Lucisano v Westpac Banking Corporation

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Lucisano v Westpac Banking Corporation [2015] FCA 243

Citation: Lucisano v Westpac Banking Corporation [2015] FCA 243
Parties: NANCY LUCISANO v WESTPAC BANKING CORPORATION (ABN 33 007 457 141) and CAPRICORN SOCIETY LIMITED (ACN 008 347 313)
File number: VID 117 of 2015
Judge: GORDON J
Date of judgment: 17 March 2015
Legislation:

Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth)
National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth)
Privacy Act 1988 (Cth)

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth)

Cases cited: Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill (2006) 227 CLR 57
Cahill v Construction Forestry Mining and Energy Union [2006] FCA 196
National Australia Bank Ltd v Zollo (1995) 64 SASR 63 Nicholas John Holdings Pty Ltd v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [1992] 2 VR 715
Date of hearing: 17 March 2015
Place: Melbourne
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: No Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 16
Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person, with her husband Mr Frank Lucisano
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr S D Hay
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Gadens
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent did not appear

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

VID 117 of 2015

BETWEEN:

NANCY LUCISANO
Applicant

AND:

WESTPAC BANKING CORPORATION (ABN 33 007 457 141)
First Respondent

CAPRICORN SOCIETY LIMITED (ACN 008 347 313)
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

GORDON J

DATE OF ORDER:

17 MARCH 2015

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The applicant’s application for interim relief filed on 17 March 2015 be refused.

2.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs of that application.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth).


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

VID 117 of 2015

BETWEEN:

NANCY LUCISANO
Applicant

AND:

WESTPAC BANKING CORPORATION (ABN 33 007 457 141)
First Respondent

CAPRICORN SOCIETY LIMITED (ACN 008 347 313)
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

GORDON

DATE:

17 MARCH 2015

PLACE:

MELBOURNE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

1.               INTRODUCTION

  1. This is an urgent application for interim relief to restrain the Westpac Banking Corporation (ABN 33 007 457 141) (WBC) from taking any further step in taking possession of the applicant’s property identified in Certificate of Title Volume 09831, Folio 755 and known as 27 Kirkford Drive, Mooroolbark, Victoria 3138 (the Property).

  2. A warrant for possession of the Property has been issued.  The Sheriff has advised the applicant that she will be evicted from the Property at 11.00am tomorrow morning, 18 March 2015.  The applicant was served with a notice to vacate the Property on 11 March 2015. 

    2.               BACKGROUND

  3. The history of the dispute between the applicant, her husband and the respondents is long and complicated.  The nature of the dispute was described by the applicant in a draft fast track statement provided to the Court in the following terms:

    This dispute alleges invalidity of [WBC’s] mortgage documents and defaults in pre-contractual disclosure, and furthermore impugns [WBC’s] enforcement conduct between…

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Details
Case
[2015] FCA 243
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The matter of Lucisano v Westpac Banking Corporation involves an application by the applicant, Lucisano, for interim relief to restrain Westpac Banking Corporation (WBC) from executing a warrant for possession of the Property. The applicant's urgent application was filed on 17 March 2015, and the matter was heard on the same day. The applicant had been served with a notice to vacate the property on 11 March 2015 and was informed by the Sheriff that she would be evicted at 11:00am on 18 March 2015. The applicant seeks an interim injunction under various statutory provisions to prevent the execution of the warrant for possession until the hearing of her application. WBC, the first respondent, appeared for the hearing, while CSL, the second respondent, did not appear as no interim relief was sought against it.

The court had to decide whether an interim injunction should be granted based on the well-established test: whether there was a serious question to be tried and where the balance of convenience lay. The court found that the applicant failed to establish a serious question to be tried as no cause of action was identified. The applicant did not address any complaint about the warrant for possession, and the affidavits did not provide sufficient evidence to substantiate the applicant's claims. Consequently, the applicant could not demonstrate a sufficient likelihood of success to justify the preservation of the status quo pending the trial.

In light of the above, the court refused the applicant's application for interim relief. The court ordered that the applicant pay the first respondent's costs of the application. The court's decision was based on the applicant's inability to establish a serious question to be tried, and the court found that the balance of convenience lay in favour of the respondent. The court's orders were entered in accordance with Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth).

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The applicant’s application for interim relief filed on 17 March 2015 be refused.

2. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs of that application.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth).

