LUDLOW and LEGAL PRACTICE BOARD

Case

[2025] WASAT 65

27 NOVEMBER 2025


JURISDICTION     :   STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL

ACT:   LEGAL PROFESSION UNIFORM LAW (WA)

CITATION:   LUDLOW and LEGAL PRACTICE BOARD [2025] WASAT 65

MEMBER:   PRESIDENT GLANCY

HEARD:   DETERMINED ON THE DOCUMENTS

DELIVERED          :   4 JULY 2025

PUBLISHED           :   27 NOVEMBER 2025

FILE NO/S:   VR 47 of 2024

BETWEEN:   JEREMY RICHARD LUDLOW

Applicant

AND

LEGAL PRACTICE BOARD

Respondent


Catchwords:

Interim application - Applicant seeks that Respondent be compelled to admit or deny certain assertions and allegations - Whether such an order would narrow issues in dispute or clarify Respondent's position - Veracity of assertions and allegations not relevant to the resolution of the issues in dispute - Where making such an order would be contrary to the objectives set out in s 9 of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) - Determination on the documents

Legislation:

Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA), s 56(2), 56(3)
Legal Profession Uniform Law (WA), s 100, s 100(1)(a), s 100(7)
Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2022 (WA), s 118(2)
State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 9, s 9(b), s 9(2), s 17, s 18, s 24, s 27(1), s 27(2), s 27(3), s 30, s 32(6), s 32(7)(a), s 34(1), s 34(5), s 35(6), s 46(2), s 60(2), Pt 3 Div 3, Pt 4

Result:

Interim application dismissed

Category:    B

Representation:

Counsel:

Applicant : N/A
Respondent : N/A

Solicitors:

Applicant : In Person
Respondent : Legal Practice Board of Western Australia

Case(s) referred to in decision(s):

Nugawela and Medical Board of Australia [2023] WASAT 82

REASONS FOR DECISION OF THE TRIBUNAL:

Introduction

  1. On 15 May 2024 the Practitioner commenced proceedings pursuant to s 100(1)(a) of the Legal Profession Uniform Law (WA), by which he seeks a review of a decision of the Legal Practice Board of Western Australia (Board), communicated to him on 17 April 2024, to refuse to issue him a practising certificate on the ground that the Board did not consider him a fit and proper person to hold the certificate.  He seeks orders from the Tribunal granting him a certificate and requiring the Board to pay the costs of the application. 

  2. The Practitioner has brought an interim application in the review proceedings in which he seeks to have the Board ordered to provide a written statement answering certain statements, allegations or assertions made by him.  He submits that 'in essence [he] is asking the Tribunal to order that he be permitted to rely on something broadly equivalent to a pleading'.[1]  These reasons for decision concern the interim application. 

    [1] Applicant's outline of submissions in support of interim application filed 5 September 2024, [21]. 

  3. The Practitioner says in his interim application that the answers to the statements, allegations or assertions he poses may:

    1.narrow the issues in dispute between the parties; or

    2.in respect of matter which the Board refuses to admit, will force the Board to comply with paragraph 1 of the Tribunal's orders of 25 June 2024, which required the Board to file a bundle of documents in its possession or under its control which are relevant to the Tribunal's review of the decision.[2] 

    [2] Interim Application filed 5 September 2024 (Interim Application).

  4. The Board opposes the making of the orders sought.

Outcome

  1. For the reasons set out below I have concluded that the Practitioner's interim application should be dismissed. 

Application determined on the documents

  1. Pursuant to s 60(2) of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) (SAT Act) this interim application has been determined entirely on the documents.  Those documents are:

    1.the application for review dated 15 May 2024;

    2.the Interim Application, including the attachment to that application which set out the orders sought and the grounds upon which they are sought and a [Redacted];

    3.the Practitioner's outline of submissions in support of the interim application dated 7 October 2024;

    4.the Practitioner's undated bundle of documents in support of his interim application filed with the Tribunal on 7 October 2024;

    5.the Board's submissions in response to the Practitioner's interim application filed 28 October 2024; and

    6.the Practitioner's response to the Board's submissions filed 12 February 2025.

Background to the application

  1. Before going further, it is necessary to put the Interim Application into context by setting out some of the background to the matter.  In doing so I make no findings of fact in relation to these matters but only recite relevant aspects of the Practitioner's version of events, or other uncontroversial background facts. 

