means a DAC cannot be issued outside of 15 days after the decision to issue the certificate is made.
[7] [2008] HCA 31.
This conflates a decision to issue a certificate with the issue of the certificate. That these are two separate processes is reflected in s 72O of the Act which separately provides for the notification of a decision on the application in an approved form (s 72O(1)) and the issuing of a copy of the certificate at (s 72O(3)). Further, Shi may be used to decide what material should be considered. A meaningful decision can be made on review either on the material that exists at the time of the original decision or at the time the Tribunal makes its decision.
It was also submitted that the applicant can apply again under s 72K for another DAC if the dates have passed. This does not mean the first decision should not be reviewed.
Section 72K does not specify that an application must be for specific dates. The Tribunal could not locate an approved application form in the documents provided by the Registrar or on the website of the Child Support Agency. In this case, Mr Mahmoud sent an email to the Child Support Agency, which appears to have been accepted as an application for a DAC. It follows that a valid application can be made without specifying the dates of proposed travel, although this would be necessary to assess the application.
Section 72L(2)(a)(i) of the Act states that the Registrar must be satisfied (among other things) that if the certificate is issued it is likely that the person will depart and return to Australia within a period that the Registrar considers appropriate and that it is likely that within an appropriate period the Registrar will be required to revoke the DPO. This requires a particular duration; not specific dates.
The provisions relating to what a DAC must authorise appear in s 72N of the Act. A decision under s 72N is not reviewable by this Tribunal. The provisions that relate to issuing a DAC are contained in s 72L of the Act. Subsections 72L(2) and (3) specify when the Registrar must issue a certificate. These do not refer to specific dates, but rather to a period of time. As such, a decision under s 72L does not require the specific dates of departure to be determined, as this is the work of s 72N.
The decision record in this case states as its heading “We have refused your application for a Departure Authorisation Certificate”. It does not refer to the dates of proposed travel or dates for which the DAC was refused. The decision record goes on to state that the applicant has 28 days from the date of the decision to seek a review of the decision.
In many circumstances, waiting 28 days for review would frustrate the ability of the person to apply for review as the period of proposal travel may have expired before that date. In the absence of a request by a party to shorten the time to provide these documents under s 37(1A) of the AAT Act, the Registrar has a further 28 days after an application for review is lodged to provide the documents on which its decision is based (s 37(1) of the AAT Act). The effect of these provisions, and the notification of the Registrar, is that a person may effectively be denied the ability to seek review by virtue of the notices issued by the Registrar and by the operation of provisions in the AAT Act.
Removing a person’s ability to apply for review otherwise provided for in an enactment is a serious matter, and requires clear legislative intent.
The powers of the Tribunal in reviewing a decision are provided in s 43(1) of the AAT Act. This allows the Tribunal to affirm the decision, vary the decision, or set aside the decision under review and make another decision in substitution or remit the matter for reconsideration in accordance with any directions or recommendations of the Tribunal.
The power of the Tribunal to review a decision to refuse to issue a DAC does not require it to, in fact, issue a DAC if the application is successful. A decision can be made that is of utility to Mr Mahmoud, such a decision to set aside the decision under review and substitute another decision, for example a decision to issue a DAC, or to issue a DAC for a particular period of time, or it could set aside the decision and remit it for reconsideration in accordance with particular directions or recommendations.
Ultimately, whether considering a DAC after the dates of the proposed travel have passed is of any utility to the person will depend on the reasons the person seeks to leave Australia. If the person seeks the certificate for an event that has passed, the decision may be of no utility to that particular person in those particular circumstances, however this is a matter for each individual applicant.
Where, as in this case, the dates of the proposed travel have passed, and Mr Mahmoud still seeks to visit his mother in Sudan, there remains utility in making a decision on the issue of a DAC.
