Lui v Minister for Immigration
[2007] FMCA 867
•5 June 2007
FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| LUI v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2007] FMCA 867 |
| MIGRATION – Application for review of decision of Migration Review Tribunal – pending hearing Department decides to remove applicant from Australia – whether such decision is a “privative clause” decision – application for injunctive relief – serious question to be tried as to jurisdictional error. |
| Migration Act1958, ss.13, 14, 29, 37, 72, 73, 109, 189, 195, 196, 198, 338, 474, 481, 482, Divisions 3A, 6, 7, Schedule 1, 2 Regulations 2.01, 2.03 Federal Magistrates Act1999, s.15 |
| WAJZ v MIMIA [2004] FCA 1332 M38/2002 v MIMIA (2003) 131 FCR 146 NATB v MIMIA (2003) 133 FCR 506 Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 474 Beyazkilinc v Manager, Baxter Immigration Reception and Processing Centre [2006] FCA 1368 Shahrooie v MIMIA [2003] FCA 996 NATB v MIMIA [2003] FCAFC 185 Kopiev v MIMIA [2000] FCA 1831 Re Minister; ex parte SE (1998) 158 ALR 735 Mastipour v Secretary, DIMIA [2004] FCA 1571 He v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1368 Li v MIMIA [2002] FCA 667 P1/2003 v MIMIA [2003] FCA 1029 Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill [2006] HCA 46 Beecham Group Ltd v Bristol Laboratories Pty Ltd (1968) 118 CLR 618 VAAN v MIMIA [2002] FCA 197 |
| Applicant: | CHUN LIN LUI |
| First Respondent | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP |
| Second Respondent: | MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL |
| File number: | BRG265 of 2007 |
| Judgment of: | Wilson FM |
| Hearing date: | 1 June 2007 |
| Date of last submission: | 1 June 2007 |
| Delivered at: | Brisbane |
| Delivered on: | 5 June 2007 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Mr M. Steele |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | Cruise Lawyers |
| Counsel for the Respondent: | Mr P Bickford |
| Solicitors for the Respondent: | Clayton Utz |
ORDERS
An injunction issue restraining the Minister, and his servants, agents and officers from removing the applicant from Australia until the final disposition of the applicant’s application to review the decision of the MRT dated 15 March 2007, and the decision to remove him from Australia, made on or about 16 May 2007.
That costs of and incidental to this application be reserved to the final hearing on 22 June 2007.
| FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT BRISBANE |
BRG 265 of 2007
| CHUN LIN LUI |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP |
First Respondent:
| MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
On 5 April 2007 the applicant filed in this court an application for judicial review of a decision of the Migration Review Tribunal (“the MRT”) notified to the applicant on 16 March 2007, wherein the MRT affirmed the decision of the delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (as he now is) not to grant the applicant a Bridging E (Class WE) visa.
On 20 April 2007 I made directions for the hearing of the application, and listed it for hearing on 22 June 2007.
Notwithstanding this hearing date, on 16 May 2007, the solicitors for the first respondent (“the Minister”) wrote to the applicant and his solicitors in the following (relevant) terms:
“We note that you have been unlawful and in detention since
27 January 2007 and that you filed an application for a substantive visa, namely a spouse visa, on 9 February 2007 with the Department which was deemed invalid pursuant to s 195 of the Migration Act 1958 (“the Act”).
We are instructed that, pursuant to s. 198 of the Act, you will be removed from Australia on 7 June 2007.
In view of the above, our client is not prepared to further delay your removal UNLESS the Court orders, on application by you, that you not be removed. The filing of your current application (i.e. your application for review of the decision of the MRT) does not of itself prevent your removal as you have not sought interim relief nor has any been granted.
Please note that absent any order from the Court restraining, prohibiting or injuncting our client from removing you, our client is of the view that it is reasonably practicable to remove you from Australia on 7 June 2007.”
This precipitated an application by the applicant, in the existing proceedings, for an order that, pending the resolution of the applicant’s application for review of the decision of the second respondent made on 15 March 2007, the first respondent and his servants, officers or agents be restrained from removing the applicant from Australia. As foreshadowed in his solicitors’ letter of 16 May 2007, the first respondent opposes the application for interlocutory relief.
