Luu v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Luu v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs
[2001] FCA 1136

MIGRATION LAW - Deportation – Criminal conviction – Detention pending deportation -Review of Minister’s decision to refuse order of release under s 253(9) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – Review of Minister’s decision to refuse to revoke deportation order under s 206(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – Whether detention was indeterminate

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – Review under s 5(1) of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) – Whether the decisions failed to accord applicant procedural fairness – Whether the decisions failed to take relevant considerations into account – Whether decisions were unreasonable – Whether decisions were invalid because applicant’s detention was unauthorised – Whether decisions were ultra vires because the detention was punitive

INTERNATIONAL LAW – Whether the applicant had a legitimate expectation that the Minister would act in accordance with the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights 1966 – Whether the Minister breached the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights 1966

WORDS AND PHRASES – “indeterminate detention”, “risk of flight”

Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 206, 253(9)
Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Act 1986 (Cth)
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966

Minh v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998) 86 FCR 304 referred to
Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550 applied
Nguyen v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 887 followed
Pilbara Aboriginal Land Counsel Aboriginal Corporation Inc v Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Island Affairs (2000) 103 FCR 539 followed
Commissioner for Australian Capital Territory Revenue v Alphaone Pty Ltd (1994) 49 FCR 576 cited
Somaghi v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1991) 102 ALR 339 cited
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273 applied
Tien v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998) 89 FCR 80 followed
Van Alphen v The Netherlands UNHRC305/88 referred to
Vo v Minister Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 98 FCR 371 referred to
Betkhoshabeh v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1999) 92 FCR 504 cited
Tuiletufuga v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998) 87 FCR 389 cited
Cabal v Secretary, Department of Justice (2000) 177 ALR 306 cited
Cabal v Secretary, Department of Justice [2000] FCA 1227 applied
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24 applied
Perez v Minister for Immigration (1999) 94 FCR 287 referred to
Luu v Renevier (1989) 91 ALR 39 referred to
Prasad v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1985) 6 FCR 155 applied
Videto v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1985) 8 FCR 167 referred to
Singh v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1426 followed
Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration (1992) 176 CLR 1 referred to

Aronson & Dyer Judicial Review of Administrative Action 2nd ed. 2000 cited

MINH…

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Details
Case
[2001] FCA 1136
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Luu v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, the Federal Court considered an application for judicial review of two decisions made by the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs. The applicant, Mr Luu, a Vietnamese citizen who had been in Australian immigration detention since his release from prison in 1997, sought the release from detention and the revocation of a deportation order. The court was required to determine whether the Minister's decisions were compliant with the principles of procedural fairness under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth).

The primary legal issue was whether the Minister's decisions to refuse the release from detention and the revocation of the deportation order complied with the principles of procedural fairness. The court examined whether Mr Luu was adequately informed of the critical issues and provided a meaningful opportunity to respond. Given Mr Luu was represented by legal practitioners, the court held that he had sufficient opportunity to respond to the issues raised by previous decisions and relevant correspondence. The court found that while procedural fairness required the Minister to inform Mr Luu of adverse conclusions that were not obviously open on the known material, it did not necessitate the Minister to provide specific information about the currency of the material relied upon or to initiate further investigation.

The court dismissed the application, holding that the Minister's decisions were in accordance with the principles of procedural fairness. The applicant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs of the proceeding.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the proceeding.

