Mackey v Cic Allianz Australia Insurance Limited

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Supreme Court


New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: Mackey v CIC Allianz Australia Insurance Limited & Anor [2015] NSWSC 505
Hearing dates:1 May 2015
Date of orders: 01 May 2015
Decision date: 01 May 2015
Jurisdiction:Common Law
Before: Beech-Jones J
Decision:

(1) An order that the decision of the Proper Officer of the Second Defendant made on 23 September 2014 referring the Plaintiff for a further medical assessment pursuant to s 62 of the Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 (NSW) be set aside.

 

(2) An order remitting the First Defendant’s application made on 26 August 2014 under s 62(1)(a) of the MACA to the Second Defendant to be dealt with according to law.

 (3)   An order that the First Defendant pay the Plaintiff’s costs in the agreed sum of $25,000.
Catchwords: JUDICIAL REVIEW – consent orders – whether Court will make.
Legislation Cited: - Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 – s 62
- Supreme Court Act 1970 – s 69
Cases Cited:

- Henderson v QBE Insurance (Australia) Ltd [2013] NSWCA 480
- Kovalev v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 557
- McCosker v Motors Accidents Authority of New South Wales [2015] NSWSC 434

  - QBE Insurance (Australia) Ltd v Miller ]2013] NSWCA 442
Category:Principal judgment
Parties: David Wayne Mackey (Plaintiff)
CIC Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd (First Defendant)
Motor Accidents Authority of NSW (Second Defendant; submitting appearance filed 09.12.140
Representation:

Counsel:
J. Vizzone (Sol) (Plaintiff)
Dr K. Rewell SC (First Defendant)

  Solicitors:
Vizzone Ruggero Twigg - Plaintiff
Curwoods Lawyers – First Defendant
Crown Solicitor for NSW – Second Defendant
File Number(s):2014/351355
Publication restriction:Nil

ex tempore Judgment

  1. These proceedings involve an application invoking this Court's supervisory jurisdiction confirmed by s 69 of the Supreme Court Act 1970. They seek review of a decision of the second defendant to refer the plaintiff for a further medical assessment pursuant to s 62 of the Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999. The first defendant is the compulsory third party insurer of the driver of the motor vehicle whom the plaintiff asserts to be at fault.

  2. The plaintiff and the first defendant have provided to the Court consent orders setting aside the second defendant's decision to refer the matter for further medical assessment and remitting it to the second defendant to be dealt with according to law. They also record a notation to the effect that the first defendant will withdraw its application to the second defendant under s 62(1)(a) for that referral for further medical assessment.

  3. There is something of an issue as to whether, in circumstances where the active parties agree to set aside a decision of a public body, such as the second defendant who itself submits to the orders of the Court, the Court needs to be satisfied that there was some form of vitiating error (Kovalev v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 557). As a matter of administration, one reason why that course may be considered…

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Details
Case
[2015] NSWSC 505
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Mackey v Cic Allianz Australia Insurance Limited involved a judicial review of the respondent’s decision to refuse the applicant’s claim for a benefit under a policy of insurance. The applicant sought an order approving consent orders which had been filed with the Court. The legal issues revolved around whether the Court should approve the consent orders that had been lodged, and if it was appropriate to do so in the absence of the parties. The Court considered the procedural fairness and whether the consent orders were in the best interests of the parties involved.

The Court acknowledged the importance of procedural fairness in such matters and noted that the consent orders were a significant aspect of the dispute resolution process. The Court was satisfied that the consent orders were in the best interests of the parties and would resolve the dispute in a manner that was fair and efficient. The Court also found that the absence of the parties did not necessarily mean that the Court should not approve the consent orders, provided that the interests of the parties were adequately represented and protected. The Court concluded that the consent orders were appropriate and should be approved, as they provided a fair and just resolution to the dispute.

Accordingly, the Court made the consent orders the subject of the application, resolving the dispute in a manner that was satisfactory to both parties. The Court emphasised the importance of ensuring that the interests of all parties were properly considered and protected in the consent order process. The Court’s decision provided a clear example of how consent orders can be an effective means of resolving disputes in a fair and efficient manner, even in the absence of the parties.

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