Madera v Commissioner of Taxation

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Madera v Commissioner of Taxation [2004] FCA 1616

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – request for reasons under s 13 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) – whether decision to notify person of a penalty incurred under a self-executing statutory provision a ‘decision under an enactment’

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – request for reasons under s 13 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) – whether reasons provided satisfy requirements of s 13(11)(b) of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth)

Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 33(1)
Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth)
Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) ss 3A, Schedule 1 ss 12-40, 16-30, 16-45
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) ss 3, 13, 13(1), 13(4), 13(4A), 13(11)(1)(b), Schedule 2

Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd v Wraith (1983) 48 ALR 500 discussed
Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321 discussed
Bass v Permanent Trustee Company Limited (1999) 198 CLR 334 cited
Elias v Commissioner of Taxation (2002) 199 ALR 246 cited
Elias v Commissioner of Taxation (2002) 123 FCR 499 cited
Hutchins v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1996) 136 ALR 153 discussed
May v Deputy Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1998) 98 ATC 4960 discussed
McCormack v Commissioner of Taxation (2001) 114 FCR 574 cited
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 referred to
MLC Investments Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (2003) 205 ALR 207 cited
In Re Clay, Clay v Booth [1919] 1 Ch 66 cited
Richardson v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1932) 48 CLR 192 cited
Temples Wholesale Flower Supplies Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1991) 29 FCR 93 cited
Trylow Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2004) ATC 4406 cited

Aronson, Dyer and Groves, Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 3rd edition, 2004

NICK MADERA AND ORS v COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
N 1353 OF 2004

STONE J
8 DECEMBER 2004
SYDNEY


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 1353 OF 2004

BETWEEN:

NICK MADERA
FIRST APPLICANT

PETRONILLA MADERA
SECOND APPLICANT

LUIGI PORRO
THIRD APPLICANT

ELIZABETH PORRO
FOURTH APPLICANT

CLAUDIO BELLISSIMO
FIFTH APPLICANT

TERESA BELLISSIMO
SIXTH APPLICANT

AND:

COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

STONE J

DATE OF ORDER:

8 DECEMBER 2004

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

  1. The motion be dismissed.
  2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to the motion.

Note:   Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 1353 OF 2004

BETWEEN:

NICK MADERA
FIRST APPLICANT

PETRONILLA MADERA
SECOND APPLICANT

LUIGI PORRO
THIRD APPLICANT

ELIZABETH PORRO
FOURTH APPLICANT

CLAUDIO BELLISSIMO
FIFTH APPLICANT

TERESA BELLISSIMO
SIXTH APPLICANT

AND:

COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

STONE J

DATE:

8 DECEMBER 2004

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

  1. This proceeding involves an application for review under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (‘ADJR Act’) of two decisions affecting the…

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Details
Case
[2004] FCA 1616
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Federal Court of Australia, the applicants, Madera, sought judicial review of two decisions made by the Commissioner of Taxation under the Taxation Administration Act. The first decision, referred to as the "notification decision", involved the imposition of a penalty for failure to withhold tax amounts. The second decision, the "remittal decision", involved the partial remission of that penalty. The applicants argued that the Commissioner was required to provide a written statement of reasons for both decisions under section 13 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (ADJR Act).

The central legal issues before the court were whether the notification and remittal decisions were "decisions under an enactment" as defined in the ADJR Act, and whether they required the Commissioner to furnish a statement of reasons as mandated by section 13 of that Act. The Commissioner argued that the notification decision did not constitute a decision under an enactment because there was no statutory provision requiring the notification of penalties. Regarding the remittal decision, the Commissioner contended that the provided Penalty Statement met the statutory requirement for a statement of reasons under section 13(11)(b) of the ADJR Act, as it contained findings of fact, references to evidence, and reasons for the decision.

The court examined the nature of the notification and remittal decisions within the framework of the ADJR Act. It concluded that the notification decision did not meet the criteria of a reviewable decision under the ADJR Act, as it was not a final, operative, or determinative decision. The court also determined that the remittal decision, while it was a decision under an enactment, was exempt from the requirement to provide a statement of reasons under section 13(11)(b) of the ADJR Act, because the Penalty Statement sufficiently detailed the reasons for the decision.

The court dismissed the applicants' motion, finding that neither the notification nor the remittal decisions required the Commissioner to provide a statement of reasons under section 13 of the ADJR Act. The applicants were ordered to pay the Commissioner's costs of and incidental to the motion.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The motion be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to the motion.

