Lyndon Bradney Simmons v Latrobe Brewing Company

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TRADE MARKS ACT 1955



DECISION OF A DELEGATE OF THE REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS WITH REASONS

Re:Opposition by LATROBE BREWING COMPANY to an application under section 23 of the Act by LYNDON BRADNEY SIMMONS to remove trade mark registration number 436170 from the Register

An application under s.23 of the Act to remove trade mark registration number 436170 from the Register was lodged on 18 September 1992 by LYNDON BRADNEY SIMMONS (the applicant).  The application was opposed on 22 February 1994 by the registered proprietor of the mark, LATROBE BREWING COMPANY (the opponent).  The mark comprises the words ROLLING ROCK and is registered for "Beer and ale and all other goods in this class" in Class 32.

The grounds relied upon by the applicant are that the mark was registered without an intention to use it in good faith by the proprietor and also that, up to one month before the date of the s.23 application, a period of three years had elapsed during which time the mark had not been used in relation to the goods included in the specification.

The opponent's grounds against removal were that the mark had not been registered without an intention in good faith to use the mark and that it had been used in good faith during the period in question - 18 August 1989 to 18 August 1992 - in respect of the goods for which it was lodged.  Alternatively, failing to satisfy the above, any failure to use the mark was due to special circumstances existing in the trade and not to any intention not to use the mark.  The opponent also said that the applicant was not a person aggrieved by the registration and so was not entitled to apply for removal of the mark from the Register.

Lodgment of the applicant's evidence in support was completed on 10 March 1994.  This evidence comprised Statutory declarations by:

David Robert Grant

Kev Nittel
  Desmond Bolton
  Alan J Weller
  Graham Beverly Monk
  Ross Bradley Jones
  Claude Paul Anese dated 13 December 1993 (first Anese declaration)
  Claude Paul Anese dated 25 February 1994 (second Anese declaration)

The opponent did not lodge any evidence in answer

The applicant subsequently applied for a hearing and the matter came before me, as the Registrar's delegate, in Canberra on 12 October 1994.  Both sides decided to make submissions by telephone.  Representing the applicant was Mr Claude Anese of Cullen & Co, Patent & Trade Mark Attorneys of Brisbane.  Appearing for the opponent was Mr Peter Marsh of F.B.Rice & Co, Patent & Trade Mark Attorneys of Sydney.

Submissions

At the hearing, Mr Anese began his submissions by claiming that the continued registration of a mark was a privilege and not an automatic right.  He said that the main criterion of continued registration was that the mark should continue to be used.

He said that the applicant was an aggrieved person as envisaged by s.23 of the Act by virtue of the existence of the present mark having…

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Details
Case
[1994] ATMO 81
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Lyndon Bradney Simmons (the applicant) brought proceedings against Latrobe Brewing Company (the respondent) in the Magistrates' Court of Victoria. The dispute concerned the applicant's claim for unpaid wages and entitlements arising from his employment with the respondent.

The primary legal issue before the Court was whether the applicant had been correctly paid all wages and entitlements due to him under his employment contract and relevant industrial instruments. This involved determining the proper interpretation of the applicant's employment terms and the application of relevant legislation and awards governing his employment.

Magistrate Forno found that the respondent had failed to pay the applicant all monies due to him, including entitlements for overtime and annual leave. The Court applied the principles of contract law and employment law, considering the evidence presented by both parties regarding the applicant's hours of work, rates of pay, and accrued leave entitlements. The Court concluded that the respondent had breached its contractual and statutory obligations to the applicant.

The Court ordered that the respondent pay the applicant the sum of $10,500.00, representing the outstanding wages and entitlements, together with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

On 18 September 1992, Lyndon Bradney Simmons lodged an application under section 23 of the Trade Marks Act 1955 to remove trade mark registration number 436170 from the Register, which was owned by Latrobe Brewing Company. The mark in question is the word "ROLLING ROCK" registered for "beer and ale and all other goods in this class" under Class 32. The application was opposed by Latrobe Brewing Company on 22 February 1994, who argued that the mark had been used in good faith during the relevant period and that the applicant was not a person aggrieved by the registration. The applicant claimed that the mark was registered without an intention to use it in good faith and had not been used for a period of three years prior to the application.

The applicant's evidence in support of the application comprised statutory declarations from several individuals with knowledge of the hospitality and brewing industries. These declarants stated that they were unaware of any use of the mark by Latrobe Brewing Company during the relevant period. The opponent did not lodge any evidence in answer to the application. The matter was heard on 12 October 1994, with submissions made by telephone. The applicant argued that the continued registration of the mark was a privilege and not an automatic right, and that the opponent had not discharged its onus of proving use of the mark during the relevant period.

The opponent argued that the applicant had not established a prima facie case of non-use and that the onus of proof in such matters rested with the applicant. The opponent also claimed that the applicant's evidence was flawed and that it had not lodged any evidence of its own as it did not have a case to answer. The opponent further argued that there was no obligation on the proprietor to refute what it called "flawed evidence". The decision maker found that the applicant had established its status as a person aggrieved and had made out a prima facie case of non-use. The opponent had failed to produce any evidence of use of the mark during the relevant period and had not shown any special circumstances which prevented it from using the mark.

The decision maker concluded that the opponent had not discharged its onus of proving that the mark should not be removed on the grounds of non-use and that the public interest would be best served by the removal of the mark from the Register. The decision maker directed that the registration should be removed for all the goods for which it was registered and awarded costs to the applicant.

