MacDonald and Repatriation Commission
[2007] AATA 1980
•23 November 2007
Administrative Appeals Tribunal
DECISION AND REASONS FOR DECISION [2007] AATA 1980
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL )
) No N2006/1529
VETERANS’ APPEALS DIVISION )
ReJOHN ARTHUR MACDONALD
Applicant
AndREPATRIATION COMMISSION
Respondent
DECISION
TribunalSenior Member M D Allen
Dr M E C Thorpe, Member
Date23 November 2007
PlaceSydney
DecisionThe decision under review is SET ASIDE and the Tribunal substitutes in lieu thereof its decision, viz. THAT John Arthur MacDonald is entitled to pension at the intermediate rate pursuant to section 23 of the Veterans’ Entitlements Act 1986 as and from 1 July 2002.
.................[sgd]........................
M D Allen
Presiding Member
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
No: N 200601529
VETERANS’ APPEALS DIVISION
Re: John MacDonald
Applicant
And: Repatriation Commission
Respondent
DIRECTION [2007] AATA 1980
TRIBUNAL: Senior Member M D Allen
DATE: 25 January 2008
PLACE: Sydney
Pursuant to section 43AA of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal 1975 being satisfied that there is an obvious error in the text of the decision of the Tribunal, I DIRECT the Registrar of the Tribunal to alter the text of the decision in accordance with the following directions namely:
That the date of the reviewable decision is amended to read 12 July 2004.
..................[sgd]......................
M D Allen
Senior Member
CATCHWORDS
VETERANS’ ENTITLEMENTS – application for review of decision increasing applicant’s pension for incapacity from war-caused injury and disease to eighty percent of general rate pension as opposed to special rate of pension – inability to undertake remunerative work due to war caused incapacity – loss of earnings – alone test – standard of proof to tribunal’s reasonable satisfaction – applicant no longer producing income for partnership – gross receipts – partnership may arrange remuneration in any manner including agreement that one or more partners receive nothing – decision under review set aside
LEGISLATION:
Veterans’ Entitlements Act 1986 sections 23, 23(1)(b), 23(2), 23(2)(a), 24, 24(1)(b), 28, 28(a), 28(b), 120(4) and 120(6)
CASE LAW
Repatriation Commission v Smith (1987) 15 FCR 327
Chambers v Repatriation Commission (1995) 36 ALD 207
Repatriation Commission v Alexander (2003) 75 ALD 329
Repatriation Commission v Hendy [2002] FCAFC 424 (reported 76 ALD 47)
Cavell v Repatriation Commission (1988-9) 9 AAR 534
Counsel v Repatriation Commission (2002) 122 FCR 476
M Young Legal Associates Ltd v Zahid (a firm) and Others [2006] 1 WLR 2562
REASONS FOR DECISION
23 November 2007
Senior Member M D Allen
Dr M E C Thorpe, Member
Summary
1. By application made 7 November 2006, the Applicant sought review of the decision of the Respondent made on 18 September 2006 that increased his pension for incapacity from war-caused injury and disease to 80 percent of the general rate of pension.
2. It was contended by the Applicant in these proceedings that he was entitled to the special rate of pension pursuant to section 24 of the Veterans’ Entitlements Act 1986.
3. Section 24 VEA, so far as is relevant, reads:
…
Special rate of pension
(1)This section applies to a veteran if:
(aa)the veteran has made a claim under section 14 for a pension, or an application under section 15 for an increase in the rate of the pension that he or she is receiving; and
(aab)the veteran had not yet turned 65 when the claim or application was made; and
(a) either:
(i)the degree of incapacity of the veteran from war‑caused injury or war‑caused disease, or both, is determined under section 21A to be at least 70% or has been so determined by a determination that is in force; or
(ii)…
(b) the veteran is totally and permanently incapacitated, that is to say, the veteran's incapacity from war-caused injury or war-caused disease, or both, is of such a nature as, of itself alone, to render the veteran incapable of undertaking remunerative work for periods aggregating more than 8 hours per week; and
(c) the veteran is, by reason of incapacity from that war-caused injury or war-caused disease, or both, alone, prevented from continuing to undertake remunerative work that the veteran was undertaking and is, by reason thereof, suffering a loss of salary or wages, or of earnings on his or her own account, that the veteran would not be suffering if the veteran were free of that incapacity; and
(d) section 25 does not apply to the veteran.
