Ludowyk v Superannuation Complaints Tribunal

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Ludowyk v Superannuation Complaints Tribunal [2013] FCA 692

Citation: Ludowyk v Superannuation Complaints Tribunal [2013] FCA 692
Parties: PATRICIA ANNE LUDOWYK v SUPERANNUATION COMPLAINTS TRIBUNAL
File number: ACD 70 of 2012
Judge: FOSTER J
Date of judgment: 16 July 2013
Catchwords: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – whether the Superannuation Complaints Tribunal (the Tribunal) committed errors of law when it decided to treat the subject matter of a second complaint as having been adequately dealt with by its determination of an earlier complaint and thus decided to treat the second complaint as withdrawn pursuant to s 22(3)(d) of the Superannuation (Resolution of Complaints) Act 1993 (Cth) (the Complaints Act) – whether, in arriving at its decision to treat the second complaint as withdrawn, the Tribunal applied the wrong test for determining both complaints – whether, having regard to the true interpretation of s 14(2) and s 37(3), (4), (5) and (6) of the Complaints Act, the Tribunal is to conduct its review as if it were tantamount to a hearing de novo or whether it is required first of all to evaluate the decision under complaint in order to ascertain whether or not it was unfair, unreasonable or both before deciding whether it is obliged to affirm the decision under complaint or whether it should set aside, vary or remit that decision
Legislation: Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) s 44
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth), ss 5, 10(2)(b)(iii), 11(1), 11(3)
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), s 39B
Superannuation Act 1976 (Cth), ss 80, 137, 153AM, 153AP, 157
Superannuation Act 1990 (Cth)
Superannuation (Resolution of Complaints) Act 1993 (Cth), ss 11, 12, 14(2), 21, 22, 37, 39, 40, 45, 46
Federal Court Rules 2011, rr 8.01, 8.03, 8.24(b), 31.01, 33.12(1), 33.34, 33.40
Cases cited: Cameron v Board of Trustees of the State Public Sector Superannuation Scheme (2003) 130 FCR 122 cited
Lykogiannis v Retail Employees Superannuation Pty Ltd (2000) 97 FCR 361 cited
National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd v Campbell (2000) 99 FCR 562 cited
Retail Employees Superannuation Pty Ltd v Crocker (2001) 48 ATR 359 cited
Date of hearing: Decided on the papers
Date of last submissions: 1 February 2013
Place: Sydney (via video link to Canberra)
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 114
Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person
Counsel for the Respondent: The Respondent submitted save as to costs

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

ACD 70 of 2012

BETWEEN:

PATRICIA ANNE LUDOWYK
Applicant

AND:

SUPERANNUATION COMPLAINTS TRIBUNAL
Respondent

JUDGE:

FOSTER J

DATE OF ORDER:

16 JULY 2013

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY (VIA VIDEO LINK TO CANBERRA)

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The folder of documents (including the index to that folder) lodged by the applicant with the Court on 1 February 2013 be marked as Exhibit “A”.

2.By 23 July 2013, the applicant file and serve an Amended Originating Application in accordance with the draft Amended Originating Application dated 22 November…

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Details
Case
[2013] FCA 692
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Federal Court, Ms Ludowyk challenged the Superannuation Complaints Tribunal's (SCT) decision to reject her claim for a late election to preserve her superannuation rights following her resignation from the Commonwealth in 1988. The court had to determine whether the SCT's decision contained errors of law warranting its annulment under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (ADJR Act). The primary legal issue was whether the SCT's refusal to accept Ms Ludowyk's late election was based on a proper application of the law, specifically section 157 of the Superannuation Act 1976 (1976 Act) and the relevant guidelines.

