FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Madera v Commissioner of Taxation [2004] FCA 1616
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – request for reasons under s 13 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) – whether decision to notify person of a penalty incurred under a self-executing statutory provision a ‘decision under an enactment’
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – request for reasons under s 13 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) – whether reasons provided satisfy requirements of s 13(11)(b) of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth)
Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 33(1)
Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth)
Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) ss 3A, Schedule 1 ss 12-40, 16-30, 16-45
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) ss 3, 13, 13(1), 13(4), 13(4A), 13(11)(1)(b), Schedule 2Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd v Wraith (1983) 48 ALR 500 discussed
Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321 discussed
Bass v Permanent Trustee Company Limited (1999) 198 CLR 334 cited
Elias v Commissioner of Taxation (2002) 199 ALR 246 cited
Elias v Commissioner of Taxation (2002) 123 FCR 499 cited
Hutchins v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1996) 136 ALR 153 discussed
May v Deputy Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1998) 98 ATC 4960 discussed
McCormack v Commissioner of Taxation (2001) 114 FCR 574 cited
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 referred to
MLC Investments Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (2003) 205 ALR 207 cited
In Re Clay, Clay v Booth [1919] 1 Ch 66 cited
Richardson v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1932) 48 CLR 192 cited
Temples Wholesale Flower Supplies Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1991) 29 FCR 93 cited
Trylow Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2004) ATC 4406 citedAronson, Dyer and Groves, Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 3rd edition, 2004
NICK MADERA AND ORS v COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
N 1353 OF 2004STONE J
8 DECEMBER 2004
SYDNEY
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
N 1353 OF 2004
BETWEEN:
NICK MADERA
FIRST APPLICANTPETRONILLA MADERA
SECOND APPLICANTLUIGI PORRO
THIRD APPLICANTELIZABETH PORRO
FOURTH APPLICANTCLAUDIO BELLISSIMO
FIFTH APPLICANTTERESA BELLISSIMO
SIXTH APPLICANTAND:
COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
RESPONDENTJUDGE:
STONE J
DATE OF ORDER:
8 DECEMBER 2004
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
- The motion be dismissed.
- The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to the motion.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
N 1353 OF 2004
BETWEEN:
NICK MADERA
FIRST APPLICANTPETRONILLA MADERA
SECOND APPLICANTLUIGI PORRO
THIRD APPLICANTELIZABETH PORRO
FOURTH APPLICANTCLAUDIO BELLISSIMO
FIFTH APPLICANTTERESA BELLISSIMO
SIXTH APPLICANTAND:
COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
RESPONDENT
JUDGE:
STONE J
DATE:
8 DECEMBER 2004
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
INTRODUCTION
This proceeding involves an application for review under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (‘ADJR Act’) of two decisions affecting the…
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- Case
- [2004] FCA 1616
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issues before the court were whether the notification and remittal decisions were "decisions under an enactment" as defined in the ADJR Act, and whether they required the Commissioner to furnish a statement of reasons as mandated by section 13 of that Act. The Commissioner argued that the notification decision did not constitute a decision under an enactment because there was no statutory provision requiring the notification of penalties. Regarding the remittal decision, the Commissioner contended that the provided Penalty Statement met the statutory requirement for a statement of reasons under section 13(11)(b) of the ADJR Act, as it contained findings of fact, references to evidence, and reasons for the decision.
The court examined the nature of the notification and remittal decisions within the framework of the ADJR Act. It concluded that the notification decision did not meet the criteria of a reviewable decision under the ADJR Act, as it was not a final, operative, or determinative decision. The court also determined that the remittal decision, while it was a decision under an enactment, was exempt from the requirement to provide a statement of reasons under section 13(11)(b) of the ADJR Act, because the Penalty Statement sufficiently detailed the reasons for the decision.
The court dismissed the applicants' motion, finding that neither the notification nor the remittal decisions required the Commissioner to provide a statement of reasons under section 13 of the ADJR Act. The applicants were ordered to pay the Commissioner's costs of and incidental to the motion.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The motion be dismissed.
2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to the motion.
Background
Background to the litigation
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: STONE J
The respondent also placed considerable reliance on the fact that the applicant had taken advantage of the offer of informal review extended to him in the respondent’s letter of 29 September 2004. It was submitted that in undertaking that ‘voluntary review’ the Commissioner had agreed to re-exercise the power to remit in s 16-45 of the Taxation Administration Act and, according to s 33(1) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), he was entitled to do so. Any decision made pursuant to that voluntary review would be a decision under an enactment and would replace the remittal decision and therefore a declaration pursuant to s 13(4A) would be premature and futile. CONSIDERATIONThe notification decision In my view the cases to which the applicants referred (see [10] above) in support of their claim that the notification decision is a decision under an enactment within the meaning of s 3 of the ADJR Act, do not support that proposition. While those cases all concern circumstances in which a penalty (or ‘additional tax’ as in Richardson) is imposed by force of a statute rather than by an administrative decision, they are not concerned with whether the Commissioner’s notification of the imposition of the penalty is a decision in and of itself. Rather, in these cases, the courts were concerned with the question of whether the penalty imposed by operation of a statute could be indirectly reviewable in the context of an application to review the decision of the Commissioner to remit part or all of the penalty. Section 3A of the Taxation Administration Act provides that the Commissioner ‘has the general administration of this Act’. The provision does not, however, convert any decision made by the Commissioner into a decision made under the Act. In Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321 (‘Bond’) at 337, Mason CJ considered the nature of a reviewable decision under the ADJR Act. His Honour commented that the policy considerations and the textual and contextual considerations both lead to the same answer: ‘That answer is that a reviewable “decision” is one for which provision is made by or under a statute. That will generally, but not always, entail a decision which is final or operative and determinative, at least in a practical sense, of the issue of fact falling for consideration. A conclusion reached as a step along the way in a course of reasoning leading to an ultimate decision would not ordinarily amount to a reviewable decision, unless the statute provided for the making of a finding or ruling on that point so that the decision, though an intermediate decision, might accurately be described as a decision under an enactment.’ In Hutchins v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1996) 136 ALR 153 (‘Hutchins’) the majority of the Full Federal Court held that the Deputy Commissioner’s decision to vote against a proposed composition of the appellant’s debts was not reviewable under the ADJR Act. Lockhart J, referring to s 8 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) which is the equivalent of s 3 of the Taxation Administration Act, said at 160: ‘Section 8 is a section of the most general kind, authorising the Commissioner of Taxation’s general administration of the Assessment Act. In the course of administering the Assessment Act, the Commissioner makes numerous decisions of many kinds.’ His Honour accepted that the decision to vote against the proposed composition was provided for by s 8 in combination with s 208 and that, read in conjunction, these sections impliedly authorised the Commissioner to take the reasonably necessary steps to recover tax due to the Commonwealth. Nevertheless, the Deputy Commissioner’s decision was not reviewable because ‘there was nothing final, or operative, or determinative’ about the decision. It was simply a step taken in the course of the Commissioner’s execution of his duties to recover tax owing by the appellant.