Lyberopoulos v Police No. Scgrg-00-348

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LYBEROPOULOS  v  POLICE
[2000] SASC 412

Application for Judicial Review

  1. DUGGAN J.      This is an application for judicial review which arises out of the decision of the Registrar of the Adelaide Magistrates Court to make an enforcement order against the applicant pursuant to the Expiation of Offences Act 1996 (the Act) and the dismissal of an application made to a magistrate to review the order.

  2. Before dealing with the facts of the case, it is convenient to say something about the scheme to provide for expiation of offences pursuant to the Act.

  3. Section 5 of the Act authorises expiation notices to be given in relation to certain alleged offences.  Various provisions relating to expiation notices are set out in s 6.  Section 6(1)(e) provides that an expiation notice cannot be given after the expiry of the period of 6 months from the date of the alleged offence.

  4. Section 8 enables an alleged offender who receives an expiation notice to elect to be prosecuted for the offence.  Apart from an exception which is not relevant to the present case, the election to be prosecuted cannot be made after the making of an enforcement order under s 13 of the Act.

  5. A procedure for the enforcement of expiation notices in cases where the offence remains unexpiated is set out in s 13.  The authority which issued the expiation notice can forward to the Registrar a certificate containing certain prescribed particulars.  The Registrar can then make an order for enforcement.  The order for enforcement is equivalent to an order of the court imposing a fine (s 13(6)(b)).  However, the Registrar cannot make an order for enforcement in consequence of receiving a certificate if the time for commencement of a prosecution against the person for the unexpiated offence has expired (s 13(3)(a)). Section 52 of the Summary Procedure Act, 1921 provides that, in the case of an expiable offence:

    “(i)if an expiation notice was given to the person - the proceedings must be commenced within 6 months of the expiry of the expiation period specified in the notice (whether or not the notice was subsequently withdrawn);

    (ii)if an expiation notice was not given to the person - the proceedings must be commenced within 6 months of the date on which the offence is alleged to have been committed.”

  6. Enforcement orders are not subject to appeal, but may be reviewed by the Magistrates Court (s 14).  Section 14 contains the following provisions:

    “14. (1)    An enforcement order is not subject to appeal, but the person liable under the order may apply to the Court for a review of the order within 30 days of being given notice of the order.

    (2)The Court may entertain an application made out of time if it thinks good reason exists for doing so.

    (3)    An application can only be made on the ground that -

    (a)     the expiation notice should not have been given to the applicant in the first instance; or

    (b)     the procedural requirements of this…

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Details
Case
[2000] SASC 412
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Lyberopoulos v Police, the applicant, Mr Lyberopoulos, sought judicial review of decisions made by the Registrar of the Adelaide Magistrates Court and the magistrate in relation to an enforcement order made against him under the Expiation of Offences Act 1996 (SA). Mr Lyberopoulos alleged that he did not receive an expiation notice for a speeding offence, and subsequently, an enforcement order was made against him. He applied for a review of the enforcement order, which was dismissed. The Supreme Court of South Australia was called upon to determine whether the Registrar had the authority to make the second enforcement order and whether the magistrate was correct in dismissing the application for review. The court held that the Registrar could not make the second enforcement order as the time for commencement of prosecution had expired. The court quashed the dismissal of the application for review and directed that the application be re-heard before another magistrate. This decision highlights the importance of adhering to statutory time limits and procedural requirements in enforcement proceedings.

Background

Background to the litigation

This case involves an application for judicial review brought by Mr. Lyberopoulos against the Police in relation to an enforcement order made by the Registrar of the Adelaide Magistrates Court. The enforcement order was issued under the Expiation of Offences Act 1996 (the Act). The applicant had been issued an expiation notice for a speeding offence allegedly committed on 28 October 1998. The vehicle involved was registered in the name of Mr. Theofanous, who nominated Mr. Lyberopoulos as the driver. An expiation notice was subsequently issued to Mr. Lyberopoulos, but it is alleged that he did not receive the notice. On 15 February 1999, a certificate for enforcement was forwarded to the Registrar by the South Australian Police Department, and an enforcement order was made by the Registrar on 17 February 1999. Mr. Lyberopoulos applied for a review of the order, but the application was dismissed by a magistrate on 29 March 1999.

Mr. Lyberopoulos then sought judicial review of the magistrate's decision, which was initially dismissed as an incompetent appeal. However, the matter was later treated as an application for judicial review, and the enforcement order was quashed. The matter was then re-heard in the Adelaide Magistrates Court, where the enforcement order was revoked. Following this, the Registrar referred the matter back to the South Australian Police, who advised Mr. Lyberopoulos that the expiation notice could be enforced again. Another enforcement order was made by the Registrar on 15 December 1999, and Mr. Lyberopoulos again applied for a review of the order, which was dismissed. The applicant then brought a summons for judicial review, seeking to quash the second enforcement order and the magistrate's decision dismissing the application for review.