The court examined the facts surrounding Ms Ludowyk's employment history, her attempt to make a late election in 1996, and the SCT's assessment of her claim. Ms Ludowyk argued that the SCT should have accepted her late election due to misleading information on the election form and her lack of awareness of her rights at the time of her resignation. The Commissioner initially accepted her late election but the SCT later declined it. The court found that the SCT had considered the new evidence presented by Ms Ludowyk, including the misleading caption on the election form and her lack of awareness of her rights, but remained unpersuaded that the late election should be accepted. The court concluded that the SCT's decision was not made in error and did not exceed its jurisdiction. Therefore, the court dismissed Ms Ludowyk's application for judicial review.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

The precise issue which arises for determination in the present proceeding is, therefore, whether this Court should make an order setting aside the Tribunal’s decision communicated to Ms Ludowyk by the 24 July letter because the decision involved one or more errors of law (as to which see s 5(1)(f) and s 11 of the ADJR Act). The Relevant Facts In this section of these Reasons, I propose to record relevant facts and matters which took place between the date when Ms Ludowyk resigned from her employment with the Commonwealth in 1988 (viz 29 September 1988) and the making of the Tribunal’s decision in July 2012 which is challenged by Ms Ludowyk in this proceeding. On 14 August 1989, Ms Ludowyk commenced a second period of employment with the Commonwealth in a temporary capacity without joining the CSS. In September 1988, she had not intended to resume employment with the Commonwealth. On 8 June 1993, Ms Ludowyk became a permanent employee of the Commonwealth once again. She was then a full-time permanent employee of AusAID. At this point, she was admitted to the Public Service Superannuation Scheme constituted under the Superannuation Act 1990 (Cth). By letter dated 22 September 1996, addressed to the Commissioner of ComSuper, Ms Ludowyk sought to make a late election to preserve her superannuation rights pursuant to s 157(1) of the 1976 Act. In her letter dated 22 September 1996, Ms Ludowyk claimed that she had resumed employment with the Commonwealth within one year of having resigned her employment on 29 September 1988 and had continued to be employed in the Commonwealth Public Service in full-time and part-time capacities ever since. She claimed that she had not appreciated the advantages of preserving her superannuation benefits when she elected not to do so in September 1988. The Commissioner wrote to Ms Ludowyk by letter dated 7 November 1996. In that letter, the Commissioner indicated to Ms Ludowyk that the Commissioner accepted Ms Ludowyk’s letter dated 22 September 1996 as a late election under s 157 of the 1976 Act. The Commissioner enclosed with his letter copies of the relevant sections of the 1976 Act, a copy of the CSS Board of Trustees guidelines and a blank Form S302. The Commissioner requested Ms Ludowyk to respond to those parts of the guidelines which she considered to be relevant to her application. The Commissioner also enquired of the Department of Veterans’ Affairs in order to ascertain whether Ms Ludowyk had, in fact, received any advice or counselling in relation to the choice which she had made in respect of her superannuation benefits in late September 1988. By letter dated 21 November 1996, the Department of Veterans’ Affairs advised the Commissioner that it was difficult to provide answers to the questions asked of it given the lapse of time and the fact that the relevant staff had left the Department. The Department observed that, if Ms Ludowyk had questioned the preservation option outlined in the Form S2R in 1988, she would have been referred to ComSuper for advice.