Macedo v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue (No.2)

[2015] NSWCATAD 227

Civil and Administrative Tribunal

New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation:	Macedo v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue (No.2) [2015] NSWCATAD 227
Hearing dates:	6 October 2015
Decision date:	02 November 2015
Jurisdiction:	Administrative and Equal Opportunity Division
Before:	A Verick, Senior Member
Decision:	The matter is remitted, pursuant to s 65 of the Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997, to the Chief Commissioner for reconsideration as advised.
Catchwords:	STATE REVENUE – Stamp Duties – whether copy of Declaration of Trust Deed liable to ad valorem duty – Stamp Duties Act 1920 - s 73D.
Legislation Cited:	Stamp Duties Act 1920 Duties Act 1997 Taxation Administration Act 1996 Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997
Cases Cited:	Chief Commissioner of State Revenue v Paspaley [2008] NSWCA 184 Ross v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue (No 2) [2010] NSWADT 51 Ross v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2010] NSWADTAP 74 Commissioner of Stamp Duties (NSW) v Pendal Nominees (1988-1989) 167 CLR 1
Category:	Principal judgment
Parties:	Deidre Macedo (Applicant) Chief Commissioner of State Revenue (Respondent)
Representation:	Counsel: A Rider (Respondent)   Solicitors: R Ross (agent for the Applicant) Crown Solicitor’s Office (Respondent)
File Number(s):	1410611

Reasons for decision

1. The Applicant has applied for a review of a decision made by the Chief Commissioner of State Revenue on 27 August 2014 to disallow an objection to an ad valorem stamp duty assessment.

2. However, since the decision of the Court of Appeal in Chief Commissioner of State Revenue v Paspaley [2008] NSWCA 184, it is now well settled law that the review before the Tribunal pursuant to s 96 of the Taxation Administration Act 1996 (“the Administration Act”) is “not to a ruling made on an objection” but is in respect of the assessment or the initial decision the subject of the objection.

3. Accordingly, in this matter the review is in respect of the Chief Commissioner’s ad valorem duty assessment issued on 28 July 2008 (“the assessment”).

4. The assessment was made by the Chief Commissioner on the basis of a copy of a declaration of trust executed by the Applicant on 21 March 1997 (“the Trust Deed”) over a residential property situated at Naremburn (“the Naremburn property”). The declaration of trust was between Raymond Ross as transferee and Deirdre Ann Macedo as trustee (transferor). The Applicant and Mr Ross are siblings.

Factual Background

5. This matter has a long history and the events leading to this matter and related proceedings are as follows.

6. On 7 February 1997, Mr Ross entered into a contract to purchase the Naremburn property.

7. In correspondence with the Chief Commissioner in late 2007, Mr Ross advised the Chief Commissioner:

… the property was not purchased in the name of Deirdre Macedo in April 1997. The name on contract documentation was variously Raymond Ross or Natalie Amanda Ross (daughter 9 years old at the time). Even stamp duty was not paid in name of Deidre Macedo.

The property remained unregistered and in my ownership for two and half years until around August 1999 when amendments were made to the transfer documentation to register the transfer in Deirdre’s name.

8. The correspondence was in respect of a request by Mr Ross to have an undated executed transfer for the Naremburn property from the Applicant to him be chargeable to nominal duty under s 55 of the Duties Act 1997 (“the Duties Act”), which came into effect from 1 July 1998. Section 55 provided that a nominal duty was chargeable in respect of “a transfer of dutiable property from an apparent purchaser to the real purchaser, in a case where dutiable property is vested in an apparent purchaser upon trust for the real purchaser who provided the money for the purchase of the dutiable property”.

9. But the Chief Commissioner, on the basis of information supplied, did not accept Mr Ross was entitled to the concession. In a letter dated 8 February 2008 the Chief Commissioner informed Mr Ross that –

As the evidence submitted does not show that you solely provided all the purchase monies of $372,000 as claimed, the undated transfer to you does not fall under Section 55 of the Duties Act 1997.

It is liable to ad valorem duty and you are required to lodge a current valuation by a registered valuer so that an assessment can be done.

10. In response, Mr Ross made further representations in writing dated 11 February 2008 and drew the Chief Commissioner’s attention to various documents that he had supplied in the correspondence leading to the decision made by the Chief Commissioner.

