Luya Julius Pty Ltd v Shepherd - [1955] HCA 47

LUYA JULIUS PROPRIETARY LIMITED

AND ANOTHER DEFENDANTS, SHEPHERD

RESPONDENT,

ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF

QUEENSLAND.

OF A. Workers' Compensation (Q.)-Infant worker-Injury-Sustained on journey to work

-Injury due to negligence of third party-Entitled to compensation-Compensa- tion paid to and received by infant worker-Whether infant worker entitled to maintain common law action for damages for negligence-The Workers' Com- Aug. 3;

pensation Acts 1916 to 1952 (Q.), 88. 9, 15, sched. cll. 20, 24. SYDNEY,

An infant who has received workers' compensation under The Workers' Aug. 23.

Compensation Acts 1916 to 1952 (Q.) in respect of an injury sustained by him is not entitled to maintain a common law action for damages in respect thereof against a third party whose negligence caused the injury.

Smith v. Commonwealth Oil Refineries Ltd. (1938) 60 C.L.R. 141, applied Farmer &Co. Ltd. v. Griffiths (1940) 63 C.L.R. 603 and Cain v. Malone (1942) 66 C.L.R. 10, distinguished.

Decision of the Supreme Court of Queensland (Matthews J.), reversed.

APPEAL from the Supreme Court of Queensland.

One Shepherd brought an action in the Supreme Court of Queens- land against Luya Julius Proprietary Limited and another claiming damages for injury sustained by him when a collision took place between his motor cycle and a truck owned by the defendant company and driven by the second defendant. At the time of the accident and of the institution of the proceedings the plaintiff was an infant, but he had attained the age of twenty-one years by the time the action came on for hearing. The substantive defence raised

99 CLR 279

was based upon cl. 24 of the schedule to The Worker's Compensation Acts 1916 to 1952 (Q.) in that the plaintiff had applied for and recovered compensation under such Act and was thereby precluded from recovering in an action for damages. To this defence the plaintiff answered that at the time of the receipt of the compensation he was an infant, that such receipt of compensation was not for his benefit and was not legally binding upon him SO as to preclude him from suing.

The action came on for hearing before Matthews J., who entered judgment for the plaintiff.

From this decision the defendants appealed to the High Court. The relevant facts and statutory provisions are sufficiently set forth in the judgment of the Court hereunder.

G. A. G. Lucas, for the appellants. A. L. Bennett Q.C. and J. Aboud, for the respondent.

Cur. adv. vult.

THE COURT delivered the following written judgment :- This is an appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court of Queensland (Matthews J.). The judgment was given in an action in which the respondent Shepherd was plaintiff and the two appellants were defendants. The plaintiff was injured in a collision which occurred in the city of Brisbane on the morning of 23rd June 1952, between a motor cycle ridden by him and a motor truck owned by the appellant company and driven by the other appellant. By their pleading…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

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Details

Case: [1955] HCA 47
Decision Date: 23 August 1955

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia heard an appeal from the Supreme Court of Queensland concerning an action brought by an infant worker, Shepherd, against Luya Julius Proprietary Limited and another defendant. Shepherd had sustained injuries in a motor vehicle collision caused by the admitted negligence of the defendants. The core of the dispute revolved around whether Shepherd, having received workers' compensation under Queensland legislation, was precluded from pursuing a common law action for damages against the negligent third parties. The defendants' primary defence was based on clause 24 of the schedule to The Workers' Compensation Acts 1916 to 1952 (Q.), which they contended barred such an action after compensation had been recovered. Shepherd, an infant at the time of receiving compensation and commencing proceedings, argued that his infancy meant the receipt of compensation was not for his benefit and therefore not legally binding, thus not precluding his common law claim.

The legal issues before the High Court were whether an infant worker who had received workers' compensation was entitled to maintain a common law action for damages against a third party whose negligence caused the injury, and whether previous High Court decisions concerning infant workers, specifically *Farmer & Co. Ltd. v. Griffiths* and *Cain v. Malone*, were applicable to the Queensland legislation in question. The Court was required to determine the effect of clause 24 of the schedule to the Queensland Act, which stipulated that a worker who had recovered compensation was not entitled to recover both damages and compensation, and to consider the impact of the plaintiff's infancy on the validity of his receipt of compensation as a bar to his common law action.

The Court reasoned that the decisions in *Farmer & Co. Ltd. v. Griffiths* and *Cain v. Malone* were founded on the premise that an infant lacked the capacity to give a binding receipt for workers' compensation, thereby not being precluded from pursuing damages unless it was proven to be for their benefit. However, the Court found that the Queensland Workers' Compensation Act, specifically clause 20 of its schedule, expressly conferred upon an infant the capacity to give a good and valid discharge for moneys paid under the Act, placing them in the same position as an adult in this regard. Consequently, the Court held that the reasoning in *Farmer & Co. Ltd. v. Griffiths* and *Cain v. Malone* was inapplicable to the Queensland legislation. The Court concluded that the plaintiff, having received compensation and being legally capable of giving a valid discharge under the Queensland Act, was precluded from maintaining a common law action for damages, thereby overturning the decision of the Supreme Court of Queensland.

The appeal was allowed with costs. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Queensland was discharged, and in its place, judgment was entered for the defendants in the action with costs.

Orders