Lyngstad v Cox
[2023] ACTSC 192
•21 July 2023
SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
Case Title: | Lyngstad v Cox |
Citation: | [2023] ACTSC 192 |
Hearing Date: | 6 July 2023 |
Decision Date: | 21 July 2023 |
Before: | McWilliam J |
Decision: | See [61] |
Catchwords: | APPEAL – APPEAL FROM MAGISTRATES COURT – Appeal against sentence – failure of sentencing magistrate to apply discount for guilty plea – appeal allowed – re-exercise of sentencing discretion – backdated sentence imposed |
Legislation Cited: | Bail Act 1992 (ACT) s 49 Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) s 26 Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) ss 7, 10, ,12 (1)(b), 33, 35, 35A, 36, 37, 63 Criminal Code 2002 (ACT) s 326 Magistrates Court Act 1930 (ACT) ss 207, 208, 216, 218 |
Cases Cited: | Cotter v Corvisy [2008] ACTSC 64; 1 ACTLR 299 Craig Farrell Ledson v Christopher Richard Taylor, Mark Patrick Robison and Luke James Brown [2010] ACTSC 42; 239 FLR 184 DD v Ilievski [2016] ACTSC 115 Gillard v The Queen [2016] ACTCA 50 Kentwell v The Queen [2014] HCA 37; 252 CLR 601 Kirby v Ali [2021] ACTSC 95; 358 FLR 288 KN v Frizzell [2020] ACTSC 217 Lee v R [2016] NSWCCA 146 Markarian v R [2005] HCA 25; (2006) 228 CLR 357 McLeod v The Queen [2018] ACTCA 59 Muldrock v The Queen [2011] HCA 39; 244 CLR 120 R v Foster [2021] ACTSC 229 R v Griggs [2006] ACTCA 3 R v McMahon [2014] ACTSC 280 R v Thomson; R v Houlton [2000] NSWCCA 309; 49 NSWLR 383 R v UG [2018] ACTCA 64; 14 ACTLR 70 SBT v Wright [2021] ACTSC 322; 17 ACTLR 137 Skeen v Bannerman [2012] ACTSC 40 Urlich v The Queen [2019] ACTCA 30; 14 ACTLR 267 Ursino v Read [2005] ACTSC 106 White v Brown [2003] NTSC 51; 13 NTLR 50 Wickey v The Queen [2012] ACTCA 38 |
Texts Cited: | Encyclopaedic Australian Legal Dictionary (Lexis Nexis) |
Parties: | Sarah Lyngstad (Appellant) Jessica Cox (Respondent) |
Representation: | Counsel E Chen ( Appellant) E Roff ( Respondent) |
| Solicitors Legal Aid ACT ( Appellant) ACT Director of Public Prosecutions ( Respondent) | |
File Number: | SCA 4 of 2022 |
Decision Under Appeal: | Court/Tribunal: ACT Magistrates Court Before: Special Magistrate Hunter Date of Decision: 17 February 2022 Case Title: The Police v Lyngstad Court File Number: AM 487 of 2016 |
McWILLIAM J:
1․The appellant, Ms Sarah Lyngstad, appeals from a sentence imposed in the Magistrates Court on 17 February 2022 for the following four offences:
(a)Common Assault, contrary to s 26 of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) (Crimes Act) (CC2020/9022): Convicted and sentenced to a 12-month good behaviour order with core conditions only.
(b)Obtain Property by Deception, contrary to s 326 of the Criminal Code 2002 (ACT) (Criminal Code) (CC2020/13820): Convicted and sentenced to a 12-month good behaviour order with core conditions only.
(c)Failure to Appear, contrary to s 49 of the Bail Act 1992 (ACT) (Bail Act) (CC2021/2071): Convicted and sentenced to a six-month good behaviour order with core conditions only.
(d)Failure to Appear, contrary to s 49 of the Bail Act (CC2022/1512): Convicted and sentenced to two months’ imprisonment to be served as full-time detention, commencing on 16 January 2022 and expiring on 15 March 2022.
2․The maximum penalty for common assault and failure to appear is 2 years’ imprisonment. The maximum penalty for obtain property by deception is 10 years’ imprisonment.
3․The appeal proceeding was commenced on 24 February 2022. It concerns only the fourth charge listed above (CC2022/1512). Pursuant to section 216(1)(a) of the Magistrates Court Act 1930 (ACT) (MC Act), the sentence in respect of that offence only has been stayed since that time.