11. The Chief Commissioner, in a letter dated 21 April 2008, accepted the letter dated 11 February 2008 from Mr Ross as an objection as provided by s 86 of the Administration Act. The Chief Commissioner also responded by providing a full explanation as to the basis for the concession under s 55 of the Duties Act but concluded that the Chief Commissioner was not satisfied that all the money to purchase the property was provided by him. The objection was disallowed.

12. Mr Ross responded on 2 May 2008 seeking a review on the basis of further submissions and various documents.

13. The Chief Commissioner, in a letter dated 18 July 2008, responded by providing a further explanation as to why Mr Ross was not entitled to the concession under s 55 of the Duties Act. Mr Ross was also informed as follows:

Our letter of the 21 April 2008 informed you of your further rights of review through the judicial system.

Finally we acknowledge receipt of a photocopy of a declaration of trust deed, dated 21 March 1997 between Deirdre Macedo, as Trustee and Raymond Ross, as Purchaser that has not been duly stamped with duty.

The trust deed will be referred to the Operations area where the trust deed will be assessed and a notice of assessment will issue in due course.

14. On 28 July 2008, in a letter form the Chief Commissioner, Mr Ross was informed that the declaration of trust dated 21 March 2008 was liable to ad valorem duty because, on the evidence, the Chief Commissioner was not satisfied that all the purchase money had been provided by “Raymond Ross”. The Chief Commissioner also responded as follows:

In addition, a clear intention that Deidre Macedo was to hold the Naremburn property in trust for Raymond Ross had to be established at the time of entering into the contract to purchase, as mentioned in our letters of 21 and 18 July 2008. For the same reasons as stated in our earlier letters it has not been established that Deidre Macedo was to hold the property as trustee at the time of entering into the contract.

Consequently the Trust Deed has been assessed under Schedule 2 paragraph (2)(a) of the heading, Declaration of Trust of the Act and subject to ad valorem duty. The person declaring the trust is primarily liable to pay the duty, in this instance Deidre Macedo.

Normally a comprehensive valuation of the Naremburn property by a registered valuer would be required, however as the contract for sale appears to be arms length transaction, the purchase price expressed in the contract will be accepted as the value of the Naremburn property, as at 21 March 1997 and has been used for the purposes of the assessment.

Enclosed is a Duties notice of assessment for $24,460.00 comprising of $12,230.00 duty plus $12,230.00 interest for late payment. Interest has been capped at 100% of the duty payable, representing the fine which would have been paid under the Stamp Duties Act. Please note, any additional interest incurred will be remitted to the amount of $12,230.00 even though the enclosed assessment notice shows $18,951.45 interest is payable.

It is noted the Declaration of Trust Deed is only a photocopy; please forward the original Trust Deed to enable the Trust Deed can be duly stamped.

15. On 27 August 2008, the Chief Commissioner received an objection against the assessment lodged by Mr Ross.

16. On 12 November 2008, in a letter addressed to Mr Ross, the Chief Commissioner disallowed the objection.

17. Nothing seemed to have happened in relation to the assessment until 13 December 2012 when the Chief Commissioner issued a Legal Notice to the Applicant demanding payment of the outstanding stamp duty with interest. There was no response to the Legal Notice and the Chief Commissioner, on 21 November 2013, issued a further Legal Notice demanding payment of both the duty and all accrued interest.

18. There was also no response to the second notice and Chief Commissioner proceeded to satisfy the debt by garnishment of the Applicant’s bank account pursuant to his powers under s 46 of the Administration Act.

19. When that occurred, the Applicant made inquiries as to the basis of the liability and was informed of the assessment in issue. The Applicant on, 5 May 2014, lodged an objection against the assessment on grounds that she had not received the assessment.

20. On 27 August 2014, the Chief Commissioner responded by accepting the late objection under his powers found in s 90 of the Administration Act. Section 90 gives the Chief Commissioner authority to accept an objection lodged after expiry of the 60-day period prescribed in s 89 of the Administration Act as the time for lodging an objection.

21. The Chief Commissioner, also in his letter, informed the applicant that, after a review, he had partly allowed the objection as follows:

In this matter the Chief Commissioner garnished your bank account for $39,488.14 for duty of $12,230 and interest of $27,258.14.

