FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Lucisano v Westpac Banking Corporation [2015] FCA 243
Citation: Lucisano v Westpac Banking Corporation [2015] FCA 243 Parties: NANCY LUCISANO v WESTPAC BANKING CORPORATION (ABN 33 007 457 141) and CAPRICORN SOCIETY LIMITED (ACN 008 347 313) File number: VID 117 of 2015 Judge: GORDON J Date of judgment: 17 March 2015 Legislation: Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth)
National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth)
Privacy Act 1988 (Cth)Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth)
Cases cited: Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill (2006) 227 CLR 57
Cahill v Construction Forestry Mining and Energy Union [2006] FCA 196
National Australia Bank Ltd v Zollo (1995) 64 SASR 63 Nicholas John Holdings Pty Ltd v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [1992] 2 VR 715Date of hearing: 17 March 2015 Place: Melbourne Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: No Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 16 Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person, with her husband Mr Frank Lucisano Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr S D Hay Solicitor for the First Respondent: Gadens Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent did not appear
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
VID 117 of 2015
BETWEEN: NANCY LUCISANO
ApplicantAND: WESTPAC BANKING CORPORATION (ABN 33 007 457 141)
First RespondentCAPRICORN SOCIETY LIMITED (ACN 008 347 313)
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
GORDON J
DATE OF ORDER:
17 MARCH 2015
WHERE MADE:
MELBOURNE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The applicant’s application for interim relief filed on 17 March 2015 be refused.
2.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs of that application.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth).
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
VID 117 of 2015
BETWEEN: NANCY LUCISANO
ApplicantAND: WESTPAC BANKING CORPORATION (ABN 33 007 457 141)
First RespondentCAPRICORN SOCIETY LIMITED (ACN 008 347 313)
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
GORDON
DATE:
17 MARCH 2015
PLACE:
MELBOURNE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
1. INTRODUCTION
This is an urgent application for interim relief to restrain the Westpac Banking Corporation (ABN 33 007 457 141) (WBC) from taking any further step in taking possession of the applicant’s property identified in Certificate of Title Volume 09831, Folio 755 and known as 27 Kirkford Drive, Mooroolbark, Victoria 3138 (the Property).
A warrant for possession of the Property has been issued. The Sheriff has advised the applicant that she will be evicted from the Property at 11.00am tomorrow morning, 18 March 2015. The applicant was served with a notice to vacate the Property on 11 March 2015.
2. BACKGROUND
The history of the dispute between the applicant, her husband and the respondents is long and complicated. The nature of the dispute was described by the applicant in a draft fast track statement provided to the Court in the following terms:
This dispute alleges invalidity of [WBC’s] mortgage documents and defaults in pre-contractual disclosure, and furthermore impugns [WBC’s] enforcement conduct between…
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- Case
- [2015] FCA 243
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court had to decide whether an interim injunction should be granted based on the well-established test: whether there was a serious question to be tried and where the balance of convenience lay. The court found that the applicant failed to establish a serious question to be tried as no cause of action was identified. The applicant did not address any complaint about the warrant for possession, and the affidavits did not provide sufficient evidence to substantiate the applicant's claims. Consequently, the applicant could not demonstrate a sufficient likelihood of success to justify the preservation of the status quo pending the trial.
In light of the above, the court refused the applicant's application for interim relief. The court ordered that the applicant pay the first respondent's costs of the application. The court's decision was based on the applicant's inability to establish a serious question to be tried, and the court found that the balance of convenience lay in favour of the respondent. The court's orders were entered in accordance with Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth).
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The applicant’s application for interim relief filed on 17 March 2015 be refused.
2. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs of that application.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth).
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The application for interim relief was brought on urgently this afternoon. WBC was given late notice of the application and appeared. CSL, the second respondent, was given notice of the application but did not appear. No interim relief was sought against it.3. CONSIDERATION The test which the Court must apply in determining whether an interim injunction should be granted is well settled: see, eg, Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill (2006) 227 CLR 57 at [65]-[72]. There are two enquiries – is there a serious question to be tried and where does the balance of convenience lay? In relation to the first enquiry, it is sufficient if the applicant demonstrates a sufficient likelihood of success to justify, in the circumstances, the preservation of the status quo pending the trial: see O’Neill at [65]. This threshold is not particularly onerous: Cahill v Construction Forestry Mining and Energy Union [2006] FCA 196 at [22]. In considering the second enquiry – the balance of convenience and the interests of justice of the case – the Court must assess and compare the prejudice and hardship likely to be suffered if an injunction is granted with that which is likely to be suffered if one is not granted. 3.1 Serious question to be tried? Is there a serious question to be tried? Unfortunately, the applicant fails at the first hurdle. No cause of action has been identified which would raise, in my view, any question, let alone a serious question, to be tried. The legislative provisions referred to by the applicant (see [4] above) identify the power of the Court to grant an injunction in certain circumstances. Other than the reference to s 117 of the NCCP Act (which I assume should be taken to be a reference to s 177 of the NCCP Act) none of the provisions identify a cause of action. Extensive affidavit material has been filed by and on behalf of the applicant, as well as a detailed draft fast track statement. I note that draft fast track statement has not yet been filed, but I have given serious consideration to its contents. Those affidavits and the draft fast track statement record events commencing in October 2010 and include matters which do not appear to have any direct relevance to the warrant for possession. Indeed, the affidavits do not address any complaint about the warrant for possession. In the accompanying document filed with the application, the applicant stated:The urgency of this application is such that the sheriff's office has informed the applicant that it will be exercising a notice to vacate tomorrow morning at 11 AM.The reason for the short notice of this application is the notice to vacate was not served on the applicant until late Wednesday of last week, the applicant concedes that she was expecting the notice to vacate to be served on her, but did so with the expectation that she would [be] extended the usual 3 Fridays away notice to vacate, additionally we have been attempting to secure legal representation for the applicant up until as late as yesterday afternoon to no avail.…Furthermore we have well founded concerns as to our personal safety, I totally understand that this is an extremely serious contention to put forward, considering the fact that nothing is contained within the material to substantiate any such concern and would purely be hearsay, nevertheless obtaining these initial injunctions are imperative, if proceeding [on an] ex parte basis should mitigate against obtaining the order sought today we will proceed on an interparty basis and trust that the court remains sensitive to our concerns.…