Luke Mifsud v Director of Public Prosecutions

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SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA

COURT OF APPEAL

S APCI 2018 0148

LUKE MIFSUD Applicant
v
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS Respondent

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JUDGES: WHELAN, T FORREST JJA and KENNEDY AJA
WHERE HELD: MELBOURNE
DATE OF HEARING: 7 October 2019
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 18 October 2019
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: [2019] VSCA 233
JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM: [2018] VSC 608 (Bell J)

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VEHICLES AND TRAFFIC – Driving offence – Driver exceeding speed-limit – Alleged speed of 86 kilometres per hour – Permitted speed of 40 kilometres per hour – Temporary speed-limit sign erected – Sign physically compliant with legislation – Whether lawful erection of sign is element of offence – Whether defence to prove lawful erection of sign – Leave to appeal granted – Appeal dismissed – Road Safety Road Rules 2009 rr 20, 20, 315, 316 – Road Safety (Traffic Management) Regulations 2009 pt 2.

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APPEARANCES: Counsel Solicitors

For the Applicant

Mr M Y Bearman with
Mr D P Hannan
Ondrik Larsen Lawyers
For the Respondent Mr C T Carr Mr J Cain, Solicitor for Public Prosecutions

WHELAN JA
T FORREST JA
KENNEDY AJA:



Background

  1. The applicant seeks leave to appeal from a decision of the Supreme Court of Victoria dated 18 October 2018.[1]

    [1]DPP v Mifsud [2018] VSC 609 (‘Reasons’).

  1. The applicant’s proposed grounds are as follows:

1.That the learned Trial Judge erred in finding a speed-sign establishing a speed-limit applying to a driver for a length of road to which the sign applied under Rule 21(1) of the Road Safety Rules 2009 is presumed to be lawfully authorised in the absence of proof by a defendant to the contrary.

2.That the learned Trial Judge should have found that the prosecution was required to prove that the speed-limit sign was lawfully authorised as an element of the offence of a driver exceeding the speed limit under Rule 20(1), where a speed limit sign under Rule 21(1) applied.

  1. In a notice of contention, the respondent stated:

1.The learned trial judge was correct to determine, at [23], that the prosecution was not required to prove lawful erection of a speed limit sign as part of any prosecution for exceeding the speed limit.

2.The learned trial judge erred in finding, at [22], that it was a defence to a charge of exceeding the speed limit, on a reverse onus, that a speed sign was not lawfully erected.

Factual summary

  1. The following facts are undisputed:

(a)       On 21 November 2015, the applicant was driving on Sydney Road in Somerton between Gasoline Way and Patullos Lane.

(b)      The ordinary speed-limit for that length of road was 80 kilometres per hour but a temporary speed-limit sign (‘the speed-sign’) had been erected for that length, which stated that the speed-limit was 40 kilometres per hour.  The sign was placed because of works being carried out by fire authorities at a nearby fire.  It is not known who erected the sign.  The sign substantially complied with the requirements of the Road Safety Rules 2009 (‘RS Rules’) for…

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Details
Case
[2019] VSCA 233
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Luke Mifsud versus the Director of Public Prosecutions, the defendant contested a conviction for exceeding the speed limit on a public road. Mifsud was issued a notice of intended prosecution for driving at an alleged speed of 86 kilometres per hour in a zone where the speed limit was 40 kilometres per hour. The prosecution alleged that a temporary speed-limit sign was lawfully erected, which the defendant failed to observe. Mifsud challenged the conviction on the grounds that the prosecution had to prove not only the speed at which he was travelling but also the lawful erection of the temporary speed-limit sign. The court was required to determine whether the defence needed to prove the lawful erection of the speed-limit sign and whether this was an element of the offence under the relevant legislation.

The court examined the provisions of the Road Safety Road Rules 2009 and the Road Safety (Traffic Management) Regulations 2009 to ascertain whether the lawful erection of the speed-limit sign was an element of the offence of exceeding the speed limit. The court concluded that the primary concern of the offence was the driver's compliance with the speed limit as indicated by the sign, rather than the specific process of the sign's lawful erection. It was held that the prosecution did not need to prove the lawful erection of the sign, as long as the sign was physically compliant with the legislation. The court found that the defence did not have to prove the unlawful erection of the sign to negate the offence.

The appeal was dismissed by the court, and leave to appeal to a higher court was granted. The court determined that the trial judge had correctly instructed the jury on the elements of the offence and that there was no error in the trial judge's direction. The conviction was upheld, and Mifsud's appeal was dismissed. The case serves as a reminder that in cases of alleged speeding, the focus should be on whether the driver was aware of and complied with the speed limit as indicated by a compliant speed-limit sign, rather than the specific process by which the sign was erected.

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