M84 of 2002 v Minister for Immigration
[2004] FMCA 312
•10 May 2004
FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| M84 of 2002 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION | [2004] FMCA 312 |
| MIGRATION – Review of decision of Refugee Review Tribunal – no jurisdictional error – application dismissed. |
Migration Act 1958
Federal Magistrates Court Rules 2001
SDAV v Minister (2003) FCAFC 129
SBAS v Minister (2003) FCA 528
HUTN v MIMIA (2001) 194 ALR 244
Minister v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559 at 574
SDAU v Minister (2003) FCAFC 129
SVAS v MIMIA (2003) FCA 528
Applicant 168/2003 v MIMIA (2004) FCA 250
MIMIA v Yusuf (2001) 180 ALR 1
WAEE v MIMIA (2003) FCA 184
Rezaei v MIMIA (2001) FCA 1294
| Applicants: | APPLICANTS M84/2002 |
| Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS |
| File No: | MZ 580 of 2003 |
| Delivered on: | 10 May 2004 |
| Delivered at: | Melbourne |
| Hearing Date: | 10 May 2004 |
| Judgment of: | Walters FM |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Ms Kennedy SC, Mr Maiden |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | Pro-bono assistance |
| Counsel for the Respondent: | Mr Mosley |
| Solicitors for the Respondent: | Australian Government Solicitor |
ORDERS
The application be dismissed.
The applicant do pay the respondent’s costs fixed in the sum of $4,500.00
| FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT MELBOURNE |
MZ 580 of 2003
| APPLICANTS M84/2002 |
Applicants
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
This is an application to review a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the RRT”) made on 8 October 2001. The decision was handed down on 26 October 2001. The RRT affirmed the decision of a delegate of the Minister not to grant the applicants a protection visas.
The applicants are a married couple, and their son. They are citizens of Sri Lanka and are of Sinhalese ethnicity.
The applicant husband arrived in Australia in January 1998, as a student. The applicant wife arrived in Australia in March 1988, together with their son.
Both the applicant husband and the applicant wife were holders of class TU Student (Sub-class 560) Visas.
I accept the following statement of background facts contained in paragraphs 1.2 to 1.9 (inclusive) of the respondent’s contentions of fact and law (filed 28 August 2003):
1.2By application lodged 21 October 1999, the applicants applied to the respondent’s Department for protection visas. The applicant wife and son applied as members of the family unit of the applicant husband but made no claims themselves. The application was therefore to be considered on the basis of the claims made by the applicant husband. Those claims were set out in a submission by him attached to the application.
1.3The applicant husband claimed that as a consequence of his involvement in Sri Lankan politics, as a member of the United National Party (UNP), he feared persecution from supporters of other political groups. In particular the Peoples Alliance (PA) government and its major participant the Sri Lankan Freedom Party (SLFP) and the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna Party (JVP).
1.4On 12 January 2000, a delegate of the respondent determined that the applicants were not persons to whom Australia had protection obligations and refused the application.
1.5On 3 February 2000 the applicants applied for review of the delegate’s decision to the RRT, pursuant to the provisions of the Migration Act 1958 (“the Act”). Material additional to that before the delegate was provided to the RRT. The RRT conducted a hearing on 1 June 2001 and on 8 October 2001 affirmed the delegate’s decision refusing he grant of a protection visa to the applicants. That decision was handed down on 26 October 2001.
1.6On 29 November 2001 the applicants requested the respondent to consider the exercise his public interest power under s417 of the Act to substitute a more favourable decision fro the decision of the RRT. The request was refused on 18 March 2002.
1.7On 12 June 2002 the applicants made application to the High Court of Australia for constitutional writs under s75(v) of the Constitution and seeking an extension of time within which to make the application…
1.8On 7 February 2003, Justice Hayne ordered that the further proceedings in the application be remitted to the Federal Court subject to a direction that it proceed as if steps already taken in the application of the High Court had been taken in the Federal Court. There was no consideration of the matter on the merits in the High Court.
1.9On 29 May 2003 the respondent filed a Notice of Objection to Competency in the Federal Court on the ground that the application had not been filed within the time prescribed by s486A of the Act.