(2)For the purpose of paragraph (1)(c):
(a)a veteran who is incapacitated from war-caused injury or war-caused disease, or both, shall not be taken to be suffering a loss of salary or wages, or of earnings on his or her own account, by reason of that incapacity if:
(i) the veteran has ceased to engage in remunerative work for reasons other than his or her incapacity from that war-caused injury or war-caused disease, or both; or
(ii) the veteran is incapacitated, or prevented, from engaging in remunerative work for some other reason; and
(b)where a veteran, not being a veteran who has attained the age of 65 years, who has not been engaged in remunerative work satisfies the Commission that he or she has been genuinely seeking to engage in remunerative work, that he or she would, but for that incapacity, be continuing so to seek to engage in remunerative work and that that incapacity is the substantial cause of his or her inability to obtain remunerative work in which to engage, the veteran shall be treated as having been prevented by reason of that incapacity from continuing to undertake remunerative work that the veteran was undertaking.
(2A)…
4. Section 23 VEA states the criteria for the payment of pension at the intermediate rate of pension. Section 23 is in similar terms to s24 except that subs23(1)(b) refers to an inability to work otherwise than on a part-time basis or intermittently.
5. The concept of working part-time or intermittently is explained by subs23(2) which reads:
…
Intermediate rate of pension
…
(2)Paragraph (1)(b) shall not be taken to be fulfilled in respect of a veteran who is undertaking, or is capable of undertaking, work of a particular kind:
(a)if the veteran undertakes, or is capable of undertaking, that work for 50 per centum or more of the time (excluding overtime) ordinarily worked by persons engaged in work of that kind on a full-time basis; or
(b)in a case where paragraph (a) is inapplicable to the work which the veteran is undertaking or capable of undertaking – if the veteran is undertaking, or is capable of undertaking, that work for 20 or more hours per week.
…
6. Section 23(2)(a) has resonance in this matter where the Applicant previously carried on farming pursuits, namely horticulture, and like most primary producers, he did not work on a nine-to-five five-day week, but his level of activity depended on the seasons.
7. The standard of proof in this matter is that mandated by subs120(4) VEA, namely of that to the Tribunal’s “reasonable satisfaction”. In Repatriation Commission v Smith (1987) 15 FCR 327 the Full Court of the Federal Court equated that to the civil standard of proof, namely proof on the balance of probabilities. Subsection 120(6) VEA provides that neither party to this review bears any onus of proof.
8. There is no dispute in this matter that the Veteran is entitled to pension at 80 percent of the general rate of pension and is aged under 65. The injuries and diseases that have been accepted by the Respondent as being war-caused are described as:
(a)Diffuse discoid eczema intertrigo;
(b)Post-traumatic stress disorder;
(c)Osteoarthritis of the right knee; and
(d)1st metatarso-phalangeal joint in the left foot.
9. The issues in this matter are:
(a)Is the Veteran incapable of undertaking remunerative work?
(b)If yes, for what period of time?
(c)Is that incapacity to undertake remunerative work due to war-caused injury or disease ALONE?
(d)As a result of his war-caused inability to undertake remunerative work, is the Veteran thereby suffering a loss of earnings on his own account that he would not otherwise be suffering?
10. After enlisting in the Australian Regular Army, the Applicant was allocated to the Royal Australian Corp of Signals. During 1967, 1968, he served in South Vietnam and was present at a fire support base Coral when it was attacked by North Vietnamese forces. After service in South Vietnam, he returned to Australia and completed the term of his engagement whilst posted to 5 Signal Regiment in Western Sydney.
11. Upon discharge form the Regular Army in 1972, he was employed by Standard Telephone and Communications as a mainframe computer technician, originally doing the same job at 5 Signal Regiment, albeit as a civilian, as he had been doing immediately prior to his discharge.
12. After 10 years the Applicant was then employed by Sperry Corporation (now Unisys) as a mainframe computer technician, achieving the position of “chief engineer” at its city-based mainframe maintenance unit. In this position he was in effect the technical manager and had to allocate resources and manage the task. Although in receipt of an attractive remuneration package, he was affected by the stress and pressure of that job and so resigned.