  2. [Redacted].

  3. [Redacted].

  4. The Practitioner complained to the Legal Profession Complaints Committee (LPCC), which was statutory committee of the Board, about [Redacted], which he regarded as amounting to serious professional misconduct.

  5. [Redacted].  The Practitioner says that although this was unknown to him at the time, it meant that the LPCC had a conflict of interest in dealing with his complaint.  He says he was not notified about the conflict, which he regards as 'obvious'. 

  6. The Practitioner says that the LPCC, and hence the Board, failed to take appropriate action in relation to his complaint as a result of the conflict.  

  7. The Practitioner subsequently complained about the LPCC's failure to inform him of the conflict and asserted that, by not responding appropriately in relation to his complaints, [Redacted], the LSCC and the Board and their respective members were also [Redacted].

  8. On 11 April 2019, the Executive Director of the Board wrote to the Practitioner (11 April 2019 Letter) stating [Redacted] 'appeared to be baseless' and (in the Practitioner's words) 'threatening dire consequences' if he persisted in making the allegations he had made to date.[3] 

    [3] The consequence was that the Board might find that he was not a fit and proper person to hold a practising certificate.

  9. The Practitioner regarded the 11 April 2019 Letter to be a further act of very serious professional misconduct. 

  10. On 24 July 2019, the Board gave the Practitioner notice informing him of its proposal to cancel his practising certificate pursuant to s 56(2) of the Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA) (LP Act) (2019 Proposed Cancellation Notice). 

  11. The Practitioner regarded the 2019 Proposed Cancellation Notice to be 'legally invalid' and as having been issued in retaliation for his refusal to comply with the demand made in the 11 April 2019 Letter that he cease to make the allegations. 

  12. The Practitioner alleges that everyone involved in the issuing of the 2019 Proposed Cancellation Notice has engaged in serious professional misconduct.

  13. On 25 September 2019 the Board issued a notice pursuant to s 56(4) of the LP Act stating that it had cancelled the Practitioner's practising certificate (Cancellation Notice).

  14. The Practitioner says that the Cancellation Notice was invalid for reasons including that no one honestly held the belief which was stated to be the reason for the cancellation because no one had ever properly considered his various complaints and could not, therefore, have formed the view that they were baseless.  He also says that the Cancellation Notice was issued for improper purposes, including that the decision was taken in retaliation for his refusal to cease making the allegations.  He regards everyone involved in the issuing of the Cancellation Notice to have engaged in serious professional misconduct in doing so. 

  15. In matter [Redacted], commenced on [Redacted], the Practitioner sought review of the Board's decision to cancel his practising certificate.  On 8 May 2020, the Tribunal ordered, with the consent of the parties:

    (i)that the decision, as reflected in the Cancellation Notice, was set aside; and

    (ii)that an agreed condition was imposed on his practising certificate. 

  16. The Practitioner's view is that those orders meant that he was not prevented from continuing to make the allegations [Redacted] that he had made up until that date. 

  17. The Practitioner next applied for a practising certificate.  It was not accompanied by the requisite application fee[4] and no certificate was issued to him. On 24 October 2021, the Practitioner commenced proceedings [Redacted] for review of what he said was a decision to refuse to renew his practising certificate. By orders made on 17 March 2023, the Practitioner was granted leave to withdraw the proceeding and the proceeding was dismissed pursuant to s 46(2) of the SAT Act.

    [4] The Practitioner says this was because he had not worked for some time because of the Board's dealings with him and therefore did not have the funds to pay the fee. 

  18. The Practitioner contends that the Board's approach to that proceeding was inappropriate and improper and a breach of its obligations as a model public sector litigant and its obligations under s 30 of the SAT Act.

  19. On 30 May 2023, the Practitioner applied to renew his practising certificate but did not pay the application fee.  He subsequently requested that the fee be waived.  That request was refused on 6 July 2023. 

  20. On 31 July 2023 the Practitioner commenced proceedings for a review of what he regarded to be a decision of the Board to refuse to renew his certificate [Redacted]. 

  21. The parties agreed that that proceeding would be withdrawn, and the Board agreed that it would consider an application for a practising certificate if a fresh application was made and the application fee paid. 