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Ms Ludowyk has failed to make out her proposition that the Tribunal’s decision of 20 April 2007 was ultra vires the Tribunal in the sense in which she has used that expression.The New Evidence Point At [17] of ARIA’s Statement of Reasons dated 4 May 2010, under the heading “Request for Reconsideration”, ARIA recorded the following matters:Request for ReconsiderationOn 18 August 2009, Dr Ludowyk submitted another lengthy request for reconsideration on the grounds that the evidence she submitted on 23 June 2008 was in fact new evidence not previously considered. Dr Ludowyk forwarded copies of documents that had already been provided, as well as a copy of an internal SCT file note which was relevant to her case and not previously known to the Trustee. According to Dr Ludowyk, the new evidence comprised: “i)evidence of a Similar case;ii)the fact that DVA lost my file and have never provided any Information from my file to ComSuper – therefore ComSuper is basing their case on assumptions – not the facts – and they still can’t find my file;iii)ask that ComSuper fully consider the fact that a Base Grade Clerk actioned my exit rather than a Personnel Officer as per her signature on the documents; iv)recognise that there is no proof that anyone other than Ms Nagel actioned my exit; v)understand that I do not remember being given any notes/pamphlets accompanying the S2R form; vi)I have not received the relevant material requested (e.g. F155 and other documents which I still haven’t received even from the FOI documents when I requested it); vii)the inappropriateness of my only next course of action being going to the Federal Court against a bevy of government lawyers with the inability as a citizen to meet these legal costs; and viii)recognise that it is contrary to model litigant guidelines proclaimed under Section 55Z of the Judiciary Act 1903 for me to not be given all documentation and have to take legal action and for my case not to be considered by an independent reviewer.” Dr Ludowyk requested that her “case be considered by someone who is independent and without a vested interest.” Dr Ludowyk went on to claim that “the following considerations are important” in her case:“(a)That I had no knowledge of my right to elect to fully preserve my benefits at the time of resignation(b)That ComSuper had no interest in telling people of these rights at the time (c)That ComSuper made no effort to inform Departmental staff of these rights at the time (d)The fact that a base grade clerk performed my exit interview and did not give me appropriate advice regarding my superannuation (e)The fact that the CSS (Superannuation Act 1976) was closed on 1 July 1990. There was a wealth of Parliamentary debate over the contingent liability of the Commonwealth arising from the CSS being unsustainable. Late elections simply added to that contingent liability. In the mid to late 1980’s ComSuper determined not to tell anyone anything about late elections in the hope of restraining the liabilities of the CSS. (f)The fact of the matter is that superannuation rights were a term and condition of the employment of public servants in the 1980’s. An individual public servant’s CSS superannuation entitlement is not dependant on a retrospective view of the Commonwealth as to whether those rights may have been too generous. They are both statutory and contractual in nature. It is poor governance for citizens to be forced into expensive legal battles to get due process. (g)The fact that similar cases to mine are accepted for late election (eg. Ms Kennedy and others). Dr Ludowyk’s letter dated 18 August 2009 was accepted as a formal request for reconsideration of the Trustee’s decision and in a letter dated 15 September 2009, she was requested to forward the $150 reconsideration fee.

