Macik & Janson
[2023] FedCFamC1F 143
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 1)
Macik & Janson [2023] FedCFamC1F 143
File number(s): PAC 930 of 2020 Judgment of: HANNAM J Date of judgment: 10 March 2023 Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – INTERIM PARENTING – Oral application to vary interim orders – Where final hearing vacated – Where father seeks an increase in the child’s time with him and removal of the requirement for supervision – Where the mother seeks a suspension of the child’s time with the father – Where mother contends the father poses an unacceptable risk of harm on the basis of sexual abuse – Where mother indicates that she will seek a positive finding of sexual abuse at final hearing – Where it was previously found it would be unlikely that a trial judge at final hearing would determine the father poses an unacceptable risk – Where that assessment has not changed – Where orders are made for an increase in the child’s time with the father – Where the requirement of professional supervision is removed. Legislation: Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 60CA, 60CC, 65D Cases cited: Macik & Janson [2020] FamCA 743 Division: Division 1 First Instance Number of paragraphs: 60 Date of hearing: 6 March 2023 Place: Parramatta Solicitor for the Applicant: Mr Mokhtar, AMG Law Firm Counsel for the Respondent: Mr Hodgson Solicitor for the Respondent: Cameron Legal Counsel for the Independent Children's Lawyer: Mr Cook Solicitor for the Independent Children's Lawyer: Phillip A Wilkins & Associates ORDERS
PAC 930 of 2020 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 1)
BETWEEN: MS MACIK
Applicant
AND: MR JANSON
Respondent
INDEPENDENT CHILDREN'S LAWYER
order made by:
HANNAM J
DATE OF ORDER:
6 March 2023
THE COURT ORDERS THAT PENDING FURTHER ORDER COMMENCING SUNDAY 12 MARCH 2023:
1.The interim orders made on 7 September 2020 in respect of the child Y born 2019 (“the child”) are varied as follows:
(a)The requirement for professional supervision of the time the child spends with the father is removed and discharged.
(b)The time the child spends with the father takes place in the presence of one or all of Ms B, Ms C or Mr D.
(c)The time the child spends with the father is increased from a period of three hours to a period of five hours.
2.In order to facilitate the time the child spends with the father pursuant to order 1, the mother or her agent is to deliver and collect the child to and from the father’s residence at E Street, Suburb F.
3.The parties are each restrained from criticising or making derogatory statements about one another in the presence or hearing of the child or permitting him to remain in the presence of any other party who is doing so.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
Section 121 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Macik & Janson has been approved pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
HANNAM J:
INTRODUCTION
A few days prior to the date that was fixed for the final hearing in a parenting dispute, the hearing was vacated as each of the parties had failed to comply with trial directions to ready the proceedings for final hearing. An application to discharge this order and effectively reinstate the final hearing dates was made by the father but subsequently withdrawn after the legal representatives for both parties and the ICL were no longer confident that the proceedings could be determined within the three days allocated for final hearing.
After it became clear that the final hearing would not proceed on the allocated dates, the father of the parties’ only child (“the father”) was given leave to make an oral application to vary the current interim arrangements for the child subject of these proceedings. By this application, the father sought to discharge the requirement that the child’s time with him be supervised and sought an increase in that time. The Independent Children’s Lawyer (“ICL”) agreed these changes are in the child’s best interest.
The child’s mother (“the mother”) was then granted leave to also seek a variation of the interim orders by suspending the child’s time with the father.
Neither party nor the ICL proposed that the current arrangement for the child’s time with the father continue pending final order.
After hearing submissions from each of the parties in respect of their proposals, I determined that it was in the best interests of the child to vary the interim parenting arrangements by discharging the requirement for formal supervision and increasing the child’s time with the father by two hours. At the time I made those orders I indicated that I would subsequently publish my Reasons for doing so. These are those Reasons.
BACKGROUND
The parties commenced their relationship in 2016, began to live together the following month, and married later the same year.
When the parties’ relationship began the mother’s daughter from another relationship (“the mother’s daughter”) was aged three. Neither the mother nor the mother’s daughter have had any relationship with that child’s biological father since her birth and the father for all intents and purpose has been this child’s father.
In 2019 the parties’ son (“the child”) was born.