However in his letter dated 28 July 2008 the Chief Commissioner stated that assessment is for $24,460 comprising duty of $12,230 and interest of $12,230. The interest charge has been capped at 100% of the duty payable, representing the fine which would have been paid under the Stamp Duties Act. The Chief Commissioner also advised in his letter that any additional interest incurred will be remitted.

Therefore pursuant to the Chief Commissioner’s letter dated 28 July 2008 we now remit the interest charge of $15,028.14 ($27,258.14 less $12,230). This amount will be refunded to you with interest under separate cover.

Please find attached the stamped copy of the Declaration of Trust.

Please note; as ad valorem duty has now been paid on the Declaration of Trust, a transfer of the Naremburn property for no consideration from you to Mr Ross will be eligible for concessional duty of $50 under Section 57 of the Duties Act.

22. Mr Ross had also lodged an objection on 11 February 2008 against the Chief Commissioner’s decision not to grant him concessional duty of $10 under s 55(1)(b) of the Duties Act in respect of the undated transfer of the Naremburn property from the Applicant to him. The Chief Commissioner disallowed the objection and the decision was conveyed to Mr Ross in a letter dated 21 April 2008.

23. On 27 March 2009, Mr Ross filed an application for review at the Administrative Decisions Tribunal of the Chief Commissioner’s decision not to grant the concessional duty on the executed transfer.

24. In the first instance, in Ross v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue (No 2) [2010] NSWADT 51, the Tribunal found that the evidence did not establish conclusively that Mr Ross provided the money for the purchase of the dutiable Naremburn property.

25. More importantly, the Tribunal held that Mr Ross was not entitled to the concession because Ms Macedo, the current Applicant, was not the “apparent purchaser” of the Naremburn property.

26. On appeal, the Appeal Panel in Ross v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue NSWADTAP 74 upheld the decision of the Tribunal. Speaking of the transfer instrument from the Applicant to Mr Ross, the Appeal Panel said:

46 The Appeal panel is of the view that the respondent’s approach is the correct one. Even if Mrs Macedo was a transferee, she was never a “purchaser”. She was not a party to the purchase agreement. The purpose of the exemption from ad valorem duty is to save payment of double duty in the circumstances set out in s 55. The property was apparently purchased by Mr Ross as trustee for his daughter. He sought, for reasons which advantaged him at the time, to amend the documentation after the purchase was completed, to register the property in the name of Mrs Macedo. She has never been involved in the purchase of the property. She was not even “apparently” involved in the purchase, and on Mr Ross’ evidence, she came into picture after the contract was entered into with the vendors.

27. Further, the Appeal Panel referred to the decision of the High Court in Commissioner of Stamp Duties (NSW) v. Pendal Nominees Pty Ltd (1988-9) 167 CLR 1 and noted that –

48 Pendal Nominees confirmed that the exemption from ad valorem is aimed at circumstances of resulting trust – where:-

“a document reveals a certain person as the purchaser of property and does not reveal that another person has “actually paid the purchase money”, but contains a declaration of trust by the “apparent” purchaser in favour of that other person” (at 17, Mason CJ).

28. The Appeal Panel concluded that –

49 It seems clear to the Appeal Panel that in no sense was Mrs Macedo the purchaser, apparent or real, of the property. The appellant submitted that Pendal Nominees could be distinguished on the basis of the facts, as there was a transfer to Pendal Nominees after the purchase of (and payment of moneys by) BTA, a subsidiary of Pendal Nominees. Pendal Nominees would then hold the shares in trust for BTA.

50 While the facts are somewhat different, a proper reading of Pendal Nominees shows that the analysis of the section by the High Court is indeed relevant. In order to fall within it, and to obtain the exemption, Mrs Macedo would need to appear to the world as a purchaser of the property, when in fact she was a person who received a transfer of the legal title some later time.

Evidence

29. At the hearing of the present matter, the Tribunal had the documents provided by the Chief Commissioner as required by s 58 of the Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997.

30. The Applicant relied on the following –

1. affidavit of Raymond Ross sworn on 15 March 2009;

2. report of Mark Bryant dated December 2009;

3. affidavit of Marie Ross sworn on 14 January 2010;

4. affidavit of Deirdre Macedo sworn on 26 July 2013 (but not produced or filed) and

5. another affidavit of Raymond Ross sworn on 20 May 2015.