The applicant is in detention. The Minister submits that the decision, pursuant to s.198(5) Migration Act1958 (“the Act”), that it is reasonably practicable to remove the applicant from Australia, is a privative clause decision, as that term is defined in s.474(2) of the Act. It follows, therefore, in the Minister’s submission, that the decision is not subject to injunction: s.474(1)(c) of the Act. This submission is slightly at odds with the terms of the solicitors’ letter which at least implicitly suggests that an application for injunctive relief could be made in the existing proceedings.
The Minister’s submission finds support in the decision of French J in WAJZ v MIMIA [2004] FCA 1332. His Honour considered, at [74], that the duty to remove a non-citizen from Australia cannot arise before a point in time “as soon as reasonably practicable” after the time at which all of the circumstances giving rise to the duty have occurred. His Honour said that the power to remove a non-citizen under s. 198 of the Act comes into existence only with the duty to remove. It is parasitic upon that duty and so only arises when it becomes “reasonably practicable” to remove the non-citizen.
French J referred to the decision of the Full Federal Court in M38/2002 v MIMIA (2003) 131 FCR 146 in which it was held that the duty to remove under s. 198 of the Act is not absolute, but only when it is reasonably practicable. Reasonably practicable is an evaluative term to be assessed by reference to all the circumstances of the case. Further, his Honour referred to the Full Court decision in NATB v MIMIA (2003) 133 FCR 506 in which the Full Court regarded it as undesirable to attempt a definition of the expression “reasonably practicable”.
However, French J accepted that s. 474 of the Act has to be construed in accordance with the judgment of the High Court in Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476, namely that s.474 does not preclude challenge to a purported decision on the basis of jurisdictional error.
More recently in Beyazkilinc v Manager, Baxter Immigration Reception and Processing Centre [2006] FCA 1368 Besanko J decided that a decision to remove an unlawful non-citizen from Australia is a privative clause decision within s. 474 of the Act. His Honour also followed the judgment of the Full Federal Court in M38/2002, supra, at [88]. His Honour held, at [41], that the question of reasonable practicability is not a jurisdictional fact, but that the proposed removal of a detainee from Australia can be challenged on other grounds which do constitute jurisdictional error, relying on WAJZ at [70].
The applicant submits that s.15 Federal Magistrates Act1999 gives the court power, in relation to matters within its jurisdiction, to make such orders as it thinks appropriate. That submission begs the question. Is it within the jurisdiction of this court to grant an injunction to restrain the carrying into effect of the decision to remove the applicant from Australia? In my view, this court can only have jurisdiction if the decision under s.198(5) of the Act was not a privative clause decision. That in turn requires the applicant to challenge the decision to remove the applicant from Australia, on the basis of some jurisdictional error.
The applicant’s counsel submitted that no decision had been made, and none had been communicated by the Minister to the applicant. However, I think it is at least strongly arguable that, fairly read, the solicitors’ letter of 16 May 2007 does contain the decision, and that it was thereby notified to the applicant. If the applicant requires the Minister to state reasons for the decision he should, as was submitted by counsel for the Minister, request a statement of reasons.
The authorities relied upon by the applicant do not deal with the issue raised by the Minister, in express terms. In Shahrooie v MIMIA [2003] FCA 996 Lander J consider the case of an applicant who sought an injunction to prevent his removal from Australia. An application for a protection visa had been dismissed. At the time the applicant sought the injunction, there was no application for a substantive visa on foot [as in the present case] and the applicant was in detention [as in the present case], and liable to remain in detention until he was removed from Australia. His Honour referred to s.198 of the Act, which his Honour accepted imposed obligations upon officers of the Department. At [27] his Honour observed that the applicant was a detainee who had made a valid application for a substantive visa which had been refused and finally determined. He had not made another valid application for a substantive visa. His Honour noted that in M38/2002 v MIMIA, supra, the Full Court concluded at [72] – [78] that s.198(6) imposed an imperative duty upon the officer of the Department which required the officer to act to remove the applicant as soon as ‘reasonably practicable’ after the events in s.198(6) had occurred. The Full Court noted that the officer’s duty, whilst imperative, was not absolute in that it arose ‘as soon as reasonably practicable’. His Honour granted an injunction to restrain removal, but did not consider any argument that the decision to remove was a privative clause decision. His Honour’s decision seems to have turned on whether the officer who made the decision under s.198 of the Act was required, in making a decision that it was reasonably practicable to remove the applicant from Australia, could take into account whether the applicant was a ‘refugee’, notwithstanding the adverse determination of the protection visa application.