The parties’ relationship which had been under strain for some time broke down a few months after the birth of the child, and the father moved out of the family home. The child and the mother’s daughter continued to live with the mother and maternal grandmother.
It is the mother’s case that in early 2020 her daughter reported something to her that the mother understood to be an allegation of sexual abuse perpetrated by the father.
Over the ensuing months from early 2020 to around mid-2020, the mother contends that there were ongoing disclosures made by her daughter about the alleged sexual abuse which were reported by the mother to various agencies including the Department of Communities and Justice (“the Department”).
The various allegations were investigated by the Joint Child Protection Response Program (“JCPRP”)[1] team who interviewed the child on two occasions. The sexual abuse allegations were not substantiated but unhelpfully in my view, the mother’s daughter has received ongoing counselling through “Victim Services” on the basis that she has been the victim of sexual abuse.
[1] The Joint Child Protection Response Program is made up of officers from police and Community Services investigates allegations of serious child abuse.
On 1 May 2020 the matter was allocated into the Magellan Program[2] and an ICL was appointed. A hearing in relation to the interim arrangements for the child and the mother’s daughter (“the children”) was commenced on 29 May 2020 and was adjourned part-heard until late July 2020. In the meantime, the investigation into the allegations of sexual abuse was completed and those allegations were not substantiated. Following the resumed hearing on 10 July 2020, orders were made on 7 September 2020 (“the September 2020 orders”) for the child to spend supervised time with the father for at least 3 hours per fortnight. No orders were made with respect to the mother’s daughter spending time with the father.
[2] The Magellan Program is a case management program in the Federal Circuit and Family Court Division 1 that deals with serious allegations of physical and sexual child abuse.
The September 2020 orders
As can be seen from my judgment delivered on 7 September 2020[3] (“the September 2020 judgment”) the significant matter in dispute at that time was whether the father posed an unacceptable risk to the children on the basis of sexual abuse as alleged by the mother. Further, although the father did not seek at that interim hearing orders that would see the children live with him, he contended that the mother posed a risk of emotional and psychological harm to the children given the serious allegations she maintained against him, which he says is without foundation.
[3] Macik & Janson [2020] FamCA 743
The mother at the interim hearing opposed any orders that would see the father spend time with or pursue any relationship with the children or either of them. Ultimately, the father did not press for interim orders that the mother’s daughter spend time with him, though I understand his intention at the time was that he may seek orders with respect to the mother’s daughter at final hearing.
As is clear from the September 2020 judgment, close consideration was given in the 24 page Reasons to an assessment of the risk of sexual abuse said to have been posed by the father to the children. The following evidence upon which the mother relied in respect to the sexual abuse allegations was considered for the purpose of making that assessment:
·The alleged disclosures made by the mother’s daughter;
·Advice sought by the mother said to have been given by the family doctor to the mother;
·Notifications made to the Department and investigations by the JCPRP;
·The mother’s version of events given to police in police statements and police records on the various reasons that the mother presented her daughter to the police;
·The Magellan Report;
·The answers given by the mother’s daughter in the course of her police interviews;
·The terms of alleged disclosures said to have been made by the mother’s daughter to a school counsellor;
·Clinical notes of consultations with a family doctor;
·Other matters that the mother regarded as suspicious including the mother’s daughter’s reported behaviours and the presence of a urinary tract infection.
A summary and consideration of all of this evidence is contained in the September 2020 judgment between [49] – [88].
In the September 2020 judgment I then went on to assess the alleged risk of harm, having regard to the relevant authorities. I assessed the likelihood of sexual abuse occurring if orders were made as sought by the father as “extremely low” for Reasons given at [92] – [94]. Of particular note, it can be observed that the mother’s allegations rest entirely on complaints allegedly made to her and then later to police by her daughter, aged seven. Although the solicitor for the mother sought to rely upon concerns that this child may have experienced a urinary tract infection (“UTI”) at around the same time that she allegedly made complaints about the improper touching by the father, there was no evidence that this child suffered from a UTI or that the presence of such an infection was probative in relation to the question of sexual abuse. Moreover, the tenor of the mother’s daughter’s allegations in early 2020 relate to events that were said to have occurred sometime previously, so the relevance of the UTI is difficult to understand. In the September 2020 judgment, I set out in detail my assessment of the daughter’s disclosures to the mother and police, including 18 matters to which I attached weight in determining that it would be unlikely that a trial judge at final hearing would find that the father sexually abused the mother’s daughter on any occasion.