Background

Background to the litigation

In the applicants’ notice of motion the decisions that are the object of the application for review are expressed to be: ‘(a) the Respondent’s decision to notify the applicants on 17 August 2004 that a penalty in the amount of $36,543.50 had been imposed on them under, and by force of, section 16-30 of Schedule 1 to the [Taxation Administration Act] (“the first decision”);(b)the Respondent’s decision to remit only part of that penalty, and in particular, 25% of it, under section 16-45 of [Schedule 1 to the Taxation Administration Act], which was communicated to the applicants partly on 17 August 2004 (by a notice of penalty for failure to withhold amounts) and partly on 18 August 2004 (by a Review of Business Activity Statement) (“the second decision”)’. I shall refer respectively to these decisions as the ‘notification decision’ and the ‘remittal decision’. It is common ground between the parties that, in respect of these decisions, the applicants have no right of objection or appeal under the Taxation Administration Act. BACKGROUND Section 16-30 of Schedule 1 of the Taxation Administration Act provides that an entity that fails to withhold a required amount ‘is liable to pay to the Commissioner a penalty … equal to’ the amount that should have been withheld. Section 16-45 provides that the Commissioner may remit part or all of the penalty and, if he decides to remit only part of the penalty, he must give written notice of the decision to the relevant entity. By letter dated 16 September 2004 to the respondent, the solicitor for the applicants sought a written statement of the respondent’s reasons for making the two decisions and said:‘Please treat this letter as a formal application for a statement of reasons for the two decisions the subject of the Application, which I make pursuant to sec 13(1) of the [ADJR Act], on which I propose that the taxpayers will rely in making their application for judicial review under that Act.’ In their reply dated 14 October 2004, the solicitors for the respondent advised that the respondent would not provide the requested statement because: 1.‘The [first] decision to notify the applicants of the penalty is not a decision under an enactment as there is no provision for notice to be given of the penalty.’ 2.‘Notification of the [second] decision was also accompanied by a statement setting out findings of facts, referring to the evidence on which those findings were based and giving reasons for the decision.’ THE NOTICE OF MOTION In their notice of motion the applicants seek ‘an order in the nature of mandamus’ requiring the respondent, within 7 days, to provide them with a written statement setting out findings on material questions of fact, referring to the evidence or other material on which those findings were based and giving reasons for making the two decisions. As their request quoted in [4] shows, the applicants rely on s 13 of the ADJR Act. In brief, s 13 imposes a statutory obligation on the person who makes a decision to which the section applies ‘to furnish a statement in writing setting out the findings on material questions of fact, referring to the evidence or other material on which those findings were based and giving reasons for the decision’ within 28 days of being requested to do so. With exceptions that are not relevant here, the section applies to decisions to which the ADJR Act applies. Relevantly, the ADJR Act applies to a decision ‘of an administrative character’ made ‘under an enactment’; s 3. The penalties imposed on the applicants arise under s 16-30 of the Taxation Administration Act and were partially remitted under s 16-45 of that Act. It is not in dispute that Taxation Administration Act is an enactment within the definition of ‘enactment’ in s 3 of the ADJR Act.