In NATB v MIMIA [2003] FCAFC 185 the Full Court left open the question whether any decision made by an officer under s.198(6) was subject to review having regard to the provisions of s.474 as explained in Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia. However, as explained by Besanko J in Beyazkilinc, this question seems to have been determined by the Full Court in M38/2002.
The applicant’s counsel referred to Kopiev v MIMIA [2000] FCA 1831 in which Sackville J considered an application by the Minister to summarily dismiss an application to review a decision refusing to grant the applicant a Bridging Visa E (Class WE). The applicant had been removed from the country prior to the hearing of the application. His Honour did not consider, and was not asked to consider whether the decision to remove the applicant was a privative clause decision. This was because his Honour was being asked to summarily dismiss the proceedings.
At [24] his Honour said that in determining what is reasonably practicable it may be relevant that there are legal proceedings on foot to which the non-citizen is a party or which he or she is required to attend. His Honour thought that nothing said by Hayne J in Re Minister; ex parte SE (1998) 158 ALR 735 at 740 suggested otherwise.
At [26] his Honour observed that whatever the correct construction of s.198(6) of the Act, it seems that s.482(1) [presumably referring to what is now s.481 of the Act] permitted the Minister to remove the applicant from Australia notwithstanding the institution of proceedings seeking review of the MRT’s decision. At [28] his Honour concluded that the Minister was entitled, if not required, to remove the applicant from Australia notwithstanding that the applicant had instituted proceedings in the court.
The applicant also relied on Mastipour v Secretary, DIMIA [2004] FCA 1571 in which Mansfield J considered an application for injunctive relief where the applicant was being held in detention. His application for a protection visa had been refused, and finally determined as that expression is defined in s.5(9) of the Act. His Honour considered a submission that the court could not grant interlocutory relief because to do so would involve the court making an order inconsistent with s.198(6) of the Act. His Honour said at [15] that the question of whether there exists power to make the orders sought involves consideration of two propositions which apparently intersect. One is that the court cannot make an order which requires the officer of the Department to act inconsistently with a statutory obligation. The other is the Court’s power to protect the integrity of its own processes. The applicant submitted that the court could make an order to prevent steps being taken that could frustrate or subvert its process. A similar submission was made by the applicant before me.
After referring to He v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1368 in which Sackville J doubted that the proper interpretation of s.198(6) of the Act precluded the restraining of removal to enable proceedings to be conducted, and the decision of Sackville J in Li v MIMIA [2002] FCA 667 in which he expressed the same opinion at [20], his Honour noted that French J in P1/2003 v MIMIA [2003] FCA 1029 accepted that the mandatory terms of s.198 leaves no room for unlawful non citizens to remain in Australia merely for the purpose of pursuing legal proceedings in this country. After reviewing the authorities, Mansfield J followed the approach of Sackville J. His Honour did so on the basis that the duty in s.198(6) is a relative rather than an absolute one as explained in M38/2002. His Honour was strongly influenced by the fact that in the case before him, the applicant was likely to have to give evidence. There were significant issues of credit involved. That is not so in the case before me.
In my view, it should be concluded that it is strongly arguable that the decision of the officer of the Department that it is reasonably practicable to remove the applicant from Australia is a privative clause decision. The applicant must therefore raise an arguable case of jurisdictional error regarding that decision before the court can restrain the officers of the Department from acting pursuant to s.198(5) of the Act.