13. Prior to his resignation from Sperry Corporation, the Applicant had purchased some 10 acres of land at Wedderburn near Sydney and had planted fruit trees (peaches) upon that land.
14. Whilst still employed, the Applicant had attended a TAFE course in horticulture and after his resignation, he devoted himself full-time to farming. He and his wife also built a dwelling on the land at Wedderburn. Later, because he found that growing peaches was too labour intensive, the Applicant converted his farm into the growing of proteas.
15. The Applicant’s wife had had a separate business, namely that of a potter. Originally she sold her wares at craft shows and fetes, but in 2004 a business was purchased that involved the potting of containers into which are placed the ashes of deceased pets. The purchase of that business has led to an increase in the profit from the pottery business.
16. In 1988, the Applicant and his wife brought her pottery business and the horticultural business into a partnership, JA & MK MacDonald. The partnership deed originally provided for the partnership profits to be shared equally by the partners (the Applicant and his wife). On 30 June 2004, the deed of partnership was varied so as to provide that as from 1 July 2004 and including any subsequent years, the Applicant would not receive any distribution from the partnership.
17. During the course of these proceedings the Applicant stated that the intent of the variation was to deny him any share of the partnership income as he was no longer making any contribution to the income obtained by the partnership.
18. The Applicant explained that increasingly, because of his war-caused incapacities, he found it more and more difficult to carry out the task of growing and selling proteas. His orthopaedic disabilities made working the farm increasingly painful whereas his PTSD resulted in his having difficulty dealing with purchasers of the flowers, plus a loss of interest in the activity.
19. In his report of 12 April 2007 to the Respondent, Dr Chase, occupational physician, referred to the Applicant not wanting to seek employment. In evidence he expanded on this to state that because of his PTSD the Applicant is “demotivated” and had lost interest in growing proteas.
20. Dr Morris, psychiatrist, in a report dated 6 March 2007 to the Respondent stated:
…
Mr MacDonald’s psychiatric impairment of Chronic Post Traumatic Stress Disorder causes him problems in his concentration, makes it difficult for him to handle the pressure and stress of work and also to work with other people because of his social isolation and avoidance symptoms.
…
Dr Morris noted that the Applicant stated he felt uncomfortable in crowds and trains and does not feel in control.
21. Dr Law is the Applicant’s treating psychiatrist. In a report dated 13 September 2007 he stated:
…
… He very seldom socialized. He has given up the hobby of reading novels, as his concentration was not good. He felt sorry for himself but he could not help it – especially as he remembered he used to love horticulture, yet his interest has declined relentlessly in the past few years. He has not worked since June 2004, and he just could not pull himself together to return to even a little bit of gainful employment. Mental examination revealed he remained dejected, and he held a bleak view of his future, health-wise and career-wise. …
…
Dr Law concluded his report by stating:
…
Conclusion
As his PTSD symptoms have been present for at least a few years, and yet the symptoms have remained clinically significant despite regular outpatient treatment (counseling [sic] and use of psychiatric medications), he is most probably unable to return to even part-time work. He is now most probably totally and permanently incapacitated for work. (that is, unable to work up to 8 hours in a week) because of the ongoing and deleterious effects of various PTSD symptoms.
22. Dr Chase in the report referred to at paragraph 19 above, opined:
…
I do not doubt that Mr McDonald [sic] suffers from a post traumatic stress disorder and that it has impacted his ability to undertake remunerative work. I also note that he does have some osteoarthritis in both knees though it is only the right that appears to be symptomatic. He has some evidence of degenerative changes in both feet though the left is more symptomatic than the right … Nonetheless, he does have significant residual work capacity and I do not believe he is totally incapable of engaging in any activity. From a physical and psychological point of view, he already does engage in many activities around his farm though I would agree that they are probably insufficient to maintain the farm as a viable commercial entity. That is not, however, the issue – he does have residual work capacity and he would be able to seek and gain work elsewhere.
…
23. In evidence Dr Chase referred to his examination of the Applicant and his notation that the Applicant had heavy calluses on one knee indicative of the Applicant doing a lot of kneeling, and engaging in physical activity. Cross-examined, he pointed out that the calluses will go away if no activity is carried out and that the calluses he observed were on one knee only.