Notwithstanding the filing of the Notice of Objection to Competency, the respondent accepted that, if the RRT’s decision is found to be affected by jurisdictional error, then (in effect) the relevant time limit will not apply.[1]
[1] See paragraph 4 and 5 of the first respondent’s contentions of fact and law
The proceedings were transferred to this Court by an Order of the Federal Court dated 28 May 2003.
The RRT’s Decision
After reviewing the factual background of the applicants’ claims and setting out certain relevant independent information about Sri Lanka, the RRT made certain findings.[2] The most relevant of the findings are summarised in paragraphs 11 to 17 of the applicants’ contentions of fact and law as follows:
[2] See pages 97 to 102 of the Court Book
11.The RRT accepted that the applicant husband is a long-time supporter of the UNP.
12.The RRT found that:
(a)the applicant husband was involved from the late 1980’s until the 1994 election, most actively in the two years preceding that election;
(b)that his activity was focused on Mr Silva’s[3] campaign for the 1994 election; and
(c)that he had no active involvement after that.
13.The RRT accepted that between 1992 and the 1994 election the applicant husband was threatened as he has claimed, that he was involved in arguments about politics and about posters and banners and he may have been hit, and hit others, in fighting which broke out in these circumstances.
14.The RRT accepted that four intruders entered the applicants’ house in September 1996 but was unable to find that the applicant wife was severely physically or sexually assaulted. It is also “doubted” that it was the applicant husband’s political involvement which was the motivation for the intrusion notwithstanding the stated political content of the words painted on the wall. In reaching this conclusion, the RRT had regard to the applicants’ evidence that their wallets were stolen, suggesting that theft could have been a motivation for what occurred, and the absence of any other action against them in the preceding two years.
15.The RRT did not accept that the applicant husband was threatened after moving from the house where he and the applicant wife were robbed as was claimed in his application.
16.The RRT found that there was no evidence before the RRT that the JVP might, in the reasonably foreseeable future, become involved in violent revolutionary action, or that the applicant husband or members of his family would be persons at particular risk of coming to harm at the hands of the JVP if they were to return to Sri Lanka, or that the police would be unable or unwilling to respond in the unlikely event that the JVP did begin again to conduct itself as it did a decade or so ago.
17.The RRT concluded that there was not more than a remote chance that the applicant husband or his wife and child would face harm of a kind which might constitute persecution because of the applicant husband’s political opinion and activities.
[3] Mr Silva is the applicant husband’s uncle. He was a UNP MP from 1977 to 1999
The applicant husband claimed, amongst other things, that individuals connected with the JVP could seek to harm him. The RRT dealt with the applicant husband’s claims in this regard as follows[4]:
The applicant husband’s claims indicate that he had been afraid in the late 1980’s because of the activities of the JVP. At the hearing he said that individuals connected with the JVP could seek to harm him and that it was not known whether the JVP could emerge again as a violent political force. Independent information indicates that the JVP of the late 1980’s is a quite different organisation to the JVP which now participates in main stream political life in Sri Lanka. There is no evidence before me that the JVP might, in the reasonably foreseeable future, become involved in violent revolutionary action, or that the applicant husband or his family would be a person at particular risk of coming to harm at the hands of the JVP if he were to return to his country, or that the police would be unable or unwilling to respond in the unlikely event that the JVP did begin again to conduct itself as it did a decade or so ago. [emphasis added]
[4] See Court Book page 100
Grounds of Review
On 14 August 2003, the applicants filed a document entitled “Particulars of Grounds Relied upon by the Applicants”. I was advised at the hearing on 10 May 2004 that certain of the grounds described in that document had been abandoned.
The grounds as relied upon by the applicants at the hearing were as follows:
The RRT committed jurisdictional error by failing to take into account relevant considerations namely:
(a)potential harm from people associated with the JVP; and
(b)the political nature of the slogans daubed on the applicants’ walls in September 1996.
The JVP Claim
Ms Kennedy SC and Mr Maiden (for the applicants) presented the following written submissions in relation to this ground:
28.In relation to the JVP the applicant husband further stated that he did not fear the party itself, but individuals associated with it, and that “individuals connected with the JVP could seek to harm him”.
29.The RRT considered:
(a)whether or not the JVP as a party might become involved in violent revolutionary action;
(b)whether the applicants could come to harm at the hands of the JVP; and
(c)whether the police would not respond in the “unlikely event that the JVP did begin again to conduct itself as it did a decade or so ago”.