4․The appellant has already served 40 days of her sentence and has been in custody for a further eight days on remand. She was granted bail, pending determination of the appeal, on 4 March 2022. The total sentence of imprisonment was 58 days. She therefore has 10 days left to serve for the second failure to appear offence that is the subject of challenge. It is in that context that the Court comes to consider this appeal.
Facts of the offending
5․The facts were agreed in the court below and may be briefly stated in relation to the circumstances of the offending conduct the subject of CC2022/1512. On 22 January 2021, the appellant failed to attend court in accordance with her bail undertaking when the matter was listed for a mention. That failure gave rise to the first offence of failing to appear (CC2021/2072) and a warrant was issued for the appellant’s arrest.
6․The appellant was arrested on 20 February 2021.
7․She was granted bail but then failed to attend court on 10 January 2022 when the matter was listed for sentence. That constitutes the second offence of failing to appear (CC2022/1512).
8․Again, a warrant was issued for her arrest, and she was arrested on 11 February 2022. The following day the appellant was charged with CC2022/1512 and refused bail. She pleaded guilty to that offence on 17 February 2022.
Jurisdiction
9․The appeal is brought under pt 3.10 of the MC Act, with the Supreme Court having the power to hear the appeals specified in div 3.10.2: s 207. An appeal against a sentence of imprisonment falls within several of the categories of appeal listed in s 208.
10․The orders the Supreme Court may make on such an appeal are set out in s 218 of the MC Act. Relevantly here, the Court may confirm, reverse or vary the sentence (s 218(1)(a)), or give the judgment or make the order that, in all the circumstances, it considers to be appropriate (s 218(1)(b)), which then has effect as if it were a decision of the Magistrates Court and may be enforced by the Magistrates Court accordingly: s 218(2).
Grounds of Appeal
11․The Further Amended Notice of Appeal was filed in Court, with leave, on 6 July 2023. The only offence that is the subject of appeal is CC2022/1512, which resulted in the 2-month term of imprisonment sentence.
12․There were three grounds of appeal:
(a)That the sentence imposed by the sentencing magistrate was manifestly excessive in all the circumstances (Ground 1);
(b)That the sentencing magistrate took into account extraneous or irrelevant matters in reaching her decision, namely the appellant’s uncharged instances of failing to appear in court when assessing the objective seriousness of the offence that was the subject of CC2022/1512 (Ground 2); and
(c)That the sentencing magistrate erred in not applying a discount to the sentence of CC2022/1512 for the appellant’s plea of guilty (Ground 3).
13․The Director (respondent) made a limited concession of error, in accepting there was a failure by the magistrate to comply with s 37 of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) (Sentencing Act). The wording of Ground 3 is broad enough to include the concession made by the respondent; at least that is how I propose to deal with that ground, adopting a similar approach to that taken in Lee v R [2016] NSWCCA 146 at [20]. Accordingly, that ground of complaint will be addressed first.
Ground 3 – was there a failure to apply a discount for the plea of guilty?
The applicable statutory framework
14․Under s 35 of the Sentencing Act, where an offender pleads guilty to an offence and the Court considers that there is a real likelihood that it will sentence the offender to imprisonment ( s 35(1)), there is a discretion for the Court to impose “a lesser penalty… than it would otherwise have imposed if the offender had not pleaded guilty to the offence”: s 35(3).
15․In deciding how to sentence the offender, if at all, for the offence, the Court must consider a number of factors or matters, set out in s 35(2) of the Sentencing Act:
(a)the fact that the offender pleaded guilty;
(b)when the offender pleaded guilty, or indicated an intention to plead guilty;
(c)whether the guilty plea was related to negotiations between the prosecution and defence about the charge to which the offender pleaded guilty;
(d)the seriousness of the offence;
(e)the effect of the offence on the victims of the offence, the victims' families and anyone else who may make a victim impact statement.
16․Under s 37 of the Sentencing Act, where a court imposes a lesser penalty for an offence under ss 35, 35A or 36 of the Sentencing Act, the court must state, “the penalty…it would have otherwise imposed”: s 37(2).
17․In helpful written submissions provided by the respondent to the appeal, the point was made that there is no particular form for the manner in which such a statement should be made. Examples for expressing the penalty that otherwise would have been imposed may be by stating an applicable discount, or an indication of the length of a sentence that would have been imposed absent the offender’s plea.