Having considered the specific words of the legislation in the context of both the Act and the review power in the AAT Act, the decision under review in this case is a decision to refuse to issue a DAC. It is not a decision to refuse to issue a DAC for specific dates. A person’s right to review cannot lightly be removed, and a meaningful decision can be made.
It follows that the Tribunal is not satisfied the application is frivolous, vexatious, misconceived or lacking in substance, or that it has no reasonable prospect of success and declines to dismiss the application under s 42B of the AAT Act.
CONDUCT OF THIS MATTER
The Registrar was represented by counsel. Mr Mahmoud was not represented and English is his second language. The Tribunal was assisted by an interpreter.
The Registrar sought in closing to rely on Mr Mahmoud failing to provide certain information. Mr Mahmoud was not asked about this information in the course of the hearing.
For example, it was submitted in closing that Mr Mahmoud has not explained why he wanted to leave Australia for a period of 40 days, and as the period was not explained the Tribunal should not be satisfied he would return within an appropriate period. The Register was asked why the Tribunal should draw this conclusion when this had not been put to Mr Mahmoud in the course of the hearing. It was submitted it was for Mr Mahmoud to establish that the period of time he was seeking was appropriate.
The aim of the Tribunal is to provide a review process in a manner which is accessible, fair, just, informal, economical, proportionate and quick, and promotes public trust and confidence in the decision-making of the Tribunal.[8] In the circumstances of this case, it is not fair to seek an inference to be drawn from a failure of an unrepresented person to provide information which has not been asked of him. While not bound by the rules of evidence, the Tribunal is bound by the hearing rule which requires an adverse matter to be put to an applicant for comment.
[8] Section 2A of the AAT Act.
LEGISLATION AND PRINCIPLES
A DPO is issued under s 72D of the Act. This order prohibits a person travelling overseas where the conditions under s 72D of the Act are met.
Mr Mahmoud was issued with the DPO on 27 June 2016. The purpose of this is to ensure that the person does not depart from Australia without either wholly discharging his or her child support liability or making arrangements satisfactory to the Registrar for its discharge.[9]
[9] Whittaker v Child Support Registrar (2010) 264 ALR 473 at [291] – [292].
A person who has a DPO in place can apply under s 72K for a DAC to allow them to leave Australia. Under s 72L of the Act, the Registrar must issue a DAC where the following circumstances are made out:
72L When Registrar must departure authorisation certificate
(1) This section applies if a person makes an application under section 72K for a departure authorisation certificate.
(2) The Registrar must issue the departure authorisation certificate if the Registrar is satisfied:
(a) that, if the certificate is issued:
(i)it is likely that the person will depart from Australia and return to Australia within a period that the Registrar considers appropriate; and
(ii)it is likely that, within a period that the Registrar considers appropriate, the Registrar will be required by subsection 72I(1) to revoke the departure prohibition order in respect of the person; and
(b)that it is not necessary for the person to give security under section 72M for the person’s return to Australia.
(3) If the Registrar is not satisfied as mentioned in subsection (2), the Registrar is not must nevertheless issue the departure authorisation certificate if:
(a)the person has given security under section 72M for the person’s return to Australia; or
(b)if the person is unable to give such security, the Registrar is satisfied:
(i)that the certificate should be issued on humanitarian grounds; or
(ii)that refusing to issue the certificate will be detrimental to Australia’s interests
The relevant policy to be considered is contained in Chapter 5.2.11 of the Child Support Guide (“the Guide”).
ISSUES TO BE DETERMINED
The issue before the Tribunal is whether a DAC is to be issued under s 72L of the Act. As it applies to Mr Mahmoud, this requires a consideration of the grounds in ss 72L(2) and (3) of the Act.
IS IT APPROPRIATE TO ISSUE A DAC UNDER SECTION 72L(2) OF THE ACT?
In looking to the ground in s 72L(2), there are three elements that must be met. These are that the person is likely to depart and return in within an period the Registrar considers appropriate (s 72L(2)(a)(i)), that it is likely within an appropriate period that the Registrar will be required to revoke the DPO (s 72L(2)(a)(ii)), and that it is not necessary the person give security (s 72L(2)(b)). These elements are cumulative, and each must be met for the Registrar to issue a DAC.
It is convenient to first look at whether the Registrar will be required to revoke the DPO within an appropriate period under s 72L(2)(a)(ii).
Is the Registrar likely to be required to revoke the DPO within an appropriate period?

