FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| LV PROPERTY INVESTMENTS PTY LTD v LIANG | [2014] FCCA 1715 |
| Catchwords: BANKRUPTCY – Application for review of Registrar’s decision to make a Sequestration Order – applicant asserting extensive fraud by creditor, creditor’s solicitor and others – whether assertions of fraud made out – applicant clearly unable to pay debts as and when due – fraud not established – whether Sequestration Order should be made – application for review dismissed. |
| Legislation: Federal Court (Bankruptcy) Rules 2005, rr.4.04, 4.06 |
| Sandell v Porter (1966) 115 CLR 666 Cain v Whyte (1933) 48 CLR 639 Ling v Enrobook Pty Ltd (1997) 74 FCR 19 |
| Applicant: | LV PROPERTY INVESTMENTS PTY LTD |
Respondent: Supporting Creditor: | YAN LIANG DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION |
| File Number: | LNG 40 of 2013 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Burchardt |
| Hearing date: | 11 June 2014 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 11 June 2014 |
| Delivered at: | Melbourne |
| Delivered on: | 13 August 2014 |
REPRESENTATION
| The Applicant: | In person |
| Counsel for the Respondent: | Mr Munting |
| Solicitors for the Respondent: | Wallace Wilkinson +Webster |
| Counsel for the Supporting Creditor: | Mr Cummings |
| Solicitors for the Supporting Creditor: | Angus McCulloch |
ORDERS
The orders made by Registrar Scott on 9 January 2014 are affirmed.
The application for review is dismissed.
The costs of the application, including any reserved costs, are to be paid out of the estate of the Bankrupt in accordance with the Bankruptcy Act 1966.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT MELBOURNE |
LNG 40 of 2013
| LV PROPERTY INVESTMENTS PTY LTD |
Applicant
And
| YAN LIANG |
Respondent
And
DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
Supporting Creditor
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introductory
The matter presently before the court is an application for review of a Sequestration Order made by Registrar Scott in Hobart on 9 January 2014. Self-evidently the proceeding commenced with a Petition, filed by LV Property Investments Pty Ltd (“LV Property”) on 22 November 2013, but in the circumstances it is convenient to describe Ms Liang as the applicant and LV Property as the respondent.
In substance, Ms Liang appears to assert that she has a cross-claim very substantially in excess both of the moneys owing to LV Property and to the supporting creditor and she appears, from time to time, to assert that she is able to pay her debts within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (“the Act”).
For the reasons that follow, I do not accept either of these assertions and it follows that the application will be dismissed.
The procedural history of the matter
Ms Liang was self-represented at all times and, although fluent in English, she was not always easy to follow. This difficulty obtains with her written materials as filed from time to time also. In order to put this matter in its proper context, I propose to review the materials filed in rather more detail than would ordinarily be necessary or appropriate.
On 22 November 2013, LV Property filed a Creditor’s Petition. The Petition relied upon a debt of…
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- Case
- [2014] FCCA 1715
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the Court was whether the defendant's continued occupation of the property after the termination of the licence agreement constituted trespass. This required the Court to determine the nature of the licence granted to the defendant and the effect of its termination. Specifically, the Court had to consider whether the licence was revocable at will and, if so, whether the defendant had any legal right to remain in possession.
Judge Burchardt found that the licence granted to the defendant was a bare licence, revocable at the will of the licensor. The Court reasoned that there was no contractual term or proprietary interest that would prevent the plaintiff from revoking the licence. Upon revocation, the defendant's right to occupy the property ceased, and his continued presence constituted trespass. The Court applied the principles established in cases concerning the revocation of bare licences and the consequences of remaining in possession after such revocation.