Background

Background to the litigation

A warrant for possession of the Property has been issued. The Sheriff has advised the applicant that she will be evicted from the Property at 11.00am tomorrow morning, 18 March 2015. The applicant was served with a notice to vacate the Property on 11 March 2015. 2. BACKGROUND The history of the dispute between the applicant, her husband and the respondents is long and complicated. The nature of the dispute was described by the applicant in a draft fast track statement provided to the Court in the following terms:This dispute alleges invalidity of [WBC’s] mortgage documents and defaults in pre-contractual disclosure, and furthermore impugns [WBC’s] enforcement conduct between January 2011 and the present. [WBC] has at each turn wrongfully frustrated the applicant’s efforts to service the loan agreements. Moreover, the conduct of [WBC] and its agents have ensured that the Applicant’s debt and moreover arrears continued to escalate beyond her capacity to repay, predominately aided by enforcement costs in the area between $70,000 to $80,000. In addition, [WBC] has colluded with CSL [the second respondent], a third party with whom the Applicant has litigation on foot, actively facilitating the interests of CSL whilst compromising the position of the applicant breaching its duties in statute, in contract and common law. By an application filed this afternoon purportedly under one or more of r 7.01(1)(a) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), s 12GD of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth), s 98 of the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) and what is described as s 117 of the National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth) (NCCP Act), the applicant seeks an interim injunction to restrain WBC from taking any further step in taking possession of the Property until the hearing of the applicant’s application. The application for interim relief was brought on urgently this afternoon. WBC was given late notice of the application and appeared. CSL, the second respondent, was given notice of the application but did not appear. No interim relief was sought against it.3. CONSIDERATION The test which the Court must apply in determining whether an interim injunction should be granted is well settled: see, eg, Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill (2006) 227 CLR 57 at [65]-[72]. There are two enquiries – is there a serious question to be tried and where does the balance of convenience lay? In relation to the first enquiry, it is sufficient if the applicant demonstrates a sufficient likelihood of success to justify, in the circumstances, the preservation of the status quo pending the trial: see O’Neill at [65]. This threshold is not particularly onerous: Cahill v Construction Forestry Mining and Energy Union [2006] FCA 196 at [22]. In considering the second enquiry – the balance of convenience and the interests of justice of the case – the Court must assess and compare the prejudice and hardship likely to be suffered if an injunction is granted with that which is likely to be suffered if one is not granted. 3.1 Serious question to be tried?

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The application for interim relief was brought on urgently this afternoon. WBC was given late notice of the application and appeared. CSL, the second respondent, was given notice of the application but did not appear. No interim relief was sought against it.3. CONSIDERATION The test which the Court must apply in determining whether an interim injunction should be granted is well settled: see, eg, Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill (2006) 227 CLR 57 at [65]-[72]. There are two enquiries – is there a serious question to be tried and where does the balance of convenience lay? In relation to the first enquiry, it is sufficient if the applicant demonstrates a sufficient likelihood of success to justify, in the circumstances, the preservation of the status quo pending the trial: see O’Neill at [65]. This threshold is not particularly onerous: Cahill v Construction Forestry Mining and Energy Union [2006] FCA 196 at [22]. In considering the second enquiry – the balance of convenience and the interests of justice of the case – the Court must assess and compare the prejudice and hardship likely to be suffered if an injunction is granted with that which is likely to be suffered if one is not granted. 3.1 Serious question to be tried? Is there a serious question to be tried? Unfortunately, the applicant fails at the first hurdle. No cause of action has been identified which would raise, in my view, any question, let alone a serious question, to be tried. The legislative provisions referred to by the applicant (see [4] above) identify the power of the Court to grant an injunction in certain circumstances. Other than the reference to s 117 of the NCCP Act (which I assume should be taken to be a reference to s 177 of the NCCP Act) none of the provisions identify a cause of action. Extensive affidavit material has been filed by and on behalf of the applicant, as well as a detailed draft fast track statement. I note that draft fast track statement has not yet been filed, but I have given serious consideration to its contents. Those affidavits and the draft fast track statement record events commencing in October 2010 and include matters which do not appear to have any direct relevance to the warrant for possession. Indeed, the affidavits do not address any complaint about the warrant for possession. In the accompanying document filed with the application, the applicant stated:The urgency of this application is such that the sheriff's office has informed the applicant that it will be exercising a notice to vacate tomorrow morning at 11 AM.The reason for the short notice of this application is the notice to vacate was not served on the applicant until late Wednesday of last week, the applicant concedes that she was expecting the notice to vacate to be served on her, but did so with the expectation that she would [be] extended the usual 3 Fridays away notice to vacate, additionally we have been attempting to secure legal representation for the applicant up until as late as yesterday afternoon to no avail.…Furthermore we have well founded concerns as to our personal safety, I totally understand that this is an extremely serious contention to put forward, considering the fact that nothing is contained within the material to substantiate any such concern and would purely be hearsay, nevertheless obtaining these initial injunctions are imperative, if proceeding [on an] ex parte basis should mitigate against obtaining the order sought today we will proceed on an interparty basis and trust that the court remains sensitive to our concerns.…