Mafulu Pty Limited v Mather
[1989] HCATrans 214
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Sydney No S2 of 1989 B e t w e e n -
MAFULU PTY LIMITED
Applicant
and
ROBERT JOHN MATHER
Respondent
Application for special leave
to appeal
MASON CJ TOOHEY J GAUDRON J
| Mafulu |
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT SYDNEY ON FRIDAY, 15 SEPTEMBER 1989, AT 9.35 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
| SlT 1 /1/PLC | 1 | 15/9/89 |
| MR B.J. GROSS, QC: | May it please the Court, I appear with my |
learned friend, MR G.F. LITTLE, for the applicant.
(instructed by Nevill & Edwards)
| MR R.E. HOTCHKISS: | I appear for the respondent, if the Court pleases |
(instructed by Carroll & O'Dea)
MASON CJ: Yes, Mr Gross?
| MR GROSS: | May it please the Court. This case is concerned |
| with working director cases under the WORKERS' | |
| COMPENSATION ACT. | |
| MASON CJ: | We are familiar with what the case is concerned |
| so you can proceed precisely to the explanation | |
| as to why these issues should attract the grant of | |
| special leave. | |
| MR GROSS: | There are the following issues which this case |
| presents: one, what is the minimum level of | |
| evidence from which it can be found that a | |
| master/servant relationship exists between a company | |
| and its director. |
MASON CJ: That does not look like a special leave point,
does it?
MR GROSS: Not framed in those terms unless it is subject to
the two further matters I am now about to put:
secondly, whether the bare belief or assumption made
by a director that he is a worker employed by the
company is sufficient even if such belief or
assumption is, in fact, shared by the other directors.
MASON CJ: That sounds even less like a special leave point.
MR GROSS: Well, in our submission, it is an important matter
because cases like this have to be determined on
evidence and by reference to criteria. What occurred
in this case at all levels was acceptance of the
proposition that a bare belief or a bare assumption
that the relationship exists suffices to show that there is such a relationship. The bare subjective intention on the part of the directors of the
family company that the director should be a worker
was taken as being sufficient for that relevant purpose.
There was an absence of any objective indicia of that
relationship.
In our submission, it comes down to two matters:
whether, what is required is objective indicia as
distinct from prior subjective intention and,
secondly, whether a belief or assumption, even if it
is a shared assumption with the other directors, is
sufficient to show the contractual relationship which
is the foundation of"belief" under the WORKERS r.
COMPENSATION ACT.
| SlTl/2/PLC | 2 | 15/9/89 |
| Mafulu |
Your Honours, we would accept that this is a
small level of claim in that it is concerned with
five months of total incapacity for an injury
occurring in 1983, some years ago. However, the process of reasoning at all levels, in our
submission, indicates that the Chief Judge of the
Compensation Court and the Court of Appeal have
accepted as being sufficient to show the worker
relationship in this context matters which merely
go to what, in a sense, is inside the heads of
particular persons. In our submission, more needs
to be shown.
Can I very briefly take Your Honours to the
very bare evidence which was raised on this point?
| MASON CJ: | But how is that going to help us, Mr Gross? |
MR GROSS: Perhaps if I can sunnnarize it Your Honours will
see. Prior to 1983 Mr Mather and his wife had been
partners in a shearing contracting business. Some time before 1983, after a discussion with an accountant,
there was further discussion within the family,
that is Mr and Mrs Mather and their two sons, as
to whether or not Mr and Mrs Mather were to be
employees of the company. The evidence is that Mr Mather continued to act on this basis thereafter. company and would be deemed as employees; "deemed"
to be an expression used by the witness. This
decision, on the evidence, was made by Mr Mather
and everyone agreed with that.
Now, in the Court of Appeal the main argument
put was that "deemed" involved a hypothesis which
existed regardless of the factual truth of the
matter. The learned President dismissed this
argument on the basis that the word "deemed" was
used in a lay sense of "assumed" or "classified"
rather than in some technical legal sense. There
was no evidence beyond this deeming or this intent.
The other evidence clearly indicated the business going
on precisely as it had gone on while they were a partnership.
Your Honours, the findings in the Court of Appeal
are merely findings concerning the sufficiency of
evidence, a matter which, in the context of the
particular facts, may not appeal to Your Honours as
being,per se, a matter of importance that requires
review. However, in our submission, it is common in
cases like this, particularly in rural areas or with
persons lacking sophistication, that there is a
belief or assumption but nothing further occurs.In our submission, something more is required to show
that, in fact, the director is the servant rather
than it being the other way around where the company
is the servant and the master is, in fact, the director
who is formally the sole trader or practising partnership.
