Luya Julius Pty Ltd v Shepherd

The High Court of Australia heard an appeal from the Supreme Court of Queensland concerning an action brought by an infant worker, Shepherd, against Luya Julius Proprietary Limited and another defendant. Shepherd had sustained injuries in a motor vehicle collision caused by the admitted negligence of the defendants. The core of the dispute revolved around whether Shepherd, having received workers' compensation under Queensland legislation, was precluded from pursuing a common law action for damages against the negligent third parties. The defendants' primary defence was based on clause 24 of the schedule to The Workers' Compensation Acts 1916 to 1952 (Q.), which they contended barred such an action after compensation had been recovered. Shepherd, an infant at the time of receiving compensation and commencing proceedings, argued that his infancy meant the receipt of compensation was not for his benefit and therefore not legally binding, thus not precluding his common law claim.

The legal issues before the High Court were whether an infant worker who had received workers' compensation was entitled to maintain a common law action for damages against a third party whose negligence caused the injury, and whether previous High Court decisions concerning infant workers, specifically *Farmer & Co. Ltd. v. Griffiths* and *Cain v. Malone*, were applicable to the Queensland legislation in question. The Court was required to determine the effect of clause 24 of the schedule to the Queensland Act, which stipulated that a worker who had recovered compensation was not entitled to recover both damages and compensation, and to consider the impact of the plaintiff's infancy on the validity of his receipt of compensation as a bar to his common law action.

The Court reasoned that the decisions in *Farmer & Co. Ltd. v. Griffiths* and *Cain v. Malone* were founded on the premise that an infant lacked the capacity to give a binding receipt for workers' compensation, thereby not being precluded from pursuing damages unless it was proven to be for their benefit. However, the Court found that the Queensland Workers' Compensation Act, specifically clause 20 of its schedule, expressly conferred upon an infant the capacity to give a good and valid discharge for moneys paid under the Act, placing them in the same position as an adult in this regard. Consequently, the Court held that the reasoning in *Farmer & Co. Ltd. v. Griffiths* and *Cain v. Malone* was inapplicable to the Queensland legislation. The Court concluded that the plaintiff, having received compensation and being legally capable of giving a valid discharge under the Queensland Act, was precluded from maintaining a common law action for damages, thereby overturning the decision of the Supreme Court of Queensland.

The appeal was allowed with costs. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Queensland was discharged, and in its place, judgment was entered for the defendants in the action with costs.