The reasons of the sentencing magistrate under challenge
18․Here, the sentencing magistrate referred to guilty pleas made in respect of the three other offences, but did not separately refer to the plea of guilty in relation to the second charge of failure to appear. For that offence, the appellant had pleaded guilty five days after she was charged. The utilitarian value of the plea was high. The sentencing magistrate did not refer to any particular discount, nor a length of sentence that would otherwise have been imposed if the offender had not pleaded guilty.
The nature of the error established
19․In R v Thomson; R v Houlton [2000] NSWCCA 309; 49 NSWLR 383, Spigelman CJ said at [52]:
The absence of any reference to actual consideration of the guilty plea in the course of the sentencing should, as a general rule, in the light of the obligation of sentencing judges to give reasons for their decision, lead to an inference that the plea was not given weight.
20․Both the appellant and the respondent agreed that the magistrate’s failure to expressly refer to the plea of guilty for the second offence of failing to appear was an error.
21․However, the parties were at odds as to how to characterise the error. The appellant argued the error was a failure to apply s 35 (and consider or apply any discount at all).
22․The respondent argued the failure to articulate the discount or lesser sentence that had been applied was contrary to s 37, but not necessarily indicative of a failure to apply s 35 at all. That was because in the context of reasons given in a busy Magistrates Court, “not much may be required to discharge the obligation” under s 35: Cotter v Corvisy [2008] ACTSC 64; 1 ACTLR 299 at [54].
23․In the present case, the sentencing magistrate did state at the end of her reasons and just before pronouncing orders: “I have taken into account her pleas of guilt and all of those other factors”. It may be that the reference to “those other factors” was a reference to the factors set out in s 35(2) of the Sentencing Act. Given the context in which those words were said, that is the most likely interpretation of those words.
24․Mr Chen, who appeared for the appellant, explained that the reason he was pressing for the Court to go further and find a failure to even consider and apply a discount for the plea at all was because the appellant was entitled to the maximum 25 percent discount. If that were applied to a sentence of two months, it would reduce the sentence of imprisonment to 1 month and 15 days, which his client has effectively already served.
25․However, if the error were only a failure to articulate a discount, and the two months were the end result of the sentencing magistrate’s application of a guilty plea, the Court may find that the error was capable of correction and ultimately decline to disturb the sentence. That concern arises from an acknowledgement by the High Court in Kentwell v The Queen [2014] HCA 37; 252 CLR 601 (Kentwell) at [42] that not all specific errors in a sentencing exercise will vitiate the sentencing discretion.
26․For the purposes of disposing of the appeal, it is not necessary to go any further than find that a specific error has been established because of at least a failure to comply with s 37 of the Sentencing Act. It has been held in R v UG [2018] ACTCA 64; 14 ACTLR 70 at [48]-[49] and in Urlich v The Queen [2019] ACTCA 30; 14 ACTLR 267 at [50] and [53], that non-compliance with s 37 is a “specific error of significance.” In each of those cases, the failure was in the context of a lesser sentence being imposed pursuant to s 35A of the Sentencing Act (which deals with assistance to authorities), but I agree with the respondent’s submission that the reasoning applies equally to a lesser penalty being imposed by reason of a guilty plea under s 35.
27․In any event, even if the bare fact of non-compliance with s 37 did not of itself invalidate the magistrate’s exercise of the sentencing discretion, the respondent properly accepts that the error in the present sentence was not one capable of correction. The failure to specify a discount at all means that the Court is unable to work out from the reasons what the intended “lesser penalty” was, or otherwise reverse engineer the result to calculate what the starting point of the sentencing magistrate’s sentence was.
28․Because the Court cannot discern from the reasoning what discount was applied in respect of the second failure to appear offence, the Court cannot discern whether the magistrate forgot to apply a discount (being the further error relied upon by the appellant), or if there was a discount applied, whether it was appropriate. The result is that the sentencing discretion has miscarried.
Grounds 1 and 2
29․In light of the error established in respect of Ground 3, Grounds 1 and 2 fall away. Some of the arguments made by the appellant in respect of manifest excess are also relevant to how the Court might resentence. They will be addressed in the course of the reasons that follow.