The applicant has now partly addressed this problem by filing an application to review the decision referred to in the letter of 16 May 2007. The applicant does not set out in the application what jurisdictional error is said to affect the decision that it is reasonably practicable to remove the applicant from Australia. However, if the Court concludes that there is an arguable case (or, more properly, a serious question to be tried) then an injunction could issue restraining the Minister from acting on the decision until the Court deals with that application for review. Otherwise, the process of the court may be rendered nugatory, and any substantive relief granted by it of no effect. In turn, in deciding whether it is reasonably practicable to remove the applicant from Australia, the court may be called upon to consider whether there is a serious question to be tried on the principal application for relief, namely the challenge to the decision of the MRT. That is, if the officer’s decision that it is reasonably practicable to remove the applicant from Australia was based on the factual premise that the applicant had no prospect of success in his application for judicial review, and that factual premise is arguably wrong, it would be open to the applicant that the officer’s decision was affected by jurisdictional error.
It is common ground that to be entitled to injunctive relief, the applicant must demonstrate:
a)that there is a serious question to be tried; and
b)whether the balance of convenience favours the grant of the injunction.
The balance of convenience clearly favours the grant of an injunction, and the Minister did not submit otherwise. Therefore, the only issue for me to decide is whether there is a serious question to be tried. The Minister argues that the application for judicial review is futile and bound to fail. There being no other basis for the applicant remaining in Australia, it is submitted that no challenge could be made to the decision that it is reasonably practicable to remove him.
The applicant submits that it is not necessary to show that he will succeed on his application for review, but rather that he has sufficient likelihood of success to justify in the circumstances the preservation of the status quo pending the trial (citing Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill [2006] HCA 46 at [65]).
The applicant further submits that how strong the probability of success needs to be depends upon the nature of the rights the applicant asserts and the practical consequences likely to flow from the order he seeks (citing Beecham Group Ltd v Bristol Laboratories Pty Ltd (1968) 118 CLR 618 at 622).
It is then necessary to examine, at least in a preliminary way, the decision of the Tribunal and determine whether the applicant can show an arguable case of jurisdictional error. Before doing so, it is necessary to understand the statutory framework in which the relevant decisions were made.
By ss.13 and 14 of the Act, because he does not hold an effective visa, the applicant is an unlawful non-citizen. He became an unlawful non-citizen when he was detained attempting to use a forged travel document on 26 January 2007.
By ss.29 and following of the Act, a non-citizen may be granted a visa giving him permission to remain in Australia. There are prescribed classes of visas, specified by Regulation: s.31. The Regulations can prescribe criteria for the grant of visas. Section 37 provides for a class of temporary visa, known as bridging visas, which are granted under Subdivision AF of Division 3 of Part 2 of the Act.
Section 73 of the Act provides that if an eligible non-citizen satisfies the criteria for a bridging visa, the Minister may grant such a visa. There was no argument on the hearing of the interlocutory application that the applicant was not, or could not be an ‘eligible non-citizen’ as define din s.72(1) of the Act.
Division 3A deals with sponsorship, and that it can be a criterion for prescribed visas.
Divisions 6 and 7 deal with keeping certain non-citizens in immigration detention. Section 195 of the Act is particularly relevant in this case. It provides that a detainee may apply for a visa, but provides strict time limits for doing so. It is common ground in this case that the applicant did not make an application for a substantive visa (as opposed to a bridging visa) within the time prescribed by the section. The effect of this is that the applicant is precluded, whilst in detention, from now applying for a substantive visa. He can, however, apply for a bridging visa. Section 196 of the Act provides that an unlawful non-citizen must be kept in detention until he is either removed from Australia, deported or granted a visa. In the present case, if the applicant is granted a bridging visa he would be released from detention. His argument is that, upon being released from detention, he could then apply for a substantive visa, unconstrained by the time limits in s.195(1) of the Act. The Minister did not submit on the hearing of the application that there was any time limit that would preclude the applicant from applying for a substantive visa (such as a spouse visa) if he was released from detention.
As discussed above, s.198 of the Act deals with the removal from Australia of unlawful non-citizens. Because the applicant is a detainee, the officers of the department must remove him as soon as reasonably practicable. The question becomes whether it is reasonably practicable to remove the applicant from Australia if the decision to do so is based on jurisdictional error, and whether such jurisdictional error can be established by showing that the decision-maker acted according to a wrong understanding of the facts or was reached by an erroneous understanding of the merits of the applicant’s application for judicial review of the decision of the MRT.