The circumstances in which the Registrar must revoke a DPO in respect of a person are given in s 72I(1) of the Act:
(1) The Registrar must revoke a departure prohibition order in respect of a person if:
(a) the person no longer has a child support liability …; or
(b)the person has a child support liability or carer liability, but arrangements satisfactory to the Registrar have been made for the liability to be wholly discharged; or
(c)the person has a child support liability or carer liability, but the Registrar is satisfied that the liability is completely irrecoverable.
Mr Mahmoud is in an unfortunate position. His child support liability was assessed on a taxable income of $265,244 in the 2014 financial year. He applied to the Taxation Division of this Tribunal for a review of the assessment of his taxable income and, on 6 August 2018, it was ordered by consent that his taxable income in the 2014 financial year be reduced to $68,998.
This has not flowed through to the assessment of his child support liability and, as it applied to a period more than 18 months in the past, he has been advised this requires an order of the Federal Circuit Court. Mr Mahmoud applied for such an order on 10 June 2019, however there is nothing before the Tribunal to show a hearing date has been set or a decision has been made.
Mr Mahmoud says as the assessment of his child support was wrong, it means his liability may now be nil. This would mean that s 72I(1)(a) is met.
The Registrar points to s 120 of the Child Support Assessment Act 1989 (the Assessment Act), which states that the fact that a proceeding is pending does not affect the child support assessment or the recovery of child support.
Mr Mahmoud’s current child support liability is shown in a certificate issued under s 116(2) of the Act, which the Tribunal must take to be prima facie evidence of the matters stated in the certificate. In the absence of an order from the Federal Circuit Court permitting the amendment of his child support, the Tribunal also accepts that, in fact, the matters in the certificate are the current particulars entered in the Child Support Register.
This means at this point in time, and until any change is made to his liability, his child support liability is $75,463.39 with penalties of $16,631.28.
Even if the child support liability were to be recalculated in accordance with his taxable income, the Tribunal does not have information before it that would show the amount of the remaining liability, and Mr Mahmoud has not stated how he would pay any such sum.
Mr Mahmoud has not made any arrangements to pay his child support liability outside of compulsory deductions of $50.01 per fortnight from his Centrelink payments.
As shown by the certificate issued by the Registrar, the child support liability is not wholly discharged. Arrangements satisfactory to the Registrar have not been made for this liability to be wholly discharged. Deductions from Mr Mahmoud’s income support payment shows that the liability is not completely irrecoverable. There is no date by which his liability will reduce or, if it is reduced, the amount of any remaining child support liability.
It follows that s 72(2)(a)(ii) is not met. As each of the requirements in s 72(2) must be met to issue the DAC, and one is not met, it is not necessary to consider the remaining requirements.
IS IT APPROPRIATE TO ISSUE A DAC UNDER SECTION 72L(3) OF THE ACT?
Under s 72L(3) of the Act, a DAC can be issued if Mr Mahmoud has given appropriate security under s 72M for this return to Australia, or he is unable to give security and a DAC should be issued on humanitarian grounds, or refusing to issue the DAC would be contrary to Australia’s interests.
Mr Mahmoud has not given or offered any security. It is not suggested that refusing to issue a DAC would be contrary to Australia’s interest.
Is Mr Mahmoud unable to provide security?
The evidence onus is on Mr Mahmoud to establish a lack of financial capacity to provide security.
Mr Mahmoud has provided a Statement of Financial Circumstances[10] and bank account statements[11] which demonstrate his financial position. His Statement of Financial Circumstances discloses no assets other than a car. It states his income is a combination of Newstart Allowance payments and income from self-employment in the African Supermarket.
[10] Exhibit A2.
[11] Exhibits A3, A4, A5, A6, A7.
There are a number of large transactions in his business account marked “Taxiepay”. Mr Mahmoud says this is the system he uses in his shop, and is not income. The previous issues with his taxable income resulted from a money transfer component of his business, where money transferred offshore was taken to be his income. Mr Mahmoud says this was not the case. The Commissioner of Taxation has consented to a reduction to his taxable income which supports his oral evidence.
Mr Mahmoud gave evidence that he is unable to give security as his business has not been doing well recently. The Tribunal accepts he is unable to give security that would approximate the amount of his current child support of over $75,000.
Should a DAC be issued on humanitarian grounds?
The word “humanitarian” is defined in the Macquarie Dictionary as “having regard to interests of all humankind; broadly philanthropic” and by the Oxford English Dictionary as “concerned with humanity as a whole; seeking to promote human welfare as a primary or pre-eminent good; acting, or disposed to act, on this basis rather than for pragmatic or strategic reasons.”
In Bettison and Child Support Registrar,[12] the Tribunal considered the authorities relevant to the issue of a DAC on humanitarian grounds and stated at [11]:
[12] [2016] AATA 592.
“The general themes of the authorities seems to condition the concept of “humanitarian grounds” with:
(i)        The quality and compelling nature of the proffered medical evidence;
(ii)       The certified quantum of child support liability;
(iii)The evidence of steps taken by an applicant to reduce that liability by way of contributions beyond the care minimum compulsorily deducted by the Registrar; and
(iv)      The danger an Applicant for a DAC may not return to Australia.”
Mr Mahmoud says he has applied for a DAC many times and booked tickets but has not been issued a DAC. In this case, Mr Mahmoud said his mother is sick and he wants to visit her in Sudan.