  22. On 24 November 2023 the Tribunal made orders giving effect to the agreement referred to in [27].

  23. On 3 December 2023 the Practitioner applied for a practising certificate. 

  24. On 1 April the Board, by its delegate, resolved to refuse the Practitioner's application for a practising certificate.  The Practitioner was given Reasons for Decision under cover of a letter dated 17 April 2024 (2024 Reasons for Decision). 

  25. The Practitioner subsequently commenced this review proceeding. 

  26. On 5 September 2024, the Practitioner filed the Interim Application. 

  27. For various reasons mostly attributable to the Practitioner, it has taken a considerable period of time to progress the Interim Application.

The orders sought by the Practitioner in the interim application

  1. By proposed order 1 of the Interim Application the Practitioner seeks that the Board either admit or deny certain statements, allegations or assertions which are, essentially, his version of the factual background to this matter. The propositions which he wants admitted or denied run to approximately 8 pages.  The statements or propositions are set out in full in Annexure A to these reasons.  

  2. By proposed order 2, the Practitioner also seeks to have the Tribunal make an order that 'in complying with [proposed order 1], the [Board] is to act as a model public sector litigant, and also in full compliance with the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) section 30'.

  3. By proposed order 3, the Practitioner seeks an order in that '[i]f and to the extent that the written statement of the [Board] referred to in [proposed order 1]  refuses to admit a matter referred to in [it], and if and to the extent that the [Board] has a positive response to any [statement], the written statement is also to set out a concise statement of that positive response'. 

  4. By proposed order 4 the Practitioner seeks the following order:

    [I]f and to the extent that the written statement refuses to admit a matter or matters referred to in a sub-paragraph of [proposed order 1], the [Board] must simultaneously file in the Tribunal and give to the [Practitioner] an indexed and paginated bundle in chronological or other logical order of each and every document and other material in its possession or under its control which:

    a.is relevant to the issue or issues created by that refusal; and

    b.has not already been filed in this Tribunal and given to the [Practitioner] pursuant to [order 1] of the order[s] of the Tribunal made on 25 June 2024.

The Board's position

  1. The Board says that the Practitioner's interim application should be dismissed for at least the following four reasons.

  2. First, the Board says that the Practitioner has not demonstrated any reason why the exchange of written submissions which has already been ordered would not be sufficient to meet the requirements of s 32(6) of the SAT Act.

  3. Secondly, the Board says that permitting the Practitioner to proceed by what would essentially be pleadings, is inconsistent with the primary objectives of the Tribunal set out in s 9(b) of the SAT Act, especially given the 'argumentative and inflammatory contents' of the propositions or allegations he seeks to have answered.

  4. Thirdly, the Board says that the allegations and assertions he seeks to have answered are not sufficiently relevant to the matters in issue in the proceeding.  In support of that submission the Board says the subject matter of its decision to refuse the application for a practising certificate concerned the Practitioner's conduct from May 2023 onwards.  That conduct was:

    1.the contents of his correspondence and appearances in the Tribunal in proceeding [Redacted];

    2.his conduct in the course [Redacted] proceedings which were [Redacted]; and

    3.the contents of statements he made to LSCC in the course of an investigation [Redacted].

    The Board says that it is those matters that caused the Board to form the view that the Practitioner was not a fit and proper person to hold a practising certificate because:

    4.he had acted improperly by [Redacted];

    5.he repeatedly made scandalous, intemperate and discourteous allegations against other legal practitioners over many years and despite the Board warning him that it was inappropriate to do so; and

    6.he was likely to have brought the profession into disrepute by intemperate and scandalous comments made during a public hearing in [Redacted] on 19 September 2023.

  5. The Board says that while some of the Practitioner's conduct prior to May 2023 was mentioned by way of background in the 2024 Reasons for Decision, in context, that conduct was not central to, or the primary reason for, the Board's decision to refuse the Practitioner's application for a practising certificate.  The Board says, therefore, that the Practitioner's attempt to expand the scope of this review proceeding to include a detailed examination of his voluminous complaints about matters relating [Redacted]:

    1.is not sufficiently relevant to the question of what now is the correct and preferrable decision to be made with respect to his application for a practicing certificate; and

    2.is not consistent with the Tribunal's primary objectives which are set out in s 9 of the SAT Act.