24. Dr Morris in his report referenced at paragraph 20 above, said of the Applicant’s ability to work:
…
Mr MacDonald has been involved in two major types of work in his career, initially as a computer technician and later in the horticulture area. He would not be able to cope with computer technician work because of his psychological symptoms. He may be able to cope with horticultural work but not in a full-time capacity and there would probably need to be some adjustment to his work so that other people were involved in going to the flower market and was [sic] involved in selling to the public.
…
He further stated:
…
It is difficult for me to be definitive in this in that I am not qualified to assess his left foot pain and disability but my opinion would be that his left foot pain disability is probably more important as a cause preventing him from getting work in the horticultural industry than his psychological symptoms.
…
25. The Respondent submitted that the Applicant was capable of retraining as a computer technician. We accept the Applicant’s evidence that his training was on mainframe computers, which are now obsolete and not in use. We find, given the opinions of Drs Morris and Law, that retraining is simply not an option.
26. Dr Chase believes the Applicant has a residual ability to engage in employment. In assessing this opinion s28 VEA must be kept in mind. Section 28 states:
…
Capacity to undertake remunerative work
In determining, for the purposes of paragraph 23(1)(b) or 24(1)(b), whether a veteran who is incapacitated from war-caused injury or war-caused disease, or both, is incapable of undertaking remunerative work, and in determining for the purposes of section 24A whether a veteran who is so incapacitated is capable of undertaking remunerative work, the Commission shall have regard to the following matters only:
(a)the vocational, trade and professional skills, qualifications and experience of the veteran;
(b)the kinds of remunerative work which a person with the skills, qualifications and experience referred to in paragraph (a) might reasonably undertake; and
(c)the degree to which the physical or mental impairment of the veteran as a result of the injury or disease, or both, has reduced his or her capacity to undertake the kinds of remunerative work referred to in paragraph (b).
…
27. The Applicant’s skills are in horticulture. No evidence was adduced as to what employment the Applicant could undertake or of what employment would be available to him within a suitable distance to travel. But as s28 VEA points out, those matters are irrelevant in considering any determination under subs23(1)(b) or 24(1)(b) VEA. As to the submission that he could be employed in the pottery business carried on by his wife, there is no evidence that it would be feasible either financially or practicably to employ him. We consider that remunerative work for the purposes of ss23 and 24 VEA must refer to a real position rather than one created out of charity or in order to give the impression of employment.
28. Notwithstanding the above comments, the Full Court of the Federal Court in Chambers v Repatriation Commission (1995) 36 ALD 207 held that it was a range of employment opportunities that a hypothetical person with the skills, qualification and experience that the veteran might reasonably undertake, and it was intended that a broad approach be taken to the interpretation of ss28(a) and (b). At p210 Davies J said:
…
In paras (a) and (b), attention is directed to the skills, qualifications and experience of the veteran for the purpose of determining the kinds of remunerative work which a person with those skills, qualifications and experience might reasonably undertake. That ambit of capacity for remunerative work is then the starting point from which the degree of reduction in work capacity by reason of the physical or mental impairment of the veteran is measured. As Moore and Sackville JJ point out, paras (a) and (b) should be applied not technically or restrictively but sensibly and fairly with a view to ascertaining the kinds of remunerative work which the veteran might reasonably undertake absent the war-caused injury or disease. Work experience is a guide but it does not delimit that ambit.
Necessarily, in the examination of the matters which arise under para (c), matters other than skills, qualifications and experience are taken into account. Every fact which bears upon the nature and extent of the physical and mental impairment of the veteran must be taken into account. And so also must every fact which bears upon the extent to which the physical or mental impairment has reduced the veteran's capacity to undertake remunerative work of the kind which the veteran might reasonably undertake.
…
See also Moore and Sackville JJ at 36 ALD p218.
29. Dr Chase gave very cogent evidence indicating that the Applicant had an ability to engage in some physical work. Questioned, he opined that the Applicant could work more than eight hours but less than 20. We accept his evidence in this regard, particularly having regard to the physical examination of the Applicant and the objective signs that the Applicant had been engaging in some activity.
30. The Applicant does have other disabilities which, it was submitted played a part in his inability to undertake remunerative work. Certainly in the past the Applicant has sought to claim that these disabilities were war-caused.