The decision not to grant the applicant a bridging visa is an MRT reviewable decision, as provided in s. 338 of the Act.
Regulation 2.01 provides for the classes of visa in Schedule 1, and Regulation 2.03 provides for the criteria set out in Schedule 2. A bridging visa E (Class WE) applied for by the applicant in this case is specified in Schedule 1, clause 1305
The criteria in Schedule 2 for the relevant bridging visa are those set out for subclass 050.
The applicant is a citizen of the People’s Republic of China. He entered Australia on a forged passport. It was found by the Tribunal (Reasons page 4) that the applicant first entered Australia on
11 November 2002 as the holder of a fraudulently obtained Australian passport. The applicant obtained this passport by submitting a forged Australian Citizenship certificate as proof of entitlement to Australian citizenship. The applicant admitted to entering Australia as the holder of an Australian passport obtained by fraudulent means. The Minister has referred to the applicant’s record of interview (at folio 24 of the Agreed Bundle of Documents) as supporting a conclusion that the applicant knew that his passport was invalid.
The applicant has been in detention since 26 January 2007.
On 31 January 2007 he first lodged an application for a Bridging E visa which was refused on 2 February. The applicant did not apply for review of this decision.
On 9 February the applicant lodged an application for a spouse visa sponsored by his wife. On 12 February this application was deemed invalid pursuant to s. 195 of the Act, as it was not lodged within time.
On 19 February the Department issued the applicant’s wife with a Notice of Intention to Consider Cancellation pursuant to s. 109 of the Act. This remains unresolved. The applicant’s wife lodged an application for citizenship on 6 March 2007.
On 5 March 2007, the applicant again applied for a bridging visa. In his application he stated that he would apply for a spouse visa, relying on his wife’s permanent residency in Australia. This was notwithstanding that the previous application had been deemed invalid. As stated above, the applicant’s argument before the court was that if granted a bridging visa, once released he could then apply for a spouse visa.
On 7 March 2007 the Minister’s delegate refused the grant of the visa on the basis that the applicant did not meet the primary criteria for the grant of such a visa, set out in Clause 050-212 of Schedule 2 to the Regulations.
On 9 March 2007 the applicant applied to the MRT for review of the delegate’s decision.
The MRT affirmed the decision on 15 March and communicated that decision to the applicant on 16 March 2007.
The applicant does not criticize the reasoning process of the Tribunal wherein it accepted that he made a valid application for a Bridging visa and meets the criteria in clause 050.211. The Tribunal did disagree with the delegate’s decision that subclause 050-212(3)(b) was not satisfied in the circumstances of the case.
At page 8 of its reasons, the Tribunal accepted that the applicant could make a valid application for a substantive visa of a kind which can be granted if he is in Australia if he was released from detention. If he was released from detention there would be nothing precluding him from lodging an application for an onshore spouse visa. Therefore, the Tribunal was satisfied that the applicant prima facie met the primary criteria for the grant of a Bridging E visa namely subclause 050.212(3)(b). It seems, therefore, that the Tribunal accepted the applicant’s argument that he could again apply for a substantive visa (a spouse visa) upon his release from detention, and therefore the primary criteria was satisfied.
Apart from questioning whether this was a jurisdictional matter, the Minister says that the MRT erred in finding that the delegate erred in failing to consider clause 050.212(3)(b) in Schedule 2 to the Regulations. The Minister argues that the applicant had applied for a substantive visa, albeit out of time. The Minister argues that s.195(2) of the Act prevents the applicant from again applying for a substantive visa. However, this depends upon the construction of the word “valid” in clause 050.212(3)(a). If the application for a spouse visa was made out of time, arguably it was not valid. The criteria would therefore not be satisfied. The applicant’s argument as to whether clause 050.212(3)(b) can be satisfied depends on its proper construction, and whether the Minister or his delegate turned his mind to the issue.
