Lynn v Moore Demo and Civil

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

IN CHAMBERS

CITATION:   LYNN -v- MOORE DEMO AND CIVIL [2025] WASC 113

CORAM:   HILL J

HEARD:   19 MARCH 2025

DELIVERED          :   19 MARCH 2025

PUBLISHED           :   9 APRIL 2025

FILE NO/S:   COR 10 of 2025

BETWEEN:   CONSUELLA JODIE LYNN

Plaintiff

AND

MOORE DEMO AND CIVIL as responsible entity of the AMBER AND SEAN LAMPRECHT THE SUNNY SKIES TRUST T/AS MOORE DEMO AND CIVIL

Defendant


Catchwords:

Practice and procedure - Discontinuance of proceedings - Whether any condition should be imposed on discontinuance - Costs following discontinuance of the proceedings by the plaintiff - Turns on own facts

Legislation:

Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA) s 37
Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA) O 23 r 2(3)

Result:

Application for leave to discontinue granted

Category:    B

Representation:

Counsel:

Plaintiff : In Person
Defendant : Mr N Siegwart

Solicitors:

Plaintiff : In Person
Defendant : Curae Law

Case(s) referred to in decision(s):

Clark v Richards [2003] WASC 5

Heartlink Ltd v Jones as liquidator of HL Diagnostics Pty Ltd (in liq) [2007] WASC 254

Kevin Ernest Judge As Liquidator of Citystyle Enterprises Pty Ltd v Trifield Corporation Pty Ltd [2011] WASC 122

O'Neill v Mann [2000] FCA 1680

Re Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs; Ex parte Lai Qin [1997] HCA 6; (1997) 186 CLR 622

HILL J:

(This judgment was delivered extemporaneously and has been edited from the transcript to include references, headings and to correct matters of grammar and expression.)

  1. On 22 January 2025, the plaintiff filed an originating process in this court, together with a minute of proposed orders, an affidavit in support of the originating process, and a certificate of urgency.

  2. The originating process stated that the application was made under s 482 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) and sought orders to set aside winding up orders made in relation to Ricon Super Pty Ltd (Company). The minute of proposed orders that was filed at the same time sought significantly wider relief, including the payment of various amounts by the defendant to the trustee of the Ricon Superannuation Fund (which amounts were described as both costs and damages), as well as amounts to the plaintiff personally.

  3. The defendant filed a notice of appearance on 31 January 2025.

  4. Since 4 February 2025, the plaintiff has filed various documents attempting to discontinue the proceedings.  On 20 February 2025, a chamber summons for leave to discontinue these proceedings was filed.  Shortly prior to this being filed, the defendant filed a minute of proposed orders, which sought to program a foreshadowed summary judgment application.

  5. In their written submissions filed ahead of the hearing, the defendant opposed leave being granted to discontinue the proceedings.  At the hearing, counsel for the defendant accepted it was appropriate for leave to be granted to discontinue the proceedings, but says that leave should only be granted on condition that the plaintiff undertake not to commence any further proceedings against the defendant, and that the plaintiff pay its costs…

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Details
Case
[2025] WASC 113
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Lynn v Moore Demo and Civil, the plaintiff, Lynn, sought to discontinue the proceedings against the defendant, Moore Demo and Civil, due to an inability to fund the proceedings. The matter was heard in the Supreme Court of Western Australia. The central legal issue before the court was whether any conditions should be imposed on the discontinuance of the proceedings by the plaintiff, and what costs should be awarded following the discontinuance.

The court considered the principles governing the exercise of discretion in relation to costs following a discontinuance. The court found that the underlying policy of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA) is that the discontinuing party should be liable for the costs of the other party, unless the court orders otherwise. The conduct of the parties and the reasons for the discontinuance were also relevant factors in the court's discretion. The court noted that the plaintiff's inability to fund the proceedings was not a recent development and did not amount to an acknowledgement of likely defeat. The court also considered whether there had been a supervening act that rendered the proceedings futile. Ultimately, the court found that there was nothing on the evidence before it that suggested the court should depart from the underlying principle that the plaintiff, as the discontinuing party, should be liable for the defendant's costs.

The court concluded that while the plaintiff should pay a portion of the defendant's costs of the application for leave to discontinue, it was not appropriate to impose any conditions on the discontinuance of the proceedings. The court did not consider it appropriate to order that the plaintiff be liable for the defendant's costs of the proceedings prior to the application for leave to discontinue, as the plaintiff had not previously been ordered to pay those costs. The court ordered that the plaintiff pay 50% of the defendant's costs of the application for leave to discontinue, and that the plaintiff bear its own costs of the proceedings prior to the application for leave to discontinue.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Where a proceeding or application has been discontinued, the legal principles that govern the exercise of the discretion as to the appropriate costs orders can be summarised as follows.(a)The underlying policy of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA) in relation to a discontinuance of an application is that the discontinuing party should be liable for the costs of the other party, unless the court orders otherwise.[3](b)The conduct of the parties and the reasons for the discontinuance can bear heavily on the exercise of the discretion.[4](c)In determining whether or not costs should be borne by the discontinuing party, the court does not engage on a trial of a hypothetical action between the parties.[5](d)Where the discontinuance 'can be said to be an acknowledgement by an applicant of likely defeat, or where no objective circumstance provides reason for the discontinuance, a costs order in favour of the other party will ordinarily be made'.[6](e)It is relevant, in considering what costs order should be made, to consider whether there has been a supervening act in the proceedings which has rendered the application futile.[7][3] Kevin Ernest Judge As Liquidator of Citystyle Enterprises Pty Ltd v Trifield Corporation Pty Ltd [2011] WASC 122 [22], [39] (Citystyle Enterprises).[4] Clark v Richards [2003] WASC 5 [27], [78].[5] Re Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs; Ex parte Lai Qin [1997] HCA 6; (1997) 186 CLR 622, 624.[6] O'Neill v Mann [2000] FCA 1680 [13].[7] Citystyle Enterprises [39]. The only evidence before the court as to the reason for the plaintiff's discontinuance of the proceedings is the plaintiff's inability to fund the proceedings. There is nothing to suggest that this was a matter that arose in the two weeks between the commencement of the proceedings, and the application for leave to discontinue the proceedings being filed. In fact, as noted in my exchange with the plaintiff, the evidence before the court is that it is the amount of costs that was in issue between the parties, not the proposal that the plaintiff be liable for any costs at all. In my view, there is nothing on the evidence before me that suggests the court should depart from the underlying principle that the plaintiff, as the discontinuing party, should be liable for the defendant's costs. There remains the question as to what the appropriate cost order in relation to the application for leave to discontinue is. In my view, while the plaintiff should pay a portion of the defendant's costs of the application for leave to discontinue on the basis that it was necessary for an application to be brought, which has rendered an appearance by the defendant necessary, at least part of the reason for the opposition or the submissions filed by the defendant was its request that the application for leave be subject to a condition. For the reasons that I have given, I do not consider that it is appropriate in the circumstances of this case for any such condition to be imposed.