  6. Fourthly, the Board says that the issue of whether the Practitioner should be entitled to a practising certificate because his allegations about the conduct of those complained of were 'substantially justified' entirely depends on what the Practitioner knew, which is within his own remit and power to demonstrate (assuming he is allowed to do so).  Accordingly, it submits that it is not relevant to matters in issue in this proceeding to interrogate the Board about those issues.

  7. The Board submits that proposed order 2 should not be made because no basis for it has been demonstrated and the Board cannot understand what would be needed to be done to comply with an order that it act as a model public sector litigant in this context.

  8. The Board submits that order 4 should not be made for the following reasons:

    1.it is an application for discovery and is not appropriate in proceedings of this kind;

    2.it is an order consequential upon proposed orders 1 and 3 being made and so if they are not made, then order 4 should not be made;

    3.there is no substance to the assertion that the Board's s 24 Bundle does not comply with the requirements of s 24 of the SAT Act; and

    4.in any event, the Practitioner is entitled to file a bundle of documents additional to those in the Board's s 24 Bundle which he considers are relevant to the matters in dispute in the proceeding and has not demonstrated why that entitlement would not be sufficient to enable the matter to be determined fairly and according to the substantial merits of the matter in accordance with s 9(a) of the SAT Act.

Resolution

  1. The Tribunal is not a court. Its jurisdiction and powers are derived from the SAT Act and from the relevant enabling Act, in this case the Legal Profession Uniform Law (WA).  It also has powers that can implied from those Acts.

  2. In many respects the procedures of the Tribunal were designed to be different from those of a court so that it could meet the objectives set out in s 9 of the SAT Act. That section provides that the main objectives in dealing with matters within the Tribunal's jurisdiction are:

    (a)to achieve the resolution of questions, complaints or disputes, and to make or review decisions, fairly and according to the substantial merits of the case;

    (b)to act as speedily and with as little formality and technicality as is practicable, and minimise the cost to parties; and

    (c)to make appropriate use of the knowledge and experience of Tribunal members.

  3. The Practitioner's application for review of the decision to refuse to issue him a practising certificate comes within the Tribunal's review jurisdiction: s 17(1) of the SAT Act and s 100 of the Legal Profession Uniform Law (WA).[5]

    [5] The Legal Profession Uniform Law (WA) is by way of s 6(2) of the Legal Practitioner Uniform Law Application Act 2022 (WA) applied as law of the state and so applied as if it were an Act. 

  4. Matters in the Tribunal's review jurisdiction must be dealt with in accordance with the SAT Act and the enabling Act, the latter of which may modify the operation of the SAT Act.[6]

    [6] SAT Act s 18.

  5. The Tribunal's review jurisdiction is dealt with in Pt 3 Div 3 of the SAT Act. Section 24 provides that where a proceeding for a review is commenced, the decision-maker is to provide the Tribunal with a statement of the reasons for the decision and other documents and material in the decision-maker's possession or under the decision‑maker's control and relevant to the Tribunal's review of the decision. In this case, the 2024 Reasons for Decision is Document 1 in the Board's Bundle of Documents filed 8 July 2024.

  6. Section 30 of the SAT Act requires that the decision-maker use its best endeavours to assist the Tribunal to make its decision on the review.

  7. A review by the Tribunal proceeds as a hearing de novo, is not confined to matters that were before the decision-maker, and may involve the consideration of material whether or not it existed at the time the decision was made.[7]  The purpose of a review is to produce the correct and preferable decision at the time of the review.[8]  Neither the reasons for decision of the decision-maker nor the grounds for review limit the Tribunal in conducting the review hearing and deciding the review.[9] 

    [7] SAT Act s 27(1).

    [8] SAT Act s 27(2).

    [9] SAT Act s 27(3).

  8. Ordinarily, there is no legal or practical onus of proof on any party in matters in the Tribunal's review jurisdiction[10] because the Tribunal's task is simply to determine the correct and preferable decision, having regard to all of the material before it at the time of the decision. 

    [10] See Nugawela and Medical Board of Australia [2023] WASAT 82, [28] (Pritchard JA).