At the interim hearing, the only basis upon which it was contended that the father poses an unacceptable risk of harm arising from potential abuse was that he had engaged in such conduct toward the mother’s daughter in the past.
The balance of the September 2020 judgment deals with a discussion of the relevant law with relevant considerations from s 60CC Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”).
My conclusion about the father’s application that the child spend time with him on an interim basis is summarised in the following paragraphs from the September 2020 judgment:
143.In reaching a decision about the orders that are proper and in the children’s best interests, I balance the various matters to which I have referred. For the reasons given I do not consider it likely that a court will find that the father poses an unacceptable risk of harm to the children on the basis that he may sexually abuse them or either one of them, and in my view there is a real risk that the relationship between the father and the children will be placed in jeopardy if orders are made as sought by the mother.
144.I also do not regard the father’s proposal as in the children’s best interests. Little is known about the current state of the relationship between the father and each of the children, and given the son’s age and limited experience of the father and the likely strained nature of the relationship between the father and daughter, each of the children will require some support in developing and/or restoring those relationships. As the father’s proposal in relation to therapy for the daughter and appropriate supervision for both children has not been properly put before the court and those proposals are either vague or not supported by any relevant evidence, I do not consider his proposal as being in the children’s best interests.
145.For this reason, I make orders largely consistent with the proposal of the ICL which I consider to be the minimum amount of time to foster the son’s relationship with the father. I do not propose making the order sought by the ICL that the daughter spend no time with the father as I do not consider such an order to be in that child’s best interests. I am of the view that it would be proper and in the daughter’s best interests for her to spend some time with the father but no proposal for this to occur, which also provides some support, was under consideration at the interim hearing.
APPLICATION FOR VARIATION
The father’s proposal
The orders made in accordance with the father’s proposal provide for an increase in the child’s time with the father from the current three hour period each alternate weekend to five hours on each occasion and dispenses with the need for that time to be supervised.
The main contention advanced on behalf of the father is that there is no longer any need for supervision and that the child will benefit from an increase in his time with the father. The child was over one year of age when the interim orders were first made and is now three years of age. There have been 33 occasions on which the child has spent time with the father in which warm and loving interactions have been observed between the two. I consider that in these circumstances it is likely that an important relationship has developed.
Another significant change so far as the father is concerned is that he no longer seeks orders to foster the relationship between the mother’s daughter and himself and the application for final orders so far as it previously extended to this child was withdrawn and dismissed.
The ICL supported the father’s application for variation of the interim arrangements for the child and submitted that for the purposes of the variation and for final orders, the ICL does not seek a finding that the father poses an unacceptable risk of harm to the child on any basis.
I raised with the father and the ICL that I may consider that it may assist the child if there were some form of support during the time spent with the father by way of other adults being present. I noted that members of the paternal family who had filed affidavits in these proceedings may be seen as suitable to be present and provide that support during the child’s time with the father. The father was not opposed to such an arrangement in the alternative to his preferred variation of removing supervision altogether.
The father relied upon the September 2020 judgment and contended that my assessment of risk in that judgment remained current. He also relied upon the reports of the 33 occasions of supervised time and of affidavits of the family members which had not been available at the interim hearing.
The reports of the child’s supervised time with the father are consistent with his contention that loving and warm interactions have been observed between the father and the child and that the child appears to enjoy his time with the father. The father also deposes to being available on every occasion that the child was to spend time with him pursuant to the September 2020 orders and that the only instances on which the supervised time did not occur was when the mother did not make the child available due to ill health. He also deposes that on many occasions notification by the mother of her intention to cancel the scheduled time was given late so that he was still required to pay the fees which were not refunded. According to his evidence there were also many occasions the mother did not provide medical certificates in relation to her claim that the child was ill in a timely manner or at all. The father deposes to having spent almost $23,000 in supervision costs and reports from the supervision.
A number of the father’s extended family members filed affidavits in these proceedings upon which the father relied in this application for variation of orders. These include the child’s paternal grandfather, paternal grandmother and paternal step-grandmother. Each of these family members have not seen the child since the parties separated and each depose to a willingness to supervise the child’s time with the father should that be necessary. Each also depose to a commitment to the child and his relationship with the child’s father and an understanding of the role of supervision. The paternal step-grandmother works with children and deposes to being fully aware of all issues pertaining to child welfare. The father currently lives in the home of the paternal grandfather and step-grandmother.