31. In addition, both parties supplied submissions in writing and made further viva voce submissions at the hearing.

Submissions

32. The Applicant’s case was that the Tribunal should, from the various matters produced by the Applicant by way of evidence, make the proper inference that Mr Ross paid the purchase price of the Property pursuant to loans from family members. It was also the Applicant’s case that there was no resulting trust in favour of any of the members of Mr Ross’ family because the funds provided by members of his family were provided by way of loan.

33. Mr Ross in his written submission described the assessment as

… an arbitrary ad valorem stamp duty assessment on one altered photocopy of a ‘number of superseded and/ or altered photocopies’ of a declaration of trust ‘never tendered for assessment’ by the applicant. Instead the photocopy was removed by the respondent from a bundle of some 15 year old photocopies of randomly selected documents collectively tendered in around 2008 in relation to the acquisition of the subject property in around 1997 and in order to demonstrate the intentions of the parties at the time.

34. It was submitted that the applicant in Ross v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue (No 2) “was not allowed by the respondent to rely upon the unstamped document”, the document which is the subject of these proceedings and that –

Following the finalisation of those proceedings the respondent promptly ‘collected’ ad valorem stamp duty (instead of the applicable $10 concessional duty) by garnishing the applicant’s bank account. Thereby bringing into existence an instrument which is clearly at odds with that earlier judgment. Furthermore the respondent went on to deny the parties the rights expressly created by this instrument. In all of the circumstances the conduct of the respondent is disingenuous.

35. It was also submitted that the outcome in that case was largely due to a finding that the Naremburn property was purchased by “Raymond Ross in trust for Amanda N. Ross” and that –

Crucially over the past 18 years there has been no claim or assertion from this non-existent person Amanda N. Ross or any other person with similar sounding name suggesting that there was an intention for the property to be held in trust for her or it.

36. The applicant also submitted that –

3.4   Due to impending family law proceedings the parties had agreed to register the property in the applicant’s name. At the same time the Applicant and her brother at least evinced an intention to establish a trust whereby she held the property on trust for Mr Ross and that the purchase price for the property was to be paid and ultimately paid by Mr Ross and not by the Applicant.

3.5   This trust subsequently was considered to be unnecessary in order to establish a resulting trust and therefore never tendered for stamping.

37. Finally, it was submitted that the Declaration did “not involve a separate dutiable transaction” and should only be subject to a nominal duty under the Second Schedule of the Stamp Duties Act as an “instrument declaring that a person in whom property is vested as the apparent purchaser thereof holds the same in trust for the person or persons who have actually paid the purchase money therefor”.

38. Mr Rider, counsel for the Chief Commissioner, in his written submissions first noted that under s 100(3) of the Administration Act the applicant bore the onus of proving her case.

39. Mr Rider also by way of introduction noted that in view of the decision in Paspaley “it is the Assessment which the Tribunal is empowered to review”.

40. Mr Rider submitted that s 73D of the Stamp Duties Act “empowered” the Chief Commissioner “to assess duty on and stamp a copy of the Trust Deed”.

41. Section 73D of the Stamp Duties Act provided:

73D   Certain copies of instruments to be dutiable

1. A copy of an original instruments chargeable with duty if the original instrument was executed on or after 20th October 1982, and such a copy is so chargeable as if it had been executed in the same way as the original instrument and had been first executed at the same time as the original instrument unless the chief Commissioner is satisfied:

1. that the original instrument has been duly stamped, or

2. that a copy of the original instrument has been duly stamped in accordance with this subsection.

2. Where a copy of an original instrument is duly stamped in accordance with subsection, the original instrument shall be deemed to have been duly stamped.

3. …

42. Reliance was also placed on the Second Schedule (Stamp duties and exemptions) to the Stamp Duties Act, in particular liability to duty of “any instrument declaring that any property vested or to be vested in the person executing the instrument is or shall be held in trust for the person or persons or purpose or purposes mentioned therein notwithstanding that the beneficial owner or person entitled to appoint that property may not have joined therein or assented thereto”.

43. Under the Second Schedule the duty payable at the relevant time was “$200.00 or the same duty as would be chargeable if the instrument were a conveyance of the property comprised therein, whichever was greater”. The Second Schedule also sets out the person primarily liable for the duty and relevantly provided that the person liable was the person declaring the trust or the person directing the declaration of the trust.