Background

Background to the litigation

On 20 April 2001 the applicant, Mr Luu, applied to the Court for an order of review under s 5(1) of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (“the ADJR Act”). The application, as amended on 1 June 2001, sought judicial review of two decisions of the respondent Minister. The first decision was one to refuse to order the release of Mr Luu from detention pursuant to s 253(9) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”). The second decision was one to refuse to revoke an extant deportation order in respect Mr Luu pursuant to s 206(1) of the Act.FACTUAL BACKGROUND Mr Luu is a Vietnamese citizen. He was born in Vietnam on 10 October 1961. He arrived in Australia on 18 January 1990 on a Class 205 Camp Clearance Visa. On 3 July 1996, the County Court of Victoria convicted Mr Luu on two counts of intentionally causing serious injury and one count of intentionally causing injury. Mr Luu was sentenced to three years and six months imprisonment, with a minimum of two years and three months (including pre-sentence remand time) being required to be served in prison before he became eligible for parole. On 9 May 1997, a delegate of the Minister made a decision pursuant to s 200 of the Act that Mr Luu be deported. The delegate also made a direction that upon Mr Luu becoming eligible for release, he would be detained in immigration detention. Mr Luu challenged the deportation order in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“AAT”). On 5 September 1997, the AAT affirmed the delegate’s decision. Mr Luu sought judicial review of the AAT’s decision but was unsuccessful; see Minh v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998) 86 FCR 304, per Weinberg J. There was no appeal from his Honour’s judgment. The circumstances that led to the commission of the offences the subject of the deportation order are comprehensively traversed by Weinberg J at 305 to 309 of his Honour’s reasons for judgment. Mr Luu was granted parole in respect of his custodial sentence on 18 June 1997 but was immediately placed in immigration detention. He has remained in immigration detention continuously since 18 June 1997, just in excess of four years time. Currently Mr Luu is detained at Port Phillip Prison, a maximum security prison. On 12 December 1997 Mr Luu’s then solicitors wrote to the Minister’s department requesting the release of Mr Luu pursuant to s 253(9) of the Act. Section 253(9) of the Act provides:“In spite of anything else in this section, the Minister or the Secretary may at any time order the release (either unconditionally or subject to specified conditions) of a person who is in detention under this section.” By letter dated 8 January 1998, a delegate of the Minister refused the solicitors’ request on the basis of her belief that Mr Luu “poses an unacceptable risk to the Australian community”. The delegate made that decision after considering information supplied on Mr Luu’s behalf, including psychiatric and psychological reports.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

MARSHALL J
Procedural fairness only requires the decision-maker to bring the “gravamen or substance” of the issues to the applicant’s attention: Pilbara Aboriginal Land Council Aboriginal Corporation Inc v Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs (2000) 103 FCR 539 at 557 (“Pilbara”) per Merkel J. I agree with Mr Tracey’s submission that the previous RRT and AAT decisions and the two letters specified above served to highlight the substance of the critical issues to the applicant. While no specific reference was made to the “MOU” in either of the letters specified above, reference was certainly made to general negotiations in the Senator Patterson letter. Furthermore, it is clear from correspondence between the applicant’s solicitors and the Minister, that the applicant was aware of the MOU and its importance to the decision. For example a letter from the applicant’s solicitors to the Minister dated 10 July 2000 stated:“We understand that negotiations have been conducted with the Vietnamese Authorities over a number of years to have a memorandum of understanding in respect to the orderly return of Deportees to Vietnam…If there is little, or no, prospect of Mr Luu being deported to Vietnam in the foreseeable future it is both contrary to the objectives of the Migration Act and costly to the community to keep him in custody.” I recognise an individual in detention, unlike a government department, lacks resources and support staff, and that requiring him or her to make submissions to the Minister can be a heavy burden. However, as Mr Luu was represented by legal practitioners, I consider that he had adequate opportunity to respond to the issues raised by previous RRT and AAT decision s and the two relevant letters. I do not consider that procedural fairness obliged the Minister to specifically inform Mr Luu that the Minister would be relying on material current as at 1998. I will return to the issue of whether the Minister was under a duty to initiate investigation.ADVERSE CONCLUSIONS GROUND The basic ‘fair hearing’ requirement of procedural fairness is further qualified by a more specific requirement to notify the applicant of adverse conclusions that have been arrived at which are not obviously open on the known material. See Commissioner for Australian Capital Territory Revenue v Alphaone Pty Ltd (1994) 49 FCR 576 at 591-2 (“Alphaone”) and Somaghi v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1991) 102 ALR 339 at 348 where Jenkinson J refers to this requirement as a “gloss on the general rule”. In approaching this particular requirement of procedural fairness, the Court must be cautious not to overstep the line between judicial review and merits review. Procedural fairness does not require a decision-maker to reveal all adverse preliminary conclusions or mental processes: see Alphaone at 592 and Aronson & Dyer Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 2nd ed 2000 at 425. However, when a decision-maker makes an adverse finding that doesn’t naturally flow from the known material, procedural fairness requires the decision-maker to inform the applicant of this finding so he or she can have a real and meaningful opportunity to respond to the case against him or her.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: MARSHALL J