Resentencing the appellant
30․The principles applying when specific error has been established on appeal are well-established: Gillard v The Queen [2016] ACTCA 50 at [43], which applied Kentwell, as authority for two propositions:
(a)Once specific error by the sentencing judge is established, the Court has a duty to exercise the re-exercise the sentencing discretion (Kentwell at [35]); but
(b)A finding of specific error does not require an appellant to be re-sentenced unless the appellate court is also satisfied that a different sentence should be imposed (Kentwell at [42]-[43]).
Objective seriousness
31․It is unnecessary on this appeal to state the applicable principles in any great detail. The evaluation of the seriousness of the conduct is objective, in the sense that the Court ignores matters personal to the offender: Muldrock v The Queen [2011] HCA 39; 244 CLR 120 at [27]. The subjective features and after-effects of the offending are considered separately as part of the factors listed in s 33 of the Sentencing Act: McLeod v The Queen [2018] ACTCA 59 at [12].
32․The maximum penalty for an offence provides a yardstick against which to assess the objective seriousness of the offences before the Court: Markarian v R [2005] HCA 25; (2006) 228 CLR 357 at [31]. Here, the two years maximum indicates that, when compared with the suite of statutory offences set out in the Bail Act, Criminal Code and the Crimes Act, the offence itself sits at the lower end.
33․However, the offence of failing to comply with a bail undertaking is nevertheless a serious offence: R v McMahon [2014] ACTSC 280 at [97], cited in R v Foster [2021] ACTSC 229 at [56], where Refshauge AJ commented (in each case) on the offence being an important part of maintaining the integrity of the justice system.
34․Here, the failure to appear at Court related to a sentence hearing. It occurred after the appellant had pleaded guilty to the other three offences. The motivation appears to have been disorganisation and a misunderstanding of the date as opposed to a deliberate attempt to frustrate the proceeding. While the conduct was not deliberate, the inevitable consequence was a delay in the Court dealing with the sentence. By comparison, the offence is objectively more serious than the first failure to appear offence in the same proceeding, which occurred much earlier in the process and at a less critical court date.
General deterrence (s 7 of the Sentencing Act)
35․In Ursino v Read [2005] ACTSC 106, Crispin J stated at [12]:
…offences of failing to appear in answer to a bail undertaking are prevalent, and the commission of offences of that character put the community to the expense and inconvenience of having to locate and arrest the absconding defendant and bring him or her back to court. Furthermore, if alleged offenders were permitted, without significant penalty, to delay trials or sentencing proceedings by failing to answer their bail, confidence in the whole process could suffer and other alleged offenders might be encouraged to adopt a similar course. Hence, in the absence of any significant mitigating factor, custodial sentences should be expected for offences of this kind.
36․In KN v Frizzell [2020] ACTSC 217 at [87], Loukas-Karlsson J observed that those comments “should certainly not be interpreted in a manner that is inimical to, and inconsistent with, the individual sentencing discretion and instinctive synthesis.” I respectfully apply the same caution here.
Subjective circumstances of the offender (s 33(1)(m) of the Sentencing Act)
37․This appellant has led a tragic life. She is a highly dependent drug addict, and has been for over 20 years, apart from a two-week period when she was in custody due to the present offence. She uses drugs to block out the trauma she has suffered during her life. She reported to the author of the pre-sentence report before the sentencing magistrate that a state of intoxication through drug use is her “normal”. From the comments made, the appellant cannot see a life beyond that of taking drugs. She has no intention or desire to rehabilitate.
38․The appellant’s father was a drug user and was reported to be an alcoholic, although the appellant learned about his addiction later in life. The appellant’s own heroin addiction started at 18 years of age. That drug use coincides with her being sexually abused by a different family member. She ultimately accepted payment from that family member on a regular basis, using the money to purchase drugs.
39․She has experienced domestic violence from a number of previous partners. She has suffered further trauma and grief through one partner committing suicide in 2019 after three years together. She has lived a transient lifestyle, including accommodation in women’s refuges. For the past six months, she has resided in a room in flats located in Ainslie.
40․She completed Year 10 in the ACT and has at times been employed in the food and retail industry in the United Kingdom. However, she was reported to have been embroiled in a manslaughter trial in the UK just before returning to the ACT and has been unemployed since 2017.
41․Her family has cut off all ties with her for the past three years, due to her continued drug use. Her only friends were said to be drug users and those involved in criminal activities.
42․Even when she was present in Court during the hearing of the appeal, her behaviour was consistent with someone who was under the effects of heavy illicit drug use.