  9. However, where a right of review arises under s 100 of the Legal Profession Uniform Law (WA), as is the case here, s 100(7) provides that where the review involves the question of whether a person is a fit and proper person to hold an Australian practising certificate -

    (a)the onus of establishing that a person is a fit and proper person to hold an Australian practising certificate is on the person asserting that fact; and

    (b)it is to be presumed in the absence of evidence to the contrary that any statement of facts in the reasons of the designated local regulatory authority for the decision concerned is a correct statement of the facts in the matter; and

    (c)a document that appears to be a document issued for the purposes of or in connection with any application, proceedings or other matter arising under the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) is admissible in the proceedings and is evidence of the matters stated in the document.

  1. The procedures of the Tribunal are set out in Pt 4 of the SAT Act. They apply in both review and original jurisdiction. Relevantly to the resolution of this interim application, s 32(7)(a) provides that the Tribunal -

    is to ensure that all relevant material is disclosed to the Tribunal to enable it to determine all of the relevant facts in issue in a proceeding.

  2. Section 34(1) empowers the Tribunal to give directions at any time in a proceeding and do whatever is necessary for the speedy and fair conduct of the proceeding. Subject to s 34(6), s 34(5) permits the Tribunal to give a direction requiring a party to produce a document or other material or to provide information to the Tribunal or another party despite any rule of law relating to privilege (other than legal professional privilege) or the public interest in relation to the production of documents.

  3. With those general matters and the issues in this particular review application in mind, I have concluded that I will not make the orders sought by the Practitioner for the following reasons. 

  4. In my view the making of proposed order 1 will not narrow the issues to be resolved in the review application.  The Board's position is clear from the Board's 2024 Reasons for Decision.  Responding to the assertions and allegations set out in proposed order 1 will not make its position any clearer or narrow the issues to be determined on the review. 

  5. The Practitioner contends, among other things, that the Board cannot have genuinely held the view that he had no basis for making the statements it relies upon in refusing to issue his practising certificate because it made no proper inquiries into their truthfulness.

  6. However, in my view that contention fails to address the nature of the review proceeding.  Because of the operation of s 100(7) of the Legal Profession Uniform Law (WA) the question of whether the Board had a reasonable basis for its view is largely, if not entirely, irrelevant.  What the Practitioner will need to do to succeed in his application for review is establish to the Tribunal's satisfaction that, at the time of the decision on the review, he is a fit and proper person to hold a practising certificate.  Of course, the case may be confined by the Board's reasons for refusing to grant the practising certificate (although that is not necessarily the case in a hearing de novo).  That will mean, for example, that he will need to establish to the Tribunal's satisfaction that at the time he made the statements relied upon by the Board for finding he was not fit and proper, he was not attempting to influence the Board [Redacted] or to [Redacted] and that there was, at that time, a basis for his claim that [Redacted] was engaging in professional misconduct. 

  7. The bases upon which he made the statements relied upon by the Board are matters within the Practitioner's own knowledge and about which he will bear the onus of proof.  

  8. In addition, the 2024 Reasons for Decision identify that the decision was taken because, at the time he made the assertions relied upon, the Practitioner had no reasonable basis for making them.  It is, therefore, irrelevant to the resolution of the review whether the assertions he made, and upon which the Board relied in refusing his application for a practising certificate, are ultimately found to be true if he had no reasonable basis for making them when they were made.  Accordingly, the Board admitting or denying the assertions will not advance the resolution of the review application. 

  9. In any event, the Board's position has been articulated in detail in the 2024 Reasons for Decision. To the extent that it may need further elaboration, the written submissions which the Board has already been ordered to file should, in my view, ensure that the Tribunal meets its obligations in s 32(1) to take measures that are reasonably practical to ensure that the parties understand the nature of the assertions made in the proceeding and the legal implications of those assertions.

  10. In those circumstances, it is my view that making an order requiring the Board to admit or deny the assertions or statements made by the Practitioner and to provide its own explanation in response to matters it denies, will not narrow the issue between the parties.  Neither will it advance the speedy resolution of the case nor assist in meeting the Tribunal's objective of ensuring that the review decision is conducted in a way that minimises costs to the parties.  On the contrary, it is my view that proceeding in the way proposed by the Practitioner is likely to detract from the real issues and increase the Board's costs and delay the resolution of this matter. 