44. Mr Rider advanced several grounds to support the Chief Commissioner’s ad valorem duty assessment.

45. Firstly, he submitted that the original Trust Deed “was liable to ad valorem duty under para.2(a) of the heading “Declaration of Trust’ in the Second Schedule of the Act as an instrument declaring that any property vested or to be vested in the person executing the instrument is or shall be held in trust for the person mentioned therein”. In this matter, he submitted “the Trust Deed was an ‘instrument’ (i.e. a written document), which clearly identified the person declaring it (i.e. the Applicant) and the relevant property (i.e. the Property) and person (i.e. Mr. Ross) the subject of the declaration”.

42. Some reliance was also placed by Mr Rider on the decision of the High Court in Commissioner of Stamp Duties (NSW) v Pendal Nominees Pty Ltd (1988-1989) 167 CLR 1 to submit that the “to be vested” requirement was satisfied by the Recital B of the Trust Deed which provided that the Applicant “will be the registered proprietor of the Property”.

43. Secondly, he submitted that, the Applicant was the person liable to pay ad valorem stamp duty on the executed original Trust and was required by s 25 of the Act to lodge it with the Chief Commissioner and cause it to be duly stamped within six months of it being first executed. But the Applicant has failed to do so.

44. Thirdly, it was submitted that the copy of the Trust Deed evidenced the signatures of the Applicant and Mr Ross on the original Trust Deed and the Chief Commissioner was satisfied that the matter contained in the original executed Trust Deed was wholly or substantially reproduced in the instrument”. And on that basis, the photocopy of the Trust Deed provided to the Chief Commissioner was a “copy”, as defined in s 73C of the Act, of the original executed Trust Deed.

45. Fourthly, it was submitted that because the original Trust Deed or a copy had not been previously duly stamped, “the ‘copy’ of the Trust Deed was chargeable under s 73D(1) of the Act with the same ad valorem conveyance duty as the original executed Trust Deed”.

46. Fifthly, Mr Rider submitted that “the application of s.73D(1) to the ‘copy’ of the Trust Deed did not depend on how it came to be in the Respondent’s possession, nor whether it was a copy of another copy of the original executed Trust Deed”.

47. Mr Rider’s sixth ground was that –

… regardless of whether multiple versions of the Trust Deed were executed at different times, such other versions were liable to ad valorem stamp duty in their own right. Further, unless and until they had been duly stamped with ad valorem duty under the Act (of which there is no evidence), they did not affect the liability to duty of the original or ‘copy’ of the Trust Deed dated 21 March 1997.

52. Finally, it was submitted that “the Respondent issued the Assessment in accordance with s.73D and assessed ad valorem stamp duty on the ‘copy’ of the executed original Trust Deed based on the purchase price for the Property of $372,000 under the Contract for sale executed by Mr. Ross and the vendors on or around 7 February 1997”.

Consideration

53. Essentially, the issue before the Tribunal was whether the Chief Commissioner was entitled to assess stamp duty on merely sighting a copy of the Trust Deed under the Stamp Duties Act 1920 (“the Stamp Duties Act”).

54. But a careful perusal of the relevant documents produced by the Chief Commissioner as required by s 58 of the Review Act raises a fairly difficult conundrum as to the core issue relating to the Applicant’s liability to ad valorem duty in respect of the assessment issued by the Chief Commissioner.

55. The s 58 documents reveal that the assessment, the subject of this review, issued on 28 July 2008 by the Chief Commissioner was an assessment issued to “Raymond Ross”.

56. Mr Ross lodged an objection against the assessment that was received by the Chief Commissioner on 27 August 2008. In the objection, Mr Ross also drew the attention of the Chief Commissioner to the then related matter that was before the Administrative Decisions Tribunal. The Chief Commissioner disallowed the objection and the decision was conveyed to Mr Ross in a letter dated 12 November 2008. Mr Ross took no further action in relation to the assessment.

57. At the hearing of the related matter, Ross v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue (No 2) [2010] NSWADT 51 (affirmed by the Appeal Panel), the applicant sought to rely on an unstamped copy of the Declaration of Trust but on objection by the Chief Commissioner the document was not allowed to be admitted. Neither the applicant nor the Chief Commissioner revealed to the Tribunal that a copy of the Trust Deed had been assessed to ad valorem duty. In a sense, the Applicant is correct in claiming that the decision in that matter is somewhat at odds with the decision made by the Chief Commissioner to accept the copy as a Declaration of Trust and impose an ad valorem duty.

