M v B - [2004] QDC 432

No judgment structure available for this case.

REVISED COPIES ISSUED
REVISED COPIES ISSUED
State Reporting Bureau
State Reporting Bureau

Date: 2 November, 2004 Date: 12 August, 2004

DISTRICT COURT

[2004] QDC 432

CIVIL JURISDICTION
JUDGE ROBIN QC
No BD899 of 2004

M Applicant
and
B Respondent
BRISBANE
..DATE 03/08/2004
JUDGMENT
CATCHWORDS: CRIMINAL LAW - COMPENSATION - SEXUAL OFFENCES - where respondent convicted of 3 counts unlawful carnal knowledge - where applicant aged 14 & 15 when offences occurred - where respondent was 6 yrs older - where applicant now suffers post traumatic stress disorder - no appearance by respondent to take advantage of time limitations applying pursuant to s663B Criminal Code - wh disorder caused by respondent's criminal conduct - wh applicant's conduct contributed to offences.

WARNING: The publication of information or details likely to lead to the identification of persons in some proceedings is a criminal offence. This is so particularly in relation to the identification of children who are involved in criminal proceedings or proceedings for their protection under the Child Protection Act 1999, and complainants in criminal sexual offences, but is not limited to those categories. You may wish to seek legal advice before giving others access to the details of any person named in these proceedings.

03082004 D.1 T1/CML (Robin, DCJ)

HIS HONOUR: This is an application for criminal compensation 1

under section 663B of the Criminal Code, by a lady who is now 28, based on the conviction of the respondent on his own plea on three counts of unlawful carnal knowledge of her. Those
happened when she was 14 and 15.

10

The dates of the offences begin with 31 July 1990, referable to an occasion in the applicant's family home when intercourse happened in her older sister's bedroom. The older sister was, in fact, the former partner of the offender. Perhaps

20

"partner" puts it too high; "former girlfriend" may be a more
accurate description.
The second count happened on 11 September 1990 in the offender's motor vehicle after he had collected the applicant

30

from a school dance. Intercourse happened in the vehicle at Mt Coot-tha. She found the event even more exciting because he was apprehended by police for speeding on the way home.

The third occasion was on 2 September 1991. It happened after the protagonists had met in a shop and he had advised her that he had moved to a new flat in Ipswich and invited her to go

40
and see him there. She went there by train after keeping some
appointment in Brisbane and sexual intercourse happened for
the last time then.
50

The offender's age was about 6 years greater than the applicant's. Notwithstanding the breakdown of the relationship with the older sister, he remained on very good 03082004 D.1 T1/CML (Robin, DCJ)

2

JUDGMENT

60

terms with the family, and was welcome in the home. He seems 1
to have been mates with the applicant's brother. The
applicant was, it seems, infatuated with him, particularly,
when he became available on the cessation of the relationship
with her older sister.

10

The first sexual contact she talks about happened on an occasion after a visit to the movies when kissing occurred and the applicant indicated she didn't want things to go any further than that, that the two of them should "just be friends".

20

On the occasion on 31 July 1990, the applicant, her brother and the offender were watching TV. The applicant's brother went to bed, then the applicant - in her own bedroom; the
30
offender entered that room and invited her out to watch more
television, which happened for a short time. He then took her
into the sister's presumably vacant bedroom where sexual
intercourse took place. Although it is said that the
applicant was naive, she plainly understood the nature of what
40
was happening and agreed to it.

The Court has been denied access to the applicant's diary, to which she confided details of the incidents. Indeed, it was her mother's discovery of the diary which led to the prosecution of the respondent. That's not something the applicant wished to bring about.

50
It is intriguing that the psychiatrist, Dr Barbara McGuire,

3 JUDGMENT 60

03082004 D.1 T1/CML (Robin, DCJ)

who saw the applicant for an hour on 19 December last year, 1
notes in her report that after the time of the first count the
respondent, "used to sneak into her bedroom window and have
sexual relations with her whilst her family didn't know. She
thought that they were together and that they were going to

10

get married. Then he told her that he had a girlfriend and
after that the relationship died down." It flared again on 2
September 1991.

While the applicant is now revealing, it seems, a whole series of "uncharged acts", she now has no memory of the final act of intimacy in the respondent's flat. There's no reason to doubt that it happened. Her statement to police describes the event and the offender, of course, pleaded guilty in respect of it.