The mother’s application
The mother opposed the father’s proposed variation to the interim orders with respect to the child’s time with the father and made application for the child’s time with the father to be suspended on an interim basis.
The mother’s proposal for a suspension of time was almost entirely dependent on the opinion expressed by the Family Consultant (as Court Child Experts were then known) in her Family Report which had become available since the interim hearing. It became apparent in the course of submissions that the mother’s case depends to a significant extent upon her contention about the adverse impact the child spending time with the father may have on the mother’s daughter and support for this position is in the Family Report.
The Family Consultant assessed the family in October 2020 shortly after the child had first spent supervised time with the father pursuant to the September 2020 orders. Her report dated 3 November 2020 was released to the parties a short time later. This report had not been available to the Court at the earlier interim hearing. At the time the parties were assessed, the mother proposed that she hold sole parental responsibility for her daughter and this child spend no time with the father. She then proposed equal shared parental responsibility with the father for the child and that he have supervised time with the father pending final hearing. At that stage, the mother was seeking to relocate with the children.
When assessed for the Family Report, the father agreed with the mother’s proposal in relation to parental responsibility and living arrangements for the mother’s daughter. He proposed that the mother’s daughter spend increasing time with him culminating in each alternate weekend if such an arrangement was in line with the wishes of that child. The father proposed equal shared parental responsibility for the child and that he spend increasing time with him until he is living in an equal time arrangement and opposed the mother being permitted to move the children’s home to an area a considerable distance away.
In the Family Report the Family Consultant paid significant attention to the impact upon the mother’s daughter if the child were to spend time with the father as the mother’s daughter appeared to have a steadfast belief that the father had sexually abused her. It was submitted on behalf of the mother in this regard that the Court should attach weight to the assessment of an “assessor” acting in the delegated authority of the Commissioner of Victims’ Rights[4] who determined “on the balance of probabilities” that the mother’s daughter had been the victim of sexual assault or a related offence between mid-2016 and late 2018. This is the period in which the mother alleges that the father sexually abused her daughter and is the central matter in dispute.
[4] Victims’ Rights and Support Act 2013 (NSW)
As I explained when that submission was made, I attach no weight to the finding of an assessor with unknown qualifications who made such a “finding” on the basis of “required documentary evidence” from the mother, particularly which according to the “Notice of Decision” attached to the mother’s affidavit is a police report or report to a government agency or a report by an agency that provides support services to victims of crime and medical, dental or counselling report. This determination does not assist when it appears to have been made on selected information provided by the mother only with respect to a complaint that was not substantiated following significant investigation by the Department police and the JCPRP. Moreover, the question of a risk of harm, if any, posed by the father arising from sexual abuse is the central matter to be determined in these proceedings.
Returning to the Family Report, it was reported by both parties that the mother’s daughter is anxious. The mother told the Family Consultant that this child had sleeping issues which have become more significant following her disclosure of abuse and that this child sometimes experiences panic attacks. The mother’s daughter when interviewed told the Family Consultant that she was aware that the child will be seeing her father and is worried that he will do the same thing to the child that he did to her.
The mother in this application relies in particular on the Family Consultant’s opinion about the impact upon the mother’s daughter if she has been the victim of sexual abuse or believes that she has been. The Family Consultant identifies far-reaching, long-term implications for this child’s well-being and recommends that if the mother’s daughter genuinely believes that she has been sexually abused by the father, it would not be recommended that the child spend time with him.
The Family Consultant also explains however that if the Court finds that the mother purposefully and maliciously influenced her daughter to make allegations, then that would unnecessarily cost the mother’s daughter her relationship with the father, and this would be considered emotionally abusive.
Other parts of the Family Report referred to in the course of submissions and relied upon by the mother include the Family Consultant’s opinion that if the child is to develop a relationship with the father, it appears highly likely that this would impact the mother’s daughter and if the child were to spend regular time with the father this will have implications for the mental health and well-being of the mother’s daughter. In summary, the Family Consultant opines that given the presentation of the mother and her daughter, the impact on the mother’s daughter and the mother’s parenting and of their apparent beliefs in relation to sexual abuse “it is not recommended that [the child] spend substantial time with [the father] as it appears that the cost to [the mother’s daughter] will be significant if he did so”.
