FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Luppino v Fisher [2018] FCA 2106
File number: SAD 288 of 2018 Judge: WHITE J Date of judgment: 19 December 2018 Catchwords: CRIMINAL LAW – interlocutory application by the Second Defendant seeking disclosure from the Plaintiff of the password(s) to a mobile phone pending resolution of the Plaintiff’s challenge to an order made pursuant to s 3LA of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) – consideration of the common law privilege against self‑incrimination – the disclosure sought would infringe the privilege – application dismissed. Legislation: Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) ss 5, 6, 16
Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 3LA
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 23
Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-Vesting) Act 1987 (Cth) s 6
Cases cited: Reid v Howard [1995] HCA 40; (1995) 184 CLR 1
Sorby v The Commonwealth of Australia [1983] HCA 10; (1983) 152 CLR 281
Date of hearing: 19 December 2018 Registry: South Australia Division: General Division National Practice Area: Federal Crime and Related Proceedings Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 36 Counsel for the Plaintiff: Mr M Abbott QC with Mr S McDonald Solicitor for the Plaintiff: Patsouris & Associates Counsel for the First Defendant: The First Defendant did not appear Counsel for the Second Defendant: Mr P d’Assumpcao Solicitor for the Second Defendant: Australian Government Solicitor ORDERS
SAD 288 of 2018 BETWEEN: DANIEL LUPPINO
Plaintiff
AND: GREGORY CHARLES FISHER
First Defendant
COMMISSIONER OF THE AUSTRALIAN FEDERAL POLICE
Second Defendant
JUDGE:
WHITE J
DATE OF ORDER:
19 DECEMBER 2018
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The reference to the “Third Defendant” in Order 4, 7 and 8 in the orders made on 6 December 2018 be amended to read the “Second Defendant”.
2.The Second Defendant’s Interlocutory Application of 10 December 2018 is dismissed.
3.The Second Defendant is to pay the Plaintiff’s costs of, and incidental to, the application.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
EX TEMPORE REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
WHITE J:
This is a judgment on an interlocutory application seeking the disclosure by the plaintiff, in confidential form, of the password or passwords to a mobile phone and to the applications on that phone.
Although the application involves some important issues of principle, there are a number of reasons why it is desirable for the Court to give a decision on it now, rather than reserving judgment. One of these is that the very nature of the relief which is sought is such that a deferral by the Court of its decision could, by itself, result in the effect which the application is intended to avoid. Another is that the imminent holiday period many mean that some time may lapse before the Court can prepare formal reasons, even though it has reached a firm view as to the fate of the application.
On 30 August 2018, the first defendant, who is a Magistrate in the Magistrates Court of South Australia, made an order requiring the plaintiff…
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- Case
- [2018] FCA 2106
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the common law privilege against self-incrimination in making its decision. It found that the disclosure sought would infringe the privilege. The court noted that the privilege against self-incrimination is a fundamental aspect of the criminal justice system, designed to protect individuals from being compelled to provide evidence that could incriminate themselves. In this case, requiring the Plaintiff to disclose the password(s) to the mobile phone would compel them to provide information that could potentially incriminate themselves. Therefore, the application for disclosure was dismissed.
The court's decision was based on the principle that the privilege against self-incrimination is a fundamental right that must be protected. The court recognised that the disclosure sought would infringe this privilege and was therefore not permissible. The court's decision was final, and no further orders were made in relation to the application.
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