SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Lu v Fenson Legal Pty Ltd [2025] QCA 165
PARTIES:
YUE LU
(applicant)
v
FENSON LEGAL PTY LTD (ACN 608 884 233)
TRADING AS FENSON & CO LAWYERS
(first respondent)
BING HAN
(second respondent)FILE NO/S:
Appeal No 12583 of 2024
DC No 1093 of 2019DIVISION:
Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING:
Application for Leave s 118 DCA (Civil)
ORIGINATING COURT:
District Court at Brisbane – Unreported, 23 August 2024 (Heaton KC DCJ)
DELIVERED ON:
5 September 2025
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
12 March 2025
JUDGES:
Bond and Boddice JJA and Bradley J
ORDERS:
1. Application for leave to appeal dismissed.
2. The applicant pay the respondents’ costs of the application.
CATCHWORDS:
PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – COURT SUPERVISION – WANT OF PROSECUTION OR LACK OF PROGRESS – where the applicant commenced a claim in the District Court seeking damages, interest and costs against the respondents on 1 April 2019 – where no party had taken a step in the proceeding since 1 March 2021, where the primary judge in the District Court dismissed the applicant’s claim for want of prosecution and ordered her to pay the respondents’ costs of the proceeding – where the applicant seeks leave to appeal from orders made by the primary judge – where the applicant contends the primary judge ought to have allowed the applicant’s cross-application for leave to proceed – where the applicant contends sufficient weight was not given to her personal circumstances offered as the explanation for the delay in taking further steps in the proceedings – whether the applicant will be severely prejudiced if deprived of the opportunity to pursue her claim against the respondents in the proceeding – whether the primary judge erred in the exercise of their discretion
Civil Proceedings Act 2011 (Qld), s 22
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), r 5, r 280, r 367, r 389Coal and Allied Operations Pty Ltd v Australian Industrial Relations Commission (2000) 203 CLR 194; [2000] HCA 47, considered
Cooper v Hopgood & Ganim [1999] 2 Qd R 113; [1998] QCA 114, considered
Dempsey v Dorber [1990] 1 Qd R 418, cited
GLJ v Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Diocese of Lismore (2023) 97 ALJR 857; [2023] HCA 32, considered
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; [1936] HCA 40, considered
Hoy v Honan[1997] QCA 250, cited
Jenkins v Martin[2005] QCA 64, cited
KMD v CEO (Department of Health NT) (2025) 99 ALJR 474; [2025] HCA 4, considered
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW (2018) 264 CLR 541; [2018] HCA 30, considered
Moore (a pseudonym) v The King (2024) 98 ALJR 1119; [2024] HCA 30, considered
Norbis v Norbis (1986) 161 CLR 513; [1986] HCA 17, considered
R v Templeton[2023] QCA 145, cited
Tyler v Custom Credit Corp Ltd[2000] QCA 178, considered
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- Case
- [2025] QCA 165
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were whether the primary judge erred in the exercise of their discretion in dismissing the applicant’s claim for want of prosecution and whether the applicant would be severely prejudiced if deprived of the opportunity to pursue her claim against the respondents. The court examined the standard of review for the primary judge’s decision, noting that the High Court in GLJ determined that the “correctness standard” applied for appellate review of an order permanently staying proceedings on the ground that a trial would be necessarily unfair or so unfair or oppressive to the defendant as to constitute an abuse of process. The court also considered the decision in Moore, which applied the correctness standard to an appellate review of a decision not to exclude otherwise admissible hearsay evidence on the basis that its probative value was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice resulting from the admission.
The court dismissed the application for leave to appeal and ordered the applicant to pay the respondents’ costs of the application. The court found that the primary judge was correct to dismiss the applicant’s claim for want of prosecution and that the applicant had not demonstrated that she would be severely prejudiced if deprived of the opportunity to pursue her claim against the respondents. The court concluded that the primary judge had given sufficient consideration to the applicant’s personal circumstances and that the application for leave to appeal was without merit. The applicant was ordered to pay the respondents’ costs of the application.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Application for leave to appeal dismissed.
2. The applicant pay the respondents’ costs of the application.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi