M
[2008] WASAT 262 (S)
•7 NOVEMBER 2008
M [2008] WASAT 262 (S)
| STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL | Citation No: | [2008] WASAT 262 (S) | |
| GUARDIANSHIP AND ADMINISTRATION ACT 1990 (WA) | |||
| Case No: | GAA:1454/2008 | 23 MARCH 2009 | |
| Coram: | MS J TOOHEY (SENIOR MEMBER) MR J MANSVELD (MEMBER) MS H LESLIE (SENIOR SESSIONAL MEMBER) | 6/11/08 | |
| 2/04/09 | |||
| 15 | Judgment Part: | 1 of 1 | |
| Result: | Application dismissed | ||
| B | |||
| PDF Version |
| Parties: | G E |
Catchwords: | Application for administration Public Trustee appointed plenary administrator for mother Conflict between applicant and brother Application opposed by mother and brother Application for costs under s 87(2) State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) and s 16(4) Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 (WA) Factors to be considered in determining costs applications Whether rule that parties bear own costs should be set aside Whether applicant's costs should be paid out of his mother's estate Tribunal not satisfied orders should be made Application for costs dismissed |
Legislation: | Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 (WA), s 16(1), s 16(4), s 65, s 97(1)(b)(iii) State Administration Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 9, s 32, s 87, s 87(1), s 87(2), s 90 State Administrative Tribunal (Conferral of Jurisdiction) Amendment and Repeal Act 2004 (WA), s 427 |
Case References: | Chew and Director General of The Department of Education and Training [2006] WASAT 248 LC and JS [2007] WASAT 127 M [2008] WASAT 262 MO and JB [2008] WASAT 228 Re IO; Ex Parte VK [2008] WASAT 8 Summerville and Department of Education & Training [2006] WASAT 368 (S) Uniting Church Homes (Inc) and City of Stirling [2005] WASAT 341 |
Summary | G had lodged applications which led to the appointment of an administrator for his mother, M. G was legally represented throughout the proceedings as were M and G's brother, E, both of whom opposed the applications.,At the conclusion of the proceedings, G sought an order under s 87(2) of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) that E pay his legal costs. Further, or in the alternative, he sought an order under s 16(4) of the Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 (WA) that his costs be paid out of M's assets. ,The amount of costs sought was $105,426.88.,The Tribunal was not satisfied there was reason to depart from the rule in s 87(1) of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) that parties to proceedings before the Tribunal bear their own costs. In particular, it did not accept that the issues for determination concerning M were more complex than most matters in the guardianship and administration jurisdiction such that legal representation was necessary in order to bring and conduct the proceedings in a timely and coherent manner. The proceedings became unnecessarily adversarial and protracted mainly because of the brothers' business dealings and the conflict between them, rather than the complexity of their mother's financial affairs. ,The Tribunal was not satisfied that G's legal costs should be paid out of his mother's estate. It was questionable how much he had acted in her interests, as opposed to his own, in bringing the applications. The intensity of the conflict between the brothers was such that they refused to cooperate even where their mother's interests were adversely affected. In all the circumstances, while G was entitled to legal representation before the Tribunal, his mother should not be required to meet his costs. ,The Tribunal dismissed the application for costs. |
JURISDICTION : STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL STREAM : HUMAN RIGHTS ACT : GUARDIANSHIP AND ADMINISTRATION ACT 1990 (WA) CITATION : M [2008] WASAT 262 (S) MEMBER : MS J TOOHEY (SENIOR MEMBER)
- MR J MANSVELD (MEMBER)
MS H LESLIE (SENIOR SESSIONAL MEMBER)
DECISION : 2 APRIL 2009 FILE NO/S : GAA 1454 of 2008
- GAA 2082 of 2008
- Applicant
AND
E
Respondent
Catchwords:
Application for administration - Public Trustee appointed plenary administrator for mother - Conflict between applicant and brother - Application opposed by mother and brother - Application for costs under s 87(2) State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) and s 16(4) Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 (WA) - Factors to be considered in determining costs applications - Whether rule that parties bear own costs should be set aside - Whether applicant's costs should be paid
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out of his mother's estate - Tribunal not satisfied orders should be made - Application for costs dismissed
Legislation:
Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 (WA), s 16(1), s 16(4), s 65, s 97(1)(b)(iii)
State Administration Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 9, s 32, s 87, s 87(1), s 87(2), s 90
State Administrative Tribunal (Conferral of Jurisdiction) Amendment and Repeal Act 2004 (WA), s 427
Result:
Application dismissed
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
Applicant : Mr J Hammond
Respondent : Mr R Butcher
Solicitors:
Applicant : Hammond Worthington
Respondent : Butcher Paull & Calder
Case(s) referred to in decision(s):
Chew and Director General of The Department of Education and Training [2006] WASAT 248
LC and JS [2007] WASAT 127
M [2008] WASAT 262
MO and JB [2008] WASAT 228
Re IO; Ex Parte VK [2008] WASAT 8
Summerville and Department of Education & Training [2006] WASAT 368 (S)
Uniting Church Homes (Inc) and City of Stirling [2005] WASAT 341
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Summary of Tribunal's decision
1 G had lodged applications which led to the appointment of an administrator for his mother, M. G was legally represented throughout the proceedings as were M and G's brother, E, both of whom opposed the applications.