30.The applicants did not claim that they fear violence at the hands of the JVP, but at the hands of the PA or SLFP, or thugs associated with the JVP and/or the PA or SLFP. The violence practised by such thugs bears no relationship to the “involvement of the JVP in violent revolutionary action” as was intimated by the RRT above. [emphasis added]
31.The likelihood of the JVP becoming a violent revolutionary party, and the likelihood of persecution by the JVP itself, did not deal with the applicants’ claims. The RRT’s failure to consider these claims amounts to a failure to exercise jurisdiction (and see SDAV v Minister [2003] FCAFC 129; SBAS v Minister [2003] FCA 528).
During the course of her submissions, Ms Kennedy drew my attention to the following passage from the RRT’s decision[5]:
I asked the applicant husband if he was afraid of the JVP as it appeared he had been in the past. He said that if something were to happen to him who could know who had done it. He said that he did not foresee a problem with the party itself but certain individuals could possible seek to harm him: when he had associated with a lot of young people in the earlier days, he did not know their attitudes and said that he had learned that some were leaning towards the JVP. The applicant husband said that it was not known whether the JVP would emerge again as a violent political force.
[5] See Court Book page 90-1
Ms Kennedy also referred to the passage from the decision referred to in paragraph 9 above.
It was argued on behalf of the applicants that the RRT did not deal with the claim that was put to it and that it had, in effect, asked itself the wrong question.
Reference was made to HUTN v MIMIA (2001) 194 ALR 244, where the Full Court said (at page 259):
The requirement to review the decision under section 414 of the (Migration) Act requires the tribunal to consider the claims of the applicant. To make a decision without having considered all the claims is to fail to complete the exercise of jurisdiction embarked on. The claim or claims or its or their component integers are considerations made mandatorily relevant by the Act for consideration… It is to be distinguished from errant fact finding… The Tribunal’s statutorily required task is to examine and deal with the claims for asylum made by the applicant. If there is a sur place claim made in addition to a claim based on conduct or experience elsewhere, both must be dealt with. If the sur place claim is, or is to be seen as, based on more than one foundation… both bases of the claim must be dealt with. (The tribunal’s failure to deal with both bases of the applicant’s claim) was not a failure merely to attend to evidence, even probative evidence, and by such route commit a factual error. It was a failure to deal with one part of the claim for asylum…
Mr Mosley (for the respondent) traced the references to the JVP (and the applicant husband’s concerns regarding the JVP and its supporters) in various documents contained within the Court Book,[6] and pointed out that the RRT had summarised the applicant’s claims in this regard on page 86 of the Court Book.
[6] See Court Book pages 21, 22, 24, 26, 47-51 and 61
Mr Mosley also referred to the passage (appearing on page 90 of the Court Book) referred to in paragraph 13 above, and to the information regarding the JVP appearing on page 94 of the Court Book under the heading “Relevant Independent Information about Sri Lanka”.
In paragraph 6.4 of his written contentions, Mr Mosley said:
It is clear that the applicant was associating his fear of persecution from individuals in his past to their possible support for the JVP and its possible re-emergence as a violent political force. The RRT noted that at the hearing the applicant claimed that individuals connected with the JVP could seek to harm him and that it was not known whether the JVP could emerge again as a violent political force. The RRT’s consideration of whether or not the JVP might re-emerge as violent force and whether the applicant would be a person at particular risk of harm if so, clearly addresses the claim which was expressly put forward by the applicant in the context in which it was raised by the applicant himself.
I agree with Mr Mosley’s submission contained in the previous paragraph. In my opinion, it is clear beyond argument that the RRT has addressed and dealt with this aspect of the applicants’ claim. No relevant “component integer’ has been ignored.
In my opinion, to attempt to draw a distinction between the consideration of a claim somehow relating to “individuals connected with the JVP” and a claim relating to the JVP itself is to endeavour to draw a distinction without a difference. After all, and as submitted by Mr Mosley, the JVP is nothing if not the people that belong to it, support it or are otherwise associated or connected with it.
