Macleod v The Queen - [2002] HCATrans 386

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
Sydney No S86 of 2002

B e t w e e n -
ROBERT JAMES MACLEOD
Appellant
and
THE QUEEN
Respondent

GLEESON CJ

McHUGH J
GUMMOW J
HAYNE J
CALLINAN J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT CANBERRA ON THURSDAY, 10 OCTOBER 2002, AT 10.06 AM

MR P.L.G. BRERETON, SC: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR J.C. PAPAYANNI, for the appellant. (instructed by Jeffreys & Associates)

MR T.A. GAME, SC: If the Court pleases, I appear with my learned friend, MR D. JORDAN, for the respondent. (instructed by Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions)

GLEESON CJ: Yes, Mr Brereton.

MR BRERETON: May it please the Court, in the Court of Criminal Appeal the Crown case was summarised in a manner to which I think no one takes objection. In the judgment of her Honour Justice Simpson at volume 5, page 1022, paragraph 71. Her Honour said:

Put shortly, the Crown case was that the entire enterprise was a sham.

Then her Honour proceeded to illustrate it by reference to one project. The matters from which it was said to be amply open to infer dishonesty or fraud was summarised at paragraph 95 on page 1027. There her Honour said that:

There was in this case ample evidence on which the jury could conclude that the appellant, at the relevant times, acted dishonestly. This evidence included evidence of the disposal of the investors’ funds –

and that is one illustration of where the looseness of thinking about whose property the moneys charged appears:

A very small proportion of the funds was used ($718,000) was used and produced in films. The income statement sent to investors falsely represented that income had been derived.

That, as we will come to see, says nothing about how the funds were applied:

The so‑called subsidy of 70 percent offered to investors was similarly a misrepresentation of the true position.

That may have been a deception of the investors to obtain the money from the investors, but it had very little, if anything, to do with the application of the company’s funds:

The instruction given by the appellant to David Staume to conceal records from the ASC was evidence the jury were entitled to use as evidence of dishonesty.

It may be but only if that could be related to and to nothing else than dishonesty in the application of the company’s funds as distinct from the obtaining of those funds in the first place from investors.

GLEESON CJ: Mr Brereton, it would be of assistance to me if you could state in a summary form the facts on which the Crown relied to make out these charges against your client and the nature of the defence that your client propounded at the trial.

MR BRERETON: I shall try to do that in this way. The appellant, who was the sole shareholder in…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Macleod v The Queen

Details

AGLC: Macleod v The Queen [2002] HCATrans 386
Case: [2002] HCATrans 386
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered an appeal by Macleod against his conviction for murder. The central dispute concerned the admissibility of certain evidence obtained during police investigations and the proper application of the law relating to self-defence.

The High Court was required to determine whether the trial judge had erred in admitting evidence that Macleod had made prior threats to the deceased. Furthermore, the Court had to consider whether the jury directions on self-defence, particularly in relation to the subjective and objective elements of the defence, were adequate and correctly conveyed the relevant legal principles.

The Court reasoned that the prior threats were relevant to establishing Macleod's state of mind and intent at the time of the killing, and therefore were admissible. Regarding self-defence, the Court affirmed that the jury must be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused did not believe they were acting in self-defence, or that the force used was not reasonably necessary in the circumstances as the accused perceived them. The Court found that the directions given at trial, when considered as a whole, adequately conveyed these requirements to the jury.

The appeal was dismissed.

Orders