In my view, while some weight must be attached to the opinions of the Family Consultant, when considering the application to vary or suspend the orders for the child’s time with the father on an interim basis, a number of relevant factors must be taken into account in assessing the likely weight to be given to the Family Consultant’s evidence as at final hearing. These factors are:
·When the Family Consultant made her assessment the child had only just been reintroduced to the father through spending time with him. Since that time, there has been a consistent pattern of the child spending fortnightly time with the father over an almost two and half year period;
·All available reports in relation to the interactions between the father and child in the supervised setting are positive;
·It is apparent from information given to the Family Consultant by the mother, her trial affidavit and Outline of Case that the mother’s sole concern about the father is her contention that he sexually abused her daughter. The mother told the Family Consultant that she does not have concerns for the child’s physical safety with the extended paternal family though she did express the view that they had seemed uninterested in him;
·The mother places significant weight on her reported concerns to the Family Consultant and the Family Consultant’s views on the impact upon the mother’s daughter of the child spending time with the father, when the mother’s daughter believes she was sexually abused by the father. At the interim hearing the father withdrew his application in respect to the mother’s daughter so the impact of the father’s proposal upon this child is no longer a matter that the Court is required to take into account;
·The Family Consultant identified concerns about the impact of the child spending time with the father upon the sibling relationship and the mother’s parenting capacity when the mother’s daughter believes she was sexually abused by the father. However, the tenor of the Family Consultant’s opinion is that these impacts are bound up with impact of the father’s proposal upon the mother’s daughter, a matter which the Court is not required to take into account;
·The Family Consultant opines that if the father did not sexually abuse the mother’s daughter and orders are made as the mother proposes, the child will be deprived of a relationship with his father which is described as “an important part of his life”. Such circumstances the Family Consultant opines are likely to have significant implications on the child’s well-being such as difficulties with self-esteem. The child may experience issues with abandonment and rejection and be more likely to suffer depression and anxiety as a result. This loss may also have implications for his relationships with other family members, peers and future intimate relationships. The Family Consultant describes this as an extremely unfortunate outcome for the child;
·The Family Consultant’s evidence has not been tested and significant changes in the family’s circumstances and the father’s changed proposal (as he now seeks orders only in relation to the child) may cause the Family Consultant to change her recommendations.
In any event, the Family Consultant’s opinion is not determinative and the Court will have regard to all of the best interest considerations in determining proper orders for the child.
THE LAW & DISCUSSION
The relevant principles in relation to parenting and interim proceedings is set out in detail in [97] – [103] of the September 2020 judgment and that judgment is to be read with and incorporated into these Reasons.
One matter of significance in relation to this application is the likely duration of the interim orders under consideration. The final hearing was vacated due to non-compliance with trial directions and as the parties did not have confidence that it would be contained within the allocated time. It is unknown when these proceedings will be listed for final hearing, though it appears to be unlikely to occur in at least the next six months. It is thus likely that the interim arrangement under consideration will be in place for a lengthy period of time before a final hearing can take place. This is particularly significant where the child’s time with the father has already been supervised for a period of almost two and a half years.
Neither legal representative addressed the considerations that must be taken into account for determining the best interest of the child for the purposes of this application and I had some difficulties gleaning their respective contentions in relation to these matters from the Outline of Case filed for the purposes of the final hearing that was vacated.
Doing the best that I can in the foregoing circumstances and having regard to the best interest considerations in s 60CC of the Act compendiously I attached weight to the following matters.
It is not clear whether the mother contends that the child will not benefit from having a meaning relationship with the father, though there can be no doubt she attaches particular weight to the need to protect the child from harm from being subjected to abuse. In the course of the application the mother’s lawyer confirmed that the mother seeks that the Court make a positive finding that the father sexually abused her daughter and on this basis, as I understand it, contends that the father poses an unacceptable risk of harm to the child.
As I understand it, the evidence that the mother relies upon at final trial and in this application to suspend the orders for the child’s time with father is the same evidence as was relied upon in the previous interim hearing. Thus, the following extracts from the September 2020 judgment are in my view still apposite to the current application:
108.Although the need to protect children from harm of the type envisaged in this consideration is ordinarily a particularly weighty matter, for reasons given earlier I do not consider that it is likely that a court will find at final hearing that the father poses any unacceptable risk of harm to the children in this regard.