Mr Tracey further contended that Mr Luu, acting through his solicitors, had been free to make submissions to the Minister regarding the critical issues at any time. As an example Mr Tracey pointed to the fact that on 7 March 2001 Mr Luu’s solicitors had written to the Minister requesting that the Minister take into account the availability of supervision, accommodation, counselling and employment if Mr Luu was released. Mr Tracey also submitted that procedural fairness did not oblige the Minister to conduct any further investigation to obtain more recent information on Mr Luu. Consideration The requirements of procedural fairness are flexible and depend on the circumstances in a particular case: Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550 (“Kioa”). The requirements of procedural fairness may vary depending on the statutory context, the interest of the individual affected and the interests and purpose which the statute seeks to protect or advance: Kioa at 585 per Mason J. In considering the requirements of procedural fairness in the circumstances, I have taken into account that Mr Luu initiated the application. However, I reject the respondent’s contention that the court should characterise the application as an “initial application”. Mr Luu’s situation is not comparable with someone applying for a new licence – Mr Luu is, in effect, applying for his liberty, a basic human right. I have also taken into account the fact that Mr Luu was represented by solicitors. In light of this fact, I do not consider that procedural fairness in the circumstances required a full hearing. Rather, procedural fairness in the circumstances required Mr Luu to be informed of the critical issues and given a “meaningful opportunity to respond”: Nguyen v MIMA [2001] FCA 887 at 22 per Sackville J. I consider the opportunity to make written submissions would satisfy procedural fairness in the circumstances. Procedural fairness only requires the decision-maker to bring the “gravamen or substance” of the issues to the applicant’s attention: Pilbara Aboriginal Land Council Aboriginal Corporation Inc v Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs (2000) 103 FCR 539 at 557 (“Pilbara”) per Merkel J. I agree with Mr Tracey’s submission that the previous RRT and AAT decisions and the two letters specified above served to highlight the substance of the critical issues to the applicant. While no specific reference was made to the “MOU” in either of the letters specified above, reference was certainly made to general negotiations in the Senator Patterson letter. Furthermore, it is clear from correspondence between the applicant’s solicitors and the Minister, that the applicant was aware of the MOU and its importance to the decision. For example a letter from the applicant’s solicitors to the Minister dated 10 July 2000 stated:“We understand that negotiations have been conducted with the Vietnamese Authorities over a number of years to have a memorandum of understanding in respect to the orderly return of Deportees to Vietnam…If there is little, or no, prospect of Mr Luu being deported to Vietnam in the foreseeable future it is both contrary to the objectives of the Migration Act and costly to the community to keep him in custody.” I recognise an individual in detention, unlike a government department, lacks resources and support staff, and that requiring him or her to make submissions to the Minister can be a heavy burden. However, as Mr Luu was represented by legal practitioners, I consider that he had adequate opportunity to respond to the issues raised by previous RRT and AAT decision s and the two relevant letters. I do not consider that procedural fairness obliged the Minister to specifically inform Mr Luu that the Minister would be relying on material current as at 1998. I will return to the issue of whether the Minister was under a duty to initiate investigation.ADVERSE CONCLUSIONS GROUND