  11. Proposed orders 2 - 4 are dependent upon the making of proposed order 1.  That is, if order 1 is not made the other orders sought by the Practitioner have no utility.  As I have decided that I will not make proposed order 1, it follows that orders 2 - 4 will also not be made.

Conclusion

  1. I will make an order dismissing the Practitioner's interim application dated 5 September 2024. 

Annexure A

a.in mid-February 2017, the Applicant began complaining to the Legal Profession Complaints Committee (LPCC), a statutory committee of the Respondent, to the effect that [Redacted], a legal practitioner, with the assistance of [Redacted], a legal practitioner who was then a [Redacted];

b.in responding to the Applicant's complaints, the public officers at the LPCC, and therefore also the LPCC and the Respondent, failed to inform the Applicant that [Redacted], was then [Redacted], with the consequence that the LPCC had an obvious conflict of interest in dealing with the [Redacted] allegations;

c.after the Applicant found out about that conflict of interest in approximately early 2018, he made further complaints to the LPCC, arising from the failure of the LPCC to inform him of its conflict of interest [Redacted];

d.the Applicant also complained vigorously to the LPCC to the effect that in his view various officers of the LPCC had failed to respond appropriately to the [Redacted] allegations, which were very serious and to the effect that [Redacted] were engaging in very serious [Redacted];

e.[Redacted];

f.[Redacted];

g.[Redacted]:

[Redacted]

h.[Redacted];

i.[Redacted]:

[Redacted]

j.by letter to the Applicant dated 11 April 2019 (April 2019 letter), [Redacted], Executive Director of the Respondent on behalf of the Respondent, with the assent of an unspecified number of unidentified members of the Respondent (assentors):

i.made a number of allegations about the Applicant, including a central allegation that the [Redacted] allegations "appear to be baseless" ('baseless' allegation); and

ii.threatened dire consequences to the Applicant unless he promptly ceased making the [Redacted] allegations and his allegations associated with the [Redacted] allegations (dire consequences threat).

k.in light of the sworn affidavit evidence referred to in pars g and i above, the 'baseless' allegation was clearly false;

l.further, the 'baseless' allegation was made dishonestly, as neither [Redacted] nor any other person for or on behalf of the Respondent:

i.had ever carried out any proper investigation into whether any of the allegations the Respondent made [Redacted] were true (and therefore no person for or on behalf of the Respondent had ever provided [Redacted] or any of the assentors with any proper evidentiary basis for making the 'baseless' allegation); and

ii.in particular, had ever asked or even invited the Applicant to provide the Respondent with any evidence, sworn or otherwise, in support of the [Redacted] allegations or any of his other allegations made to the Respondent;

m.additionally, the Respondent acted improperly towards the Applicant in making the dire consequences threat;

n.the reason the Respondent's making of the dire consequences threat was improper is that if the Applicant had complied with the dire consequences threat, he would have been:

i.desisting from continuing to make the [Redacted] allegations [Redacted] even though a [Redacted]; and

ii.[Redacted].

o.in light of the matters referred to in pars k to n above:

i.[Redacted] and each and all of the assentors engaged in very serious professional misconduct in participating in the Respondent's actions in sending the April 2019 letter, and

ii.when the Applicant subsequently made a complaint to the LPCC to that effect, the LPCC should have upheld that complaint and ensured that [Redacted] and each and all of the assentors were properly disciplined for that very serious professional misconduct;

p.by letter dated 6 June 2019 (June 2019 letter), the Applicant responded to the April 2019 letter in terms beginning with the following:

"… [the April 2019] letter is an absolute disgrace. It should never have been drafted, should never have been signed, and above all, should never have been sent to me in the form in which it was drafted."

q.the statement just quoted is clearly true;

r.elsewhere in the June 2019 letter, the Applicant, inter alia:

i.in par 10, informed the Respondent of the [Redacted];

ii.in pars 20 to 22, vigorously denied that he had no evidence to substantiate his allegations, stated that he did have evidence to substantiate the allegations, and offered to meet with "an officer of" the Respondent to discuss that evidence;

iii.in pars 23 and 24, stated:

"Your allegation that my demands appear to be baseless is clearly false.