20
30

charge of maintaining a relationship of a sexual nature in
respect of which the Prosecutor entered a nolle prosequi and
the respondent was discharged. In my view he can be held
responsible in this application only for those things and the
consequences of those things for which he was convicted.

The indictment on which he pleaded contained, as Count 1, a difficult for the Court to accept that all of the unsatisfactory features of the applicant's life, which she attributes to the offending, and I would add with the backing of Dr McGuire, can really be linked to it.

40
50
In another application, which has some similarities to the

4 JUDGMENT 60

03082004 D.1 T1/CML (Robin, DCJ)

present, W v. P, 1887 of 2001, 25 May 2001, I noted the 1

comment of Thomas JA that "It would be unrealistic to
attribute all of her life's problems to this one incident,
although it has no doubt played a major part in the problem of
which she now complains" - a comment made in S v. K, SC 5144
of 2000, 12 July 2000, [2000] QSC 270. 10

The applicant apparently had a succession of relationships after the incidents involving the respondent, involving, it is said, a dozen men. None of those relationships seems to have
20
been satisfactory. She has two children now.
She attributes the disruption of her education and her failure
to achieve her ambition of becoming a lawyer to the
respondent's conduct. Likewise, as I understand it, her
30
problems which may have extended to addiction with alcohol,
marijuana and amphetamines, and her obtaining employment as a
stripper to make money to finance her habits.

The breakdown of the applicant's parents' marriage is attributed by her to her parents' different reactions to discovery of the contents of the diary and what followed. She blames the offending for the difficulties she feels in relationships with her children, especially her son. She is determined to bring this compensation application, according to Dr McGuire, "Because she wants not to be seen as the perpetrator", and, according to herself, to achieve "closure".

40
50
There is no basis, given that the applicant's material is

5 JUDGMENT 60

03082004 D.1 T1/CML (Robin, DCJ)

unchallenged, for doubting the genuineness of the applicant's 1

complaints. It is difficult, however, to fall in with the judgment that the respondent is the author of all of them.

The applicant says, and the Court must accept, she was a virgin at the time of the first offence. While inexperienced sexually she was not, it seems to me, "naive", and I respectfully question Dr McGuire's ability after one short

10
interview which plainly didn't go into the dramatic
intervening incidents of the applicant's subsequent life in
20
any detail, to express with confidence some of her
conclusions, which seem to me to represent acceptance of the
applicant's own analysis; to this I suppose Dr McGuire had
little alternative.
30
Authorities which happen to come from the Supreme Court
reveal what I think is the approach the community would expect
and that the Courts ought to take.
In T v. H, Application 6139 of 1996, 9 August 1996, while
40
awarding compensation under the presently relevant provisions
for other matters, Williams J, as his Honour then was, said:
"The material discloses that the applicant, though aged 15 at
the time, was sexually experienced and willingly participated
in the acts of intercourse giving rise to the unlawful carnal
50
knowledge charges. Having regard to section 663B(2), which
obliges the Court to bring into account any conduct of the

applicant contributing to the offence and consequent injury,
no basis is made out for any claim for compensation with
03082004 D.1 T1/CML (Robin, DCJ) 6 JUDGMENT 60

respect to the unlawful carnal knowledge offences. Indeed 1
there is nothing in material or psychological reports which
suggests the applicant has sustained any injury in consequence
of the acts of intercourse constituting those offences."
Plainly, the applicant here does not face the difficulty

10

described in the last sentence of that quotation which, as I
read it, assigns an independent basis for the refusal of a
compensation order. The repetition of offences of unlawful
carnal knowledge on different occasions in different locations
tends to confirm the complainant's willing participation.

20

It is certainly not the case that consent to sexual activity by an under-age applicant precludes success of the application. (See, for example, Duff v Holmes (1995) 12 SR(WA) 319, which involved an age disparity similar to that encountered here, and an offender who pleaded guilty to having carnal knowledge of the applicant against the order of nature.)

30

Decisions in our Supreme Court in which compensation orders were made based on unlawful carnal knowledge include S v. K,

40

which depended on the Criminal Offence Victims Act ("COVA") and the associated Criminal Offence Victims Regulation, and KAB v. DJB, [2000] QSC 498, SC 8509 of 2000, in which the
bulk of the award was made under the Code provisions, part
50
also being attributed to the COVA. The circumstances in both
those matters were considerably different from those of the
usual sexual adventure involving an under-age complainant.