58. As the facts now reveal, the Chief Commissioner, sometime in December 2013, acted to have the assessment satisfied by monies garnisheed from the Applicant’s bank account. This action led the Applicant to make inquiries as to the basis of the liability and was informed of an outstanding assessment. The Applicant then sought to object to the assessment, giving rise to the current proceedings. But the assessment that the Chief Commissioner relied upon was not against the Applicant. The assessment dated 28 July 2008 was directed to “Raymond Ross” and his name was also in the notice noted as the “Client name”. No assessment has been issued to the Applicant, giving rise to any liability under the Stamp Duties Act or the Duties Act.

59. The Chief Commissioner’s Objection Determination Report dated 14 August 2014, included in his s 58 documents, discloses why the assessment was made against Mr Ross –

However in this matter the Declaration of Trust was lodged with OSR by Mr Ross and it is OSR’s practice to issue notice of assessment to the lodging party instead of the person primarily liable.

60. The Chief Commissioner’s powers to issue assessments are found in Part 3 of the Administration Act. The Chief Commissioner’s general power to make an assessment is found in s 8, which allows the Chief Commissioner to make an assessment of the tax liability of a taxpayer. Section 14 gives the Chief Commissioner authority to issue a notice of assessment showing the amount of the assessment “in a form approved by the Chief Commissioner”. I think an assessment is required to be made against the party liable to the duty and the process is only complete if the notice is served on that party.

61. It is not clear on what basis the Chief Commissioner was able to garnish the Applicant’s bank account to obtain funds to stamp the Declaration of Trust. The s 58 documents indicate that the Chief Commissioner exercised his powers under s 46 of the Administration Act, which allows the Chief Commissioner to collect any outstanding tax from third parties, including banks holding monies due to a taxpayer. But the section can only be enlivened if there is a pre-existing tax liability, which remains unpaid.

62. The conundrum in this matter concerns the absence on the facts of any liability on the part of the Applicant under the assessment issued to Mr Ross. Although the Applicant was a party to the Trust Deed, no assessment has been issued to her.

63. As correctly pointed out by Mr Rider for the Chief Commissioner, “it is the Assessment which the Tribunal is empowered to review”.

64. The Tribunal is thus not empowered, pursuant to this application, to determine whether there is any independent liability to duty on the part of the Applicant in respect of the Trust Deed.

65. Under the Second Schedule of the Stamp Duties Act, the liability to pay the duty on a Declaration of Trust is on – “The person declaring the trust or the person directing the declaration of the trust”. And under s 13 of the Duties Act, the duty charged is payable by the transferee.

66. I also note that under s 4 of the Duties Act a duty charged under the Duties Act, is “when a liability to pay the duty is created a debt due to the State of New South Wales”.

67. In all circumstances of this matter, I think the proper course for the Tribunal to take is to remit this matter pursuant to s 65 of the Review Act back to the Chief Commissioner to reconsider his position. The Chief Commissioner needs to consider whether in the absence of an assessment against the Applicant, the Applicant is nevertheless liable to pay the duty imposed on the Trust Deed.

68. Alternatively, the Chief Commissioner needs to consider whether the duty imposed under the assessment is a debt due from Mr Ross.

69. This reconsideration I think ought to be done against the factual background of the outcome in Ross, in particular the Chief Commissioner’s position taken on the facts in that matter.

70. The Applicant’s agent must bear some responsibility for this outcome. Mr Ross did not register the original transfer for a number of years to avoid disclosure of ownership of the property to his former wife in the then divorce proceedings, made changes to the transfer instrument without proper process and failed to inform the Tribunal and the Appeal Panel in his own matter that an ad valorem duty assessment had been issued to him in respect of the Declaration of Trust.

71. Mr Ross has also not been truthful as far as the facts are concerned. In 2007, he informed the Chief Commissioner that the name on the contract document was “variously” and included “Natalie Amanda Ross (daughter 9 years old at the time)”. He now describes her as the “non-existent person Amanda N. Ross or any other person with similar sounding name”.

72. The matter is remitted to the Chief Commissioner for reconsideration as advised.

I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales.

Registrar

Decision last updated: 02 November 2015