2 At the conclusion of the proceedings, G sought an order under s 87(2) of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) that E pay his legal costs. Further, or in the alternative, he sought an order under s 16(4) of the Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 (WA) that his costs be paid out of M's assets.
3 The amount of costs sought was $105,426.88.
4 The Tribunal was not satisfied there was reason to depart from the rule in s 87(1) of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) that parties to proceedings before the Tribunal bear their own costs. In particular, it did not accept that the issues for determination concerning M were more complex than most matters in the guardianship and administration jurisdiction such that legal representation was necessary in order to bring and conduct the proceedings in a timely and coherent manner. The proceedings became unnecessarily adversarial and protracted mainly because of the brothers' business dealings and the conflict between them, rather than the complexity of their mother's financial affairs.
5 The Tribunal was not satisfied that G's legal costs should be paid out of his mother's estate. It was questionable how much he had acted in her interests, as opposed to his own, in bringing the applications. The intensity of the conflict between the brothers was such that they refused to cooperate even where their mother's interests were adversely affected. In all the circumstances, while G was entitled to legal representation before the Tribunal, his mother should not be required to meet his costs.
6 The Tribunal dismissed the application for costs.
Orders sought
7 On 7 November 2008, the Tribunal appointed the Public Trustee plenary administrator for M in proceedings commenced by her son, G. M and her other son, E, opposed the applications.
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8 The Tribunal's written reasons were published as M [2008] WASAT 262.
9 G now seeks an order under s 87(2) of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) (SAT Act) that E pay his costs incurred in bringing the applications. Further, or in the alternative, he seeks an order pursuant to s 16(4) of the Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 (WA) (GA Act) that his costs be paid out of M's assets.
10 The amount of the costs is $105,426.88
Background
11 M is an elderly woman who speaks little English. Her husband died in 2004. More recently, her sons have become engaged in a bitter dispute over the management of her financial affairs.
12 On 16 June 2008, G lodged an application for orders:
(i) revoking enduring powers of attorney made by M in 2005 and 2007 by which she had appointed G and E her joint attorneys, and E her sole attorney, respectively;
(ii) declaring M incapable of managing her estate and appointing the Public Trustee her administrator;
(iii) requiring M to be assessed by a suitably qualified medical practitioner to determine whether she was 'in need of a power of attorney'; and
(iv) requiring E to pay G's costs of the application.
13 M and E opposed the applications. They maintained she was capable of managing her estate. Reports from M's general practitioner and a psychiatrist available at the time of the applications indicated that she was capable.
14 On 2 July 2008, the Tribunal referred the applications to the Public Advocate for investigation pursuant to s 97(1)(b)(iii) of the GA Act and asked the Public Advocate to provide a written report of her investigation.
15 At a directions hearing on 5 September 2008, the Tribunal made programming orders. It took the view that it could not require M to attend on a medical practitioner for assessment of her capacity and declined to make the
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- order sought in that regard.
16 The Tribunal also declined G's request that it make an emergency order pursuant to s 65 of the GA Act. Given that the only medical evidence before the Tribunal indicated that M was capable, and given her opposition to the orders sought, the Tribunal was not satisfied that it was appropriate to make an emergency order.