31. Dr Giblin, orthopaedic surgeon, on 13 August 2003 recorded a history of pain in both feet more severe in the left than the right. Previously, in 2002, Dr Giblin had taken a history of painful ankles and forefeet. Dr Bentivoglio, orthopaedic surgeon, in a report dated 18 May 2006 to the Respondent stated:
…
Mr MacDonald’s major complaints were in relation to his right knee and left foot (accepted disability). He also complained of symptoms in his right foot and ankle regions.
X-rays taken of his ankle and his feet on 20 January 2006 were essentially normal. I consider therefore that the majority of Mr MacDonald’s symptoms (probably in excess of 90 % of his symptoms and disability) were as a result of his accepted disabilities.
…
I consider that the amount of symptoms Mr MacDonald should be experiencing coming from his right ankle and right foot region would not diminish the length he could walk (this would be determined by the amount of symptoms he is experiencing in his right knee).
Similarly, I would consider that any disability he had from his right ankle would not decrease the distance he is capable of walking or affect any other activities. Once again, this would be determined by the amount of symptoms he is experiencing in his left great toe region.
Mr MacDonald should not experience any resting pain in his ankles or right foot region.
…
32. In Repatriation Commission v Alexander (2003) 75 ALD 329 at 332, Spender J referred to the Full Court decision in Repatriation Commission v Hendy [2002] FCAFC 424 (reported 76 ALD 47). At paragraph 37 of Hendy supra the Full Court said:
…
The consideration of what a veteran would probably have done, absent the service disabilities, is a hypothetical exercise. The language of s 24(1)(c) VEA directs attention to the question of whether incapacity from the relevant condition alone prevents a veteran from continuing to undertake remunerative work. The provision does not contemplate that other factors are only to be taken into account if they, of themselves, prevent the veteran from working. The decision-maker is required to take into account any factor that plays a part or contributes to a veteran's being prevented from continuing to engage in remunerative work. …
…
Spender J then added at 75 ALR p334, para 22:
…
The conclusion that a combination of war service and non-war service related conditions prevented Mr Alexander from working is a non-issue is simply wrong. If the non-service related conditions were a factor in preventing Mr Alexander from continuing to undertake remunerative work, albeit those conditions were of secondary importance, the alone requirement of s 24(1)(c) would not be satisfied.
…
33. Dr Chase considered the effect of the Applicant’s non-war-caused disabilities in his report. He opined:
…
… his accepted disabilities are the sole cause of his current problems with work. The major issue is as noted above – he has lower limb discomfort in the right knee and left foot, and he has lost motivation. The lower limb discomfort would make it somewhat difficult for him to work full-time as a protea grower/horticulturist. The post traumatic stress disorder would make it difficult for him to retrain or up skill and return to electronics or computer technician work.
…
Dr Chase later in his report noted that he observed no abnormalities in the Applicant's right foot.
34. The Applicant’s evidence was that it was his war-caused incapacity that caused him to cease work, and given the reports of Drs Giblin, Bentivoglio and Chase, we are able to accept his evidence that his ankle and right foot conditions played no part in his ceasing work. As pointed out by Burchett J in Cavell v Repatriation Commission (1988-9) 9 AAR 534 at 539, the so-called “alone” test should be a practical test applied “… with an eye to reality and as a matter in respect of which common sense is the proper guide”.
35. That the partnership had, according to its tax returns, not suffered any loss of income, was said by the Respondent to evidence that the Applicant had not suffered a loss of remuneration on his own account. The Applicant for his part said that the increase in income was due to his wife’s pottery business making larger profits following the acquisition of the pet memorial business and that if he had been able to continue with his primary production, namely the growing of proteas, the profits of the partnership would have been even greater. As it was, the amendment to the deed of partnership was made to reflect the reality that he was no longer producing any income for the partnership.
36. Mr Menzies, a forensic accountant, gave evidence for the Respondent. In his report dated 15 June 2007 he referred to the income of the partnership fluctuating from year to year but we place no significance upon this. Likewise that for some years the primary production arm of the partnership made a net loss is unremarkable. Apart from any taxation advantages that may have flowed to the partnership from a primary production loss (and we note Mr Menzies said that in fact none would have), as was pointed out in Counsel v Repatriation Commission (2002) 122 FCR 476, it is the gross receipts to which regard must be had; cf: Anderson v Repatriation Commission [2204] FCA 1009 where at paragraph 45 Gray J agreed with the Tribunal's decision that “… farming would not necessarily cease to be remunerative simply because the end of year accounts showed a loss, and that there was a distinction to be drawn between small amounts of money derived from a hobby and remuneration”. There is no suggestion that the Applicant’s protea growing business was a hobby.