7 JUDGMENT 60

03082004 D.1 T3/SDH (Robin DCJ)

In S v. K, advantage was taken of her by the 22 year old 1
husband of her pregnant cousin; he took advantage of her
after effectively disabling her by provision of alcohol and
marijuana, which made her quite sick.

10

KAB was an even more repellent scenario in which the offender was the stepfather of the applicant, who engaged in increasingly serious sexual activity with her over about nine years until she reached the "age of consent".

20

The feature of it which seems to me applicable is that a clutch of UCK offences - I think there were six - which must have occurred over about three years, were treated by Atkinson J as a single course of conduct, so that together they could attract a no greater level of compensation, there being no physical injury, than the $20,000 relevantly applicable for mental or nervous shock. Another $20,000 was available for other kinds of offending, which the Judge regarded as constituting a separate course of conduct.

30
40

In present circumstances, my view would be that the three relevant incidents should be regarded as a single course of conduct, notwithstanding the break of the better part of a year between the second and the third. It would seem to me anomalous that the effect of such a break would be to place this applicant in a more favourable situation than KAB, for example.

50
I have found this a difficult decision to make and have been

8 JUDGMENT 60

03082004 D.1 T3/SDH (Robin DCJ)

reflecting on it not only overnight, when I had access to all 1

the material, and Mr Stevenson's extremely helpful written
submissions, but for some months since it came to my knowledge
that this application would be brought. It has to be accepted
on the state of the evidence that Dr McGuire is correct and
that, at this stage, a dozen or more years after the offences,
in the course of which the applicant has undergone momentous
life experiences with effects both from and upon the
experiences of her wider family, she "is suffering 10
post-traumatic stress disorder to a severe degree". Dr
20

McGuire goes on: "This has been present since the age of 15 and continues and is characterised by nightmares, flashbacks, avoidance of cues, reminding her of the incident and some dissociation (et cetera)."
30

What I find difficult to accept, because I am not persuaded that Dr McGuire had the opportunity to go into the matter, is that "there do not appear to be any contributing factors (otherwise) which have had an effect on her symptoms."
40

The present circumstances are affecting and sad, but I am not able to avoid the conclusion which Williams J reached in the matter before him, that there was conduct by the applicant considerably contributing to the offence, which means the application ought to fail. I am conscious that his Honour was
50

dealing with an applicant who already had sexual experience,
which does not appear to be the case here. (Under the COVA a
similar issue may arise under s 19(2)(a) as to whether the
complainant child could be party to an offence of unlawful
03082004 D.1 T3/SDH (Robin DCJ) 9 JUDGMENT 60

carnal knowledge committed upon her. I note the doubt 1
expressed by the authors of Carter's Criminal Code of
Queensland as to the application to the Criminal Code of
Tyrrell (1894) 1 QB 710 and Whitehouse (1977) QB 868: See
215.20).

10

I think it is appropriate to note some other features of this application. It is plainly statute-barred, not having been filed until the 10th of March 2004. Chong [2001] 2 Queensland Reports 301 establishes that there is a six year limitation period from the date of the conviction of the offender. That date was the 12th of November 1992. However, the applicant was a minor until 24th of March 1994 and the limitation period did not start running against her until then. It expired in March 2000. It is established that, under the somewhat different regime of the COVA, the Court is obliged to apply the limitation provision it contains, whether or not a

20
30
respondent relies upon it, and refuse an application which
comes too late. See Jacob v. Roberts [2002] QCA 87 and Watson
v. Poynter [2002] QSC 283, which I noted in Francis v.
40

McGlone, Southport 514/2002, 6-8 July, 2004. That is not the situation under the Code provisions, as Chong establishes. Indeed, in the circumstances of it, no-one was going to take the point because Mr Chong was long dead. The Court of Appeal expressed the view that the Government authorities responsible
50

for determining whether or not to make an ex gratia payment
may have regard to whether or not the applicant was out of
time. Experience seems to be that those authorities, for
whatever reason, rarely, if ever, go behind the Court order.
03082004 D.1 T3/SDH (Robin DCJ) 10 JUDGMENT 60

1

The respondent has not appeared today. Mr Stevenson has been careful to go what I think is probably an appropriate distance to look after his situation. This matter was originally set down for a day when I was scheduled to be - and in the end was

10

- out of Brisbane on circuit, the 20th of July. When it became necessary to change the date of the hearing until today, Mr Stevenson ensured that the respondent, who had been
served with the material advising the earlier hearing date,
was informed of the change.