Mr Mahmoud provided a Medical Examination Form from the Gulf Health Council in Riyadh dated 10 March 2019.[13] This form states it relates to Fatema Mahmoud who is 91 years of age. In the section “medical examination” under “cardiovascular – heart”, there is the annotation “cancer” and in the column entitled results is the annotation “1-3”.
[13] Exhibit T1-130, T Documents, page 48.
Another Medical Examination Form was provided dated 2 June 2019,[14] and in the medical examination in cardiovascular, hear it is again marked annotated “cancer”, but is now marked “1-4”. Ms Mahmoud’s recorded weight has decreased from 79 kilograms to 71 kilograms.
[14] Exhibit A8.
Mr Mahmoud said he has not seen his mother since 2016 and he cannot believe he is being prevented from travelling to see his mother because of a liability that will change.
On being asked about what information he could provide on her condition, he said his mother is 90 years old and has cancer, so anything could happen to her. He said he has no medical background but knows that since August last year she has had cancer, and he knew this because his sister told him. His sister sent him the medical examination forms. He said he has spoken to his sister about his mother’s health and that she has said that their mother is not well. He could not say what type of cancer she has.
The Registrar submitted that there was no evidence to show his mother consented to the medical report being released, and the reports provided are not compelling documents. It is submitted there was no medical practitioner made available to assist in assessing urgency of the circumstances. It is suggested that it was not drafted in a way that assists the Tribunal to determine the case.
The Registrar has not adduced any evidence to show the document was not issued by the Gulf Health Council. I am not inclined to accept submissions that more detailed evidence should be available in the absence of information to show that more detailed medical reports would be available to Mr Mahmoud’s mother in Sudan. The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) report on Sudan (2016) states that “…a lack of capacity and resources means that Sudanese overall have poor access to health care and poor health outcome, particularly outside major urban centres.”[15]
[15] DFAT Country Information Report, 27 April 2016, at 2.18.
As a result, I am satisfied that Mr Mahmoud’s mother is 91 years of age and has cancer. I infer that there is therefore a real chance that she has a limited remaining lifespan.
Mr Mahmoud’s certified liability is substantial; $75,463.39. While the Tribunal accepts that this is his current liability, as shown by the certificate issued under s 116(2) of the Act, he is taking action in the Federal Circuit Court to reduce his liability. His liability will almost certainly change because the Commissioner of Taxation has consented to a reduction in his taxable income. The likelihood of the liability decreasing forms part of the humanitarian considerations.
The difficulty is determining the effect the likelihood of his liability decreasing should have. Mr Mahmoud says his liability will decrease from over $90,000 to $16,000, and he does not think he will have a liability outstanding as money was deducted from his account in 2015. There is no other information before the Tribunal about the likely amount of his liability if the taxable income consented to by the Commissioner of Taxation is used to assess his child support liability. In these circumstances, and as Mr Mahmoud said he would not be willing to give any security as he does not know how much the assessment would be, that the liability will reduced can only be given limited weight in favour of issuing certificate.
The records of the Registrar include contact with one of the parties who receives child support from Mr Mahmoud. In this contact it was reported she had heard Mr Mahmoud was trying to leave Australia and that he had told her if he left he would not come back. There is an allegation he is running a business in Sudan and if he were to leave Australia the business in Australia would be operated by his cousin. It was reported that his mother is very old but in good health.
No other information about Mr Mahmoud operating a business in Sudan has been provided. Mr Mahmoud says this is false information. The Tribunal does not consider significant weight can be given to an untested allegation from an interested party.
Mr Mahmoud said he has a business in Australia and his children are in Australia, and there is nothing in Sudan except his mother. Given he said his sister was communicating with him about his mother’s condition, it is likely he has other family in Sudan. He has previously travelled to Sudan and returned.
While there is little information on the medical records about the severity of his mother’s condition, ultimately Mr Mahmoud has produced medical certificates stating his mother has cancer. The Tribunal is not satisfied more details records are available that Mr Mahmoud has failed to produce. His child support liability was assessed on the basis of an income that the Commissioner of Taxation has agreed is not his taxable income. As a result, his child support liability is highly likely to decrease. If the DAC is refused he will be denied the opportunity to see his mother who he says is very ill. His mother’s age stated in the medical report is 91 years. There is a real possibility if the DAC is not issued he will not have an opportunity to see his mother before she dies.
CONCLUSION
In the unusual circumstances of this case, where the child support liability is highly likely to reduce, and given the prospects of Mr Mahmoud’s mother having a limited lifespan and the harm to Mr Mahmoud if he is unable to see his mother, the Tribunal finds there are humanitarian grounds on which to issue the DAC.
DECISION
The decision under review is set aside and the matter remitted to the Registrar for reconsideration in accordance with the direction that humanitarian grounds exist for the issue of a Departure Authorisation Certificate under section 72L(3)(b)(i) of the Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1998.

84. I certify that the preceding 83 (eighty-three) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Senior Member K Millar

.....[Sgnd]...........................
Associate
Dated: 19 August 2019

Date of hearing: 12 June 2019

Applicant: In person

Advocate for the Respondent:

Solicitor for the Respondent:

Mr Christopher Tran, Counsel

Mr Christopher Bishop, Mills Oakley Lawyers