37. It seems to us that the judgment of Goldberg J in Counsel supra is entirely applicable to this matter. At 122 FCR 492-3 his Honour said:
…
The fact that at the end of the relevant accounting period the partnership might be showing a loss should not obscure the fact that during that year the appellant had access to the cashflow or earnings of the partnership which had been derived from his personal exertion. When the appellant was ultimately prevented by incapacity from continuing to undertake the work which he carried out in the course of the partnership, he thereby suffered a loss of earnings on his own account in the sense that he was no longer able to have access to, or take advantage of, the cashflow or earnings of the partnership business. It is not to the point that at the end of a relevant accounting period the partnership was shown in its accounts to have carried on business at a loss.
When s 24(2A)(e) is viewed in this way it can be said that the reference to earnings, in a partnership context, is a reference to the money brought into the partnership, that is its cashflow, through the personal exertion of the veteran, that is, on his or her own account.
I do not consider that this analysis, as the respondent submitted, confuses two concepts, namely a loss of income by the partnership business in the sense that it is trading at a loss, with a loss of earnings on the part of the appellant. Rather it concentrates on the requirement that the entitlement to a special rate pension depends on establishing not only that war-caused injury or disease has prevented the veteran from undertaking the remunerative work he or she has been undertaking, but that it has also brought about a cessation of the generation of an income stream which hitherto existed. Put another way, the appellant's efforts of personal exertion no longer produce money.
…
38. Mr Menzies suggested in evidence that the Australian Taxation Office would regard the partnership as having been dissolved following the deed of amendment that stated that the Applicant was no longer entitled to any income. We have no intention in these proceedings of reviewing the practices of the Commissioner of Taxation. Suffice it to say, the Applicant and his wife have at all times acted upon the advice of their accountant and there has been no suggestion that the accounts of the partnership, its tax returns and the individual returns of the partners are in any way other than correct, nor has it been suggested that they disclose an intention to avoid tax.
39. Although the matter does seem to have been a moot point previously, the decision of the Court of Appeal in M Young Legal Associates Ltd v Zahid (a firm) and Others [2006] 1 WLR 2562 is authority to the proposition that the members of a partnership may arrange for their remuneration in any manner they chose including the agreement that one or more receive nothing. At p2576 Hughes LJ said:
…
… the words of s 1 of the 1890 act seem to me to put the matter beyond doubt. They refer to the making of profit as an aim, but studiously abstain from reference to any necessity that it be shared. On principle it seems to me that if there is an essential element of partnership it is the carrying on of business in common, that is to say in such manner as to make each the agent of the other for all acts done in the course of the business. Having thus constituted themselves, the partners are free under the Act to arrange for the remuneration of themselves in any manner they chose, including by agreement that one or more shall receive specific sums, or that one or more receive nothing, in either case irrespective of profits.
…
(Note: Section 1 of the Partnership Act 1890 (UK) is in the same terms as s1 of the NSW Partnership Act 1892.)
40. We are satisfied on the balance of probabilities that because of incapacity from war-caused injury and disease alone, the Applicant is incapable of undertaking remunerative work for 50 percent or more of the time ordinarily worked by persons engaged in the type of work of the kind he was previously engaged in, namely farming, and in any event he is incapable of working for 20 hours or more. We are further satisfied that as a result thereof he is suffering a loss of earnings on his own account, namely the loss of partnership income that would have accrued to him if he were free from war-caused incapacity and able to continue the protea growing business.
41. The decision under review will therefore be set aside and the Tribunal substitutes in lieu thereof its decision, namely that John Arthur MacDonald is entitled to pension at the intermediate rate pursuant to s23 VEA as and from 1 July 2002.
I certify that the 41 preceding paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Senior Member M D Allen and Dr M E C Thorpe, Member.
Signed: .............[sgd]....................
Mwela Kapapa, AssociateDate/s of Hearing: 7 November 2007
Date of Decision: 23 November 2007
Advocate for the Applicant: Vietnam Veterans’ Association of Australia
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr G Purcell
Solicitor for the Respondent: Department of Veterans’ Affairs
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