20

It was also recommended to the respondent that he seek legal
advice and, if he had the wit to appreciate it, which I would
think he did not, he would have understood that all that was
required of him to defeat the application was to communicate
to the Court a desire to take the limitation point. The
applicant, in her affidavit, in paragraph 9, expressly states
that, "I understand that my application is out of time",
later going on to explain this situation arose because she was
ignorant of certain matters. 30
40
The respondent's non-appearance today when called is what
happens in respect of 99 per cent or more of respondents
in applications of this kind. It is idle to speculate why he
has not turned up. One of the unsatisfactory aspects of the
50
originating application procedure, which is required to be
followed, is that the applicant has no need to advise the
respondent of the likely amount of any money order that might
be made. Many respondents who have the means to pay something

11 JUDGMENT 60

03082004 D.1 T3/SDH (Robin DCJ)

themselves might be galvanised into action, if they knew, as 1

$40,000. I would speculate that the respondent may have
reacted somewhat cynically to the well-intentioned advice from

is the situation here, that there is a claim for as much as legal representation for himself. To a suspicious mind, that might look like lawyers attempting to make work for other lawyers. Nonetheless, the Court is faced with circumstances in which it is not open to it, given Chong, to take the limitation point on behalf of the respondent. The application has to be allowed to run, in marked contrast to what would be the position if it were made under the COVA.

10
20

If the application had been successful, Mr Stevenson is correct that, in another contrast with the COVA situation, the respondent might have been ordered to pay the costs.

30

Unfortunately, for the reasons I have given, the application is dismissed.
40

I would like to close by commending Mr Stevenson and his office for the way in which they worked it up and provided what I think was determined and excellent representation for the applicant.
50

-----

12 JUDGMENT 60

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Citations

M v B [2004] QDC 432

Most Recent Citation

RC v Glatzer [2005] QDC 17

Cases Citing This Decision

1

RC v Glatzer [2005] QDC 17

Cases Cited

3

Statutory Material Cited

0

Sanderson v Kajewski [2000] QSC 270

Jacob v Roberts [2002] QCA 87

Watson v Poynter [2002] QSC 283

HIS HONOUR: This is an application for criminal compensation	1
under section 663B of the Criminal Code, by a lady who is now 28, based on the conviction of the respondent on his own plea on three counts of unlawful carnal knowledge of her. Those
happened when she was 14 and 15.

The third occasion was on 2 September 1991. It happened after the protagonists had met in a shop and he had advised her that he had moved to a new flat in Ipswich and invited her to go	40
and see him there. She went there by train after keeping some appointment in Brisbane and sexual intercourse happened for the last time then.
50

terms with the family, and was welcome in the home. He seems	1
to have been mates with the applicant's brother. The applicant was, it seems, infatuated with him, particularly, when he became available on the cessation of the relationship with her older sister.

The first sexual contact she talks about happened on an occasion after a visit to the movies when kissing occurred and the applicant indicated she didn't want things to go any further than that, that the two of them should "just be friends".	20
On the occasion on 31 July 1990, the applicant, her brother and the offender were watching TV. The applicant's brother went to bed, then the applicant - in her own bedroom; the
30
offender entered that room and invited her out to watch more television, which happened for a short time. He then took her into the sister's presumably vacant bedroom where sexual intercourse took place. Although it is said that the applicant was naive, she plainly understood the nature of what
40
was happening and agreed to it.
The Court has been denied access to the applicant's diary, to which she confided details of the incidents. Indeed, it was her mother's discovery of the diary which led to the prosecution of the respondent. That's not something the applicant wished to bring about.	50
It is intriguing that the psychiatrist, Dr Barbara McGuire,

who saw the applicant for an hour on 19 December last year,	1
notes in her report that after the time of the first count the respondent, "used to sneak into her bedroom window and have sexual relations with her whilst her family didn't know. She thought that they were together and that they were going to