In my opinion, the RRT properly and adequately dealt with this aspect of the applicant husband’s claim. On page 101 of the Court Book, the RRT said:
I recognise that there is a high level of political violence in Sri Lanka and so there is a chance that people who are involved in activities undertaken to foster support for a party (such as undertaking practical support tasks and assisting during campaigns such as the applicant husband claims to have done) might find themselves victims of violent actions taken by people supporting the candidates of other parties. Taking all of the evidence before me into account, I have concluded that there is not more than a remote chance that the applicant husband or his wife and child would face harm of a kind which might constitute persecution because of the applicant husband’s political opinion and activities. [emphasis added]
In my opinion, the passage appearing in the previous paragraph makes it clear that the essential nature or character of the applicant husband’s claim regarding the JVP (and/or those associated or connected with it) was not overlooked. On a fair reading of the RRT’s decision, the applicant husband’s claim in this regard was properly assessed.
The Home Invasion
The applicants’ written submission as it relates to this subject is as follows:
36.The RRT had evidence before it that during the home invasion in 1996 the intruders daubed PA slogans including slogans which mentioned “politics, police and revenge” on the walls of the house.
37.Despite this, the RRT “doubted” that it was the applicant husband’s political involvement which was the motivation for the intrusion notwithstanding the stated political content of the words painted on the wall, and had regard to the theft of the wallets suggesting theft “could have been” a motivation.
38.The RRT thereby failed to make findings on an essential part of the applicant’s claims, namely, whether the slogans were really there or not, and, if yes, why they were there. Instead, the RRT has sought to circumvent the crucial 1996 incident by referring to it as a “single” or “isolated” incident.
39.Whether the incident was isolated or not, it was incumbent on the RRT to deal with and make a finding on what precisely occurred in 1996 because it was only by assessing and evaluating what occurred at that time that the RRT would be able to make a prediction about the future…
40.In failing to consider and address a central element of the applicants’ claims the RRT thereby fell into jurisdictional error…
During the course of her oral submissions, Ms Kennedy referred — by analogy — to SVAS v MIMIA (2003) FCA 528. She submitted that the RRT was required to ask itself why political slogans were painted on the walls of the applicants’ home during the home invasion in September 1996 if, as the RRT eventually found, the home invasion “was not motivated by the applicant husband’s involvement in politics”.[7] Ms Kennedy argued that the RRT was required to consider how the home invasion, together with the other events referred to by the applicants, impacted on their treatment in Sri Lanka — that impact being cumulative with all other events which they claimed impacted adversely on their lives by reason of the applicant husband’s political activities.
[7] See Court Book page 99
The passages from the RRT’s decision relating to the home invasion are as follows:
I have considered the evidence about intruders coming to the applicants’ home in September 1996 some months after they moved there. It was submitted in the application that the applicant wife was sexually assaulted by the intruders and that the telephone line was cut, property destroyed and PA slogans, which the applicant husband said at the hearing mentioned politics, the police and revenge, painted on the walls. Professor McGorry’s report also states that the applicant wife was severely physically and sexually assaulted and I assume that it was in the context of the home invasion as there is no evidence that anything happened to the applicant wife at any other time. The applicant parents’ wallets were stolen before the intruders left following the arousal of neighbours who had heard shouting. I consider the applicant husband’s evidence at the hearing that he decided not to pursue the complaint made to the police about the incident on the advice of his father because to do so might mean that the intruders could come again (presumably because those involved would learn of the police investigation from the police) rather difficult to reconcile with the claim in the application that there was a police friend who gave them protection after the incident. Nevertheless, I accept that four intruders entered the applicants’ house in September 1996.