17 On 11 September 2008, G sought an injunction pursuant to s 90 of the SAT Act restraining E from dealing with M's estate and restraining any purported dealings by her. On 22 September 2008, Deputy President Judge Eckert refused the application, noting E's undertaking not to act on his power as attorney without G's consent pending final determination of the proceedings.
18 On 6 October 2008, the Tribunal ordered parties to provide information about M's estate to the Tribunal, the Public Advocate and each other.
19 A further directions hearing was held on 14 October 2008 and further programming orders made. G's solicitors requested five days be set aside for his witnesses alone. The Tribunal considered the matter could be dealt with in three days and listed it for hearing on 28, 29 and 30 October 2008.
20 Prior to the final hearing, M attended on and was assessed by another psychiatrist and a geriatrician. Both provided reports to the Tribunal indicating that she lacked the requisite capacity.
21 The Tribunal delivered its decision and reasons on 7 November 2008. It found that M was unable, by reason of mental disability, to make reasonable judgments about her estate and that she needed someone with lawful authority to act on her behalf.
22 The Tribunal was not satisfied it was in M's best interests for E to manage her estate pursuant to the more recent EPA. In many respects, their property and interests overlapped; M had transferred substantial assets to E in circumstances in which her understanding of the transactions was questionable, and she had executed a new will under which E was the sole beneficiary. E maintained that he was not acting pursuant to his power as attorney in these transactions which reflected M's wishes and were necessary to protect her property from dealings by G. However, the Tribunal was not satisfied that he appreciated sufficiently the obligations of an attorney or that it was in M's best
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- interests that he manage her estate pursuant to the EPA or as her administrator.
23 The Tribunal accepted that M wanted her affairs managed by one or both of her sons, and not by someone outside the family. However, G did not propose himself as administrator and, even if E had been otherwise suitable to act pursuant to the EPA or as administrator, the intense conflict would make that arrangement unworkable.
24 The Tribunal appointed the Public Trustee plenary administrator for M for two years in the hope that G and E might resolve their conflict in that time and that M's wish that her affairs be managed within the family could be given effect.
25 G was represented throughout the proceedings by Hammond Worthington Lawyers. At the start of the proceedings, Cooper Legal appeared for M and E. Cooper Legal then ceased to act for E and he was represented by Butcher, Paull and Calder.
Legislation
26 Section 87 of the SAT Act relevantly provides:
(1) Unless otherwise specified in this Act, the enabling Act, or an order of the Tribunal under this section, parties bear their own costs in a proceeding of the Tribunal.
…
(3) The power of the Tribunal to make an order for the payment by a party of the costs of another party includes the power to make an order for the payment of an amount to compensate the other party for any expenses, loss, inconvenience, or embarrassment resulting from the proceeding or the matter because of which the proceeding was brought.
27 The same principle applied under the GA Act prior to the commencement of the Tribunal in January 2005. Section 16(1) of the GA Act provided that parties to proceedings bear their own costs. Section 16(1) was repealed by s 427 of the State Administrative Tribunal (Conferral of Jurisdiction) Amendment and Repeal Act 2004 (WA) when the Tribunal commenced.
28 By s 16(4) of the GA Act, the Tribunal may order that a party's costs be paid by, or out of the assets of, the person whom the proceedings concern:
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- The State Administrative Tribunal may, if it is satisfied that a party to proceedings commenced under this Act has acted in the best interests of the represented person or a person in respect of whom an application is made, order that such costs relative to those proceedings as the State Administrative Tribunal thinks fit be paid to that party by, or out of the assets of, that person.
G's submissions in support of orders for costs
29 G says that he required legal representation to do the following:
(i) provide advice as to legal remedies available under the SAT Act and the GA Act;
(ii) prepare, file and serve the applications and extensive supporting evidence;
(iii) prepare, execute and serve six detailed witness statements with exhibits;
(iv) engage and instruct two suitably qualified medical practitioners to assess M's capacity to administer all or part of her estate;
(v) review, collate and prepare all relevant documentation requested by the Tribunal, particularly relating to M's estate, including reviewing 'significantly voluminous documents dating back a number of years';
(vi) prepare, file and serve a responsive statement of the estate of M;
(vii) liaise with legal representatives of E and M and respond to their requests and queries; and
(viii) prepare for, and appear at, various hearings before the Tribunal including directions hearings, an injunction hearing, and a threeday final hearing.