The Court ordered that the defendant deliver up possession of the property to the plaintiff and awarded damages for trespass.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter came before the Federal Circuit Court of Australia as an application for review of a Sequestration Order made by Registrar Scott on 9 January 2014. LV Property Investments Pty Ltd had filed a Creditor’s Petition on 22 November 2013, asserting a debt of $6,116.25 against Yan Liang. The Registrar made the Sequestration Order following the requisite compliance with court rules, and Ms Liang subsequently filed an application for review of this decision. The application was heard by Judge Burchardt, who dismissed the application and affirmed the Sequestration Order. Throughout the proceedings, Ms Liang, who was self-represented, made various allegations of fraud and misrepresentation against LV Property and its associated parties, which were not substantiated. The Court found that Ms Liang was unable to pay her debts and that the alleged fraud did not constitute sufficient cause to prevent the making of a Sequestration Order.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Was the act of bankruptcy committed by the applicant?
2. Have the debts on which the Petition relies been proven and not paid?
3. Is the applicant able to pay her debts within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act 1966?
4. Is there other sufficient cause why a Sequestration Order should not be made?
5. Should a Sequestration Order be made given the findings on the above issues?
Held
1. Was the act of bankruptcy committed by the applicant?
The court concluded that the act of bankruptcy was committed by the applicant.
2. Have the debts on which the Petition relies been proven and not paid?
The court concluded that the debts on which the Petition relies have been proven and not paid.
3. Is the applicant able to pay her debts within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act 1966?
The court concluded that the applicant is not able to pay her debts within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act 1966.
4. Is there other sufficient cause why a Sequestration Order should not be made?
The court concluded that there is not other sufficient cause why a Sequestration Order should not be made.
5. Should a Sequestration Order be made given the findings on the above issues?
The court concluded that a Sequestration Order should be made given the findings on the above issues.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court began its analysis by confirming that the elements of Section 52(1) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 had been satisfied. The act of bankruptcy, the failure to comply with a bankruptcy notice, was evident and uncontested. The debts on which the petition relied had not been paid, and there was no dispute regarding the service of the petition. The court, therefore, had the discretion to proceed with making a Sequestration Order.
Turning to the primary issue of whether Ms. Liang was able to pay her debts, the court examined the evidence provided by Ms. Liang. Despite her claims of substantial assets and incoming funds, the court found these assertions unconvincing and unsubstantiated. The court noted that Ms. Liang had at times been nearly destitute and that there was no credible evidence of a significant influx of funds that would enable her to pay the debts owed to the respondents. The court relied on the principle established in Sandell v Porter, which expanded the interpretation of a debtor's ability to pay their debts. Based on the evidence, the court concluded that Ms. Liang was not able to pay her debts.
The court also considered whether there was other sufficient cause under Section 52(2) of the Act that would prevent the making of a Sequestration Order. Ms. Liang asserted that she had been the victim of extensive fraud by LV Property and Mr. Limmer, which justified the court withholding the order. However, the court found that the evidence of fraud was not sufficiently proven. The court emphasized the high threshold for establishing fraud, as noted in previous authorities, and concluded that Ms. Liang had not provided the necessary cogent proof of fraud.
In light of these findings, the court exercised its discretion under Section 52(2) of the Act and affirmed the Sequestration Order made by the Registrar. The court dismissed the application for review, emphasizing that the ongoing claims in other courts did not constitute sufficient cause to prevent the making of the order. The court followed the principle established in Cain v Whyte that a creditor is prima facie entitled to a Sequestration Order once an act of bankruptcy is committed, and it was for Ms. Liang to prove otherwise. The court's decision aligns with the precedent set in Ling v Enrobook Pty Ltd, affirming that the applicant must prove other sufficient cause to avoid sequestration.
The ratio decidendi of this case is that a Sequestration Order will be made if the petitioner has proved the elements of Section 52(1) and the debtor has not demonstrated, to the satisfaction of the court, either the ability to pay debts or other sufficient cause under Section 52(2) to prevent the order. The court's refusal to accept unsubstantiated claims of fraud and inability to pay aligns with the stringent requirements for proving such defenses under the Bankruptcy Act 1966.