The true position is that [Redacted] and [the assentors] are simply too lazy, incompetent and unprofessional to investigate my allegations properly, and then respond appropriately to them."

iv.in par 42, refused to comply with the demands set out in the April 2019 letter;

s.the statement the Applicant made in pars 23 and 24 of the June 2019 letter is clearly true;

t.by purported section 56(2) notice to the Applicant dated 24 July 2019 and signed and sent to the Applicant by [Redacted] (purported notice), the Respondent:

i.claimed that "the [Respondent] is of the view that there are grounds to cancel the practitioner's local practising certificate" on certain stated grounds (sic);

ii.set out the grounds in such a manner as to indicate that essential to the validity of:

1.all grounds other than the final one was an allegation that the Applicant had made the [Redacted] allegations, and certain allegations bound up with the [Redacted] allegations, "without any cogent evidence";

2.the final ground was an allegation that the Applicant had brought "the [legal] profession into disrepute by diminishing the integrity and high standing the community expects from a legal practitioner";

u.essential to the legal validity of the purported notice was that the claimed view expressed in the purposed notice (claimed view) was genuinely and honestly held by [Redacted] and each and all of those who, on behalf of the Respondent, claimed to hold the claimed view (purported notice givers);

v.the purported notice was not legally valid, because the purported notice givers did not genuinely and honestly hold the claimed view, and in particular:

i.the purported notice givers did not genuinely and honestly hold the view that the Applicant had made his allegations "without any cogent evidence", because:

1.in light of the evidence referred to in pars g and i above, any allegation by the Respondent that the Applicant had made his allegations "without any cogent evidence" would have been false;

2.no person for or on behalf of the Respondent had ever carried out any proper investigations as to whether the Applicant had made his allegations "without any cogent evidence", and therefore no person for or on behalf of the Respondent had ever provided any of the purported notice givers with any proper evidentiary basis for genuinely and honestly holding the claimed view; and

3.in particular, the Respondent:

a.had never asked or even invited the Applicant to provide the Respondent with any evidence, sworn or otherwise, in support of the [Redacted] allegations or any of his other allegations made to the Respondent; and

b.had not accepted and acted upon the offer the Applicant had made in the June 2019 letter to meet with "an officer of" the Respondent to discuss that evidence;

ii.the purported notice givers did not genuinely and honestly hold the view that the Applicant had brought "the [legal] profession into disrepute by diminishing the integrity and high standing the community expects from a legal practitioner", because:

1.any view that the Applicant had brought "the [legal] profession into disrepute by diminishing the integrity and high standing the community expects from a legal practitioner" could have been true and legally valid only if the relevant conduct of the Applicant was already known to the public as of the date of the purported notice, and there was no evidence available to the Respondent that that conduct was known to the public as of that date; and

2.no person for or on behalf of the Respondent had ever carried out any proper investigation as to whether the relevant conduct of the Applicant was known to the public, and therefore no person for or on behalf of the Respondent had ever provided any of the purported notice givers with any proper evidentiary basis for genuinely and honestly holding the claimed view that the conduct was known to the public as of that date;

w.further, the Respondent sent the purported notice to the Applicant not only purportedly under section 56(2) of the Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA), but also:

i.in improper retaliation against the Applicant for his refusal to comply with the dire consequences threat;

ii.in a further attempt improperly to force the Applicant to cease making his [Redacted] allegations and his other allegations made to the Respondent, even though by then the Applicant had expressly informed the Respondent (by the June 2019 letter) that [Redacted];

x.in light of the matters referred to in pars t to w above:

i.each and all of [Redacted] and the purported notice givers engaged in very serious professional misconduct in participating in the Respondent's issuing and sending to the Respondent of the purported notice; and

ii.when the Applicant subsequently made a complaint to the LPCC to that effect, the LPCC should have upheld that complaint and ensured that each and all of [Redacted] and the purported notice givers were properly disciplined for their very serious professional misconduct;

y.on 25 September 2019, the Respondent purported to issue a section 56(3) notice (purported cancellation notice) signed by [Redacted] and sent to the Applicant stating that it had cancelled the Applicant's practising certificate on the grounds of a stated belief that the grounds existed to cancel the practising certificate;

z.the purported cancellation notice was legally invalid, as was the purported cancellation of the Applicant's practising certificate, because:

i.the purported notice had been legally invalid;