30 G says the nature and complexity of the applications meant they were conducted by the Tribunal in a manner more formal than contemplated by the SAT Act, and usual for GA Act proceedings, and that this should be taken into account in considering the application for costs.
31 G submits that the applications involved serious allegations relating to E's involvement in the management of M's estate, in particular:
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- (i) the transfer of 50% of M's interest in her primary residence and her share in the family company to E for nil consideration;
(ii) the obtaining of a loan, secured over M's primary residence, for the sum of $2 million, arranged by E and for which M and E were jointly liable;
(iii) the removal by E of valuable jewellery from M's home; and
(iv) the recent execution of a new will by M whereby her entire estate was left to E in circumstances in which G alleged she did not have the requisite capacity to execute such a document.
32 G submits that the history of dealings involving M's estate was detailed and complex and that questionable actions dating back to her husband's death in early 2004 needed to be examined in detail. He submits that the 'contentious and unique factual matrix' involved made it necessary for him to engage legal representation. Further, that in the face of legal representation for E and M, and that he would have suffered severe prejudice without representation as well.
33 Citing the principles set out in Re IO; Ex Parte VK [2008] WASAT 8 at [29], G submits that it is unlikely that an application would have been made to the Tribunal had he not sought legal advice; he was largely unaware of the remedies available under the GA Act and required legal advice in this regard, and he had not previously been involved in proceedings before the Tribunal.
34 G submits that the conflict between him and E was of such magnitude that it is highly unlikely that the parties could have presented a coherent case in a reasonable and cooperative manner to the Tribunal without legal assistance and representation. Further, that the nature of the conflict meant he had limited access to information required for the proceedings and, accordingly, without communications between the respective parties' solicitors, matters concerning M's estate would not have been identified clearly for the Tribunal in a coherent and timely manner.
35 G says he acted in M's best interests in bringing the applications and that it is highly unlikely that another family member would have made a similar application in order to protect M. He says the Tribunal's decision to appoint an administrator bears this out.
(Page 9)
36 G maintains that E's conduct and opposition to the applications prolonged the proceedings, made them more complex and incurred unnecessary costs. In particular, he says:
(i) E refused to allow M to be independently assessed by a suitably qualified medical practitioner despite numerous requests;
(ii) E instructed two firms of solicitors to appear and oppose the applications, resulting in further evidence being required from all parties and significantly increasing the complexity of the hearing;
(iii) E maintained his opposition to the applications in the face of strong and reputable medical evidence, resulting in one and a half days of unnecessary, timeconsuming and costly hearing time;
(iv) E refused to provide information about M's estate, including information relating to her assets, adding unnecessary time and costs.
E's submissions opposing the application for costs
37 E submits that the fact that G was largely unaware of remedies available under the GA Act and required legal advice in this regard makes him no different from most applicants in this jurisdiction, and nor should it be a factor that G had not been involved in Tribunal proceedings previously. E submits that most applicants are in the same position and the Tribunal was established with self-represented parties in mind and is required to facilitate access by parties without the need for lawyers.
38 E says an unrepresented person could have raised evidence about the transactions in question in a timely manner, leaving it to the Tribunal's inquisitorial processes to determine the matter in M's best interests; it was not necessary for the parties to engage legal representation. Further, that the allegations concerning M's estate were not so serious, or the matter so complex, that legal representation was required; the case could have been prepared, if necessary, without the aid of legal representatives. He says that, while the facts required consideration, they were not beyond G's personal knowledge. Moreover, the applications did not involve any complex questions of law or legal principle.
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39 E says the fact that M's capacity to manage her affairs was disputed does not make this case unique; similar issues arise commonly in guardianship and administration proceedings especially where the proposed represented person has moderate to significant assets.
40 E does not dispute that there is intense conflict between himself and G but says it does not necessarily follow that neither could present his case in a coherent and reasoned manner before the Tribunal without legal representation.
41 E denies that he acted unreasonably in opposing the applications. He says he had reasonable grounds for opposing them in order to ensure that M's interests and wishes were honoured. In particular, he says both he and M believed she was capable of managing her own affairs and that medical opinion at the time offered support for this. Further, that it was M's express wish that one or both of her sons manage her affairs or assist her to do so; if M was found to lack the requisite capacity, then the EPA by which she had appointed him her attorney was a preferred and less restrictive means of meeting her needs and in accordance with her wishes. Finally, the appointment of a third party as administrator was an undesirable result for what was essentially a family problem.