43․Unsurprisingly, the appellant’s mental health has been the subject of past treatment, detailed in the pre-sentence report, although she did not wish to discuss her past. She has no specific mental health plan.
44․In terms of criminal history, the appellant first became known to ACT Corrective Services on 28 June 2016, when she was convicted for drug driving and a good behaviour order was imposed. The main relevant antecedent is the first offence of failure to appear in the same proceeding before the Magistrates Court.
Specific deterrence and rehabilitation (s 7 of the Sentencing Act)
45․The appellant was assessed as a medium to high risk of reoffending. That assessment is accepted. She has many risk factors as set out above – illicit substance use, attitude to offending, lack of motivation to rehabilitate, lack of pro-social family relationships or companions. How to achieve specific deterrence for a person who is presently so hopelessly addicted to drugs, with that contributing to her ability to remember court dates, is a difficult question.
Remorse (s 33(1)(w) of the Sentencing Act)
46․There was no remorse apparent from what was described in the pre-sentence report. There was a perfunctory statement of remorse expressed in the Magistrates Court but it does not appear to have been any more than paying lip-service to the consideration.
Comparable cases
47․The respondent helpfully drew attention to a number of published sentences for a failure to appear contrary to s 49 of the Bail Act. Without setting out every case cited in the respondent’s submissions, they include:
(a)SBT v Wright [2021] ACTSC 322; 17 ACTLR 137 where a sentence of three weeks’ imprisonment was imposed by the magistrate for a young offender who failed to appear in court for a mention – and the sentence was undisturbed in this appeal.
(b)Kirby v Ali [2021] ACTSC 95; 358 FLR 288 where a sentence of 12 months’ imprisonment (reduced from 15 months on account of the plea of guilty) was imposed for an offender who fled a part-heard trial by travelling overseas.
(c)DD v Ilievski [2016] ACTSC 115 where there were three offences of fail to appear. For each offence, a sentence of one month’s imprisonment was imposed by the sentencing magistrate, reduced from two months on account of the plea of guilty. These sentences were undisturbed on appeal.
(d)Wickey v The Queen [2012] ACTCA 38 where a sentence of six months imprisonment was imposed for failure to appear, although the circumstances of the failure (including the nature of the court appearance) were not articulated in any detail.
(e)Skeen v Bannerman [2012] ACTSC 40 where Burns J found that a sentence of four months’ imprisonment was manifestly excessive and substituted a sentence of seven days. In making such a finding, his Honour accepted (at [4]-[6]) that the offender in that case was not seeking to avoid the hearing of the charges and that there was no suggestion that the court date the subject of the non-appearance was a hearing date, or that significant cost or inconvenience was occasioned by reason of the offender’s failure to appear on that date.
Crafting a sentence for the individual offender
48․Determining what is “adequate punishment” by way of a sentence that is “just and appropriate” (s 7 of the Sentencing Act) for this appellant, who has already spent time in custody referable to the offence, has proved to be quite a difficult balancing exercise.
49․Accepting that a sentence of imprisonment is one of last resort (s 10 of the Sentencing Act), the objective seriousness of the offence and the comparable cases to which reference has been made above are an indication that the threshold has been crossed. In making that finding I have placed importance on both general and specific deterrence, and the fact that, however inadvertent, the non-appearance was when the appellant was required for her sentencing hearing.
50․That moves the reasoning process forward to considering the appropriate length of a sentence of imprisonment and how such a sentence might be served. As discussed with the legal representatives at the hearing, the sentencing options are limited by the offence itself and the appellant’s subjective circumstances.
51․She was assessed as unsuitable for an intensive corrections order.
52․Even though some form of rehabilitation and intervention is plainly in the appellant’s long-term interests, a Drug and Alcohol Treatment Order cannot be made. The term of imprisonment to be imposed would not in any way approach the first criterion for eligibility, being that the term of imprisonment to be imposed must be between one and four years: s 12(1)(b) of the Sentencing Act. Given the appellant’s discussions about rehabilitation and her lack of any current motivation to beat the disease of addiction, it is questionable whether she would have been suitable for the program in any event.