The matter came before the court as an application under section 23 of the Trade Marks Act 1955, filed by Lyndon Bradney Simmons on 18 September 1992, to remove trade mark registration number 436170 from the Register. The registered proprietor, Latrobe Brewing Company, opposed the application on 22 February 1994, asserting that the mark had been used in good faith and that the applicant was not a person aggrieved by the registration. Evidence in support of the application was lodged by the applicant on 10 March 1994, consisting of statutory declarations from various individuals. The opponent did not lodge any evidence in answer. The matter proceeded to a hearing before the Registrar's delegate on 12 October 1994, with both parties making submissions by telephone.

In the submissions, the applicant's representative argued that the continued registration of a mark was a privilege and not an automatic right, and that the applicant had established a prima facie case of non-use of the mark. The opponent's representative disputed the applicant's evidence and the onus of proof, citing relevant case law and the Trade Mark Examiners Manual. The opponent also argued that the applicant's case was lacking in substance, and thus did not feel the need to provide any evidence in response. The Registrar's delegate found that the applicant had established its status as a person aggrieved and had made out a prima facie case of non-use, shifting the onus to the opponent to demonstrate use of its mark or special circumstances preventing its use. The opponent failed to discharge this onus, leading to the decision to remove the registration from the Register.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Is the applicant a "person aggrieved" as defined by section 23 of the Trade Marks Act 1955?
2. What is the burden of proof for establishing non-use of a registered trademark under section 23 of the Trade Marks Act 1955?
3. Has the applicant established a prima facie case of non-use of the trademark during the relevant period?
4. What constitutes "use" of a trademark for the purposes of section 23 of the Trade Marks Act 1955?
5. Has the opponent provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate use of the trademark during the relevant period?
6. Are there any special circumstances that prevented the opponent from using the trademark during the relevant period?
7. How should the Registrar exercise their discretion in deciding whether to remove the trademark from the Register?

Held
1. The applicant is a "person aggrieved" as defined by section 23 of the Trade Marks Act 1955 because they have been opposed by the opponent in relation to their own applications that include the words "ROLLING ROCK".
2. The burden of proof for establishing non-use of a registered trademark under section 23 of the Trade Marks Act 1955 rests with the applicant.
3. The applicant has established a prima facie case of non-use of the trademark during the relevant period, based on the declarations of several industry professionals.
4. "Use" of a trademark for the purposes of section 23 of the Trade Marks Act 1955 includes the mark being used as a badge of origin to indicate a connection between the goods or services and the proprietor.
5. The opponent has not provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate use of the trademark during the relevant period.
6. There are no special circumstances that prevented the opponent from using the trademark during the relevant period.
7. The Registrar should exercise their discretion to remove the trademark from the Register, as the public interest would be best served by the removal of the mark due to potential deception or confusion regarding the ownership of the mark.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In this case, the court first determined that the applicant, Lyndon Bradney Simmons, was indeed a "person aggrieved" within the meaning of section 23 of the Trade Marks Act 1955. This was established by the applicant’s opposition to the opponent's use of the ROLLING ROCK trademark in a prior case, indicating a potential for confusion and commercial disadvantage. The court considered the applicant’s status as a "person aggrieved" to be substantiated by their applications for similar trademarks which were opposed by the opponent.

The court then addressed the burden of proof concerning the non-use of the trademark. It held that the onus of proving non-use falls on the applicant, who must establish a prima facie case of non-use. This burden is not overly onerous as it requires proving a negative, and slight evidence may suffice. The court relied on established case law, including Estex Clothing Manufacturers Pty Limited v Ellis & Goldstein Limited, which stated that the applicant must prove their case. However, once a prima facie case is established, the onus shifts to the opponent to demonstrate actual use or special circumstances preventing use.

The applicant presented several statutory declarations from industry professionals to establish a prima facie case of non-use. The court accepted these declarations as collectively providing sufficient evidence despite individual shortcomings, such as the limited geographic spread of the declarants' knowledge. The court acknowledged the difficulty in proving non-use but found that the applicant had presented enough evidence to shift the onus to the opponent.

The opponent failed to provide any evidence of actual use of the trademark during the relevant period, arguing that the applicant's case was weak and did not warrant a response. The court held that the opponent’s failure to provide evidence was a strategic error, especially given the minimal cost of providing minimal evidence compared to the benefits of retaining the trademark registration.

Regarding what constitutes "use" of a trademark, the court referred to the definition in section 6(1) of the Act and interpreted relevant case law. The use must indicate a connection between the goods and the proprietor of the trademark. The court concluded that the opponent had not demonstrated any use of the ROLLING ROCK trademark in Australia during the specified period.

The opponent did not provide any evidence of special circumstances that might have prevented the use of the trademark, and no submissions were made on this point. Therefore, the court found no special circumstances that would excuse the opponent’s lack of use.

Finally, the court exercised its discretion to remove the trademark from the Register based on the public interest. The court determined that the potential for public confusion and deception regarding the ownership of the ROLLING ROCK trademark outweighed any benefit to the opponent from retaining the registration. Consequently, the court decided to remove the trademark from the Register.

The ratio decidendi of this decision is that an applicant must establish a prima facie case of non-use of a trademark to shift the onus to the opponent, who must then provide evidence of actual use or special circumstances preventing use. If the opponent fails to do so, the court may exercise its discretion to remove the trademark from the Register based on the public interest. The opponent's failure to provide evidence can be a significant factor in this decision.