While the applicant is now revealing, it seems, a whole series of "uncharged acts", she now has no memory of the final act of intimacy in the respondent's flat. There's no reason to doubt that it happened. Her statement to police describes the event and the offender, of course, pleaded guilty in respect of it.	20
30
charge of maintaining a relationship of a sexual nature in respect of which the Prosecutor entered a nolle prosequi and the respondent was discharged. In my view he can be held responsible in this application only for those things and the consequences of those things for which he was convicted.
The indictment on which he pleaded contained, as Count 1, a difficult for the Court to accept that all of the unsatisfactory features of the applicant's life, which she attributes to the offending, and I would add with the backing of Dr McGuire, can really be linked to it.	40
50
In another application, which has some similarities to the

present, W v. P, 1887 of 2001, 25 May 2001, I noted the	1
comment of Thomas JA that "It would be unrealistic to attribute all of her life's problems to this one incident, although it has no doubt played a major part in the problem of which she now complains" - a comment made in S v. K, SC 5144 of 2000, 12 July 2000, [2000] QSC 270.	10
The applicant apparently had a succession of relationships after the incidents involving the respondent, involving, it is said, a dozen men. None of those relationships seems to have
20
been satisfactory. She has two children now.
She attributes the disruption of her education and her failure
to achieve her ambition of becoming a lawyer to the respondent's conduct. Likewise, as I understand it, her
30
problems which may have extended to addiction with alcohol, marijuana and amphetamines, and her obtaining employment as a stripper to make money to finance her habits.
The breakdown of the applicant's parents' marriage is attributed by her to her parents' different reactions to discovery of the contents of the diary and what followed. She blames the offending for the difficulties she feels in relationships with her children, especially her son. She is determined to bring this compensation application, according to Dr McGuire, "Because she wants not to be seen as the perpetrator", and, according to herself, to achieve "closure".	40
50
There is no basis, given that the applicant's material is

unchallenged, for doubting the genuineness of the applicant's	1
complaints. It is difficult, however, to fall in with the judgment that the respondent is the author of all of them.
The applicant says, and the Court must accept, she was a virgin at the time of the first offence. While inexperienced sexually she was not, it seems to me, "naive", and I respectfully question Dr McGuire's ability after one short	10
interview which plainly didn't go into the dramatic intervening incidents of the applicant's subsequent life in
20
any detail, to express with confidence some of her conclusions, which seem to me to represent acceptance of the applicant's own analysis; to this I suppose Dr McGuire had little alternative.
30
Authorities which happen to come from the Supreme Court reveal what I think is the approach the community would expect and that the Courts ought to take.
In T v. H, Application 6139 of 1996, 9 August 1996, while
40
awarding compensation under the presently relevant provisions for other matters, Williams J, as his Honour then was, said: "The material discloses that the applicant, though aged 15 at the time, was sexually experienced and willingly participated in the acts of intercourse giving rise to the unlawful carnal
50
knowledge charges. Having regard to section 663B(2), which obliges the Court to bring into account any conduct of the

respect to the unlawful carnal knowledge offences. Indeed	1
there is nothing in material or psychological reports which suggests the applicant has sustained any injury in consequence of the acts of intercourse constituting those offences." Plainly, the applicant here does not face the difficulty

It is certainly not the case that consent to sexual activity by an under-age applicant precludes success of the application. (See, for example, Duff v Holmes (1995) 12 SR(WA) 319, which involved an age disparity similar to that encountered here, and an offender who pleaded guilty to having carnal knowledge of the applicant against the order of nature.)	30
Decisions in our Supreme Court in which compensation orders were made based on unlawful carnal knowledge include S v. K,	40
which depended on the Criminal Offence Victims Act ("COVA") and the associated Criminal Offence Victims Regulation, and KAB v. DJB, [2000] QSC 498, SC 8509 of 2000, in which the
bulk of the award was made under the Code provisions, part
50
also being attributed to the COVA. The circumstances in both
those matters were considerably different from those of the
usual sexual adventure involving an under-age complainant.

In S v. K, advantage was taken of her by the 22 year old	1
husband of her pregnant cousin; he took advantage of her after effectively disabling her by provision of alcohol and marijuana, which made her quite sick.