53․A good behaviour order (impliedly upon a suspended sentence) was found to be suitable with a recommended medium to high level of intervention. However, the appellant’s state of existence is such that the Court may be setting her up to fail. Even a good behaviour order of only six months’ duration may expose the appellant to further interaction with the justice system for this offence if she were to drop out of contact with Corrective Services or otherwise found to be non-compliant with the supervision conditions. I note that the sentencing magistrate previously imposed core conditions only in respect of the other offences for which the appellant was sentenced at the same time. Any good behaviour obligations that the appellant was subject to in relation to the other sentences imposed in February 2022 have now expired.
54․As the Director submitted, a short, sharp, sentence of imprisonment would achieve the appropriate objectives of denunciation and deterrence without such exposure. Further, the appellant has formally served 40 days of imprisonment referable solely to this offence, and then a further eight days where the appellant was on remand, also referable to the offence. I will take those matters into account in backdating the sentence pursuant to s 63 of the Sentencing Act.
55․Under s 63(2), the taking into account of any period which the offender has already been held in custody in relation to the offence does not apply in various circumstances, one of which is if a sentence of imprisonment of less than one day were to be imposed.
56․I have noted that aspect of the legislation because the appellant’s counsel submitted that this should have a consequence of the Court sentencing the offender “to the rising of the Court”. This was explained by Refshauge J in Craig Farrell Ledson v Christopher Richard Taylor, Mark Patrick Robison and Luke James Brown [2010] ACTSC 42; 239 FLR 184 (Ledson) at [56] by reference to the following definition taken from the Encyclopaedic Australian Legal Dictionary (Lexis Nexis):
A sentence of imprisonment imposed on an offender for the period of the sitting of the court in which the sentence has been passed. Very often after imposing the sentence the court indicates that for the purpose of the sentence it shall be taken as having risen and thereby the offender is immediately released from the custody of the court.
57․It is a sentence of imprisonment: White v Brown [2003] NTSC 51; 13 NTLR 50 (at [19]), cited in Ledson at [57], where Refshauge J went on to state (citation omitted):
It is a nominal punishment, almost never appropriate for serious offences.
58․There are cases in the Territory where a person convicted of a serious offence has received such a sentence, most notably, R v Griggs [2006] ACTCA 3 (cited in Ledson at [59]). However, in that case, the sentence was a result of procedural confusion and delay that meant that any other sentence would effectively have been one that was more severe than that which would have been appropriate at first instance. Gray J made the Court of Appeal’s position clear (at [22]):
To sentence Mr Griggs to the rising of the court is not a sentence that should be regarded as anything other than a response to the extraordinary circumstances that surround the proceedings in relation to this offence. And I would wish it to be clearly understood that the sentence is based on the circumstances which are special to this particular matter.
59․The appellant here is not in similarly extraordinary procedural circumstances. As discussed during oral argument during the hearing, a sentence of full-time imprisonment for this appellant is one that I may have striven to avoid at first instance. However, I have reflected upon the various authorities dealing with failure to appear (discussed above) and the submissions made in relation to the lack of alternatives for this appellant. A sentence for a serious offence that only extends to the rising of the Court is not a sentence that properly reflects the gravity of the offending when a person fails to appear at a sentence hearing. A term of full-time imprisonment for a short period of time remains an appropriate sentence, not least because it is the clearest way of taking into account the time already spent in custody, by backdating the sentence pursuant to s 63 of the Sentencing Act.
60․The appellant’s counsel was concerned that if his client were to face court in the future for a similar offence, a sentence of imprisonment for any length of time would appear on her criminal history and may had an unintended adverse influence on a future sentence. To address that concern, I have endeavoured to make clear the reasons for arriving at the particular sentence to be imposed. It need hardly be said that none of the above reasons should not be taken as in any way fettering a future court’s discretion, or suggesting any particular outcome, for any future matter involving the appellant.
Conclusion and orders
61․The orders of the Court are as follows:
(1)The appeal is allowed.
(2)The orders made in the Magistrates Court on 17 February 2022 are varied as follows:
(a)In respect of CC2022/1512, the sentence of two months’ imprisonment is set aside and in lieu thereof, the following sentence is imposed:
(i) The appellant is convicted and a sentence of one month and 18 days’ imprisonment is imposed (reduced from two months on account of the appellant’s plea of guilty), backdated pursuant to s 63 of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) to commence on 3 June 2023 and conclude on 20 July 2023 (with such term being fully subsumed by time previously spent in custody).
| I certify that the preceding sixty-one [61] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of her Honour Justice McWilliam. Associate: Date: 21 July 2023 |
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