.~._
~
IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Hobart No H6 of 1993 B e t w e e n -
BARRY JAMES LYONS
Applicant
and
THE QUEEN
Respondent
Application for special leave
to appeal
DAWSON J
TOOHEY J
GAUDRON J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT MELBOURNE ON THURSDAY, 9 DECEMBER 1993, AT 10.38 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
| Lyons | 1 | 9/12/93 |
| MR T.J. ELLIS: | May it please the Court, I appear for the |
applicant. (instructed by Clarke & Gee)
| MR D.J. BUGG: | May it please the Court, I appear with my |
learned friend, MR J.N. PERKS, for the respondent.
(instructed by the Director of Public Prosecutions
(Tasmania))
| DAWSON J: | Mr Ellis. |
| MR ELLIS: Thank you, Your Honour. | Your Honours, the point |
sought to be raised in this application is that
there ought to be, if there is not already, a
universal and consistent rule that a sentencing
court, upon a plea of guilty, must give a discountin the sentence which it would have otherwise given
were it - - -
| GAUDRON J: | Your basic premise must surely be open to very |
serious question, that there ought to be such a
rule, a general rule. Surely, it all depends on
the circumstances.
MR ELLIS: That is one stream of authority but, in my
submission, it only and demonstrably leads to
capriciousness whereas the pragmatic view which
seems to have prevailed in South Australia and now Western Australia obviates many of those arguments
which are really insoluble such as is there true contrary, Your Honour but, in my submission, the
contrition; is there an answerable case and so on.benefits to be gained from the universality of such
a rule outweigh those.
GAUDRON J: There is certainly no necessity for such a rule.
There may be benefits; there may be not; they are
matters that are surely open to be determined in
the facts of a particular case.
| DAWSON J: And, really, it comes down to this, when an |
accused pleads guilty to manslaughter when he is in
danger of being convicted of murder, it is in hisown interests to do so and it hardly demonstrates
something which is particularly meritorious on his
part.
MR ELLIS: In the general administration of justice, it
would be in the interests for him to plead guilty
if he was guilty. It is also in the interests of
justice that he not chance his arm on the basis
that he might succeed or he might not but there is
no difference to him in terms of sentence if he
does.
| Lyons | 9/12/93 |
The Full Court in Victoria, although
proceeding under a statutory basis has, in Giakis
and Morton, expressly rejected as a circumstance
disentitling the discount in sentence for a plea of
guilty, the fact that the accused faced a
conviction for a more serious charge. Again, it is
a matter of pragmatism, perhaps, to an extentoverriding - - -
GAUDRON J: That is hardly a…
Continue reading Lyons v The Queen
Sign in free to access the full text
- AGLC
- Lyons v The Queen [1993] HCATrans 370
- Case
- [1993] HCATrans 370
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issue before the High Court was whether there should be a universal and consistent rule requiring sentencing courts to grant a discount on sentences when an offender pleads guilty. The applicant argued that such a rule would promote consistency and avoid capriciousness in sentencing, even if it meant overlooking the specific merits of individual cases, such as the strength of the prosecution's evidence or the genuineness of contrition.
The applicant contended that the pragmatic benefits of a universal rule, such as encouraging guilty pleas for the efficient administration of justice, outweighed the difficulties in assessing individual circumstances. The Court, however, questioned the premise of a universal rule, suggesting that the necessity and benefits of such a rule were matters to be determined on the facts of each case. The Court also noted that pleading guilty when facing a more serious charge, such as murder when charged with manslaughter, is often in the accused's own best interests and may not necessarily demonstrate exceptional merit. The applicant further argued that differing state policies on this issue led to fundamental differences in principle and inconsistent outcomes.
Orders
Orders of the court
Full text does not contain this section.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Full text does not contain this section.