The feature of it which seems to me applicable is that a clutch of UCK offences - I think there were six - which must have occurred over about three years, were treated by Atkinson J as a single course of conduct, so that together they could attract a no greater level of compensation, there being no physical injury, than the $20,000 relevantly applicable for mental or nervous shock. Another $20,000 was available for other kinds of offending, which the Judge regarded as constituting a separate course of conduct.	30
40
In present circumstances, my view would be that the three relevant incidents should be regarded as a single course of conduct, notwithstanding the break of the better part of a year between the second and the third. It would seem to me anomalous that the effect of such a break would be to place this applicant in a more favourable situation than KAB, for example.	50
I have found this a difficult decision to make and have been

reflecting on it not only overnight, when I had access to all	1
the material, and Mr Stevenson's extremely helpful written submissions, but for some months since it came to my knowledge that this application would be brought. It has to be accepted on the state of the evidence that Dr McGuire is correct and that, at this stage, a dozen or more years after the offences, in the course of which the applicant has undergone momentous life experiences with effects both from and upon the experiences of her wider family, she "is suffering	10
post-traumatic stress disorder to a severe degree". Dr
20
McGuire goes on: "This has been present since the age of 15 and continues and is characterised by nightmares, flashbacks, avoidance of cues, reminding her of the incident and some dissociation (et cetera)."
30
What I find difficult to accept, because I am not persuaded that Dr McGuire had the opportunity to go into the matter, is that "there do not appear to be any contributing factors (otherwise) which have had an effect on her symptoms."
40
The present circumstances are affecting and sad, but I am not able to avoid the conclusion which Williams J reached in the matter before him, that there was conduct by the applicant considerably contributing to the offence, which means the application ought to fail. I am conscious that his Honour was
50

carnal knowledge committed upon her. I note the doubt	1
expressed by the authors of Carter's Criminal Code of Queensland as to the application to the Criminal Code of Tyrrell (1894) 1 QB 710 and Whitehouse (1977) QB 868: See 215.20).

I think it is appropriate to note some other features of this application. It is plainly statute-barred, not having been filed until the 10th of March 2004. Chong [2001] 2 Queensland Reports 301 establishes that there is a six year limitation period from the date of the conviction of the offender. That date was the 12th of November 1992. However, the applicant was a minor until 24th of March 1994 and the limitation period did not start running against her until then. It expired in March 2000. It is established that, under the somewhat different regime of the COVA, the Court is obliged to apply the limitation provision it contains, whether or not a	20
30
respondent relies upon it, and refuse an application which comes too late. See Jacob v. Roberts [2002] QCA 87 and Watson v. Poynter [2002] QSC 283, which I noted in Francis v.
40
McGlone, Southport 514/2002, 6-8 July, 2004. That is not the situation under the Code provisions, as Chong establishes. Indeed, in the circumstances of it, no-one was going to take the point because Mr Chong was long dead. The Court of Appeal expressed the view that the Government authorities responsible
50

It was also recommended to the respondent that he seek legal advice and, if he had the wit to appreciate it, which I would think he did not, he would have understood that all that was required of him to defeat the application was to communicate to the Court a desire to take the limitation point. The applicant, in her affidavit, in paragraph 9, expressly states that, "I understand that my application is out of time", later going on to explain this situation arose because she was ignorant of certain matters.	30
40
The respondent's non-appearance today when called is what
happens in respect of 99 per cent or more of respondents
in applications of this kind. It is idle to speculate why he
has not turned up. One of the unsatisfactory aspects of the
50
originating application procedure, which is required to be
followed, is that the applicant has no need to advise the
respondent of the likely amount of any money order that might
be made. Many respondents who have the means to pay something

themselves might be galvanised into action, if they knew, as	1
$40,000. I would speculate that the respondent may have reacted somewhat cynically to the well-intentioned advice from
is the situation here, that there is a claim for as much as legal representation for himself. To a suspicious mind, that might look like lawyers attempting to make work for other lawyers. Nonetheless, the Court is faced with circumstances in which it is not open to it, given Chong, to take the limitation point on behalf of the respondent. The application has to be allowed to run, in marked contrast to what would be the position if it were made under the COVA.	10
20
If the application had been successful, Mr Stevenson is correct that, in another contrast with the COVA situation, the respondent might have been ordered to pay the costs.	30
Unfortunately, for the reasons I have given, the application is dismissed.
40
I would like to close by commending Mr Stevenson and his office for the way in which they worked it up and provided what I think was determined and excellent representation for the applicant.
50