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| Mafulu |
In our submission, the reasoning which
is necessarily implicit in these findings
concerning sufficiency do reveal the error of the
type that we have defined and present the issues
of the type we have suggested.
That completes our submissions.
| MASON CJ: | Mr Gross, I just wanted to ask you one question. | ||
| In the affidavit in support of this application | |||
| emphasis is given to a challege to the correctness | |||
| of the earlier decision of the Court of Appeal in | |||
| ASSOPARDI's case. | |||
| MR GROSS: | Yes, Your Honour. | ||
| MASON CJ: | Now, you have not said a word about that. | ||
| MR GROSS: |
| ||
| this Court, since the time when we conrrnenced | |||
| proceedings, has passed upon the correctness of AZZOPARDI although in short detail. | |||
| MASON CJ: | You are referring to EDELSTEIN's case? | ||
MR GROSS: | Yes, Your Honours, and that had discouraged us from pursuing that line and it was perceived - | ||
| MASON CJ: | I am not suggesting that you should agitate the | ||
| point at all but I wanted to make this point, that when we come to look at the papers in support of an | |||
| application for special leave, needless to say | |||
| we give attention to the case as it is expounded in the affidavit in support of the application and that may or may not involve the Court in undertaking some sort of research. In this case, we did look for | |||
| EDELSTEIN's case and it seems to me that if parties | |||
| prepare an affidavit in support of an application for | |||
| special leave setting out the grounds on which the | |||
| application is to be presented and subsequently come to the conclusion that they are not going to press one or more of those grounds, something ought | |||
| |||
| Court does not waste its time in pursuing a point | |||
| before the hearing takes place. | |||
| MR GROSS: | Yes, Your Honour, we accept that a supplementary | ||
| affidavit or notification to the Court should have | |||
| been made although what occurred here was that the | |||
| realization of the impact of EDELSTEIN's case was | |||
| long after the affidavit and, to a degree, long after | |||
| EDELSTEIN's case. | |||
| MASON CJ~ |
| ||
| |||
| in support that the subsequent decision in HAINES | |||
| case threw some doubt on the correctness of AZZOPARDI's |
| SlTl/4/PLC | 4 | 15/9/89 |
| Mafulu |
case or, at least, that in HAINES' case there was a
suggestion that AZZOPARDI might require reconsideration?
I am referring to page 47 of the application book,
paragraph 6, about line 35 - 37.
| MR GROSS: | Yes. |
MASON CJ: Now, I looked at HAINES' case. It did not seem to
me there was anything in HAINES' case that suggested
that AZZOPARDI might require reconsideration. Now, I may be wrong in that but having read it that is the view I formed about HAINES' case. But what I want to do is to draw attention to the need for
accuracy in affidavits that are filed in support of
special leave applications and that is the only
comment I wish to make.
| MR GROSS: | Yes. Your Honour, I accept that fully, of course, but may I point out that paragraph 6 seems rather to be concerned with describing the curial |
| history of consideration of AZZOPARDI's case rather | |
| than, per se, mounting an argument. | |
MASON CJ: | I accept that and that would be appropriate if the point were to be raised but, at least, when one is |
| reciting history one should recite that history | |
| accurately. | |
| MR GROSS: | Yes, Your Honour, we accept that. |
| MASON CJ: | The Court need not trouble you, Mr Hotchkiss. |
The substantial question in this case is
whether the evidence could support the finding
that there was a contract of service between the
respondent and the applicant. It is not a question
which raises a matter of general principle and
therefore does not justify the grant of special
leave to appeal.
The application is therefore refused.
Yes, Mr Hotchkiss, are you going to apply for
costs?
| MR HOTCHKISS: | Yes, Your Honour. |
| MASON CJ: | Yes. You do not oppose that, Mr Gross? |
| MR GROSS: | No, Your Honour. |
MASON CJ: The application is refused with costs.
AT 9.47 AM THE MATTER WAS ADJOURNED SINE DIE
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| Mafulu |
Key Legal Topics
Areas of Law
-
Employment Law
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Statutory Interpretation
Legal Concepts
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Intention
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Statutory Construction
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Contract Formation
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