This case, Lyberopoulos v Police, pertains to an application for judicial review made by the applicant against the decision of the Registrar of the Adelaide Magistrates Court to make an enforcement order against him under the Expiation of Offences Act 1996. The case originated from an alleged speeding offence committed by Mr Lyberopoulos on 28 October 1998. After an expiation notice was issued to him on 23 November 1998, which he claimed not to have received, an enforcement order was made by the Registrar on 17 February 1999. Mr Lyberopoulos applied for a review of this enforcement order, but his application was dismissed by a magistrate on 29 March 1999. The applicant then purported to appeal to the Supreme Court of South Australia against the decision and order of the magistrate, but the appeal was deemed incompetent. Instead, it was treated as an application for judicial review, and the order of the magistrate was quashed, directing the application to revoke the enforcement order to be re-heard in the Adelaide Magistrates Court. On reconsideration, the magistrate revoked the enforcement order made on 17 February. Subsequently, another enforcement order was made by the Registrar on 15 December 1999, which led to another application for review by Mr Lyberopoulos. This application was also dismissed, and he issued a summons for judicial review on 20 April 2000, seeking to quash the second enforcement order and the magistrate's decision dismissing his most recent application for review.

Decision

Reasons for decision

DUGGAN J
Issues
1. Is the Registrar of the Adelaide Magistrates Court empowered to make a second enforcement order under the Expiation of Offences Act 1996 if the time for commencement of a prosecution for the unexpiated offence has expired, despite a previous enforcement order being made but revoked?
2. Did the learned magistrate err in dismissing the applicant's application for review of the second enforcement order by not considering whether the procedural requirements of the Act were complied with, particularly in light of the limitation period in section 13(3)(a)?
3. Can the applicant, Mr Lyberopoulos, seek judicial review of the dismissal of his application for review of the second enforcement order, and if so, what remedy should be granted in this case?

Held
1. Is the Registrar of the Adelaide Magistrates Court empowered to make a second enforcement order under the Expiation of Offences Act 1996 if the time for commencement of a prosecution for the unexpiated offence has expired, despite a previous enforcement order being made but revoked? The court concluded that the Registrar was not empowered to make a second enforcement order in these circumstances. As a result, the second enforcement order made on 15 December 1999 was quashed.
2. Did the learned magistrate err in dismissing the applicant's application for review of the second enforcement order by not considering whether the procedural requirements of the Act were complied with, particularly in light of the limitation period in section 13(3)(a)? The court held that the learned magistrate did err in dismissing the application for review without considering the procedural requirements of the Act. As a result, the dismissal of the application for review was quashed, and the application is to be re-heard before another magistrate.
3. Can the applicant, Mr Lyberopoulos, seek judicial review of the dismissal of his application for review of the second enforcement order, and if so, what remedy should be granted in this case? The court concluded that Mr Lyberopoulos could seek judicial review of the dismissal of his application for review. As a result, the dismissal of the application for review was quashed, and the application is to be re-heard before another magistrate. The court made an order in the nature of mandamus to quash the dismissal of the application for review and direct that the application be re-heard.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: DUGGAN J

The court in Lyberopoulos v Police carefully examined the power of the Registrar of the Adelaide Magistrates Court to issue a second enforcement order under the Expiation of Offences Act 1996, when the initial period for prosecution had expired, despite a prior enforcement order being revoked. The court held that the Registrar's authority to issue enforcement orders is circumscribed by section 13(3)(a) of the Act, which prevents an order from being made once the time for prosecution has expired. This limitation applies irrespective of any previous enforcement orders that were subsequently revoked. The court found that it was not permissible to read an exception into the Act to allow for such a second enforcement order, as doing so would contravene the explicit provisions of the statute.

In examining the learned magistrate's dismissal of Mr Lyberopoulos's application for review of the second enforcement order, the court noted that the magistrate had not considered whether the procedural requirements of the Act had been adhered to, specifically in relation to the limitation period outlined in section 13(3)(a). The court determined that it was an error for the magistrate not to consider this ground for review, as outlined in section 14(3)(b) of the Act. By failing to address this aspect, the magistrate did not fully apply the relevant legal principles, leading to an improper dismissal of the application for review.

Lastly, the court addressed the applicant's right to seek judicial review of the dismissal of his application for review. The court concluded that since a decision made on a review of an enforcement order is not subject to appeal, Mr Lyberopoulos's recourse lay in seeking judicial review. The court found that the dismissal of the application for review was improper due to the magistrate's failure to consider the compliance with the Act's procedural requirements. Consequently, the court granted an order in the nature of mandamus, quashing the dismissal of the review application and directing that the application be re-heard before another magistrate.

The ratio decidendi of this case is that the Registrar of the Adelaide Magistrates Court lacks the authority to issue a second enforcement order under the Expiation of Offences Act 1996 if the period for prosecution has expired, even if a previous enforcement order was made and subsequently revoked. Additionally, when reviewing an enforcement order, the magistrate must consider whether the procedural requirements of the Act have been complied with, including adherence to the statutory limitation periods. Finally, where a magistrate improperly dismisses an application for review, the applicant may seek judicial review, which in this case led to the quashing of the dismissal and a direction for the application to be re-heard.