Decision

Reasons for decision

At [16]–[17] of its Statement of Reasons, and after considering Ms Ludowyk’s case in considerable detail, the CSS Board said:ConclusionHaving considered the new submissions and evidence submitted on Dr Ludowyk’s behalf, the Board was not persuaded that a different finding from the finding made by the previous Committee and the Board should be made under any of the guidelines.Decision of the BoardFrom the foregoing considerations, the board remained of the view that grounds of the kind set out in the guidelines did not exist sufficient to justify a direction under subsection 157(1) that Dr Ludowyk’s late election to preserve her rights be treated as though it had been made within the specified time limit. It therefore decided to affirm the decision taken by the Board on reconsideration of a decision taken by a delegate not to accept a late election by Dr Ludowyk to preserve her superannuation rights following her resignation on 22 December 1996. By letter dated 12 September 2005 from Ms Ludowyk to the CSS Board, Ms Ludowyk requested yet a further reconsideration of her case in light of what she described as “new evidence”. Under cover of her letter, she enclosed a copy of an Advice from Counsel retained by her, Mr A Anforth. Mr Anforth’s opinion is, for the most part, an assessment of the relevant case law which he considered ought to be applied to the circumstances of Ms Ludowyk’s case. The so called “new evidence” said to have become available is recorded at [49] of Mr Anforth’s opinion in the following terms:There is new evidence in the fact that Comsuper had hitherto not taken account of the fact that the set of notes attached to the S2R form contained in fact contained the misleading caption. That remark refers back to [42]–[43] of Mr Anforth’s opinion. Those paragraphs are in the following terms:The refund/preservation election form signed by Dr Rogers [referring to Ms Ludowyk] is attached and has been extracted from the Comsuper FOI records. The first page is headed “Resignation benefit Application-Refund Information”. It contains notes on refunds and contains the caption:“This form is to be used by persons who have ceased employment with the Commonwealth and have not attained their minimum retiring age and do not intent [sic] to resume or take up Commonwealth employment in the near future.”The second page of the form is headed “Preservation Information” and contains notes on preservations. At [45]–[46] of his opinion, Mr Anforth expressed his reasons for his opinion that the notes on the relevant form were misleading. He said:The caption appears on the page containing the notes on refunds and does not appear on the page containing the notes on preservations. An ordinary reading of the first page of the form, with the caption and the notes on refund (but not reference to preservations) suggests to the uninformed reader that anyone leaving Commonwealth employment and not likely to return to that employment in the near future, should apply for a refund. The above connotation carried by the caption is wrong at law and positively misleading. The right to the preservation option is not conditional on any intention to return to employment with the APS, whether in the near future or otherwise.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In the draft Amended OA, Ms Ludowyk raised additional grounds of review which were not pressed in her Written Submissions (Grounds 38–47 failure to take account of relevant considerations and Grounds 48 and 49 failure to provide adequate reasons). As Ms Ludowyk has not seen fit to make any submission in support of these additional grounds, I do not propose to address them. Consideration The Relevant Legislative Provisions Sections 11 and 12 of the Complaints Act provide:11 Tribunal objectivesThe Tribunal must, in carrying out its functions or exercising its powers under this Act, pursue the objectives of providing mechanisms for:(a)the conciliation of complaints; and(b)if a complaint cannot be resolved by conciliation—the review of the decision or conduct to which the complaint relates;that are fair, economical, informal and quick.12 Functions(1)The functions of the Tribunal are:(a)to inquire into a complaint and to try to resolve it by conciliation; and(b)if the complaint cannot be resolved by conciliation—to review the decision or conduct to which the complaint relates;(c)any functions conferred on the Tribunal by or under any other Act.(2)In addition to the functions conferred on the Tribunal by a law of the Commonwealth, the Tribunal may perform functions conferred on the Tribunal by a law of a State or Territory, where:(a)the functions relate to one or more exempt public sector superannuation schemes; and(b)the schemes are not specified in regulations made for the purposes of section 4A. Section 14(2) of the Complaints Act provides that a person may make a complaint (other than an excluded complaint) to the Tribunal that the relevant decision by a trustee whose decisions are subject to review under the Act is or was unfair or unreasonable. Ms Ludowyk’s complaints are not “excluded complaints” within s 14(2). Her current complaint is that ARIA’s 4 May 2010 decision is unfair or unreasonable because, by that decision, ARIA declined to uphold her late election claim in circumstances where, had it properly considered that claim pursuant to s 157 of the 1976 Act, it would have acceded to it. Section 21 of the Complaints Act provides that a complainant may withdraw a complaint at any time. Section 22 of the Complaints Act provides:22 Power to treat a complaint as having been withdrawn(1)If:(a)a complainant makes a complaint; and(b)the Tribunal is satisfied, either after having communicated with the complainant, or having made reasonable attempts to contact the complainant and having failed to do so, that the complainant does not intend to proceed with the complaint;the Tribunal must deal with the complaint as if it had been withdrawn by the complainant under section 21.(2)If the Tribunal decides to treat a complaint as withdrawn under subsection (1), the Tribunal must give notice in writing to:(a)if the Tribunal communicated with the complainant—the complainant; and(b)the other party, or each of the other parties, to the complaint;of that decision and the reasons for that decision.(3)The Tribunal may also decide to treat a complaint as if it had been withdrawn under section 21, in the following cases:(a)if the complaint has been made to the Tribunal and relates to a decision or conduct (other than a decision of a trustee, RSA provider, insurer or other decision maker to pay a disability benefit because of total and permanent disability)—more than 12 months have elapsed since the decision complained of was made or the conduct complained of was undertaken; or(b)if the complaint has been made to the Tribunal—the Tribunal thinks that the complaint is trivial, vexatious, misconceived or lacking in substance;(c)if a remedy has been sought from some other body in relation to the subject matter of the complaint—the Tribunal thinks that the subject matter of the complaint has been, or is likely to be, dealt with by that body;(d)if the subject matter of the complaint has already been dealt with by the Tribunal or by another statutory authority—the Tribunal thinks that the subject matter of the complaint has been adequately dealt with;(e)if the Tribunal thinks that the subject matter of the complaint could be more effectively or conveniently dealt with by another statutory authority.(4)If the Tribunal decides to treat a complaint as withdrawn under subsection (3), the Tribunal must give notice in writing of that decision and of the reasons for that decision:(a)to the complainant; and(b)to the other party, or each of the other parties, to the complaint.