Re: ALICE ROSE LYNCH
And: W.J. HOWARD, A. BARTON, J. MARSHALL, J. OSBORNE, K. MARCH, M. McGREGOR,
E. JOHNSON, D. WATKINS, F. LAURIE, D. WITTINGSLOW, W. NOCK, W. SPICER,
L.J. OSBORNE, A. FOSTER, F. FOSTER, R. SMALL, E. TREVORS, B. RENET, A. BOWDEN
L.J. SHOPT, AND THE SHOWMEN'S GUILD OF AUSTRALASIA (1980) 44 FLR 71
N.S.W. No. 1 of 1980
Industrial Law - Conciliation and Arbitration - Appeal
COURT
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
INDUSTRIAL DIVISION
Smithers(1), Evatt(2) and Keely(2) JJ.
CATCHWORDS
Industrial Law - election to membership - "a majority of the votes of all members present and voting" - meaning of - recourse to history of rule where ambiguity - Conciliation and Arbitration Act s.141
Evidence - application for leave to adduce further evidence on hearing of appeal - Federal Court of Australia Act s.27
Appeal - application that proceeding be remitted to trial judge for further hearing - discretion of appeal court - whether parties bound by the course of the trial - Federal Court of Australia Act s.28(1)(c)
Conciliation and Arbitration - Registered organization - Performance and observance of rules - Proposed member of organization - Requirement that proposed member receive majority of votes of members present and voting at meeting - Informal votes - Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 (Cth), ss. 140, 141.
Appeal - Application for leave to adduce further evidence at appeal - Application to remit matter to trial judge - Discretion of appellate court - Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), ss. 27, 28 (1) (c).
HEADNOTE
Rule 4(c) of the rules of a registered organization provided in part: "A person proposed for membership must receive a majority of the votes of all members present and voting at the meeting before being accepted as a member. This voting shall be by secret ballot."
The appellant, a member of the organization, brought proceedings under ss. 140 and 141 of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 after her husband (the applicant) had unsuccessfully applied for membership of the organization. The trial judge found that at the relevant meeting the applicant had received fourteen "Yes" votes, four "No" votes and that sixty-eight members present had not recorded a vote and dismissed the appellant's action.
On appeal.
Held: Per curiam - (1) Rule 4 (c) required each applicant to receive a majority of the votes of all members present and voting at the election in respect of the candidature of the applicant.
Per Smithers J. - Rule 4 (c) referred to formal votes.
(2) The respondents should not be permitted to call further evidence from the returning officer as to the voting figures at the relevant meeting because the evidence would contradict that led by the respondents at the trial and would not necessarily cause the court to rule in favour of the respondents.
Sanders v. Sanders (1881), 19 Ch D 373, referred to.
(3) It was not appropriate to remit the matter to the trial judge under s.…
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- AGLC
- Lynch, A.R. v. Howard, W.J. & Ors [1980] FCA 118 ((1980) 44 FLR 71)
- Case
- [1980] FCA 118
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues that the court needed to address were centered on the interpretation of the phrase "a majority of the votes of all members present and voting." Specifically, the court had to determine whether this phrase required a strict majority of all votes cast by members present at the meeting or if it could be interpreted more broadly. The court was also required to consider the historical context and usage of this phrase within the Conciliation and Arbitration Act to ascertain its intended meaning.
The High Court's reasoning focused on the historical application and interpretation of the phrase in question. The court examined past cases and legislative history to understand how the phrase had been applied in similar contexts. Ultimately, the court found that the phrase should be interpreted in a way that aligns with a broader and more flexible understanding, rather than a strict interpretation requiring a majority of all possible votes. This interpretation was deemed to be consistent with the legislative intent and the practicalities of conducting guild elections. As a result, the court held that Lynch's election was valid under the broader interpretation of the phrase.
The final orders of the court were to allow the appeal, set aside the previous order made on 13 December 1979, and direct each respondent, excluding the Showmen's Guild of Australasia, to recognise Lynch as a member of the Guild. This decision effectively recognised Lynch's eligibility and membership in the Guild based on the broader interpretation of the statutory requirement.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be allowed.
2. The order of the Court made on 13 December 1979 be set aside.
3. In lieu thereof each of the respondents, other than the Showmen's Guild of Australasia, is directed to perform and observe the rules of the Guild by recognising James Thomas Lynch as a member of the Guild.
Appeal allowed. Order of the court made on 13th December, 1979, set aside, in lieu thereof each of the respondents, other than the Showmen's Guild of Australasia directed to perform and observe the rules of the Guild by recognizing James Thomas Lynch as a member of the Guild.
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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