ii.the claimed belief expressed in the purported cancellation notice (claimed cancellation view) was not genuinely and honestly held by [Redacted] and each and all of those who, on behalf of the Respondent, claimed to hold the claimed cancellation view (purported cancellation notice givers), as none of them had ever carried out a proper investigation into the false and dishonest claimed view expressed in the purported notice, and in particular had not accepted and acted upon the offer the Applicant had made in the June 2019 letter to meet with "an officer of" the Respondent to discuss his evidence;

aa.further, the Respondent sent the purported cancellation notice to the Applicant not only purportedly under section 56(3) of the Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA), but also:

i.in further improper retaliation against the Applicant for his refusal to comply with the dire consequences threat;

ii.in a further attempt improperly to force the Applicant to cease making his [Redacted] allegations and his other allegations made to the Respondent, even though by then the Applicant had expressly informed the Respondent (by the June 2019 letter) that [Redacted];

bb.in light of the matters referred to in pars y to aa above:

i.[Redacted] and each and all of the purported cancellation notice givers engaged in very serious professional misconduct in participating in the Respondent's issuing and sending to the Respondent of the purported cancellation notice; and

ii.when the Applicant subsequently made a complaint to the LPCC to that effect, the LPCC should have upheld that complaint and ensured that each and all of [Redacted] and the purported cancellation notice givers were properly disciplined for that very serious professional misconduct;

cc.by order made on [Redacted], the Tribunal, with the consent of the Applicant and the Respondent, the Tribunal ordered that the Applicant's practising certificate purportedly cancelled by the Respondent be reinstated, on the basis that, on the proper construction of the order, the Applicant was not prevented from making any of the allegations he had been making up to that date that had been the subject of the Respondent's false and dishonest allegations against the Applicant up to that date;

dd.on 31 July 2023, the Applicant commenced matter [Redacted] in the Tribunal, in which he sought review of what he alleged was a refusal by the Respondent to renew his practising certificate;

ee.the grounds of the application included ground 1, contending that the Respondent's conduct of which he sought review was erroneous in law, as follows:

"Taking into account the following matters, namely:

a. that the Application (sic) has been unemployed continuously since October 2019, because the Respondent purported in September 2019 to cancel his practising certificate;

b. that in May 2020 the Respondent implicitly conceded that, by consenting to an order of this Tribunal in matter [Redacted] setting that purported decision aside ([Redacted]), that the purported decision was not the correct and preferable decision;

c. that the Applicant is unable immediately to pay the full fee for the issue or renewal of his practising certificate, because he has been unemployed since October 2019;

d. that in March 2023 the Respondent waived the fee for issuing, and issued, him with a practising certificate;

e. that the Applicant has held a Health Care Card since 23 May 2020, and produced to the Respondent in July 2023 a copy of his current Health Care Card;

f. that in July 2023 the Applicant also produced evidence to the Respondent confirming that his financial position had not improved since March 2023;

g. that the Respondent has given no reason for exercising its direction under the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Regulations 2022 (WA), reg 77, in July 2023 in the way that it did

it is to be inferred that the Respondent's exercise in July 2023 of that discretion was and is irrational, and/or unreasonable, and also indefensible."

ff.in the end, the Respondent elected to respond to that application as follows:

i.it informed the Tribunal that it would not be raising any substantive defence to the application;

ii.it filed written submissions contesting the Tribunal's jurisdiction to determine the application;

gg.the Applicant and the Respondent then settled that application;

hh.the Respondent's response to that application was inappropriate, improper, and also a breach of the Respondent's proper function as a model public sector litigant and its statutory obligation under the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), section 30;

ii.in light of the Respondent's (appropriate) election not to raise any substantive defence to that application, the only appropriate further response by the Respondent in the Tribunal to that application would have been to admit to the Tribunal, frankly, that as the Respondent accepted that it had no substantive defence to an application contending, inter alia, that it had erred in law in making an administrative decision under a State statute, the Respondent would cooperate with the Tribunal, the Applicant and the Supreme Court in having the Supreme Court quash that decision, including, if considered appropriate, by applying for or consenting to an order of the Tribunal under the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), section 50(3), referring the matter to the Supreme Court to be dealt with as an application by the Applicant for certiorari.

I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the State Administrative Tribunal.

JD

Associate to the Hon Justice Glancy

4 JULY 2025


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