42 E denies that he refused to allow M to attend on a medical practitioner for an assessment or that he unnecessarily delayed the proceedings. He says it was her decision not to attend for an assessment and that, when an appointment was arranged by G, she attended without any hindrance by him. He denies removing valuables from M's property.
43 Finally, E submits that the amount of costs sought is manifestly excessive, particularly when compared with his own.
The Public Trustee's submissions
44 The Public Trustee attended the hearing of the costs application in his capacity as plenary administrator for M.
45 The Public Trustee submits that M's financial affairs are not particularly complex and says that, at the time of her husband's death in 2004, she was a joint owner with her husband of the family home and the sole beneficiary of his will under which she received the former family home, now an investment property. She had an interest in the family company but played no active role.
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46 The Public Trustee says that, even once E started dealing with M's estate, it was still relatively simple. Transactions such as the transfer of a half share in her property and her share in the family company to E contributed to the dispute between her sons and led ultimately to these proceedings but much of the apparent complexity of her estate was due to her sons' complicated business dealings and related legal proceedings. Matters were complicated in part by the discretionary trust established in 1977 of which G and E were the main beneficiaries. M took no active part in the trust and, in the Public Trustee's submission, it was an investment vehicle for G and E and became the subject of their dispute.
47 The Public Trustee submits that, in all the circumstances, the Tribunal should not order costs under either Act.
Reasons
48 For the following reasons the Tribunal is not satisfied that this is an appropriate case in which to order costs under either Act.
The application for costs under s 87(2) of the SAT Act
49 As s 87(1) of the SAT Act makes clear, the starting point in proceedings before the Tribunal is that parties bear their own costs. This is in keeping with the objectives of the Tribunal as set out in s 9 of the SAT Act and its practice and procedure generally as set out in s 32 of that Act.
50 The Tribunal has affirmed in a number of cases that it has a broad discretion to award costs in appropriate cases but will need good reason to depart from the rule in s 87(1): see, for example, Summerville and Department of Education & Training [2006] WASAT 368 (S) (Summerville)at [23].
51 The circumstances in which the Tribunal might make a costs order have been discussed in a number of cases: see, for example, Uniting Church Homes (Inc) and City of Stirling [2005] WASAT 341.
52 In Chew and Director General of The Department of Education and Training [2006] WASAT 248, the Tribunal observed at [85]:
We take the view that in proceedings under the [SAT] Act, the Tribunal should not generally make an award for costs unless a party has conducted itself in such a way as to unnecessarily prolong the hearing; has acted unreasonably or inappropriately in its conduct of the proceedings, has been capricious; or the proceedings in some other way constitute an abuse of
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- process. The Tribunal might also make an order as to costs where a matter has been brought vexatiously or for improper purposes.
53 This statement should not be read as an exhaustive statement of the circumstances in which costs might be ordered but it provides a useful guide: Summerville at [27]; also at [38] and [39].
54 The Tribunal is not persuaded that legal representation was required in this case in order to reach a decision in M's best interests. That is not to say that parties were not entitled to be represented but whether legal representation was necessary in order to present evidence in a timely and coherent manner as G claims, and whether costs should be ordered, are other matters.
55 The issues to be determined in respect of M were relatively straightforward but tended to become obscured by her sons' commercial interests. The Tribunal noted in its earlier written reasons at [58] that M's estate was not simple, or at least not so simple that she was able to manage it herself. However, we agree with the Public Trustee that her affairs were not in themselves particularly complex. In proceedings under the GA Act the Tribunal commonly deals with matters involving large and complex estates in which parties represent themselves; many are considerably more complex than here. In this case, if anything, the involvement of legal representatives itself tended to make the matter more adversarial and complex.
56 The proceedings did not raise any particular point of law or legal principle. In that respect they were no different from most other proceedings in which the Tribunal determines similar applications. Their apparent complexity and the voluminous material submitted to the Tribunal related as much as anything to the brothers' own business dealings and legal proceedings arising out of their conflict. Their refusal to cooperate with each other exacerbated matters.