There are, however, aspects of the evidence which have led me to have some doubt about what actually happened, particularly to the applicant wife. The applicant husband did not at once correct my impression that the applicant wife had been raped: he did so only when I indicated that I found it surprising that he had apparently not wanted the attack investigated when it apparently involved the rape of his wife. The applicant husband then said that the intruders had told the applicant wife to take off her clothes and the applicant wife told me that they had torn at her clothes. The applicant wife said that she had been to hospital, and she said that she had been treated only at home by the neighbour doctor and then that she had not been aware of what was happening. I am mindful that the applicant wife has stated that she has been severely disturbed by the incident, something reported in Professor McGorry’s assessment, and I draw no adverse inferences from the minor inconsistencies in her account and between her account and that of the applicant husband. I am nevertheless unable to find that the applicant wife was severely physically or sexually assaulted. I also doubt that it was the applicant husband’s political involvement which was the motivation for the intrusion notwithstanding the stated political content of the words painted on the wall. In reaching this conclusion, I have had regard to the applicants’ evidence that their wallets were stolen, suggesting that theft could have been a motivation for what occurred, and, more importantly, the absence of any other action against them in the preceding two years. I recognise that the evidence has been that they lived for much of this time in a secure environment with the applicant husband’s father but the applicant husband’s connection to his father as a former police officer would have been known if the applicant husband’s police contact had been as potent a tool in political matters as the applicant husband claimed. If the applicant husband was travelling to and from work, even if collected and returned as he has claimed, he did so regularly and was regularly at work after 1994 and I consider that if people had been intent on harming him then they could have found an opportunity to do so. That nothing occurred has led me to the view that the home invasion was not motivated by his involvement in politics.
Even if it was so motivated or partly motivated, it was a single incident preceded and followed by nothing similar. I understand that this by itself does not preclude an action from constituting persecution within the meaning of the Refugees Convention but I must consider whether there is a real chance that something similar could occur to them again and will later consider what the applicants might face if they were to return to Sri Lanka. I note that I do not accept that the applicant husband was threatened after moving from the house where he and the applicant wife were robbed as claimed in his application: the evidence at the hearing indicated that the applicants lived without incident once they returned to live with the applicant husband’s father after the home invasion.[8]
[8] See pages 98 to 100 of the Court Book
The RRT continued (at page 101 of the Court Book):
I have considered the chance that the applicants could again be the victims of a home invasion such as that which occurred in September 1996. This was an isolated incident and nothing similar had occurred before and nothing further occurred in the fifteen months before the applicant husband left the country and the eighteen months before the applicant wife and child followed. That nothing further happened indicates to me a lack of intention to pursue and harm the applicant husband and his family. If the applicants were to return to Sri Lanka and in view of my finding that the home invasion was a single incident and followed by nothing further, I consider that the chance of the applicants coming to serious harm of such a kind which might amount to persecution and which would occur because of the applicant husband’s political involvement is remote. I am not satisfied that the chance that the applicants could be victims of such crime would be affected to any appreciable extent by the applicant husband’s political involvement. Finally, I understand that the capacity and willingness of the police to address incidents of politically motivated violence is often questioned but I note that political leaders have campaigned against political violence and the police have said that they will act to contain it and have been criticised as well as commended for their actions. The police response to politically motivated violence may be uneven but I consider that because there is a measure of police action, this further limits the chance that the applicants would face serious harm because of the applicant husband’s activities in support of the UNP. Nor do I consider that the police would for this reason fail to act on reports of crimes such as the home invasion and robbery which occurred in September 1996.
It is clear from the lengthy extracts of the RRT’s decision quoted above that the RRT did not fail to address the applicants’ claim regarding the September 1996 home invasion. The incident is described and discussed elsewhere in the RRT’s decision as well.[9]
[9] See Court Book page 92
The RRT accepted that the incident occurred, but had doubts regarding certain of its details.
The RRT did not accept that the incident was motivated by the applicant husband’s involvement in politics, notwithstanding the words daubed on the walls of the house. Mr Mosley submitted, and I agree, that that was a finding of fact for the RRT.
In my opinion, this ground simply invites the Court to enter into merits review.
In any event, the RRT concluded that, even if the home invasion was motivated (or partly motivated) by the applicant husband’s involvement in politics, it was a single incident preceded and followed by nothing similar.[10] In my opinion, there is nothing in the RRT’s consideration of this subject that would warrant interference with its decision. I agree with Mr Mosley’s submission to the effect that it is patently clear that the RRT did not fail to address the home invasion.
[10] See Court Book page 99
Further, and to paraphrase Mansfield J in Applicant 168/2003 v MIMIA (2004) FCA 250[11], the political nature of the slogans daubed on the applicants’ walls in September 1996 is a form or piece of evidence. It is not, in itself, a relevant consideration. It is a piece of evidence going to a relevant consideration. That is, it is a piece of evidence going to a component integer of the applicants’ claim. The RRT considered the applicants’ claims and rejected them. In doing so, it had regard to the piece of evidence.