As I also expressed in the September 2020 judgment, and my view has not changed, there is no reason to consider that the child will not receive a benefit from having a meaningful relationship with both parents. In the September 2020 judgment, I also expressed the view that if I were to make orders for the child to spend no time with the father and such an arrangement continues for the lengthy period of time that is likely to elapse prior to any final hearing, it may be extremely difficult for that relationship to be rekindled. I remain of that view and consider that it would be particularly unfortunate for the child’s relationship with the father to be severed at this stage which would occur if orders were made as the mother seeks.
The child is too young to have expressed a view about his parenting arrangements so this matter is not relevant.
When the family were assessed by the Family Consultant the child had spent time with the father on one occasion only in a supervised setting, so any assessment of the father/child relationship at that time is no longer current. It seems highly likely in my view that the child will be assessed to have a more developed relationship with the father as a result of spending supervised time with him over the previous two and a half years. The father is now at least a person familiar and known to the child and it seems likely that the warm and playful interactions observed between the two indicates a positive relationship.
The Family Consultant opines that if the father did not sexually abuse the mother’s daughter and the child does not have a relationship with the father, the child will be deprived of “a relationship with a parent that otherwise may have provided him warmth, guidance, security and enrichment”. She sets out the negative consequences for a child who does not receive the benefit of such relationships.
Despite the views expressed by the mother to the Family Consultant and in her affidavit about the extended paternal family’s lack of interest in the child, this is contradicted by each of the affidavits filed by the paternal grandmother, grandfather and step-grandmother who each express great interest in developing a relationship with the child and a desire for the child to experience positive relationships with his external paternal family.
It was observed in the September 2020 judgment that the father had been diligent in seeking to spend time and communicate with the children following separation. This diligence has remained in relation to the child and has included and manifested itself in the father being available on every occasion for the child’s scheduled time with him and solely meeting the significant financial burden of the cost of supervision.
The father’s decision to not pursue orders with respect to the mother’s daughter appears not to have been taken lightly and to have been informed by this child’s stated wishes and by the opinion of the Family Consultant.
In my view, the likely effect of the respective change in the child’s circumstances which would be brought about if orders were made as sought by each of the parties is a particularly salient consideration in this interim application on the available evidence. I am of the view that it would be detrimental to the child for his relationship with the father to be severed, which would occur if orders were made as the mother seeks. Such orders could only be in the child’s best interest if it were likely or inevitable that a court at final hearing will make no orders with respect to the child’s time with the father.
While the Family Consultant on the information known to her recommended that the child spend no time with the father, this recommendation is guarded and appears to rely heavily upon the impact on the mother’s daughter of the child spending time with the father and to some degree on the mother’s anxiety and parenting capacity. However, she also clearly identifies the detriments to the child if he were to spend no time with the father and the possibility that the mother’s actions may be found to be malicious (though it is not apparent that such a finding will be pursued by the father at final hearing).
The variation to the interim orders sought by the father, if made, would see a small increase in the child’s time with him and supervision being dispensed with. Some provision can be made to provide support for the child, and in the circumstances of this case, to reduce the anxiety the mother may experience through an order that members of the paternal family be present when the child is spending time with the father.
Some weight must also be given to the practical difficulty and expense of the child spending time with the father under the current arrangements. The father has endured considerable expense in paying for a supervision service for the child’s time with him and such an arrangement has continued for a far greater period of time than the Court and the father could have expected when such orders were made.
The final matter that I consider relevant is the mother’s apparent attitude towards promoting a relationship between the child and the father. The mother has persistently opposed the development of the child’s relationship with the father since an early stage in the proceedings. She opposed orders for the child to spend any time with the father when such interim orders were first sought and has on two occasions since then sought to have the orders providing for that time discharged including through this oral application which was made without prior notice.
CONCLUSION
Having regard to each of the foregoing matters and attaching weight to those as indicated, I was satisfied that the proposal of the father for a small increase in the child’s time with him and dispensing with formal supervision was proper and in the best interests of the child.
I certify that the preceding sixty (60) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Hannam. Associate:
Dated: 10 March 2023
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