57 It is true that the proceedings were more formal than most Tribunal proceedings, especially in the guardianship and administration jurisdiction, but that reflected the way in which G chose to prosecute the applications and the way that the conflict between the brothers played itself out.
58 We are not satisfied that E's opposition to the applications was such that an order under s 87(2) of the SAT Act is warranted. In particular, we do not accept that the evidence concerning M's capacity to manage her financial affairs was as straightforward as G claims. In the early stages of the proceedings, the only evidence before the Tribunal
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- indicated that M was capable of managing her own affairs.
59 As late as 27 October 2008, the Public Advocate reported to the Tribunal that she remained unclear as to whether M was able to make reasonable judgments in respect of her estate and the operation of the EPAs and whether she was in need of an administrator. Further, the solicitors for M told the Tribunal they were satisfied they could take instructions from her.
60 The question of M's capacity to manage her own affairs was a threshold issue in the application for the appointment of the Public Trustee as her administrator. It was also relevant to her capacity to execute the more recent EPA and to understand the transactions in which she had apparently been involved. Particularly given that the EPA might have operated as a less restrictive means of meeting any need for someone to act on her behalf, the Tribunal required clear evidence about her capacity.
61 We accept that, early in the proceedings, E refused to cooperate with G's request that M attend on a medical practitioner for assessment but we are not satisfied that his conduct was so obstructive as to prolong the proceedings or make them more complex. Two medical reports had indicated she was capable and M herself apparently resisted assessment. E's refusal to cooperate with G's request appears to have been just another symptom of the conflict in which he and G were equal participants.
62 Parties agreed that M would have wished for her affairs to be managed within the family if necessary. In those circumstances it was not unreasonable for E to oppose G's application for the appointment of the Public Trustee. We note that G did not propose he be appointed administrator even though an appointment within the family would have accorded with M's wishes.
63 Finally, merely because the Tribunal makes the orders sought by an applicant or determines a matter in a way that might be considered favourable to one or other party is not sufficient reason to order costs in their favour. That approach would undermine the 'own costs' regime specifically adopted by the SAT Act.
(Page 14)
The application for costs under s 16(4) of the GA Act
64 The Tribunal has a broad discretion under s 16(4) to award costs. The provision is wide in its terms with the sole qualification that a party must have acted in the best interests of the person whom proceedings concern. The intention appears to be to ensure that a party is not deterred by the prospect of incurring costs from making an application for a person in need of protection, and that a person who acts in another's best interests does not necessarily bear the costs of doing so.
65 In most cases, parties act in the best interests of the person whom the proceedings concern. If that were all that were required to satisfy s 16(4), orders would be made in most cases.
66 As the Tribunal observed in MO and JB [2008] WASAT 228 at [34] [35], s 16(4) must be read in light of s 87(1) of the SAT Act. Read this way, something more than merely acting in best interests will be required before the Tribunal will order a party's costs to be paid by, or out of the estate of, the person whom the proceedings concern. See also LC and JS [2007] WASAT 127 at [35] in which the Tribunal observed that s 16(4) should not operate independently of the cost regime in the SAT Act and the overriding principle that parties bear their own costs.
67 It is hard to resist the conclusion, from the way in which these proceedings were conducted, that M's interests were a sideshow to the main event which was her sons' business dealings and the conflict between them. In its written reasons at [60] [62] the Tribunal noted that they no longer communicated except through their solicitors and refused to communicate or negotiate even where their mother's interests were concerned. Their refusal to authorise a direct debit to enable payment of $1,600 owed by her on an investment loan had led directly to Supreme Court proceedings against her that had the potential to put her investment property at risk; either could have made the payment but both refused to.
68 It is by no means clear that G was in fact acting in M's best interests, as opposed to his own, in bringing the applications but, even allowing that he was, we do not consider it appropriate to award costs under s 16(4) of the GA Act. We see no reason why M should meet either party's costs of bringing an application that, with some cooperation, might have been managed without legal representation, very much simplified if not avoided altogether.
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Orders
1. The application for costs under s 87(1) of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) is dismissed.
2. The application for costs under s 16(4) of the Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 (WA) is dismissed.
I certify that this and the preceding [68] paragraphs comprise the reasons for decision of the State Administrative Tribunal.
___________________________________
MS J TOOHEY, SENIOR MEMBER
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