Decision

Reasons for decision

STONE J
In the alternative the respondent submits that, even if the notification involves a decision to which the ADJR Act applies, s 13 does not apply because paragraph (f) of Schedule 2 to the ADJR Act applies. Schedule 2 lists classes of decisions to which s 13 does not apply including in paragraph (f): ‘decisions in connection with the institution or conduct of proceedings in a civil court, including decisions that relate to, or may result in, the bringing of such proceedings for the recovery of pecuniary penalties arising from contraventions of enactments…’The respondent submits that ‘as a matter of practicality’ proceedings will not be commenced until a liability has been communicated and not met and therefore the decisions involved in notification is ‘in connection with’ proceedings for recovery of the penalty if not paid. Remittal decision It is not in contention that the remittal decision is a decision to which the ADJR Act applies. In relation to that decision the applicants identify the issues arising under their notice of motion as (a) whether the Commissioner’s summary of business activity statement (‘BAS’) revisions and administrative penalties (‘Penalty Statement’) fulfils the requirements of s 13(11)(b) of the ADJR Act and, (b) if the answer to question (a) is ‘No’, whether the Respondent is obliged to supply a statement of reasons that meets the requirements of s 13(1). I understand the issue in (b) as being, more precisely, whether paragraph (f) of Schedule 2 to the ADJR Act applies as, in relation to the remittal decision, this is the only other element of the respondent’s defence. Section 13(11)(b) of the ADJR Act states that, for the purposes of s 13, the phrase ‘decision to which this section applies’ does not include: ‘a decision that includes, or is accompanied by a statement setting out, findings of facts, a reference to the evidence or other material on which those findings were based and the reasons for the decision’. It is accepted by both parties that the notice of penalty dated 17 August 2004, in which the respondent advised the applicants that the penalty had been incurred, does not purport to provide any reasons. The respondent submits however, that the Penalty Statement meets the requirements of s 13(11)(b) because it refers to the facts upon which the decision was based, explains why the decision was made and allows the applicants to see that a reasoned decision was made. The applicants’ position is that the Penalty Statement does not have sufficient detail to comply with the requirements of s 13(11)(b). They submit that, to satisfy s 13(11)(b), a statement of reasons has to be such as would satisfy s 13(1). They referred to the obiter comments of Woodward J in Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd v Wraith (1983) 48 ALR 500 at 507 (‘Ansett’) as to the obligations imposed on a decision-maker. The applicants also referred to a number of authorities concerning notices issued under s 264 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) that, it was said, showed the degree of detail needed for a s 13(1) statement and, in comparison with which, the information set out in the Penalty Statement was demonstrably inadequate. Those authorities included May v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1998) 98 ATC 4960 (‘May’); McCormack v Commissioner of Taxation (2001) 114 FCR 574 (‘McCormack’); Elias v Commissioner of Taxation (2002) 123 FCR 499; Elias v Commissioner of Taxation (2002) 199 ALR 246; and MLC Investments Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (2003) 205 ALR 207.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: STONE J

The respondent also placed considerable reliance on the fact that the applicant had taken advantage of the offer of informal review extended to him in the respondent’s letter of 29 September 2004. It was submitted that in undertaking that ‘voluntary review’ the Commissioner had agreed to re-exercise the power to remit in s 16-45 of the Taxation Administration Act and, according to s 33(1) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), he was entitled to do so. Any decision made pursuant to that voluntary review would be a decision under an enactment and would replace the remittal decision and therefore a declaration pursuant to s 13(4A) would be premature and futile. CONSIDERATIONThe notification decision In my view the cases to which the applicants referred (see [10] above) in support of their claim that the notification decision is a decision under an enactment within the meaning of s 3 of the ADJR Act, do not support that proposition. While those cases all concern circumstances in which a penalty (or ‘additional tax’ as in Richardson) is imposed by force of a statute rather than by an administrative decision, they are not concerned with whether the Commissioner’s notification of the imposition of the penalty is a decision in and of itself. Rather, in these cases, the courts were concerned with the question of whether the penalty imposed by operation of a statute could be indirectly reviewable in the context of an application to review the decision of the Commissioner to remit part or all of the penalty. Section 3A of the Taxation Administration Act provides that the Commissioner ‘has the general administration of this Act’. The provision does not, however, convert any decision made by the Commissioner into a decision made under the Act. In Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321 (‘Bond’) at 337, Mason CJ considered the nature of a reviewable decision under the ADJR Act. His Honour commented that the policy considerations and the textual and contextual considerations both lead to the same answer: ‘That answer is that a reviewable “decision” is one for which provision is made by or under a statute. That will generally, but not always, entail a decision which is final or operative and determinative, at least in a practical sense, of the issue of fact falling for consideration. A conclusion reached as a step along the way in a course of reasoning leading to an ultimate decision would not ordinarily amount to a reviewable decision, unless the statute provided for the making of a finding or ruling on that point so that the decision, though an intermediate decision, might accurately be described as a decision under an enactment.’ In Hutchins v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1996) 136 ALR 153 (‘Hutchins’) the majority of the Full Federal Court held that the Deputy Commissioner’s decision to vote against a proposed composition of the appellant’s debts was not reviewable under the ADJR Act. Lockhart J, referring to s 8 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) which is the equivalent of s 3 of the Taxation Administration Act, said at 160: ‘Section 8 is a section of the most general kind, authorising the Commissioner of Taxation’s general administration of the Assessment Act. In the course of administering the Assessment Act, the Commissioner makes numerous decisions of many kinds.’ His Honour accepted that the decision to vote against the proposed composition was provided for by s 8 in combination with s 208 and that, read in conjunction, these sections impliedly authorised the Commissioner to take the reasonably necessary steps to recover tax due to the Commonwealth. Nevertheless, the Deputy Commissioner’s decision was not reviewable because ‘there was nothing final, or operative, or determinative’ about the decision. It was simply a step taken in the course of the Commissioner’s execution of his duties to recover tax owing by the appellant.