Lu v Fenson Legal Pty Ltd

Link copied
Case Copied 38 min read

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Lu v Fenson Legal Pty Ltd [2025] QCA 165

PARTIES:

YUE LU
(applicant)
v
FENSON LEGAL PTY LTD (ACN 608 884 233)
TRADING AS FENSON & CO LAWYERS
(first respondent)
BING HAN
(second respondent)

FILE NO/S:

Appeal No 12583 of 2024
DC No 1093 of 2019

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

Application for Leave s 118 DCA (Civil)

ORIGINATING COURT:

District Court at Brisbane – Unreported, 23 August 2024 (Heaton KC DCJ)

DELIVERED ON:

5 September 2025

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

12 March 2025

JUDGES:

Bond and Boddice JJA and Bradley J

ORDERS:

1.   Application for leave to appeal dismissed.

2.   The applicant pay the respondents’ costs of the application.

CATCHWORDS:

PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – COURT SUPERVISION – WANT OF PROSECUTION OR LACK OF PROGRESS – where the applicant commenced a claim in the District Court seeking damages, interest and costs against the respondents on 1 April 2019 – where no party had taken a step in the proceeding since 1 March 2021, where the primary judge in the District Court dismissed the applicant’s claim for want of prosecution and ordered her to pay the respondents’ costs of the proceeding – where the applicant seeks leave to appeal from orders made by the primary judge – where the applicant contends the primary judge ought to have allowed the applicant’s cross-application for leave to proceed – where the applicant contends sufficient weight was not given to her personal circumstances offered as the explanation for the delay in taking further steps in the proceedings – whether the applicant will be severely prejudiced if deprived of the opportunity to pursue her claim against the respondents in the proceeding – whether the primary judge erred in the exercise of their discretion

Civil Proceedings Act 2011 (Qld), s 22
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), r 5, r 280, r 367, r 389

Coal and Allied Operations Pty Ltd v Australian Industrial Relations Commission (2000) 203 CLR 194; [2000] HCA 47, considered
Cooper v Hopgood & Ganim [1999] 2 Qd R 113; [1998] QCA 114, considered
Dempsey v Dorber [1990] 1 Qd R 418, cited
GLJ v Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Diocese of Lismore (2023) 97 ALJR 857; [2023] HCA 32, considered
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; [1936] HCA 40, considered
Hoy v Honan[1997] QCA 250, cited
Jenkins v Martin[2005] QCA 64, cited
KMD v CEO (Department of Health NT) (2025) 99 ALJR 474; [2025] HCA 4, considered
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW (2018) 264 CLR 541; [2018] HCA 30, considered
Moore (a pseudonym) v The King (2024) 98 ALJR 1119; [2024] HCA 30, considered
Norbis v Norbis (1986) 161 CLR 513; [1986] HCA 17, considered
R v Templeton[2023] QCA 145, cited
Tyler v Custom Credit Corp Ltd[2000] QCA 178, considered

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Lu v Fenson Legal Pty Ltd and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2025] QCA 165
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Lu v Fenson Legal Pty Ltd, the applicant sought to appeal against a decision of the primary judge in the District Court. The applicant had initiated a claim against the respondents, seeking damages, interest, and costs. The District Court dismissed the applicant’s claim for want of prosecution, ordering the applicant to pay the respondents’ costs of the proceeding. The applicant sought leave to appeal from the primary judge’s orders, contending that the primary judge ought to have allowed the applicant’s cross-application for leave to proceed and that insufficient weight was given to her personal circumstances as the reason for the delay in taking further steps in the proceedings. The applicant argued that she would be severely prejudiced if deprived of the opportunity to pursue her claim against the respondents.

The legal issues before the court were whether the primary judge erred in the exercise of their discretion in dismissing the applicant’s claim for want of prosecution and whether the applicant would be severely prejudiced if deprived of the opportunity to pursue her claim against the respondents. The court examined the standard of review for the primary judge’s decision, noting that the High Court in GLJ determined that the “correctness standard” applied for appellate review of an order permanently staying proceedings on the ground that a trial would be necessarily unfair or so unfair or oppressive to the defendant as to constitute an abuse of process. The court also considered the decision in Moore, which applied the correctness standard to an appellate review of a decision not to exclude otherwise admissible hearsay evidence on the basis that its probative value was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice resulting from the admission.

The court dismissed the application for leave to appeal and ordered the applicant to pay the respondents’ costs of the application. The court found that the primary judge was correct to dismiss the applicant’s claim for want of prosecution and that the applicant had not demonstrated that she would be severely prejudiced if deprived of the opportunity to pursue her claim against the respondents. The court concluded that the primary judge had given sufficient consideration to the applicant’s personal circumstances and that the application for leave to appeal was without merit. The applicant was ordered to pay the respondents’ costs of the application.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Application for leave to appeal dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the respondents’ costs of the application.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The respondents noted that the prejudice they suffered because of the applicant’s delay was of the usual kind attributable to the deterioration in the quality of the evidence over the eight years since the alleged meeting and conversation, particularly to any recollections that were not otherwise recorded. They also raised the undue vexation a party suffers where litigation continues for an extended period.The standard of review of the primary judge’s decision In advance of the hearing, the Court invited the parties to make submissions about the nature of the appellate review of the primary judge’s orders, in light of the decisions in GLJ v Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Diocese of Lismore[11] (GLJ) and Moore (a pseudonym) v The King[12] (Moore).[11](2023) 97 ALJR 857.[12](2024) 308 A Crim R 592; 98 ALJR 1119; [2024] HCA 30. In GLJ, the High Court determined that the “correctness standard”, identified in Warren v Coombes,[13] applied for appellate review of an order “permanently staying proceedings on the ground that a trial will be necessarily unfair or so unfair or oppressive to the defendant as to constitute an abuse of process”.[14] The stay under review was made under the inherent jurisdiction of the New South Wales Court of Appeal.[15][13](1979) 142 CLR 531 at 552.[14](2023) 97 ALJR 857 at 862 [2] (Kiefel CJ, Gageler and Jagot JJ).[15]This had been preserved by s 6A(6)(a) of the Limitation Act 1969 (NSW). See: GLJ at [34]. The High Court members in the majority explained that in Norbis v Norbis:[16]“The line separating discretionary decisions (in which appellate review is confined to the House v The King standard) and other decisions (in which the ‘correctness standard’ applies) was identified as that between questions lending ‘themselves to differences of opinion which, within a given range, are legitimate and reasonable answers to the questions’ in which event ‘it would be wrong to allow a court of appeal to set aside a judgment at first instance merely because there exists just such a difference of opinion between the judges on appeal and the judge at first instance’, and questions to which there is but one legally permissible answer, even if that answer involves a value judgment.”[17][16](1986) 161 CLR 513 at 518 (Brennan J).[17](2023) 97 ALJR 857 at 866 [16] (footnotes omitted). The appeal in Norbis v Norbis was from a decision about “altering the interests of parties to a marriage”, and so it is an example of an appeal from a discretionary decision that called for “value judgments in respect of which there is room for reasonable differences of opinion, no particular opinion being uniquely right”. In Moore, the High Court determined that the correctness standard applied to an appellate review of a decision not to exclude otherwise admissible hearsay evidence in a criminal proceeding on the basis that its probative value was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice resulting from the admission.[18][18]Under s 137 of the Evidence Act 2008 (Vic).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established