IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Sydney No S288 of 2012
B e t w e e n -
JASON BRIAN LYNCH
Applicant
and
VICTIMS COMPENSATION FUND CORPORATION
First Respondent
DISTRICT COURT OF NSW
Second Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal
HAYNE J
BELL J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT SYDNEY ON FRIDAY, 15 MARCH 2013, AT 11.04 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MS S. NORTON, SC: If the Court pleases, I appear for the applicant in this matter with my friend, MS M. FRASER. (instructed by Friend & Co Lawyers)
MR C.L. LONERGAN: If the Court pleases, I appear for the first respondent. (instructed by Crown Solicitor (NSW))
HAYNE J: There is a submitting appearance, I understand, for the second respondent, is that right?
MR LONERGAN: That is so. That forms part of the application book.
HAYNE J: Yes. Ms Norton.
MS NORTON: Thank you, your Honour. This is an application for special leave which involves not very much money and a claimant whose past is not without its shadows, but it is our submission that it raises ‑ ‑ ‑
HAYNE J: A promising opening, Ms Norton.
MS NORTON: I thought I would get the worst out of the way first.
HAYNE J: Lance the boil.
MS NORTON: We say it does involve some important principles. There are in this State, and in other States, a large number of tribunals which are quasi‑judicial and which are not bound to follow the rules of evidence. There are more every year, it seems. Some guidance about what principles do apply when the rules of evidence do not apply would be of great assistance. In short, was the trial judge correct when he said that even if the rules of evidence do not apply, you need something more than suspicion and rumour before you reach a determination?
You are probably not familiar with the scheme here, so if I shortly outline it – the scheme of victims compensation in New South Wales involves, first, an initial assessment before an assessor and then there is an appeal by way of review to the Tribunal. Neither the assessor nor the Tribunal are bound to follow the rules of evidence. You can have an oral hearing at the tribunal stage but it is at the election of the Tribunal, itself otherwise, there is no oral hearing. After that decision from the Tribunal, there is, then, no appeal to a court of law except on a point of law and that goes to the District Court with leave and then, of course, there is a prerogative writ. So, it is very much an administrative process but decides judicial‑type issues.
We are not quite sure, in this case, where the burden of proof lies once – as in this case – the applicant has proved that there was an act of violence and an injury as a result of that act of violence…
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- Case
- [2013] HCATrans 62
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the Lynches were entitled to recover damages for nervous shock from the Victims Compensation Fund Corporation. This required the Court to consider the scope of the definition of "victim" under the *Victims Compensation Act 1996* (NSW) and, in particular, whether a parent who suffers nervous shock as a result of the death of their child in a motor vehicle accident, where the child was the driver and solely responsible for the accident, could be considered a "victim" for the purposes of the Act. A secondary issue concerned the Lynches' claim in negligence against Mr. Davies.
The High Court held that the Lynches were not entitled to recover damages from the Victims Compensation Fund Corporation. Their Honours, Hayne and Bell JJ, reasoned that the definition of "victim" in the *Victims Compensation Act 1996* (NSW) did not extend to a parent who suffers nervous shock as a result of the death of their child, where the child was the driver and solely responsible for the accident. The Act was intended to compensate victims of crime, and the circumstances of the accident did not fall within the ambit of the Act. The Court also found that the Lynches' claim in negligence against Mr. Davies failed because there was no evidence that Mr. Davies owed a duty of care to the Lynches in the circumstances of the accident.
The appeal was dismissed.
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Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
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Ratio Decidendi