In my view this issue of construction is one that should not be summarily determined. The MRT has decided it in favour of the applicant. The Minister says that the Tribunal erred in this regard. It cannot be said that the applicant has no prospect of persuading the court that his, and the Tribunal’s interpretation, is correct. Accordingly, in my view, the proper construction of clause 050.212(3) in Schedule 2 is a serious issue that ought to be determined at the final hearing.
The Minister then argues that, even if successful on this point, the application is futile because the applicant simply cannot obtain a spouse visa. He would then be seeking a bridging visa to enable him to apply for a visa that he could never be granted.
I should say at this point that the applicant in argument raised as a possibility (and put it no higher than that) that the applicant may apply for a protection visa, if he obtains a bridging visa. This was not the subject of any evidence. As counsel for the Minister pointed out, the applicant could have, but never has, applied for a protection visa. The suggestion of such an application is entirely speculative and there is no evidence to support it. I do not regard the applicant as having demonstrated that there is a serious question to be determined, namely whether he can or might apply for a protection visa.
The Minister’s argument that the applicant can no longer successfully apply for a spouse visa was put on two bases. First, it was said that the applicant can not apply for such a visa, because he failed to do so within the time stipulated in s.195(1) of the Act. It was said that a second application must similarly be doomed to fail. However, this argument presupposes that the applicant remains in detention. The Minister submitted that the applicant’s case proceeded upon a mistaken understanding of s.195. In my opinion, there is a serious question to be determined as to whether that is so. The applicant must only remain in detention if fails to obtain a bridging visa. That is the whole purpose of the application to review the decision of the MRT. If the applicant obtains a bridging visa, he will be released from detention, and arguably can then apply for a spouse visa.
The Minister says that the Tribunal failed to find that the applicant would apply for a spouse visa if he was released from detention, or that he would fulfil the criteria for the grant of that visa. The Minister argued that because of the doubts surrounding the ability of the applicant’s wife to be his sponsor, any application for a spouse visa must fail.
However, given the Minister’s concession that the Tribunal failed to consider this matter properly, and failed to make critical findings, it must be open to serious argument that the matter ought be remitted to the Tribunal to be dealt with properly. No doubt if evidence before the Tribunal established unequivocally that the applicant could not successfully apply for a substantive visa, it must then conclude that the primary criteria in clause 050.212(3)(b) could not be satisfied. However, those matters amount, in my opinion, to seriously arguable issues that ought be properly argued on the final hearing, and not determined summarily.
The applicant also referred to the reasons of the MRT in its consideration of whether the applicant satisfied clauses 050.223 and 050.224 of the criteria. Whilst the criticism by the applicant of the reasoning process might be answered by the decision of the Federal Court in VAAN v MIMIA [2002] FCA 197 set out at page 3 of the Tribunal’s reasons, I think that the question of whether the Tribunal properly considered clause 050.223, and its reasoning process in that regard is one that is susceptible to competing substantive arguments. It is a matter that raises, in my view, a serious question to be determined.
I reach the same conclusion in respect of the Tribunal’s dealing with clause 050.224, and whether it adopted a proper approach to it.
As the issues have not yet been fully argued, it is preferable that I do not express any concluded views on the merits of the competing arguments.
It follows from what I have said that there is a serious question to be determined as to whether the Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error in determining the applicant’s application for a bridging visa.
Having concluded that the applicant’s case is not spurious or unarguable, it must be arguable that the decision of the officers of the Department under s.198(5) of the Act was also affected by jurisdictional error. The officers no doubt proceeded on the understanding that the applicant enjoyed no prospects of success on his application for judicial review. If his application was successful (as to which I express no view) then the applicant would be entitled to remain in Australia, at least until his application for a substantive visa was determined. In those circumstances, if the applicant was a lawful non-citizen, could it be said that it was reasonably practicable to remove him from Australia?
An injunction should issue restraining the Minister, and his servants, agents and officers from removing the applicant from Australia until the final disposition of the applicant’s application to review the decision of the MRT dated 15 March 2007, and the decision to remove him from Australia, made on or about 16 May 2007. I will hear the parties as to the form of orders that ought be made.
I certify that the preceding fifty-eight (58) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Wilson FM
Associate: Lynnette Chin
Date: 5 June 2007