[11] at paragraph 21
As his Honour said in Applicant 168/2003 v MIMIA[12]:
The piece of evidence itself was not a relevant consideration in the sense of being a consideration which the Act requires the Tribunal to have addressed. What the Act requires the Tribunal to have addressed is each integer of the applicants’ claims.
[12] (2004) FCA 250 at paragraph 21
Put another way:
Yusuf[13] does not stand for the proposition that a relevant consideration has not been taken into account and the decision-maker thereby has failed to embark on or complete his or her jurisdictional task merely because some piece of evidence which the court thinks is relevant in the evidential or probative sense can be seen not to have been weighed or discussed. “Relevant” for this purpose means that the decision-maker is bound by the statute or by law to take this into account… In Yusuf, McHugh, Gummo and Haine JJ (with whom Gleeson CJ agreed) said this…:
What is important, however, is that the grounds of judicial review that fasten upon the use made of relevant and irrelevant considerations are concerned essentially with whether the decision-maker has properly applied the law. They are not grounds that are centrally concerned with the process of making the particular findings of fact upon which the decision-maker acts.[14]
[13] MIMIA v Yusuf (2001) 180 ALR 1
[14] See Rezaei v MIMIA (2001) FCA 1294 at paragraph 57
As to the Applicants’ Grounds Generally
In considering whether the RRT made a jurisdictional error, reference should be made to the decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court in WAEE v MIMIA (2003) FCA 184, where their Honours said (at paragraphs 45 to 47):
45 In conducting its review the Tribunal must have regard to the criteria for the grant of a protection visa and in particular the criterion that the applicant for a visa is:
... a non-citizen in Australia to whom the [Tribunal] is satisfied Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol;' (s 36(2)(a) read with s 415(1))
The critical question which ordinarily will have to be addressed in applying this criterion is whether the applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution for one of the Convention reasons. If the Tribunal fails to consider a contention that the applicant fears persecution for a particular reason which, if accepted, would justify concluding that the applicant has satisfied the relevant criterion, and if that contention is supported by probative material, the Tribunal will have failed in the discharge of its duty, imposed by s 414, to conduct a review of the decision. This is a matter of substance, not a matter of the form of the Tribunal's published reasons for decision.
46 It is plainly not necessary for the Tribunal to refer to every piece of evidence and every contention made by an applicant in its written reasons. It may be that some evidence is irrelevant to the criteria and some contentions misconceived. Moreover, there is a distinction between the Tribunal failing to advert to evidence which, if accepted, might have led it to make a different finding of fact (cf Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323 at [87]-[97]) and a failure by the Tribunal to address a contention which, if accepted, might establish that the applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason. The Tribunal is not a court. It is an administrative body operating in an environment which requires the expeditious determination of a high volume of applications. Each of the applications it decides is, of course, of great importance. Some of its decisions may literally be life and death decisions for the applicant. Nevertheless, it is an administrative body and not a court and its reasons are not to be scrutinised `with an eye keenly attuned to error'. Nor is it necessarily required to provide reasons of the kind that might be expected of a court of law.
47 The inference that the Tribunal has failed to consider an issue may be drawn from its failure to expressly deal with that issue in its reasons. But that is an inference not too readily to be drawn where the reasons are otherwise comprehensive and the issue has at least been identified at some point. It may be that it is unnecessary to make a finding on a particular matter because it is subsumed in findings of greater generality or because there is a factual premise upon which a contention rests which has been rejected. Where however there is an issue raised by the evidence advanced on behalf of an applicant and contentions made by the applicant and that issue, if resolved one way, would be dispositive of the Tribunal's review of the delegate's decision, a failure to deal with it in the published reasons may raise a strong inference that it has been overlooked.
I have read the RRT’s decision carefully. It has not failed to address any contention, which, if accepted, might establish that the applicant husband had a well founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason. The issues raised by Counsel for the applicants have clearly been identified by the RRT in the course of its comprehensive decision. The RRT has dealt with the issues, and dealt with them appropriately.
For the preceding reasons, the grounds for review must fail and the application must be dismissed with costs, which I fix in the sum of $4,500.00.
I certify that the preceding thirty eight (38) paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Walters FM
Associate:
Date: 21 May 2004
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